The British Foreign Office and the creation of the United Nations Organization, 1941-1945

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Abstract

This thesis examines Foreign Office planning for a post-war international organisation during the Second World War. It begins with Britain's search for war aims in 1939 and 1940 and ends with the signing of the United Nations Charter in June 1945. Three officials—namely Alexander Cadogan, Gladwyn Jebb and Charles Webster—are identified as the key figures behind the planning and negotiating stages. The thesis shines light on the indispensable contribution of these men as well as the Foreign Office in the creation of the United Nations Organization, arguing that the British role in this process has not been given its due weight in existing accounts. The thesis is best understood as a study of statecraft, based on archival research and using traditional methods of diplomatic history. It drills down further into the practice of 'planning', which became more important in Western foreign policy in this era, and it aims to draw out what contemporaries called a 'grand strategy for peace'. More specifically, it describes a distinct method and approach of those British diplomats who were attempting to construct and craft the mechanics of the post-war international order (of which Cadogan, Jebb and Webster were the best exemplars). This approach relied heavily on a historical sensibility as it sought to square the competing notions of national interest, power politics and internationalism. While it does not lend itself to neat categorisation, their thinking and approach is described in this thesis as a form of 'realist-internationalism'. This particular approach grew out of the experience of the failure of the League of Nations and reflected a 'great power' view of international relations rooted in a specific reading of nineteenth-century diplomatic history. It was characterised by an attempt to place the British national interest, including the preservation of the Empire, into an internationalist frame.

Table of Contents

Introduction

On a mild January afternoon in London in 1946, the first session of the United Nations General Assembly was called to order. Rising to speak in Westminster Central Hall was Dr Zuleta Angel of Colombia, the chairman of the first assembly. To his immediate right on stage was Gladwyn Jebb, the Acting Secretary General of the United Nations.[1] Below them were representatives from the 51 countries who had signed the United Nations Charter just over six months earlier, on 26 June 1945. In the audience was Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office and Britain's soon-to-be first Permanent Representative to the United Nations, as well as Charles Kingsley Webster, on leave from his professorship at the London School of Economics and now advisor to the Minister of State at the Foreign Office.[2] For Jebb, Cadogan and Webster, the start of the proceedings marked the end of a planning process that had consumed almost all of their energy during the war.

Only eighteen months before the first General Assembly, these three Foreign Office officials had sat down with their American, Russian and later, Chinese counterparts to negotiate the creation of an international organisation in the post-war period. There, the British plans which had been designed—mostly by Jebb, Webster and members of the Foreign Office's Economic and Reconstruction Department—over the previous two years were presented by Cadogan, then the head of the British delegation to the conference. That meeting, which took place on the outskirts of Washington, D.C., between August and October 1944, marked the substantive origins of what would become the United Nations Organization. Even then, the story was far from complete. Deep-seated differences emerged and were remedied at the Yalta

[1] Gladwyn Jebb: Private Secretary to Permanent Under-Secretary of State, 1937-40; Ministry of Economic Warfare, 1940-42; Head of the Economic and Reconstruction Department, 1942-45. The thesis will only mention the wartime positions of officials in the Foreign Office.

[2] Alexander Cadogan: Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, 1938-46. Charles Kingsley Webster: Stevenson Professor of International History at the London School of Economics, 1932–53; Foreign Research and Press Service, 1939-41, 1942-43; Director, British Library of Information in New York, 1941-42; Foreign Office Research Department, 1943-44; Economic and Reconstruction Department, 1944-45

Conference in February 1945, with the final details agreed upon at the San Francisco Conference later that summer. It had been an arduous process, yet one of great and lasting importance. Now each man, whether seated on stage or in the audience, could look upon the inaugural gathering in Westminster's Central Hall with some relief and a sense of pride in knowing they had served invaluable roles in the making of a new international system to improve peaceful cooperation among nations. Understanding as they did the fate of the League of Nations and thinking back to previous precedents such as the Congress system established in 1815, they were also hopeful that the institution they had designed would prove more enduring.

Despite their contributions, surprisingly little has been written about the work of these Foreign Office officials and their colleagues during the Second World War. The bulk of the historical accounts of the creation of the United Nations Organization focuses instead on the role of the United States. Moreover, when historians have addressed the British influence, much of the attention has been on the roles of Winston Churchill and his Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, as opposed to the diplomats most responsible for the planning, drafting and negotiating. In this story, insofar as it is known, the less glamorous but essential work of bureaucratic statecraft—including the half-formed memorandum that never made it to the conference table, the wasted efforts and wrong turns—is often submerged. The statecraft of planning and peacebuilding was both a worthwhile endeavour and sometimes a murky and byzantine process in which ideas, interests and personalities were all intermixed—within and between the nation states involved.

This thesis is the first sustained and dedicated treatment of the planning for a post-war international organisation that was undertaken by officials in the British Foreign Office during the Second World War. In terms of its chronological scope, the study begins with the search for war aims between 1939 and 1940—the launch pad of post-war planning efforts—and ends

with the signing of the United Nations Charter in June 1945. Over the course of nearly four years, as officials in the Foreign Office sought to ensure that the British national interest was secured and advanced in the post-war international system, planning for and negotiating an international organisation became an increasingly important foreign policy priority. Although their importance waxed and waned at different stages of this process, the thesis pivots around the roles of three officials in particular—Alexander Cadogan, Gladwyn Jebb and Charles Webster—arguing that they played the most important roles on the British side. While the thesis shines light on the indispensable contribution of Britain and the Foreign Office in the creation of the United Nations Organization, it serves, more importantly, as a study of statecraft and an insight into the way in which diplomats attempted to construct and craft the mechanics and structures of the post-war international order.

Using the language of one contemporary diplomat, what emerges is nothing less than a British 'grand strategy for peace'. This was an approach that was born in the worst period of the war—between 1941 and 1942—but which consciously sought to look beyond the military struggle and which, after coming to fruition between 1945 and 1946, created structures that served their intended purpose for many years thereafter. More specifically, in seeking to harness international enthusiasm for a new effort to order the world to serve specific British goals, the officials identified in the period are described as practicing a form of what the thesis describes as 'realist-internationalism'. This was a broad-based but identifiable way of thinking about the international order that rested on a number of basic assumptions: that the national interest was best served by the establishment of an enforceable international peace; that historical study rather than well-meaning utopianism provided the best guide to international relations; that larger powers would be the makers and enforcers of peace but that room must be found to incorporate small states in the international community; and that great power politics could not be wished away but that its negative effects could be mitigated by creating

international structures that reflected power disparities. The overarching goal was that Britain and its Empire would not have its security threatened in such an existential way ever again. For that, it was deemed vital that the new international organisation would not succumb to the same fate as the League of Nations had done just a decade before.

A Review of the Relevant Literature

Previous scholarship dealing with the history of the United Nations is surprisingly light on the diplomatic origins of the organisation during the Second World War. The majority of these works on the early United Nations tend to focus on the international crises with which it had to deal in its infancy—among them the Greek Civil War, the Indonesian Revolution, and the Arab-Israeli War—while the creation of the organisation itself is given less attention.[3] Some historians, such as Dan Plesch, have explored the wartime origins of the organisation, highlighting the ways in which the United States, in particular, worked to cultivate the United Nations alliance, and how this grouping worked to deliver the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), the Bretton Woods system and the United Nations Charter.[4]

To be sure, there were important economic, financial and relief structures established during this period and which were themselves ordering systems. The most famous of these, and ones which were linked to the discussion around a post-war organisation, were the creation of the UNRRA in 1943 and agreements reached at the United Nations Monetary and Financial

[3] Evan Luard, *A History of the United Nations, Volume I: The Years of Western Domination, 1945-1955* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982); David L. Bosco, *Five to Rule Them All: The UN Security Council and the Making of the Modern World* (London: Oxford University Press, 2009); Paul Kennedy, *Parliament of Man: The Past, Present and Future of the United Nations* (London: Penguin Books, 2007)

[4] Dan Plesch, *America, Hitler and the UN: How the Allies Won World War II and Forged a Peace* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011), p. 165. See also Plesch, 'How the United Nations Beat Hitler and Prepared the Peace', *Global Society* 22:1 (2008): 137-158; Plesch and Thomas G. Weiss, 'Introduction: Past as prelude, multilateralism as a tactic and strategy', in Plesch and Thomas G. Weiss (ed.), *Wartime Origins and the Future United Nations (*New York: Routledge, 2015), pp. 1-14

Conference in July 1944.[5] Important work has been published on these negotiations in recent years, giving rise to a body of work which more accurately describes the competing visions, the complex structures as well as the inherent limitations of the international order created in the final years of the war. The thesis engages with this literature to a certain extent, but its focus remains on the development of the larger post-war political and security structures deemed to be the foundation-stone of what was then seen as a workable international order.

Within the scholarship that has examined the post-war planning which helped to create the United Nations in June 1945, there are two key dimensions which are given considerably less attention: the role of the United Kingdom and the role of those diplomats engaged in what might be called technical statecraft. Concerning the former, when historians have taken up the subject of the creation of the organisation, their examinations have been overwhelmingly weighted towards the role of the United States. Notable works by Douglas Brinkley, Townsend Hoopes, Ruth Russell, and Stephen Schlesinger have portrayed a process shaped and dominated by President Roosevelt and other political advocates of the organisation.[6] Though

[5] See Charles Wesley Sharpe, 'The Origins of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, 1939-1943' (Dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 2012). On the Bretton Woods Conference of July 1944 and the financial systems which it created, see Armand van Dormael, *Bretton Woods: Birth of a Monetary System* (London: Macmillan Press, 1978); Benn Steil, *The Battle of Bretton Woods: John Maynard Keynes, Harry Dexter White, and the Making of a New World Order* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2013); Ed Conway, *The Summit: The Biggest Battle of the Second World War—Fought Behind Closed Doors* (London: Little, Brown, 2014); Giles Scott-Smith and J. Simon Rofe (ed.), *Global Perspectives on the Bretton Woods Conference and the Post-war World Order* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2017); Eric Helleiner, *Forgotten Foundations of Bretton Woods: International Development and the Making of the Postwar Order* (New York: Cornell University Press, 2016). For a recently published volume on the development of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, see Francine McKenzie, *GATT and Global Order in the Post-war Era* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020). For a work examining the United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture, hosted in Hot Springs, Virginia, from May to June 1943, see Craig Alan Wilson, 'Rehearsal for a United Nations: The Hot Springs Conference', *Diplomatic History* 4:3 (1980): 263-281

[6] Townsend Hoopes and Douglas Brinkley, *FDR and the Creation of the U.N.* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997); Ruth B. Russell, *A History of the United Nations Charter: The Role of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1958); Stephen C. Schlesinger, *Act of Creation: The Founding of the United Nations* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2003) and 'FDR's Five Policemen: Creating the United Nations', *World Policy Journal* 11:3 (1994): 88-93. See also Robert Divine, *Second Chance: The Triumph of Internationalism in America During World War II* (New York: Atheneum, 1967); Michael Howard, 'The United Nations: From War Fighting to Peace Planning', in Ernest R. May and Angeliki E. Laiou (ed.), *The Dumbarton Oaks Conversations and the United Nations, 1944-1994* (Washington: Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection, 1998), pp. 1-7; Lawrence Weiler and Anne Patricia Simons, *The United States and the United Nations: The Search for International Peace and Security* (New York: Manhattan Publishing, 1967); Georg Schild, *Bretton Woods and Dumbarton Oaks: American Economic and Political Postwar Planning in the Summer of 1944*

the American contribution to the United Nations may have been the most important, this thesis serves as somewhat of a corrective to the scholarship which portrays the contribution of other nations as negligible.

Other scholars, such as Thomas Campbell, Christopher O'Sullivan and Stephen Wertheim, have also examined the role of the United States; but importantly, their work has focused more on the contribution of diplomatic professionals—particularly officials working in the State Department—and how they helped to shape the Roosevelt administration's post-war policy.[7] This thesis adopts certain characteristics of Wertheim's approach, in particular.[8] First, it is similarly interested in the 'below the radar' work of the planners who drafted and then negotiated the structures of the international organisation.[9] Second, he stresses the role of other motives than liberal internationalism in their efforts. In other respects, however, the argument advanced in this thesis counters that of Wertheim. His narrow focus on the United States reduces the agency of those other actors, namely the British Foreign Office, to a state of near passivity in American designs. Next, in seeking to question the liberal internationalist credentials of the founders of the United Nations—and stressing their neo-imperial aims—Wertheim over-corrects the picture, creating an imbalanced view of what were complex liberal and realist motivations operating alongside one another.

(London: Macmillan Press, 1995); Dorothy Robins, *Experiment in Democracy: The Story of US Citizen Organizations in Forging the Charter of the United Nations* (New York: Parkside Press, 1971); David Kay (ed.), *The United Nations Political System* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1967)

[7] Texts focusing on the contribution of American diplomats include: Thomas Campbell, *Masquerade Peace: America's UN Policy, 1944-45* (Tallahassee: Florida State University Press, 1973); Christopher D. O'Sullivan, *Sumner Welles, Postwar Planning, and the Quest for a New World Order, 1937-1943* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008); Benjamin Welles, *Sumner Welles: FDR's Global* Strategist (New York: St Martin's Press, 1997). Others include: J. Simon Rofe, 'Pre-war Post-war Planning: The Phoney War, the Roosevelt Administration, and the Case of the Advisory Committee on Problems of Foreign Relations', *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 23 (2012): 254-279.

[8] Stephen Wertheim, 'Instrumental Internationalism: The American Origins of the United Nations, 1940-3', *Journal of Contemporary History* 54:2 (2019): 265-83.

[9] Erik Goldstein has referred to this as the 'marzipan' level. Quoted in J. Simon Rofe, 'Prewar and wartime postwar planning: antecedents to the UN moment in San Francisco, 1945', in Dan Plesch and Thomas G. Weiss (ed.), *Wartime Origins and the Future United Nations* (New York: Routledge, 2015), p. 17.

Other scholars have set out to examine the complex interplay of competing forces which influenced the founding of the United Nations Organization. Glenda Sluga has written that the Second World War

> was the apogee of twentieth-century internationalism, when 'international government' renamed as 'world government' was a rhetorical commonplace. The significance of this apogee lay not in its utopianism but in the fine gradations of political realism inspired by the vogue for being internationally minded.[10]

Sluga's work is an important piece of intellectual history, yet when she examines the creation of the organisation itself, the diplomatic element is often undervalued.[11] Similarly, Mark Mazower has sought to provide an 'ideological prehistory' of the United Nations in his work *No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations*.[12] Here, Mazower put forward several arguments which relate to this thesis. First, he noted that the idea of the United States as the sole creator of the United Nations was 'something of an optical illusion'.[13] Next, British intellectuals in the early twentieth century—and in particular, Jan Smuts and Alfred Zimmern—played crucial, if often overlooked, roles in the creation of the League of Nations and the United Nations.[14] Finally, their programme—and that of policymakers in Whitehall more broadly—towards both the League and the United Nations was one of 'imperial internationalism', in that it sought to preserve the British Empire in a 'democratic imperial order'.[15]

Three years later, in a follow up work entitled *Governing the World*, Mazower broadened the scope of his study to include a discussion of internationalism from the early

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[10] Glenda Sluga, *Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), pp. 79-80

[11] In discussing the San Francisco Conference, for example, most of Sluga's attention is focused on the role of the activists present, such as W.E.B. Du Bois, who, while important if often overlooked contributors to discussions about the Charter, did not account for its creation in June 1945. Sluga, *Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism*, pp. 81, 89; Mazower, *No Enchanted Palace*, pp. 62-63

[12] Mazower, *No Enchanted Palace*, p. 18

[13] Ibid, p. 16

[14] He writes of his intention to challenge the idea that 'the United Nations rose-like Aphrodite-from the Second World War, pure and uncontaminated by any significant association with that prewar failure, the League of Nations'. Mazower, *No Enchanted Palace*, p. 14. For his studies of Smuts and Zimmern, see ibid, pp. 28-103.

[15] Ibid, pp. 17-18, 21, 86, 192-194

nineteenth century to the present day. Though he abandoned some of his earlier claims about 'imperial internationalism' being one of the primary influences on the British side, Mazower, in a chapter dedicated to the creation of the United Nations, described the way in which internationalist ideas were both the product of earlier conceptions and ones which 'meshed with power politics in unpredictable ways'.

> Large international organizations such as the League of Nations and the UN did not grow up gradually. On the contrary, sponsored by Great Powers, their births were abrupt, and war was their midwife…Hardwired, therefore, into the new international bodies from the start was an inevitable tension between the narrower national interests that the Great Powers sought to promote through them and the universal ideals and the rhetoric that emanated from them.[16]

But while Mazower's work succeeds in highlighting the complex relationship between internationalism and national interest which defined much of the thinking about the post-war world, the way in which this played out in real time between 1939 and 1945 is discussed too briefly and, like his earlier work, does not focus on the all-important point of delivery—namely, the diplomats responsible for the planning and negotiation.[17] Moreover, on the topic of the creation of the United Nations, in particular, Mazower emphasises the role of the United States, while scarcely giving any credit to other powers, namely the United Kingdom. He writes, for example, that the rebirth of the League of Nations in the form of the United Nations was 'thanks to the reengineering of the League that [Leo] Pasvolsky and his colleagues had carried out during the war' and that American leaders 'had done more than any other power to set [the UN] up'.[18]

Mazower's work thus continues a trend within the historical scholarship which gives considerably less attention to the role of other countries—especially the United Kingdom and

[16] Mazower, *Governing the World*, p. xiii
[17] Ibid, pp. 191-213; *No Enchanted Palace*, p. 18
[18] Leo Pasvolsky was Special Assistant to the US Secretary of State and Chairman of the Interdepartmental Group to Consider Post-War Economic Problems and Policies in the State Department. Mazower, *Governing the World*, pp. 212-13. More unfortunate are Mazower's assertions that British diplomats only began 'focusing seriously' on plans for a post-war organisation in early 1944, and that the Economic and Social Council was entirely the work of the United States. See ibid, p. 198, 206.

the Soviet Union—in the creation of the United Nations.[19] An exception to this tendency is Robert Hilderbrand's exhaustive account of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, which examined the negotiations between the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and China in the autumn of 1944.[20] While it remains the seminal contribution to the history of this particular conference, Hilderbrand's volume does not examine in detail the planning activities of the Foreign Office between 1942 and 1944, nor does it explore the work leading up to and including the Yalta and San Francisco Conferences. Outside of Hilderbrand's study, the role of the Soviet Union in the creation of the organisation has been given very little attention by English-speaking scholars. Notable exceptions include Alexander Dallin's book *The Soviet Union and the United Nations* and Geoffrey Roberts's article 'A League of Their Own'. Both serve as useful accounts of Soviet notions of internationalism and how this played into their diplomacy during the Second World War.[21]

As for the scholarship relating to the role of the United Kingdom, these works have usually focused on individual statesmen (or, to a lesser extent, diplomats), as opposed to a more comprehensive treatment of the planning process which took place in the Foreign Office.[22] For

[19] See for example, Adam Chapnick, *The Middle Power Project: Canada and the Founding of the United Nations* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2005)

[20] Robert C. Hilderbrand, *Dumbarton Oaks: The Origins of the United Nations and the Search for Postwar Security* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1990)

[21] Alexander Dallin, *The Soviet Union and the United Nations*: *An Inquiry into Soviet Motives and Objectives* (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1962); Geoffrey Roberts, 'A League of Their Own: The Soviet Origins of the United Nations', *Journal of Contemporary History, Special Section: Dumbarton Oaks in Historical Perspective* 54:2 (2019): 303-327. See also Charles Prince, 'The Soviet Union and International Organizations', *American Journal of International Law* 36:3 (1942); John N. Hazard, 'The Soviet Union and the United Nations', *The Yale Law Journal* 55 (1946): 1016-1035; David J. Dolff, 'The Creation of the United Nations Organization as a Factor in Soviet Foreign Policy, 1943-46' (Dissertation, University of Alberta Libraries, 2010). For an account which explores the role of France, see Andrew Williams, 'France and the Origins of the United Nations, 1944-1945: 'Si La France ne compte plus, qu'on nous le dise', *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 28:2 (2017): 215-234; A.W. Deporte, *De Gaulle's Foreign Policy, 1944-1946* (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 102-125

[22] Examples include: Adam Roberts, 'Britain and the Creation of the United Nations', in Roger Louis (ed.), *Still More Adventures with Britannia: Personalities, Politics and Culture in Britain* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2003), pp. 229-47; Geoffrey L. Goodwin, *Britain and the United Nations* (London: Oxford University Press, 1957); Victor Rothwell, *War Aims in the Second World War: The War Aims of the Major Belligerents, 1939-45* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005), pp. 64-85; Elisabeth Barker, *Churchill and Eden at War* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1978), pp. 204-217; Charles Webster, 'The Making of the Charter of the United Nations', *History* 32:115 (1947): 16-38; William McNeill, *America, Britain and Russia: Their Cooperation and Conflict, 1941-1946* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1953). Included among the many titles concerning British foreign policy at the Cabinet level are: Llewellyn Woodward, *British Foreign Policy in the Second World War*, Volume

example, E.J. Hughes has examined Churchill's efforts to advance his own post-war vision, noting correctly that the Prime Minister was 'one of the main obstacles to adequate British planning and to the actual establishment of the United Nations Organisation'.[23] Notably, Hughes is critical of Churchill's views, calling them 'seriously flawed' and representing 'sporadic bursts of imaginative energy' rather than anything resembling a coordinated approach. Had these ideas been accepted, Hughes argues, they 'would have been fatal to the establishment of the United Nations'.[24] Some of the evidence uncovered in the course of this research project supports this view. Other historians, such as Raymond Douglas, have examined the post-war thinking of prominent Labour Party intellectuals and politicians in the 1930s and 1940s. In doing so, Douglas has offered one of the more extended examinations of the Foreign Office's first major planning document in the autumn of 1942, as well as the Cabinet debate which this memorandum fuelled.[25] While this thesis builds on one of the subjects of Douglas's scholarship to some extent, it also counters one of his central arguments—namely, that the historian Arnold Toynbee 'laid down the foundations of Britain's United Nations policy'.[26] Furthermore, Douglas's work, despite its focus on some of the central figures within the Labour Party, does not examine in any rigorous way the detailed planning

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II (London: H.M. Stationary Office, 1971) and op. cit. Volume V (London: H.M. Stationary Office, 1976); Christopher Hill, *Cabinet Decisions on Foreign Policy, October 1938 – June 1941* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); David Reynolds, *The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance, 1937-41*: *A Study in Competitive Cooperation* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1981); David Reynolds, Warren F. Kimball and A.O. Chubarian (ed.), *Allies at War: The Soviet, American, and British Experience, 1939-1945* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1994); Herbert Feis*, Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin: The War They Waged and the Peace They Sought* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1957); Keith Sainsbury, *Churchill and Roosevelt at War: The War They Fought and the Peace They Hoped to Make* (New York: New York University Press, 1994); Terry Anderson, *The United States, Great Britain and the Cold War, 1944-47* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981); Anthony Polonsky (ed.), *The Great Powers and the Policy Question, 1941-45* (London: London School of Economics and Political Science, 1976)

[23] E.J. Hughes, 'Winston Churchill and the Formation of the United Nations Organisation'*, Journal of Contemporary History* 9:4 (1974), p. 194

[24] Ibid, p. 194

[25] Raymond Douglas, *The Labour Party, Nationalism and Internationalism, 1939-1951* (London: Routledge, 2004), pp. 97-135

[26] He writes that, 'Foreign Office mandarins like Jebb did not devise their own framework for world government and press it upon reluctant Labour leaders, but rather appropriated, without attribution, ideas which those same Labour ministers had solicited from the F[oreign] R[research and] P[ress] S[ervice] and for whose serious consideration by the government they were largely responsible.' Douglas, *Labour Party*, pp. 106-107, 112, 118-19

and complex negotiation undertaken by members of the Foreign Office between 1942 and 1945.

The works that are of most relevance to the thesis exist in a small and rather niche subset of scholarship that examines the work of individual diplomats—rather than the Foreign Office as a whole—in this period. The three diplomats identified as the key players in this study have all been the subject of individual studies. These works provide invaluable material for this thesis, although they address the specific story of the creation of the United Nations to varying degrees.[27] Sean Greenwood's biography of Gladwyn Jebb titled *Titan at the Foreign Office* has one chapter dedicated to Jebb's work in creating the post-war international organisation, titled 'The Brain Behind the United Nations'. The work of Jebb and Webster forms the backbone of Greenwood's writing in this chapter, which argues that, 'at the core [of British planning] remained the working papers and structures which were the product of Webster's and Gladwyn's teamwork.'[28] In explaining their approach to the post-war world, Greenwood writes that Jebb saw the organisation as 'no more than a screen behind which the essential authority of the Great Powers would be concealed', while Webster 'represented more the idealist tradition of Woodrow Wilson'.[29] These general characterisations are true to a certain extent, though they tend to mask the nuance inherent in both Jebb's and Webster's thinking. As will be argued, Jebb's more realist thinking also incorporated internationalist elements, while Webster's idealism was predicated upon certain fundamental notions about the balance of power. Though Greenwood's book is an important contribution to the scholarship on the British role in the creation of the United Nations and is thus a foundational text upon

[27] T.G. Otte and Keith Neilson, in their biographical sketches of Permanent Under-Secretaries, have provided a useful account of Alexander Cadogan's background and professional experience; and David Dilks' edited collection of Cadogan's wartime diaries is filled with essential context on the man, his work and his influence. See Keith Neilson and T.G. Otte, *The Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 1854-1946* (London: Routledge, 2006); David Dilks (ed.), *The Diaries of Alexander Cadogan, 1938-1945* (London: Faber and Faber, 2010)

[28] Sean Greenwood, *Titan at the Foreign Office: Gladwyn Jebb and the Shaping of the Modern* World (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008), p. 200

[29] Ibid, p. 198

which this thesis rests, his account relies on a limited selection of Foreign Office archives, the majority of which were Jebb's professional papers.[30] It is the object of this thesis to undertake a wider, more comprehensive view of the Foreign Office planning for a post-war international organisation.

A second foundational text is P.A. Reynolds and E.J. Hughes's examination of Charles Webster's contribution to the United Nations Charter, as described in their book entitled *The Historian as Diplomat*. Organised around the diary entries of Webster from 1939 to 1945, Reynolds and Hughes set out to describe both Webster's contribution to the planning during the war, as well as the 'processes through which British policy towards the creation of a new world organization after the Second World War came to be formulated'.[31] This thesis agrees with a number of points put forward by Reynolds and Hughes in their analysis. As they rightly point out, Jebb, Webster and Cadogan weighed and prioritised the interrelated objectives of preserving British influence, maintaining peace in Europe and in the international system, and constructing an international organisation. Importantly, Reynolds and Hughes suggest that Webster tended to prioritise the international security and international organisation elements, whereas Jebb was more concerned with maintaining British influence.[32] They also mention the fact that the development of the post-war world organisation was the result of 'an interplay among individuals and groups…with varying interests and objectives', as well as ideas which grew up in an intellectual and institutional context, as opposed to, as Reynolds and Hughes put it, these ideas 'springing fully-fledged from the mind of Webster like Aphrodite from the sea-foam'.[33] These stemmed from a recognition, they note, that planning for the post-war order 'involved looking behind pressing day-to-day problems to the imagining of future global

[30] Greenwood, *Titan at the Foreign Office*, p. 431
[31] P.A. Reynolds and E.J. Hughes, *The Historian as Diplomat: Charles Kingsley Webster and the United Nations, 1939-1946* (London: Martin Robertson, 1976), pp. 107-8
[32] Ibid, pp. 85-6
[33] Ibid, p. 89

constellations…[requiring] an insight into the deep underlying trends and tendencies in the onward march of world history'.[34]

At the same time, this thesis also aims to revise certain points—some minor, others fundamental—which stem from the fact that, as they themselves admit, the study was 'drawn very largely from a single source'.[35] Among them is an argument advanced that Alexander Cadogan was not involved with the planning process until April 1944, when, in fact, he was involved in varying degrees throughout. Elsewhere, Reynolds and Hughes paint a picture of Jebb and Webster's plans serving as the opposition to Churchill's regionalism.[36] While this is largely correct, their account ignores the extent to which regional designs were initially a part of the Economic and Reconstruction Department's plans between 1942 and 1943. Perhaps most importantly, Reynolds and Hughes, at times, overstate the importance of Webster in the planning process. They write that 'the ideas that had been developed largely by Webster out of his historical knowledge and insight…eventually formed the basis for the instructions to the group of British negotiators at Dumbarton Oaks.' This assertion is later followed up by a seemingly contradictory statement, namely that 'in a broader and more rounded frame the role of Webster might seem to bulk less large.'[37]

Crucial to the study of these wartime diplomats and officials is an understanding of their own intellectualism as it relates to matters of international history and politics. Though Reynolds and Hughes go some way in articulating certain aspects of Webster's worldview, other scholars such as Ian Hall, have examined Webster's international thought more in depth. In his article 'The Art and Practice of a Diplomatic Historian', Hall described certain tenets of

[34] Reynolds and Hughes, *Historian as Diplomat*, p. 88
[35] Ibid, pp. 107-8
[36] Ibid, pp. 98-100
[37] Ibid, pp. 100, 108. Other scholarship has highlighted Reynolds and Hughes assessment of Webster's role in planning for the United Nations. See Inderjeet Parmar, *Think Tanks and Power in Foreign Policy: A Comparative Study of the Role and Influence of the Council on Foreign Relations and the Royal Institute of International Affairs* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp. 102-104

Webster's intellectualism, and in particular, how his approach to historical study shaped his thinking on international politics. In fitting in with one of the main themes of this thesis, Hall is correct to note that Webster's views were 'heterodox' and do not fit into 'realist' or 'idealist' categories.[38] Added to this is the extent to which he drew upon history and specific historical figures—among them Castlereagh, Palmerston and Woodrow Wilson—who helped to shape his approach to British foreign policy and international institutions.[39] Where this thesis differs from Hall's study, however, is in the attention it gives to the way in which Webster's thought translated directly into his proposals for a future world organisation.

Though there has yet to be a detailed examination of the planning that took place within the Economic and Reconstruction Department during the Second World War, there are several scholars who have contributed to an understanding of the department's work during the war. The first is British legal historian Brian Simpson, whose book *Human Rights and the End of Empire: Britain and the Genesis of the European Convention* examines the creation of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Britain's role throughout.[40] Spanning over 1100 pages, Simpson's work, in theory, focuses on the legal history of the convention, yet his scholarship wades, impressively so, into diplomatic history. As such, he spends time examining the way in which the Foreign Office, and in particular the Economic and Reconstruction Department, addressed the question of human rights, domestic jurisdiction and colonial trusteeship within their planning during the war.[41] These subjects, while fundamental to the wider history of the creation of the United Nations Organization, are not dealt with in detail here. Instead, the thesis relies more on the existing scholarship around these

[38] Ian Hall, 'The Art and Practice of a Diplomatic Historian: Sir Charles Webster, 1886-1961', *International Politics* 42 (2005): 470-490, here pp. 480; 486-7
[39] Ibid, pp. 480-84
[40] A.W. Brian Simpson, *Human Rights and the End of Empire: Britain and the Genesis of the European Convention* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001)
[41] Ibid, pp. 221-272. He has argued that it was not until after the war that the Foreign Office began to show more interest in the question of human rights. See ibid, pp. 44-45, 243-248

themes while focusing on the primary political and security dimensions of the future organisation.[42]

The second major study which touches on the work of the Economic and Reconstruction Department is Julian Lewis's comprehensive examination of British post-war strategic planning.[43] Despite focusing on the evolution of a wider defence strategy, as opposed to the planning which went into the creation of the United Nations Organization, his study is a meticulous account which touches on the character of British foreign policy during the war. The thesis agrees with certain aspects of Lewis's account. He writes that, until the Normandy invasions in June 1944, the Foreign Office 'dominated' long-term planning within the British government, yet these officials, he writes, were often not recognised by the key decision-makers.[44] He also points out that Foreign Office officials, namely Nigel Ronald and Richard Law, were those responsible for encouraging the Chiefs of Staff to begin considering post-war plans.[45] Elsewhere, his discussion of the numerous planning bodies and inter-departmental committees—as well as the way in which he traces the memoranda (including the Four Power Plan and the United Nations Plan) which they produced—provides a body of scholarship which buttresses much of the research found in this thesis.[46]

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[42] Another essential text is William Roger Louis' *Imperialism at Bay*, in which he traces the origins of the trusteeship system of the United Nations, and in doing so, reveals important insights into American anti-imperialist motivations and methods, as well as British suspicions and attempts to curtail challenges to its empire. Louis, *Imperialism at Bay, 1941-1945: The United States and the Decolonization of the British Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977). On the subject of the Economic and Reconstruction Department's early work on relief and reconstruction problems, see Sharpe, 'The Origins of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, 1939-1943', pp. 236-280, 328-457.

[43] Julian Lewis, *Changing Direction: British Military Planning for Post-war Strategic Defence, 1942-47* [2nd edition] (London: Frank Cass, 2005)

[44] Lewis writes that, 'Schemes could be drawn up on a grand scale in the fairly sure knowledge that the people who really mattered had neither the time nor the inclination to give them their attention.' Lewis, *Changing Direction*, p. 335

[45] Nigel Ronald: Head of the General Department, 1939-42, Assistant Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs (Economic), 1942-47. Richard Law: Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, 1941-43; Minister of State, 1943-45

[46] For an example see Lewis, *Changing Direction*, pp. 10-44

At the same time, the thesis also pushes back against some of Lewis's more critical arguments concerning the Foreign Office. He writes that the plans of British diplomats expressed 'political pipe-dreams' all while ignoring the realities of a hostile Soviet Union.

> It would appear that, to some extent, the Foreign Office gradually became a victim of its own propaganda and a dupe of its own wishful thinking, quite apart from the pressures upon it to mirror American enthusiasm for the United Nations ideal. Cut off from the realities of power, the diplomats mistook the shadow for the substance of international relations.[47]

The structure of policymaking with the Foreign Office, he says, led to policies which came about 'almost haphazardly according to which individual bestirred himself on a given question at a given moment'.[48] Lacking in his study is an account of the way in which the Foreign Office sought to balance its own plans with that of the United States and Soviet Union. Indeed, the extent to which British planning for the post-war period changed in response to contact with the ideas and plans of American and Soviet diplomats—not to mention those of the Dominion governments as well as the western allies—is crucial to the wider history.

The thesis therefore seeks to break new ground in the literature concerning Britain and the creation of the United Nations by offering the most comprehensive assessment to date of the work of Foreign Office officials associated with the planning, drafting and negotiation stages. This study is best understood as a work of traditional diplomatic history, and it is best classed with the work of historians of British foreign policy. On the one hand, it models itself on approaches undertaken by Zara Steiner, T.G. Otte and Keith Neilson, all of whom have made extensive use of Foreign Office, Cabinet and personal archives to explain how the Foreign Office and individual officials arrived at certain decisions of foreign policy.[49] The

[47] Lewis, *Changing Direction*, p. 337

[48] He contrasts this with the system overseen by the Chiefs of Staff, who, he claims, were able to provide 'straight answers to straight questions'. Lewis, *Changing Direction*, p. 338

[49] Examples include: Zara Steiner, *The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1898–1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969); T.G. Otte, *The Foreign Office Mind: The Making of British Foreign Policy, 1865-1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Keith Neilson, 'Orme Sargent, Appeasement and British Policy in Europe, 1933-39', *Twentieth Century British History* 21:1 (2010): 1-28

focus on the diplomats and officials responsible for foreign policymaking, in particular, is an approach which has long been encouraged by historians such as Herbert Butterfield, who wrote that, 'These sub-governmental, sub-ministerial actors in the drama are bound to be the real objective of a genuine enquiry into British foreign policy; and the real secrets and the real problems are situated in the very nature of things at this level.'[50]

The study relies extensively on the records of the Foreign Office and Cabinet—housed at the British National Archives in Kew—as well as the personal papers of the central protagonists, located in Cambridge and London. The papers of other individuals associated with the planning and negotiation stages, such as Eden, Lord Halifax and Arnold Toynbee, are also referenced at various points in this work. Entries from the edited diaries of a number of officials and statesmen, among them Alexander Cadogan, Charles Webster, Oliver Harvey, Ivan Maisky and Edward Stettinius, constitute vital sources for much of this research and are drawn upon throughout the work.[51] The memoirs of Eden, Jebb, and Cordell Hull, among others, were taken into account, though reference to these are limited given the way in which hindsight can alter opinions.[52] The same can be said for the published works by Jebb and Webster which appeared in the years after 1945.[53]

Because the thesis is primarily focused on the post-war planning which took place within the Foreign Office during the war, there has been limited reliance on the records of other governments involved in the creation of the United Nations, most notably the United States

[50] Quoted in Victor Rothwell, *Britain and the Cold War, 1941-1947* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1982), pp. 1-2
[51] David Dilks (ed.), *The Diaries of Alexander Cadogan, 1938-1945* (London: Faber and Faber, 2010); Reynolds and Hughes, *Historian as Diplomat*; Gabriel Gorodetsky (ed.), *The Maisky Diaries: The Wartime Revelations of Stalin's Ambassador in London* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015); John Harvey (ed.), *The War Diaries of Oliver Harvey, 1941-1945* (London: Collins, 1978); Ben Pimlott (ed.), *The Second World War Diary of Hugh Dalton, 1940-1945* (London: Johnathan Cape, 1986); Thomas M. Campbell and George C. Herring (ed.), *The Diaries of Edward Stettinius Jr, 1943-46* (New York: New Viewpoints, 1975)
[52] Gladwyn Jebb, *The Memoirs of Lord Gladwyn* (New York: Weybright and Talley, 1972); Cordell Hull, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull,* Volume II (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1948); Anthony Eden, *The Eden Memoirs: Facing the Dictators* (London: Cassell, 1962) and *The Eden Memoirs: The Reckoning* (London: Cassell, 1965)
[53] Gladwyn Jebb, 'Review of Reynolds and Hughes' *Historian as Diplomat'*, *International Affairs* 53:3 (1977): 479-481; Charles Webster, 'The Making of the Charter of the United Nations'*, History* 32:115 (1947): 16-38

and Soviet Union. The records of State Department officials, most notably Sumner Welles and Harley Notter, were consulted but are referenced sparingly.[54] The American documents included within the *Foreign Relations of the United States* volumes are relied upon at various points, especially when examining bilateral or tripartite meetings in which British officials were involved.[55]

Structure of Foreign Office planning

In addition to ideas and individuals, the study also deals with the more mechanical and technical aspects of the international order built out of the war—and the decision-making processes which fed into this. The British role in the creation of the United Nations was as much the product of planning as deliberation, the latter taking place both within and outside the British government itself.[56] The planning of the Economic and Reconstruction Department had to weather the critique of other officials in the Foreign Office, Cabinet ministers (and their respective government departments), the Dominion and allied governments, and most importantly, the American and Soviet governments. Indeed, the United Nations Organization itself was the product of a complex process of diplomacy. The thesis will examine this process along with the planning activity itself, but before doing so, it is worth outlining some of the policymaking and decision-making structures which existed within the Foreign Office.

From 1942 onwards, the Economic and Reconstruction Department remained the engine room of planning for a post-war international organisation. Gladwyn Jebb, as head of

[54] The papers of Sumner Welles are located at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library in Hyde Park, New York. The papers of Harley Notter are housed within the US National Archives at College Park, Maryland. See also Harley Notter, *Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939-1945* (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1975)

[55] Specifically, *Foreign Relations of the United States* [hereafter *FRUS*], 1941, Volume I; 1942, Volume I; 1943, Volume I; 1943, Volume III; 1943, Conferences at Washington and Quebec; 1944, Volume I

[56] In the conduct of relations with other governments, the Foreign Office also worked with the Colonial Office, the Dominions Office and the India Office. Moreover, as David Dilks has noted, the Foreign Office exercised little influence over trade and international finance, which were handled by the Board of Trade and Treasury, respectively. David Dilks, 'The British Foreign Office Between the Wars', in B.J.C. McKercher and D.J. Moss (ed.), *Shadow and Substance in British Foreign Policy, 1895-1939: Memorial Essays Honouring C.J. Lowe* (Edmonton: The University of Alberta Press, 1984), p. 187

this department, was instrumental in defining its brief, which extended from an initial responsibility for relief and reconstruction matters to eventually addressing the most important questions of a post-war international political and security order. Beginning in 1943, he began to involve Webster in the planning process for a post-war international organisation, and from this point forward, they remained the two most influential planners within the Foreign Office. Jebb and Webster were joined by other junior officials, among them Paul Falla and John Coulson, yet their contributions, as this thesis will make clear, were more limited.[57]

Throughout the process, the department's memoranda were subject to a larger review by departments within the Foreign Office, a bureaucratic process which allowed other influential diplomats—many of them with their own ideas of what a post-war order might resemble—to offer constructive criticism. The first port of call for documents produced by Jebb and Webster was Nigel Ronald, the Assistant Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs whose responsibility included economic issues. Ronald's feedback, often in the form of long hand-written minutes, was vital to the shape that Jebb and Webster's plans ultimately took. From there, papers produced by the Economic and Reconstruction Department were often circulated to political departments where senior diplomats such as Frank Roberts (Head of the Central Department), Christopher Warner (Head of the Northern Department), or Nevile Butler (Head of the American Department) were able to offer their comments.[58] Each of these departments, and especially their senior officials, viewed the Economic and Reconstruction Department's memoranda through the lens of their respective briefs; but at the same time, officials tended to take into account a wider strategic view, one which involved long-term calculations about the

[57] Paul S. Falla: Economic and Reconstruction Department, 1942-45; John E. Coulson: Economic and Reconstruction Department, 1942-45; Head of Economic Relations Department, 1945-46

[58] Frank Roberts: Central Department, 1941-43; Head of the Central Department, 1943-45; British Ambassador in Moscow, 1945-48. Christopher Warner: Head of the Political Intelligence Department, 1941; Head of the Northern Department, 1942-46. Nevile Butler: British Embassy in Washington, 1939-1941; Head of North American Department, 1941-44; Assistant Under-Secretary, 1944-47

future international system and Britain's place within it.[59] Nowhere was this more apparent than in the discussion over the first major memorandum produced by the Economic and Reconstruction Department, the 'Four Power Plan' (which will be discussed in chapter two), and in discussions of a possible 'Western Security Group' (examined in chapters five, six and seven).

In addition to their circulation to the political departments within the Foreign Office, the memoranda on post-war organisation which came from the Economic and Reconstruction Department were also reviewed by more senior officials, such as Assistant Under Secretary William Strang, Deputy Under-Secretary Orme Sargent and finally, the Permanent Under-Secretary, Alexander Cadogan. The input from these senior officials varied at different stages of the war. For instance, Orme Sargent had been involved with the earliest attempts at developing post-war aims in the early stages of the war and also contributed to Jebb's earliest drafts of the Four Power Plan, yet he remained somewhat removed from the later stages of planning for a post-war organisation due, in part, to other briefs, among them the post-war policy towards Germany.[60]

Alexander Cadogan, in his position as Permanent Under-Secretary, served as one of the crucial links—the other being the Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden—between the crafting of policy within the Foreign Office and its delivery within the Cabinet. As Keith Neilson and T.G. Otte have highlighted, after the defeat of France in May 1940, Cadogan came to be increasingly relied upon by Cabinet ministers to give direct advice on matters of foreign policy.[61] His role at the Atlantic Conference of August 1941, where he joined Churchill as the only advisor

[59] Generally speaking, the Foreign Office had a pyramid structure of hierarchy. Departments were overseen by an Under-Secretary, and above them sat (in order of seniority) the Deputy Under-Secretary, the Permanent Under-Secretary, and finally, the Foreign Secretary.
[60] William Strang: Assistant Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs (Western Europe/Europe), 1939-43; British Representative (with rank of Ambassador) on the European Advisory Commission, 1943-45. Orme Sargent: Deputy Under-Secretary of State, 1939-46
[61] Neilson and Otte have written that Cadogan, 'found himself attending the Cabinet on a regular basis, and acting as a roving extension of the Foreign Secretary'. Neilson and Otte, p. 249

dedicated specifically to foreign affairs, certainly attests to this fact.[62] Moreover, as this thesis demonstrates, despite his increased responsibility, Cadogan became more involved in the details of post-war planning as they developed into 1943 and 1944. Indeed, as planning progressed, Jebb and Webster came to see Cadogan as the senior official who could carry their plans through, both with timely interjections during Cabinet meetings and most importantly, as head of the British delegation at Dumbarton Oaks. Here, his contribution did not go unnoticed. Edward Stettinius, head of the American delegation at the conference and later the American Secretary of State, wrote to Cadogan in June 1945 that not only was his work 'invaluable' but that his ability 'to find the right answer to reconcile conflicting points of view' had made the difference.[63] Thus, Cadogan came to serve, along with Jebb and Webster, as one of the most important British officials in the development of the United Nations. The influence of these three men in particular was such that, in selecting a British representative to the United Nations Preparatory Conference in the autumn of 1945, Jebb wrote to Cadogan that there was no one on the British side who knew more about the organisation than he, Cadogan and the 'Prof'.[64]

Another important aspect of this story—as unfolds in subsequent chapters—is the way in which this group of diplomats saw themselves as a breed apart from other groups: namely military officials, politicians and intellectuals. The historian Brian McKercher has noted that during the interwar years, there was a certain 'homogeneity of the class and educational background of the "professional" diplomats, the unstated assumption that they were members of the most socially exclusive and prestigious department of state in Whitehall'.[65] This air of

[62] Cadogan was hand-picked by Churchill to attend the conference, where he served as the only foreign policy advisor present.
[63] Quoted in Dilks (ed.), *The Diaries of Alexander Cadogan*, p. 750
[64] Letter from Jebb to Cadogan, undated, Papers of Gladwyn Jebb, Churchill College Archives Centre, University of Cambridge [hereafter GLAD] 2/1/1
[65] B.J.C. McKercher, 'Old diplomacy and new: the Foreign Office and foreign policy, 1919-1939', in Michael Dockrill and Brian McKercher (ed.), *Diplomacy and World Power: Studies in British Foreign Policy, 1890-1950* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 82-83. Jebb and Cadogan, having followed a similar trajectory—Eton, Oxford and the Foreign Office—were diplomats with extensive connections in the British elite.

superiority, as will be seen as various points in this history, coloured Foreign Office views of bodies like the Chiefs of Staff, many of whom were seen as capable warriors but unrefined statesmen. In the view of some officials, and especially Jebb, they simply did not grasp the complexities of diplomacy.[66]

The same could be said of politicians, a number of whom, wishing to put their stamp on the post-war international order, inevitably clashed with the work of the Economic and Reconstruction Department. Chief among them was the Prime Minister, who regularly frustrated Foreign Office officials both with his refusal to take up their papers in Cabinet and his repeated efforts to influence the planning himself. Added to this were other leaders within the Commonwealth, such as South African Prime Minister Jan Smuts, as well as British ministers such as Sir Stafford Cripps and Leo Amery who submitted their own proposals.[67] The Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, was himself often supportive of the recommendations of his subordinates, and undoubtedly played an important part both in Cabinet debates and at the San Francisco Conference.[68] Yet in terms of understanding the more detailed planning, Jebb and Webster often felt that the Foreign Secretary lacked a complete grasp of the various moving parts. As Jebb remarked in May 1944, 'He has no mind, only a mass of antennae.'[69]

David Dilks has discussed some aspects of the elitism which existed in the Foreign Office in the interwar years. See Dilks, 'The British Foreign Office Between the Wars', pp. 182-3. For a discussion of the elitism as existed within the Foreign prior to 1914, see Zara Steiner, 'Elitism and Foreign Policy: The Foreign Office Before the Great War', in B.J.C. McKercher and D.J. Moss, *Shadow and Substance in British Foreign Policy, 1895-1939: Memorial Essays Honouring C.J. Lowe* (Edmonton: The University of Alberta Press, 1984), pp. 19-55; John Saville, *The Politics of Continuity: British Labour Foreign Policy and the Labour Government, 1945-46* (London: Verso, 1993), pp. 10, 19-20

[66] See for example Jebb minute, 18 December 1944, FO 371/40741B/U8523

[67] Field Marshal Jan C. Smuts: South African Prime Minister 1919-24 and 1939-48. Stafford Cripps: Ambassador in Moscow, 1940-42; Lord Privy Seal and Leader of the House of Commons, February - November 1942; Minister of Aircraft Production, November 1942-45. Leopold Amery: Secretary of State for India and Burma, 1940-45

[68] Reynolds and Hughes have noted the importance of Eden in certain respects. 'Without Eden…[Webster's] work and that of Jebb would probably have been abortive.' Reynolds and Hughes, *Historian as Diplomat*, p. 92.

[69] Hugh Dalton diary, 9 May 1944, Pimlott (ed.), p. 743-4. Brian McKercher has argued that when Eden became Foreign Secretary for the first time in December 1935, he differed fundamentally from his predecessors, in that he believed 'in collective rather than unilateral means of ensuring international peace and security'. McKercher, 'Old diplomacy and new: the Foreign Office and foreign policy, 1919-1939', pp. 103-105

In addition to their frequent struggles with political superiors, Foreign Office officials also engaged in a kind of intellectual sparring with contemporary commentators and academics, many of whom espoused their own visions of international order. In his first major recommendation of post-war policy, Jebb warned that they must avoid the 'facile idealisms of the [H.G.] Wellsian or Clarence Streit variety', which he considered utopian visions detached from practical politics.[70] Even the preeminent academics working for the Foreign Office in these years—men such as Arnold Toynbee and Alfred Zimmern—were not spared from such critiques, which often stemmed from a rather shallow reading of their academic and popular works. Jebb's reflexive hostility to Toynbee, in particular, was on display in the early stages of planning, when he wrote of the latter that, 'All the sentimentalists and idealists, both in this country and in the United States...will plunge like the Gadarene swine down this short-cut to salvation.'[71]

Far from rejecting outright the views of intellectuals, however, Jebb and others in the Foreign Office were attentive to the work and suggestions of certain thinkers. Scholars such as Arnold Wolfers and William Fox of Yale's Institute of International Studies, whose writing on the balance of power and collective security belied simplistic notions of realism versus idealism, were viewed by Jebb and his colleagues as in tune with reality of international politics.[72] The most notable example of this interplay with intellectuals, however, was the

[70] Memorandum by Jebb, 'Relief Machinery: The Political Background', August 1942, FCO 73/264/Pwp/42/8, p. 10. The resistance to academics influencing policy went back as far as the early 1920s. See for example, Parmar, *Think Tanks and Power in Foreign Policy*, p. 29; Michael Dockrill, 'Historical Note: The Foreign Office and the "Proposed Institute of International Affairs"', *International Affairs* 56:4 (1980), p. 669. For a discussion of Wells's and Streit's views in this period, see Or Rosenboim, *The Emergence of Globalism*: *Visions of World Order in Britain and the United States, 1939-1950* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2017), pp. 114-121, 212-216

[71] Jebb minute, 4 November 1942, FCO 73/264/Pwp/42/48. Quoted in Sean Greenwood, *Titan at the Foreign Office*, p. 164.

[72] Yale's Institute of International Studies sent numerous reports to the Foreign Office, a number of which were well received within the Economic and Reconstruction Department. These will be discussed at various points in the thesis, but for examples, see FO 371/35435/U2896 and FO 371/35397/ U3814. The grouping of academics at Yale was known by some as 'The Power School'. William C. Olson and A.J.R. Groom, *International Relations Then and Now: Origins and Trends in Interpretation* (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 99

incorporation of Charles Webster himself, a Professor of International History prior to the war, into the Economic and Reconstruction Department. One of the foremost supporters of internationalism and the League of Nations in the interwar years, Webster won the attention and eventual respect of Jebb because, in the latter's view, he was a 'great power man'. Indeed, Webster's expertise on international organisation—dating, as it did, back to the Congress of Vienna—made him a prized asset to the department most responsible for the planning of a post-war organisation.[73]

That Webster was able to move from his career as a university professor to the centre of post-war planning within the Foreign Office was a product of the demands of wartime; but at the same time, it also reflected a more systemic reality of mid-century British diplomacy—namely, that these individuals, whether diplomats or academics, were members of an elite social and intellectual milieu. Nowhere was this more apparent than at Chatham House, where from the 1920s onwards, prominent politicians, civil servants, military officers, diplomats and academics gathered to discuss issues in international affairs. Inderjeet Parmar has noted the 'numerous connections between Chatham House and sections of the British elite', with many members having been educated at Oxford or Cambridge and belonging to exclusive social clubs.[74] It is no coincidence that Arnold Toynbee, the Director of Studies at Chatham House and arguably the greatest British historian of his generation, was seconded to the Cabinet Committee on War Aims in the autumn 1940 as one of the few non-ministerial members.[75]

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[73] Gladwyn Jebb, *The Memoirs of Lord Gladwyn*, p. 120; Lord Gladwyn, 'Founding the United Nations: Principals and Objects', in Erik Jensen and Thomas Fisher (ed.), *The United Kingdom—The United Nations* (London: Macmillan, 1990), pp. 34

[74] Parmar, *Think Tanks and Power in Foreign Policy,* pp. 31-36. Moreover, within these circles, certain ideas such as liberal internationalism were strong. Parmar, pp. 70-74. Historians such as Martin Folly have also noted the influence of 'what was a fairly small and socially cohesive elite', a factor which he argues played a role in certain assumptions about the Soviet Union taking hold. Martin Folly, *Churchill, Whitehall and the Soviet Union, 1940-45* (New York: St Martin's Press, 2000), p. 5

[75] Christopher Hill, *Cabinet Decisions on Foreign Policy*, pp. 200, 203. Toynbee, along with his colleagues Alfred Zimmern and Charles Webster had, since the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, been linked with the Foreign Office in a professional capacity. Erik Goldstein, 'Historians Outside the Academy: G. W. Prothero and the Experience of the Foreign Office Historical Section, 1917–20', *IHR Historical Research* 63:151 (1990): 195-211; T.G. Otte,

Lastly, it is important to note that this triumvirate of officials, while the most significant in planning and negotiating the post-war international organisation, were not operating within a vacuum in the British government. Other officials—both at the junior and senior level, and across government departments—provided crucial direction which influenced the plans of the Economic and Reconstruction Department. John Maynard Keynes, who played one of the most important roles in the Treasury during the war, provided an important spur to Foreign Office planning in the early years of the conflict.[76] Later, during the deliberations at the Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco conferences, one of the influential voices was that of Sir William Malkin, the Foreign Office legal advisor.[77] Much of his work involved the codification of political agreements which had been reached between the delegations present—a thankless but invaluable task. Though his contribution, along with that of other officials such as Keynes, will be referenced, it will not be examined in critical detail. The thesis will focus primarily on the work of the officials who were most responsible for the planning and negotiation of a post-war political and security order.

Key assumptions behind Foreign Office planning

In examining the approaches of these officials and departments within the Foreign Office, it is crucial to highlight certain core assumptions on which they operated. First was the consideration of Britain's future status as a world power. One historian of British foreign policy in the period has written that 'the Foreign Office tried to hang on to great power status by

'"The Light of History": Scholarship and Officialdom in the Era of the First World War', *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 30:2 (2019): 253-287

[76] The work of Keynes during the war has been covered in depth, but less discussed is the way in which his ideas influenced the work of the Foreign Office, especially between 1940 and 1941. This will be examined in the following chapter. For discussion of Keynes work during the war, see Robert Skidelsky, *John Maynard Keynes, Vol III: Fighting for Freedom, 1937-1946* (New York: Viking Publishing, 2000)

[77] Sir William Malkin: Legal Advisor to the Foreign Office, 1929-45. Malkin's expertise in international law, in particular, placed him at the centre of multilateral efforts to reconstitute the Permanent Court of International Justice. During the war, he served as the chairman of the Informal Inter-Allied Committee on the Future of the Permanent Court of International Justice. See FO 371/40686/U2296

engaging in a kind of diplomacy devoid of real power.'[78] That Britain was a power inexorably declining during the Second World War has been a popular theme in historical accounts, but one which has faced some pushback in the last decade. David Edgerton, in particular, has highlighted the fact that the United Kingdom, even in May 1940, retained the 'world's largest navy, greatest aircraft production of any country, and a small but uniquely mechanized army'.[79] Though it suffered a 'stupendous relative decline', due largely to American growth, the country still remained a 'very powerful player' at war's end.[80] Important, too, was the perceptions held by both the United States and Soviet Union that Britain and its empire would remain one of the most powerful international actors.[81]

Of more relevance to this thesis, however, are the perceptions of British strength and influence which existed among Foreign Office officials throughout the war. Victor Rothwell has written that there was an 'assumption of British Great Power status' which was 'shared…by all or almost all Foreign Office officials and by the leading British politicians of the time concerned with foreign policy'. While this is true—and is something evident throughout the thesis—there was also, Rothwell notes, a 'nagging doubt' present during the war about the United Kingdom's material and financial power relative to the United States and Soviet Union.[82] These doubts were intensified by warnings from certain quarters, such as the Treasury writing in 1940 that the government would struggle to fund a war unaided for multiple years.[83] The disparity in economic and military power was not lost on members of the Foreign Office,

[78] Lothar Kettenacker, 'The Anglo-Soviet Alliance and the Problem of Germany, 1941-1945', *Journal of Contemporary History* 17:3 (1982), p. 436
[79] David Edgerton, *Britain's War Machine: Weapons, Resources, and Exports in the Second World War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 2
[80] Ibid, pp. 296-299
[81] Serhii Plokhy, *Yalta: The Price of Peace* (New York: Penguin Books, 2011), p. 397; Rothwell, *War Aims in the Second World War*, pp. 116, 160-161
[82] Rothwell, *Britain and the Cold War*, pp. 2-3. Zara Steiner has written that this assumption lasted until after the war. Steiner, 'British power and stability: The historical record', *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 14:2 (2003), p. 42. John Saville has also written that in these years, 'It was taken as given that Britain would continue with a world-wide empire.' Saville, *The Politics of Continuity*, pp. 20-21
[83] Steiner, 'British Power and Stability: The Historical Record', pp 40-41

and in particular the Economic and Reconstruction Department. As Jebb wrote in his first major planning document for the post-war world, 'We must, on the one hand, either have some powerful ally or allies, or cease to be a World Power, and, on the other hand, we cannot expect to have powerful allies unless we are powerful ourselves.'[84]

In the view of many Foreign Office officials, the source of British power was, to a large degree, dependent on the ability of the United Kingdom to draw on the support of the Empire and Commonwealth. Jebb made clear in that same planning document that, 'We have to maintain our position as an Empire and a Commonwealth. If we fail to do so we cannot exist as a world Power.'[85] Crucial pillars of the British Empire, however, were in question. The Indian Congress had, in July 1940, demanded complete independence from the United Kingdom after the war.[86] Japanese advances into Malaya, Hong Kong, Singapore and Burma between 1941 and 1942—a situation worsened by the need to counter Germany in Europe and Italy in the Mediterranean—led to questions not only about Britain's ability to defend its Empire, but about its global role more broadly.[87] Nonetheless, many Foreign Office officials held onto a view which, as David Dilks has written, already existed in the interwar years. 'Britain's position as a great Power, at least in the minds of her ministers and leading civil servants, rested to such a degree upon the possession of Empire that the notion of treating parts of it as disposable seemed too dire to contemplate.'[88] Perhaps as important was a notion, as

[84] Memorandum by Jebb, 'The "Four-Power" Plan', 20 October 1942, p. 4, copy in FO 371/31525/U783
[85] Covering Memorandum by Eden, 'The "Four-Power" Plan', WP (42) 516, 8 November 1942, p. 1, copy in FO 371/31525/U783. Jebb drafted this covering memorandum as well.
[86] Basanta Kumar Mishra, 'India's Response to the British Offer of August 1940', *Proceedings of the Indian History Congress* 40 (1979): 717-719
[87] John Kent, 'The Foreign Office and defence of the empire', in Greg Kennedy (ed.), *Imperial Defence: the Old World Order 1856-1956* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008), p. 51; Brian McKercher, *Transition of Power: Britain's Loss of Global Pre-eminence to the United States, 1930-45* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 305-306
[88] David Dilks, 'The British Foreign Office Between the Wars', p. 184. Moreover, as David Edgerton has argued, the position of the British Empire in 1941 was 'in some respects, relative to other powers…at its strongest in this part of the war'. Edgerton, *Britain's War Machine*, p. 47

John Kent has described, that Britain's weaker position during the war was 'a temporary rather than a permanent phenomenon'.[89]

Closely tied to the perception of imperial strength was an assumption held by a number of Foreign Office officials that the United Kingdom could boost their power relative to the United States and the Soviet Union by drawing on the support of acquiescent Dominion governments. Jebb wrote to a colleague that 'Unless we can get some or all of the Dominions to agree with us on first principles, we are severely handicapped in putting forward any proposal of a general nature for world order after the war to the Americans and the Russians.'[90] His thinking, however, was clouded by what would prove to be an over-confident assumption—namely, that the United Kingdom would lead and the Dominion governments would follow. As he wrote in the early months of planning, 'the Dominions may growl and grouse [but] they will eventually accept such a lead on our part.'[91] As the negotiations over an international organisation developed throughout the war, however, Jebb and the Foreign Office found that the Dominion governments were, at times, some of the most outspoken critics of their proposals.

In the course of planning for the post-war world, there was much debate on the question of whether the United Kingdom should give priority to the Empire and Commonwealth or the European continent. Some Cabinet members, such as the Secretary of State for India Leo Amery, sought salvation in the former and suggested that they leave Europe to its own devices. The majority of Foreign Office officials, however, viewed British leadership of Europe as essential to its own survival. Germany could not be allowed to start another war, and in line with a long tradition of British foreign policy, they could not allow the continent to be dominated by a state or group of states hostile to the United Kingdom. Some officials, such as

[89] John Kent, 'The British Empire and the Origins of the Cold War, 1944-49', in Anne Deighton (ed.), *Britain and the First Cold War* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1990), p. 166
[90] Jebb to Michael Wright, 7 June 1943, copy in FCO 73/266/UN/43/1
[91] Jebb minute, 2 February 1943, FO 371/35396/U402

Jebb, went as far as to say that the continent was the 'cradle and matrix' of their civilization, and should Britain forego an influential role in the future, there was a risk that 'our particular type of civilisation must inevitably crumble'.[92] This is not to say that members of the Foreign Office ignored or 'gave up' on Britain's overseas interests—indeed, it was the contrary—but their principal focus rested first and foremost on the relief, reconstruction and future ordering of the European continent.[93]

Elsewhere, the assumptions concerning the post-war intentions of the United States and Soviet Union were arguably the two most important elements in Foreign Office planning during the war. Views toward each government varied from pessimism to cynicism, but the common understanding was that future cooperation with both was a necessity. Concerning the United States, many officials held views which were in varying degrees patronizing, suspicious and uncertain.[94] Some felt that the Roosevelt administration was keen to advance anti-colonial policies which might undermine the British Empire, and at the same time, they were certain that in the Americans' moral quest, they were naïve.[95] As the Head of the American Department Nevile Butler noted, 'the United States will soon find they cannot run the show without us, and that we understand a lot more than they about the running.'[96] Officials felt that Americans had a propensity for making grand moral statements, with little regard for the future implications of such pronouncements. An official who worked in the British Embassy in Washington throughout the war wrote in 1945 that:

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[92] Memorandum by Jebb, 'The "Four-Power" Plan', 20 October 1942, p. 10, copy in FO 371/31525/U783
[93] Dilks, 'The British Foreign Office Between the Wars', p. 184
[94] For a general discussion of British suspicion of the United States dating back to the mid-1930s, see D.C. Watt, *Succeeding John Bull: America in Britain's Place, 1900-1975* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 73-80, 90-91, 97-98. While many historians have focused on Churchill, Roosevelt and Anglo-American diplomatic and military relations during the war, less attention has been given to the views of the Foreign Office. Important exceptions include Rothwell, *Britain and the Cold War*, pp. 6-14; Louis, *Imperialism at Bay*, pp. 38-40; Barker, *Churchill and Eden at War,* p. 128; David Reynolds, 'Rethinking Anglo-American Relations', *International Affairs* 65:1 (1988-1989): 89-111
[95] On British suspicion of American anti-imperialism in the early years of the war, see Rothwell, *War Aims in the Second World War*, pp. 64-65; Louis, *Imperialism at Bay*, pp. 7-8, 121-133, 187-197
[96] Butler minute, 18 May 1942, FO 371/30655/A4410

> Statements of general principles are so much in the blood of the Americans and so much part of their traditional methods of thought that they are not only a temptation they find hard to resist but almost an end in themselves which it is incumbent on an American government to secure.[97]

The Atlantic Charter, in particular, was a document to which the British contribution was as important as the American; but in the months and years after its signing, some officials in the Foreign Office viewed it as a 'rather conspicuous document', the principles of which 'could be applied to almost anything'.[98] Regardless, American support for British interests in the post-war world was viewed as a strategic necessity and would become tenet of British post-war policy.

The key assumption, however, was that the United States was comprised of an isolationist public and Congress being dragged along by an internationalist President, a perception which led the Foreign Office to employ two tactics in particular. The first was that the British government would need to adopt the general lines of American plans, broadly speaking, and to influence these ideas where possible. Second was that American citizens should be made to feel that the organisation itself was largely an American creation, so as to ensure continued public support for the institution. Even at the end of the San Francisco Conference, where the United Nations Charter was signed, Jebb wrote that Britain's policy remained 'not to emphasise our achievements in public, but rather to allow the Americans to claim the principal credit for the production of the Charter as a whole'.[99]

Foreign Office perceptions of Soviet Russia were just as important as their views of the United States, particularly in the first years of the conflict. As one Foreign Office memorandum from the period stated plainly, 'We may find ourselves between a moral and distant America

[97] Campbell minute, 31 March 1945, FO 371/50807/U2207. Ronald Ian Campbell: Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Yugoslavia, 1939-1941; Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the United States, 1941-1945; Assistant Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs (Far East), 1945-1946
[98] Jebb minute, 5 July 1942, FO 371/31513/U326
[99] Memorandum by Jebb, 'Reflections on San Francisco', 25 July 1945, FO 371/50732/U5998

and an amoral, but very present, Russia.'[100] Given their concerns over the future of the European continent, many officials highlighted the fact that Soviet interest in post-war Europe was guaranteed while American involvement remained uncertain. Thus, it was essential to not alienate Moscow, and if possible, it would be a strategic boon to develop a cooperative relationship. Towards this end, in the weeks after the Atlantic Charter was signed, some in the Foreign Office recommended that a parallel 'Volga Charter' be presented to the Russians, so as to balance the agreement recently signed by Churchill and Roosevelt.

Even if British officials remained suspicious and uncertain of American intentions, their views towards the Soviet Union were more pessimistic still.[101] Stalin's deal with Hitler in 1939 loomed large, and Eden's first wartime meeting with the Soviet leader in December 1941 led Foreign Office officials towards three basic assumptions: Soviet leaders had post-war designs of their own which were based primarily on security concerns, that their immense power might make such visions a foregone conclusion, and that Britain needed to exert diplomatic leverage before Soviet military advances rendered their influence obsolete.[102] The Anglo-Soviet Treaty in May 1942, the Moscow Declaration in October 1943, and indeed, the future international organisation itself, were seen by Foreign Office officials as ways both to forge a cooperative spirit with Moscow and to bind them into post-war commitments which would, in turn, act as a kind of restraint on future ambitions.[103] Thus, the creation of an international organisation came to be viewed by the Foreign Office as a way to maintain Anglo-Soviet relations through

[100] Memorandum by Nigel Ronald and T. North Whitehead, 'Co-operation between Great Britain and the United States', 19 February 1942, FO 371/30685/A1684

[101] This thesis relies on a number of Foreign Office files relating to views of the Soviet Union, as well as a large body of historical scholarship on Anglo-Soviet relations during the war. These works will be referenced throughout.

[102] Victor Rothwell has written that, 'The extensive discussions, especially in the Foreign Office, on the nature of Soviet aims in the months after June 1941 produced a consensus that they were much more concerned with security than with ideology.' Rothwell, *War Aims in the Second World War*, p. 66. See also Folly, *Churchill, Whitehall and the Soviet Union*, p. 87

[103] This is a view put forward by a number of scholars, including Folly, *Churchill, Whitehall and the Soviet Union*, pp. 35-28, 89-96, 167-168; Martin Kitchen, *British Policy Towards the Soviet Union During the Second World* War (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1986), pp. 194-196, 204; Rothwell, *War Aims in the Second World War*, pp. 66-67; and Ross, 'Foreign Office Attitudes to the Soviet Union', p. 521

the common objectives of holding Germany down and maintaining peace and security throughout the world.

Historians across generations have been divided on the causes and outcomes of the Foreign Office assessment of Soviet intentions throughout the war. Julian Lewis and Lothar Kettenacker, among others, have criticised the Foreign Office attitude as naïve, while others, such as Martin Folly and Martin Kitchen have considered it a reasonable position based on the realities of the period.[104] As this thesis will argue, the desire among many Foreign Office officials to establish a post-war organisation only added to the willingness to cooperate with the Soviet Union, though this did not stop these diplomats from attempting to create insurance measures, most notably in the form of a western security alliance.

Substance of Foreign Office planning

It was against this backdrop that Foreign Office officials fastened upon strategic planning for the post-war world. Their work left an indelible mark on the United Nations Organization, a point which will become clear in the course of subsequent chapters. Existing historical accounts note that the inclusion of France on the security council was the notable British influence. While important, this was hardly the singular or even the most important British proposal which was adopted. The Foreign Office contributed directly to the design of certain mechanisms which would ensure that the organisation respected the rights of smaller powers,

[104] Lewis, *Changing Direction*, p. 337. Lothar Kettenacker has written that the Foreign Office viewed the Soviet Union as 'an indispensable ally both during and after the war, regardless of whether she behaved as such or not'. Kettenacker, 'The Anglo-Soviet Alliance and the Problem of Germany, 1941-1945', p. 450. Other historians have taken up another position, arguing that the Foreign Office desire for—and belief in—future cooperation with the Soviet Union was reasonable. Graham Ross, 'Foreign Office Attitudes to the Soviet Union 1941-45', *Journal of Contemporary History* 16:3 (1981): 521-540; Elisabeth Barker, *Churchill and Eden at War* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1978), pp. 287-295; Folly, *Churchill, Whitehall and the Soviet Union*, p. 6; Victor Rothwell, *Britain and the Cold War, 1941-1947*, p. 4; Kitchen, *British Policy Towards the Soviet Union*, pp. 268-9, 274; David Reynolds, *From World War to Cold War: Churchill, Roosevelt, and the International History of the 1940s* (London: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 66, 235-248; Geoffrey Warner, 'From ally to enemy: Britain's relations with the Soviet Union, 1941-1948', in Michael Dockrill and Brian McKercher (ed.), *Diplomacy and World Power: Studies in British Foreign Policy, 1890-1950* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 221-243

allowed for the peaceful resolution of disputes and dispensed overwhelming force to quell aggression when necessary. The concern for the rights of smaller powers, in particular, was one matter on which British planners brought a unique perspective into the negotiations over the future organisation. The 'purposes and principles' of the United Nations Organization which were adopted at the San Francisco Conference were first drafted by members of the British delegation and were intended to protect the rights of small states by serving as a check on great power authority. Elsewhere, the United Nations' Military Staff Committee, the Declaration on Colonial Policy, and even the Preamble of the Charter were all products, in part, of British initiative.

But more important than charting the British contributions to the organisation is examining the way in which the Foreign Office arrived at their proposals for a post-war international order. From a methodological standpoint, they first placed a premium on formulating a proactive strategy towards the post-war world, something that was referred to by the Parliamentary Under-Secretary Richard Law as a 'grand strategy for the peace'.[105] The historian John Saville has written that, 'Forward planning was not favoured within the Foreign Office', yet this argument, as this thesis will show, is undermined by an examination of the work done to plan for the post-war world.[106] For officials such as Jebb and Cadogan, to forego such strategic planning would be to cede the initiative and thereby place British foreign policy at the mercy of the Americans and Russians. In the early years of the war, this was not as obvious a necessity to many in Whitehall. Churchill, Eden and others insisted that the war must first be won and that to plan for the post-war period was to put the cart before the horse. That Britain did devise a strategy in the end was the result, first and foremost, of the Foreign Office and Jebb, in particular. In his first major paper aimed at the post-war world, he wrote that what

[105] Richard Law, 'Speech to Cambridge Society for International Affairs, 18 March 1942', *Time and Tide*, 21 March 1942, copy in FO 371/35363/U830
[106] Saville, *The Politics of Continuity*, p. 26

they wanted to avoid was the image of Britain as a 'ramshackle Empire…devoid of ideas, and overcome by the difficulties inherent in every proposal'. By developing their own strategies suited to the interests of Britain and its allies, they might set the terms of the debate on a future order. Only in this way, Jebb wrote, could they be 'the master, and not the victim, of events'.[107]

When it came to negotiating a future international order, especially at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference in September 1944, British officials took a firm stance when necessary, offered compromises when possible and allowed others to claim credit as a matter of tactics. Nowhere was this more apparent than in the question of veto power. When it first came up at Dumbarton Oaks, the British delegation, at the direction of Cadogan, stood firm on the idea that the great powers should not have the right to vote in disputes to which they were a party. Though the Americans eventually came over to the side of the British, the issue became the one on which the future of the organisation would depend. Here again, the Foreign Office played the key role, with Cadogan recommending a compromise which would see that all disputes would have to be heard, though the great powers might retain their right to veto in the end. By the end of the Yalta Conference, when the agreement on this issue had been reached, it became known as 'the Roosevelt compromise'. Far from a hijacking, the Foreign Office had tactfully decided to allow their American counterparts to take credit, so as to boost that country's enthusiasm for the organisation.

A crucial component of the history of Britain's post-war planning process, however, is explaining the way in which officials themselves—especially Jebb, Webster and Cadogan—viewed the very nature of international politics. Whether through their own intellectual development or professional experience, these officials were consistently historically-minded, a characteristic defined by the way in which they approached the pressing questions of the

[107] Draft memorandum by Jebb, 'Relief Machinery: The Political Background', August 1942 FCO 73/264/Pwp/42/8

United Kingdom's post-war foreign policy. As such, they were in many ways exemplars of what the historian Francis Gavin calls the 'historical sensibility' in national security decision-making.[108] The memory of the League of Nations—its successes but especially its failures—loomed large in their minds, as did more distant history. The Congress of Vienna, and in particular the Concert of Europe it enshrined, was at times, even more so than the League, a model for the Economic and Reconstruction Department. Indeed, this nineteenth-century precedent was such that in his first memorandum dedicated to the post-war order, Jebb wrote of establishing a new 'Concert of the World'.

Seen in this way, the inadequacy of characterising the approach of these officials as 'realist' or 'liberal internationalist' soon become apparent. It is an irony of this story that Gladwyn Jebb, who one newspaper considered 'the brain behind the United Nations', was far from an ardent internationalist himself. In the early years of the war, he wrote that the League of Nations was the 'professors' peace' and its impotence in the 1930s was the result of grand schemes laid down by 'starry-eyed idealists'.[109] To avoid similar pitfalls, he stressed the need for British officials to understand the 'interplay of living forces', which, for him, consisted of more raw calculations of power. His aim was, in short, to ensure that the United Kingdom not only preserved a degree of its former influence by enmeshing itself in a great power concert, but also that it bound the United States into post-war commitments on the European continent. His views were such that, between the Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco conferences, he suggested on a number of occasions that the United Kingdom forego the world organisation, provided that Britain joined the United States and the Soviet Union in a tripartite alliance.[110]

[108] Francis Gavin, 'Thinking Historically: A Guide for Strategy and Statecraft', *War on the Rocks*, 19 November 2019
[109] 'Mr. Jebb, The Peace Man: Brain Behind UNO', *The Empire News*, 15 November 1945. 'Professors' Peace' cited in Greenwood, *Titan at the Foreign Office*, p. 163
[110] Greenwood, *Titan at the Foreign Office*, p. 183

Nor was there complete unanimity of worldview among the central figures in this story. If anything, there was a creative tension between different instincts. Somewhat of an antidote to Jebb's brand of realpolitik was Charles Webster, who by 1943, was seconded to the Economic and Reconstruction Department, where he took on an increasingly important role in the planning operations overseen by Jebb. Webster was a long-time internationalist, having first cut his teeth as a historian of the Congress of Vienna and later, during the interwar years, as an outspoken supporter of the League of Nations. In what would have come as a surprise to his new boss, Webster had once argued as a doctoral student of the 'inevitability' of a world state.[111] Far from the fleeting view of a graduate student, he took to the pages of *The Times* in 1938 to argue that 'the ultimate objective of those who wish to bring peace to the world should be a world state.' Such a world authority would not come about by 'a single act', however, but would come 'gradually into existence…through men using institutions and transforming them by action.[112]

Though his commitment to internationalism was indisputable, at the same time, Webster suffered no illusions as to the failures of the League. While it was undermined by procedural constraints and an unwillingness among some governments to use force to counter aggression, it experienced a 'catastrophic blow' when the American Senate refused to ratify the Covenant in November 1919.[113] For the future organisation to have any chance of enduring, there would have to be a great power grouping—which must include the United States and the Soviet Union—at the centre of the organisation. This grouping would need to remain unhindered by stifling bureaucratic procedure and would have to be flexible enough to dispense overwhelming force to counter aggression. In other words, as he wrote in 1943, 'Power and

[111] Webster, 'The Evolution of a World State', unpublished paper, Webster 21/1, LSE
[112] Webster, 'The World State: A Matter of Gradual Evolution', *The Times*, 16 July 1938
[113] 'Memorandum on the Causes of the Failure of the League', July 7, 1942, Webster Papers, 8/8

responsibility must be commensurate with each other.'[114] As important for Webster, however, was that small states be included in the organisation, that there be mechanisms designed for the peaceful settlement of disputes, and that economic and social organisations—especially those of the League which were deemed successful—be incorporated into the wider organisation.

While not as entrenched in the most detailed planning operations, Cadogan became increasingly attentive to the work of the Economic and Reconstruction Department. Long viewed as a stoic and competent leader, his interjections during the planning stages reflected both his previous professional experience as well as his changing view of Britain's global position.[115] On the latter consideration, Cadogan's view was hardly defeatist. Instead, it was based on an honest assessment of Britain's worldwide capabilities. As early as 1940, Cadogan wrote that British influence in the Far East was a 'sham' and that they had been 'bluffing' for decades.[116] When it came to the post-war international organisation, Cadogan's suggestions were rooted in his experience as the Head of the League of Nations Section in the 1920s. One of the lessons was that any future system needed to be 'flexible' and rely on guiding principles, as opposed to adhering to a more rigid 'constitution and procedure'.[117] Another was a basic conception and appreciation for power. As he wrote in 1943, 'The history of the last 20 years has surely shown us that no "machinery" for keeping the peace will work unless there is the power to drive it, and the will to use the power.'[118]

In examining certain elements of these diplomats' intellectualism as well as their wartime work, a distinct method and approach to statecraft emerges. It defies simple

[114] Webster minute, 9 September 1943, FO 371/35397/U3814. Webster also reiterated this concept in a lecture in 1943. Webster, 'Some Problems of International Organisation', Montague Burton Lecture at the University of Leeds, 15 October 1943, Webster papers, E(1)/946, LSE
[115] Reynolds and Hughes, *Historian as Diplomat*, p. 86
[116] Cadogan minute, 31 October 1940, FO 371/25208/W11399
[117] For example, see Telegram from Cadogan to Foreign Office, No. 4502, 22 August 1944, FO 371/40706/U6987
[118] Cadogan minute, 13 April 1943, FO 371/35366/U1535

categorisations of realist or idealist, nationalist and internationalist. The thesis does, however, attempt to advance a term—specifically, 'realist-internationalism'—which describes the collective approach of Jebb, Webster and Cadogan. In using this term, the thesis proceeds cautiously, in that it does not seek to create a theory of international relations or to explain how international history might fit into an analytical system.[119] Instead, the term realist-internationalism is used to describe what was a distinct approach by certain members of the Foreign Office to the pressing question of a post-war international order—one which rested on the interplay between, on the one hand, the necessity of national interest and considerations of power, and on the other, the need for a cooperative international system guided by certain principles and laws.[120]

Similar to the approach made in this thesis, a number of scholars have sought to transcend the somewhat narrow descriptions of idealist and realist, nationalist and internationalist, when describing thinkers and statesmen in the 1930s and 1940s.[121] Reynolds and Hughes, as will be discussed in the next chapter, have argued that Webster's thought was a product of realist and idealist notions.[122] Others, such as Raymond Douglas, have described the concept of a 'muscular internationalism', which he argues grew up within the Labour Party in the early years of the war and emphasised the 'military predominance of the great powers'.[123]

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[119] Ernest May, Richard Rosecrance, and Zara Steiner have described the difficulties of explaining history through narrow theoretical constructions. Ernest May, Richard Rosecrance, and Zara Steiner, 'Theory and International History', in Ernest May, Richard Rosecrance, and Zara Steiner (ed.), *History and Neorealism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 5

[120] The phrase 'realist-internationalism' has been used by the Turkish scholar Tarik Oğuzlu, though his conception differs from the one presented in this thesis. Tarik Oğuzlu, 'Isolationism versus internationalism: Which course to take in foreign policy?', *Daily Sabah*, 30 January 2020

[121] Glenda Sluga has gone so far as to describe twentieth-century internationalism as being defined by 'the fine gradations of political realism inspired by the vogue for being internationally minded'. Sluga, *Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism,* pp. 79-80

[122] Reynolds and Hughes, *Historian as Diplomat*, p. 91

[123] Douglas contrasts this with a 'Whig internationalism' which he says was reliant on a belief that constitutionalist international system could—and should—be established. He argues that this was the '"bedrock" of Labour's foreign policy for two decades'. Douglas, *Labour Party*, pp. 7-9, 60-69. It is worth noting that, according to Douglas, the first time the concept of 'muscular' internationalism appeared was in December 1942. It is around this time that Hugh Dalton, the Labour Party intellectual and politician credited by Douglas with this idea, saw Jebb's Four Power Plan. Dalton diary, 6 December 1942, Pimlott (ed.), pp. 532-533

Inderjeet Parmar has noted how thinkers associated with Chatham House and the Council on Foreign Relations remained committed internationalists but also 'recognised certain fundamentals of balance of power and of national-interest-driven world politics'.[124] Elsewhere, Dan Plesch has written that 'the evidence suggests that the leaders of the victorious powers were agreed that realism required a liberal internationalist approach with a strong social democratic theme.'[125]

The term which bears the nearest resemblance to the concept of 'realist-internationalism' as laid out in this thesis is 'Hobbesian idealism', which the historian David Long has used to articulate a version of internationalism which grew up in the interwar period.[126] In explaining this concept, Long writes that it 'marks a move away from old liberalism's idea of international legal machinery as a surrogate for more violent resolution of conflict, towards a view that international law legitimized the use of force by the collective representatives of the international society'.[127] Realist-internationalism as practiced by these British Foreign Office officials differs with Hobbesian idealism in one important way, however. The peaceful resolution of disputes, as well as an international court to resolve juridical disputes, was viewed as an essential part of the international organisation. Though

[124] Parmar labeled these thinkers 'patriotic internationalists', a phrase which was influenced, he notes, by Akira Iriye's term 'nationalistic internationalism'. Parmar, p. 72, 231 fn 55, 59. For Iriye, Wilsonian internationalism embodied this approach. Akira Iriye, *From Nationalism to Internationalism: US Foreign Policy to 1914* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977), pp. vii, 231-237

[125] Plesch, 'How the United Nations Beat Hitler and Prepared the Peace', p. 138; Mark Mazower has also noted the more realist nature of the United Nations Organization, writing that it was effectively 'the League reborn only now modified and adjusted…to the frank realities of a new configuration of great power politics'. Mazower, *No Enchanted Palace*, p. 194

[126] He points to Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson's *The European Anarchy* of 1916 as the foundation for this approach. Hobbesian idealism differed from 'new liberal internationalism' and 'Cobdenism', all of which, Long claims, constituted three 'strands' of the liberal internationalist tradition which grew up in the interwar period. David Long, 'Inter-War Idealism, Liberal Internationalism, and Contemporary International Theory', in David Long and Peter Wilson (ed.), *Thinkers of the Twenty Years' Crisis: Inter-war Idealism Reassessed* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 302-328, here p. 312

[127] Ibid, pp. 314-315. Ian Hall has briefly discussed what he calls a 'Hobbesian internationalism' present in Paul Kennedy's *The Parliament of Man*. Similar to Long's 'Hobbesian idealism', Hall writes that 'Hobbesian internationalism' was 'a perspective that found its earliest exponent in…Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson'. Ian Hall, 'World government and empire: the international historian as theorist', *International Affairs* 82:6 (2006): 1155-1165, here pp. 1160-61

many disputes were seen to been political in nature (and thereby incapable of being resolved by judicial procedure alone), many disputes were seen to be of a legal character, and therefore subject to the rulings of the international court.

As this thesis will argue, the concept of realist-internationalism can best be understood by the way in which Jebb, Webster and Cadogan sought to design and negotiate the machinery of an international organisation. To take two of the key building blocks—one representing a structure and the other a mechanism—as examples, there was established a hierarchy of authority and the development of a kind of code of conduct. First, the great powers, through the structure of the security council, would remain primarily responsible for the maintenance of peace and security throughout the world. This was a view shared by British officials well before their earliest meetings with their American and Soviet counterparts, each of whom, to varying degrees, had also arrived at this basic premise. This idea of the great powers at the centre of a wider international system was a principle which, for Jebb and Webster especially, was based on the Concert of Europe in the nineteenth century. Second, the behaviour of countries within the international system would be guided—and at times constrained—by the general stipulations laid down by an international organisation and enforced by the great powers. One example was the pacific settlement of disputes. For British officials in particular, a lingering lesson of the League of Nations had been the absence of mechanisms which would allow countries to resolve disputes without recourse to war. Webster, in particular, played a key role in introducing such functions into the British plans both for the General Assembly and Security Council, so that countries harbouring grievances—for example, over territorial boundaries—could, in theory, bring them before an international arbitrating body. There was, therefore, an element of truth in his reflection on the day of the signing of the United Nations

Charter, when he claimed to have helped design 'the new methods of harmonising the Great Power Alliance theory and the League theory'.[128]

The result was an international order which, as it stood in June 1945, worked for the national interests of Britain. As Jebb reflected on the process in the weeks after the San Francisco Conference, he noted how the new organisation helped the Foreign Office achieve its original aims. The United States was now 'tied in' to post-war commitments, a point which had remained the most important objective throughout. For the smaller powers making up the United Nations, their security was 'secured', and their economic and social interests protected. As for the Soviet Union, it would 'shortly be bound by the most solemn obligations, which it must surely hesitate to repudiate'. In what was a confirmation of his original objective at the start of the Economic and Reconstruction Department's planning effort, he wrote that with the creation of the organisation, Britain's 'major foreign political objectives have been secured'.[129]

Structure

The thesis is organised around the development of major memoranda and the deliberation at conferences, all of which serve as the essential inflection points in the process of British planning for a world organisation. The first chapter briefly discusses the respective backgrounds—intellectual and professional—of Gladwyn Jebb, Charles Webster and Alexander Cadogan; and then moves into an examination of the British view towards post-war planning through the end of 1941. The second chapter explores the creation and work of the Foreign Office's Economic and Reconstruction Department which, beginning in 1942, assumed the key planning role for Britain's approach to the post-war world. The head of that

[128] Webster diary, 26 June 1945, in Reynolds and Hughes, *Historian as Diplomat*, pp. 69-73. As Webster later put it, 'All great institutions have been produced by reconciling high principles with vested interests… and the attempt to construct a Charter to meet the peculiar needs of our own age is rooted both in national interests and moral purposes.' Webster, 'The Making of the Charter of the United Nations', p. 16

[129] Memorandum by Jebb, 'Reflections on San Francisco', 25 July 1945, FO 371/50732/U5998

department, Gladwyn Jebb, produced a paper titled the 'Four Power Plan', which, after weathering criticisms and counter-proposals from other government ministries, became the 'United Nations Plan'. While not yet official policy, it would become the conceptual framework for later planning stages, especially when it came to the post-war international organisation. The third chapter traces the development of the 'United Nations Plan' through the summer of 1943, when it became the 'United Nations Plan for Organising Peace'.

The second half of the thesis begins with an examination of Foreign Office planning in the autumn of 1943, a period in which the official approach shifted towards first, balancing the post-war aims of both the United States and the Soviet Union and second, reaching agreement between the three powers. A number of considerations—including the relationship between the great powers; the responsibilities of the great powers relative to the small powers; and whether alliances might buttress or underpin such organisation—helped frame Jebb and Webster's distinct 'realist-internationalist' approach to the post-war world, and it led to what would become, by the spring of 1944, a British grand strategy for the post-war period. Chapter five traces the development of this grand strategy throughout the spring and summer of 1944. A set of five memoranda which constituted the British proposals for a post-war organisation were developed and eventually sent to the American and Soviet governments, while proposals for a 'Western Security Group' which might underpin the wider organisation were put forward within the Foreign Office. The sixth chapter examines the work of Foreign Office officials before, during and after the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, where the three powers first agreed to detailed proposals for an international organisation. The final chapter begins with the Yalta Conference and ends with the signing of the United Nations Charter on 26 June 1945. The result was a United Nations Organization which, while the greatest internationalist creation the world had yet known, was also seen by Foreign Office officials to work in the interests of the United Kingdom.

The leap from speculating on a future international order and seeing that vision come to life was, among other things, a feat of diplomatic ingenuity. It is that journey—from abstract idealism about a world organisation to the creation of a durable structural entity in the form of the United Nations Organization—that this thesis examines in detail. A genuinely internationalist impulse animated the work of Jebb, Webster and Cadogan; but at the same time, they were anchored by an unsentimental and hard-headed desire to put the national interest of the United Kingdom first. This balance—between the constructive work of drafting plans for a world organisation and the desire to do so in one's own image, and to one's own ends—played out at every turn.

Chapter One

Jebb, Webster, Cadogan and the Early Stages of Foreign Office Planning, 1939 – 1941

This chapter sets out to examine the early years of Foreign Office planning for the post-war period. It first offers a brief summary of Jebb's, Webster's and Cadogan's careers through the 1930s and importantly, some insight into the formation of their worldviews in the period preceding the war. Jebb was decidedly realist in his outlook and placed a priority on an active strategy which advanced British national interest in the post-war world. Though he showed openness to internationalist schemes which embraced legal, economic and social dimensions, Jebb rarely strayed from the precept that political order based on the organisation of military power was the fundamental pillar of regional and international order. Webster was the internationalist of the group, though his recommendations were far from ambitious schemes which sought to transcend power politics. His approach, broadly speaking, was one which attempted to balance national interests with universal principles. Cadogan, though more of the engineer of the British planning effort, also brought his past professional experience to bear on the questions facing the creation of an international organisation. The views of each man served as important intellectual tributaries to what might be considered a realist-internationalist approach to the post-war world.

Though historians have previously addressed some of the intellectualism of both Jebb and Webster, this chapter adds to this body of scholarship by drawing on certain aspects of their worldview which have been somewhat understated.[130] For Jebb, some of his university writings, especially those related to iconic statesmen of the seventeenth and nineteenth

[130] Greenwood, chapters 1-4 cover Jebb's early years in the Foreign Office through to his work during the Second World War. Greenwood, *Titan at the Foreign Office*, pp. 1-201. See also Reynolds and Hughes, *Historian as Diplomat*, pp. 83-108; Ian Hall, 'The Art and Practice of a Diplomatic Historian', pp. 470-490

centuries, are brought to the fore, as is his proposition that a degree of 'tension' in international politics is necessary to a stable order.[131] For Webster, emphasis is laid on a paper he prepared as a graduate student in the first decade of the twentieth century which has, heretofore, been overlooked by scholars examining his view of international relations.[132] Here he argued that a world state was not only possible but inevitable, given the steady progression of peaceful inter-state relations. It was a conception which, as this chapter argues, Webster had not yet abandoned by the time the Second World War began. As for Cadogan, few scholars have addressed his worldview, an unfortunate gap in the literature given Cadogan's presence and influence in British foreign policy from the 1920s through the 1940s.[133] This chapter will lay out certain aspects of his worldview prior to the Second World War, and thus provide somewhat of an intellectual foundation for his policy recommendations.

After briefly examining Jebb, Webster and Cadogan, the chapter then describes some of the ideological and institutional context in which early notions of a future world organisation began to crystallise in the period. Though Cadogan was the only member of this triumvirate to contribute substantively to post-war matters in the earliest years of the war, the work of other Foreign Office officials and Cabinet members provided an essential framework in which future plans would develop. The pivotal moment in the early years of planning—and hence the event around which this chapter is organised—was the signing of the Atlantic Charter during a meeting between Churchill and Roosevelt in Placentia Bay in August 1941. The chapter shines light on the role that Cadogan played in drafting and revising the Charter at this conference—a contribution which has been undervalued in many of the histories of the meeting—before

[131] For example, Sean Greenwood, in his biography of Jebb, discusses his idea that 'tension of some kind is a condition of all life', but he does not take into account Jebb's university writings, or his desire to be a so-called 'entwerfer'. Greenwood, *Titan at the Foreign Office*, pp. 54-57

[132] No mention of this work is made in Ian Hall's 'The Art and Practice of a Diplomatic Historian' or Reynolds and Hughes' *The Historian as Diplomat.*

[133] David Dilks' discussion of Cadogan provides some essential background, as does Neilson and Otte's chapter on Cadogan's tenure as Permanent Under-Secretary. David Dilks (ed.), *The Diaries of Alexander Cadogan,* pp. 4-15; Keith Neilson and T.G. Otte, *The Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 1854*-1946, pp. 234-257

addressing the way in which the Foreign Office viewed the joint declaration in the months that followed.[134] While a diplomatic landmark, the signing of the joint declaration was not necessarily viewed as a triumph within the Foreign Office, a fact which has also not been as rigorously examined in previous histories.[135] Officials were suspicious of American intentions and willingness to follow through on what they considered ambitious, even vague, principles. Added to this was a concern with the ramifications that such a declaration would have on future Anglo-Soviet relations.[136] The chapter is brought to a close with the signing of the United Nations Declaration in January 1942, a moment in which, for the first time, the conception of the great powers leading a group calling itself the 'United Nations' became clear.

There are a number of themes which arise from this early phase before the planning process began in earnest. For one, the impetus for planning was initially reactive, and it was Hitler's efforts in espousing a 'New Order' for Europe which drove both the Cabinet and Foreign Office to begin thinking about war aims. One of the key figures in this early stage of post-war planning was John Maynard Keynes who was then working in the Treasury. It was his vision for future financial and monetary mechanisms on the continent which proved to be one of the key catalysts for Foreign Office thinking about the post-war world.[137] Elsewhere within Britain, the discussion over a future world order had begun in the public sphere and had

[134] Historical accounts of this meeting have often undervalued the role that Cadogan played in the drafting of the joint declaration. Russell, *A History of the United Nations Charter*, pp. 34-39. Several accounts of the Atlantic Charter meeting, for example, do not give credit to Cadogan for the first draft. See Theodore A. Wilson, *The First Summit: Roosevelt and Churchill at Placentia Bay, 1941* (Boston: Houghton and Mifflin Company, 1969), pp. 187-188; Hoopes and Brinkley, *FDR and the Creation of the U.N.*, p. 36. This is due in large part to Churchill taking credit for the draft in his memoirs. See Winston Churchill, *The Second World War, Vol. III,* pp. 385-386. Important exceptions include D.C. Watt who has written, albeit briefly, that the Atlantic Charter 'was largely a British document, drafted at Roosevelt's request by Sir Alexander Cadogan'. D.C. Watt, 'Britain and the Historiography of the Yalta Conference and the Cold War', *Diplomatic History* 13:1 (1989), p. 76. See also Louis, *Imperialism at Bay*, p. 123; David Reynolds, 'The Atlantic "Flop": British Foreign Policy and the Churchill-Roosevelt Meeting of August 1941', in Douglas Brinkley and David R. Facey-Crowther (ed.), *The Atlantic Charter* (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1994), pp. 129-150

[135] William Roger Louis has discussed the reaction of the Colonial Office to the Charter. Louis, *Imperialism at Bay*, pp. 126-133

[136] Ross, 'Foreign Office Attitudes to the Soviet Union 1941-45', pp. 522-523; Folly, *Churchill, Whitehall and the Soviet Union*, pp. 35-38

[137] For a discussion of Keynes's 'new order', see Skidelsky, pp. 194-199

captured the minds of some prominent intellectuals and campaigners. Lionel Curtis, Alfred Zimmern and Arnold Toynbee were among those who had been urging the government to take up the question of a future international order. While some historians have credited Toynbee with driving the thinking of the Cabinet in these years, this chapter argues that, in fact, Toynbee was a rather marginal figure, with many Foreign Office officials considering the great historian to be ignoring some of the hard realities and commitments of British foreign policy.[138] Within the Cabinet itself, despite the creation of a War Aims Committee in the summer of 1940, there was little enthusiasm for these efforts. Instead, attention remained on the war effort.

Throughout the period, however, the Foreign Office gradually began to become the most important centre of gravity for *thinking* about and then *planning* for the post-war world.[139] At first, officials scrambled to counter Hitler's propaganda by attempting to consolidate their own views. They quickly realised, however, that such efforts quickly brought up the largest questions of British foreign policy, namely the shape and nature of the international system after the war, as well as Britain's relations with the Soviet Union and the United States. It was the consideration of these questions which, in part, contributed to Cadogan's draft at the Atlantic Conference in August 1941, as well as to the Foreign Office's approach towards the Soviet Union in the months that followed. It is an understanding of this context which is essential to the more detailed planning processes that followed from 1942 onwards.

[138] Douglas, *Labour Party*, pp. 104-106. Similarly, Mark Mazower has highlighted the intellectual thought and influence of Alfred Zimmern, yet the records of the Foreign Office in this period show that, like Toynbee, Zimmern was a marginal figure. Mazower, *No Enchanted Palace*, p. 68

[139] Previous histories have largely undervalued the post-war thinking within the Foreign Office during these years. Rothwell notes that, in the early years of the war, 'Churchill's dislike of public debate of war aims had a counterpart in his dealings with the Foreign Office', yet he does not attempt to examine Foreign Office thinking in depth. Rothwell, *War Aims in the Second World War*, p. 66; Christopher Hill, *Cabinet Decisions on Foreign Policy,* pp. 188-215

The Realist: Gladwyn Jebb

The official most responsible for encouraging and coordinating planning for a post-war organisation throughout the war was Gladwyn Jebb. A brief look into his background at university and in his early decades at the Foreign Office reveals an individual who, armed with a sharp historical acumen, was willing to engage with emerging political ideas but at the same time, was stern in his understanding of what was both achievable and necessary in the realm of international affairs. Furthermore, as his career progressed, he became determined to be a mover and shaper of British foreign policy.

Jebb entered the Foreign Office in 1924 by way of Eton and Magdalen College, Oxford. At the former, he came under the tutelage of a young Aldous Huxley, a man who Jebb later credited with the 'real beginning' of his education. 'My eyes were opened, my zest for knowledge was quickened', he wrote in later years. At Oxford, he worked with Lewis Namier, twelve years his senior, and a historian who sparked his interest in modern history.[140] Jebb's bookshelves in these years were lined with the memoirs of the great statesmen, figures such as Charles Maurice de Talleyrand, Otto von Bismarck, and even a recent work by his future subordinate in the Foreign Office, Charles Webster, entitled *Castlereagh's Foreign Policy and the Congress of Vienna*.[141] His essays in the period were littered with praise for the work of diplomatists. Jebb wrote of Cardinal Richelieu that the seventeenth-century French statesmen was 'unquestionably the greatest that France ever produced'; while for the British Foreign Secretary Lord Castlereagh, he said that it was 'to his credit as a diplomatist that he was impervious to any of the great, vague, ideas that were then troubling the Continent'.[142]

[140] Jebb, *The Memoirs of Lord Gladwyn*, p. 15
[141] Jebb's notebook from 1920 contains a list of books he consulted for his essays. See GLAD 9/1/6
[142] Essay by Jebb, 'How far is it true that Richelieu was as great a failure as a home minister as he was successful as a politician?', undated, GLAD 9/1/7; Essay by Jebb, 'British Policy at the Congress of Vienna', 12 October 1920, GLAD 9/1/6

As Jebb began to engage more with contemporary politics during these years, his views on idealism and morality in international politics came to the fore. A popular topic in his writings was the League of Nations, an institution which was still in its infancy. The organisation, he wrote, brought up fundamental questions about the sovereignty of states. Though he acknowledged that organisations such as the League might wear down the traditional notion of sovereignty, it was important to understand that the principle would always remain a central aim of individuals and their communities. As such, he warned against focusing on 'the vague prospects of the day after tomorrow' and instead 'the practical necessities of today'.[143] This marked the beginning of what was a recurring battle for Jebb, namely what he perceived to be the naivete of so-called 'idealists'. As he wrote to a friend during his first posting in Tehran:

> I've no use for the people who don't see a continuity in politics as in everything else, and who attempt to found purely practical measures on some sort of moral notion. They're bound to be disappointed, and a disappointed idealist is the worst kind of pessimist.[144]

When Jebb entered the Foreign Office in 1924, it did not take long for him to catch his superiors' attention. Harold Nicholson, then Minister in Tehran, wrote that Jebb 'thinks in a straight line, none of that wobbly business'.[145] On a personal level, however, the young diplomat was struggling with what he saw as the monotony of his job in these years. He complained to a friend that 'the life of a diplomat is possibly a rather narrow, a rather unenterprising one', and that there was not much room, at least at his level, for being a 'creator' or designer of important plans.[146] Even Cadogan, under whom Jebb served as Private Secretary, wrote that Jebb was 'always…talking about broad issues of foreign policy and giving his

[143] Essay by Jebb, untitled, GLAD 9/1/8
[144] Jebb to Richard Rees, 16 August 1926, GLAD 8/24
[145] Harold Nicholson to Lancelot, 22 October 1926, GLAD 8/23. Portions of this letter are quoted in Greenwood, *Titan at the Foreign Office*, p. 8
[146] Jebb wrote to his friend that, 'There is not a great deal of scope for as the Germans would put it "entwerfer."' This roughly translates to 'creator' of ideas or concepts. Jebb to Richard Rees, 1 July 1926, GLAD 8/24

views' when, in fact, all he wanted was someone to perform the essential administrative duties.[147]

For all of Jebb's curiosity and ambitions in his university years and during his early postings in the Foreign Office, the 1930s marked a period in which he would more forcefully advance his views on foreign policy. As his biographer Sean Greenwood has noted, Jebb expressed a pessimism about the League which would colour his later work. As he wrote to his wife, 'The real trouble is that there are too many Great Powers outside the League (America, Japan and Germany) to make "collective security" anything else but a name.'[148] In his official work, he began producing long memoranda—sometimes solicited, other times not—in which he took on the major questions of the decade, seeking to apply dynamic strategies in what Greenwood has noted was a 'wide-ranging, world-shaping style'.[149] In June 1936, he declared that 'The "Grand Design" of the League of Nations is over…[and] it is time to build another on the interplay of living forces.' This could be accomplished, he continued, by 'an astute and lively pursuit of "Realpolitik"', which, in Jebb's view, amounted to setting Hitler and Mussolini against one another, pressuring France with a combination of inducements and threats, and eventually reaching an agreement with Germany. 'Our policy now is dictated solely by our interests', he wrote.[150] Two years later, in a memorandum which echoed some of his earlier suggestions, Jebb spoke of a theme which would animate his later proposals during the Second World War. In his view, 'tension' in international affairs was not only an inevitable occurrence but a necessary factor in keeping the peace between great powers. The key was ensuring that the tension was not too great or too small. If the former, the system would collapse

[147] Quoted in Greenwood, *Titan at the Foreign Office*, p. 48
[148] Jebb to Cynthia Jebb, 1 September 1935, quoted in Greenwood, *Titan at the Foreign Office*, p. 24
[149] Greenwood has written that, 'Though he wrote rather well, he also wrote too much. His complex, super-charged mind caused him to pour out memoranda in a wide-ranging, world-shaping style sometimes with quite convoluted conclusions.' Greenwood, *Titan at the Foreign Office*, pp. xxv, 47-48
[150] Memorandum by Jebb, 'Probable consequences of closing or failing to close the Suez Canal to Italy', undated, 1936, FCO 73/262/It/36/8

and if the latter, Britain would become a victim of the actions of others. 'In short, and in terms of practical politics', he wrote, 'we should aim at…a strong Britain and a workable Balance of Power.'[151]

As Jebb began to present his first major post-war policy recommendations in 1942, some of these earlier themes appear more clearly. First, the United Kingdom needed a coordinated foreign policy which was active rather than passive. Second, highly idealistic schemes—for example a world state or even those appealing to notions of 'common humanity'—would need to be ignored, in favour of more realistic solutions based largely on the distribution of military and economic power. Third, securing the British national interest remained the primary objective of any future foreign policy. While this might involve a wider international system, such an arrangement would have to work in the interests of the United Kingdom. Finally, Jebb looked to the Concert of Europe as the preeminent example of great powers combining to maintain an inherently unruly international order. This interest in the European congress system of the nineteenth century was shared by his future colleague, Charles Webster, though each had extracted very different lessons from the period.

The Internationalist: Charles Webster

Charles Webster was arguably the most complex and historically expert mind within the Foreign Office's post-war planning operation. While his expertise on past organisations instilled in him a respect for the influence and capability of great powers, he was also an internationalist who, at times, harboured radical, long-term visions of international organisation—ones which may have surprised some of his colleagues during the Second World War had they been fully known. His work for the Economic and Reconstruction Department,

[151] Memorandum by Jebb, 'Defence of the West', 25 April 1938, FCO 73/257/Def/38/1/A. See also Greenwood, *Titan at the Foreign Office*, p. 34

however, was based on views refined over almost forty years as well as a life-long desire to influence politics. He remained an internationalist but one who sought to bridge the gap between the more utopian ideas of a future world order that he once entertained and Jebb's more cynical or sceptical view of the realities of the international system. Both shared, crucially, a training in history and an appreciation for its modern relevance.

When Webster entered the University of Cambridge in the autumn of 1904, the study of history was continuing an evolution that had begun nearly thirty years before. Historians such as Lord Acton and John Robert Seeley had not only been treating the study of modern history as a distinct discipline but had also been encouraging their students to apply their historical study to contemporary politics, to assist what Webster later referred to as 'men of action'.[152] Even when it came to choosing the topic of his doctoral dissertation—'Studies in Foreign Policy, 1814-1818'—Webster acknowledged that he chose this subject because of the information that it might provide contemporary statesmen.[153] Not only did it offer a heretofore neglected piece of nineteenth-century history, he wrote in the introduction, but it also showed that 'many of the same problems which arose then are being forced upon statesmen at the present day.'[154]

Webster had only recently become the Chair of Modern History at the University of Liverpool when the First World War broke out. Angered form the start by Germany's violation of Belgium neutrality, he joined the Army Service Corps as a junior officer.[155] More so than anything, the job was a stepping-stone for Webster, who, early on in the war, had become

[152] For Webster's view of Acton, see Webster, 'The Study of Nineteenth Century Diplomacy', Inaugural Lecture at the University of Liverpool, 10 December 1914 (London: G. Bell and Sons, 1915), p. 6; Webster, Ford Lectures, University of Oxford, 1948, p. 1, in Webster 21/18, LSE
[153] Webster, Ford Lectures, University of Oxford, 1948, p. 1, Webster 21/18, LSE
[154] Webster, Introduction, 'Studies in Foreign Policy, 1814-1818', Dissertation, 1909, KCAC/4/11/1/Webster, King's College Archive Centre, University of Cambridge [hereafter KCAC]
[155] S.T. Bindoff and G.N. Clark, 'Charles Kingsley Webster, 1886-1961', in *Proceedings of the British Academy, Vol XLVIII* (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), p. 431; John Edwin Fagg, 'Sir Charles Webster', in S. William Halperin (ed.), *Some 20th Century Historians: Essays on Eminent Europeans* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961), p. 175. Copy in Webster 27/1, LSE

determined to be involved in the peace conference that would conclude the conflict.[156] Webster was eventually brought into the Military Intelligence Division at the War Office and then Historical Section of the Foreign Office, where in December 1918, he was asked to write about the lessons of the Congress of Vienna. The Congress which came on the heels of the Napoleonic Wars, he wrote, was the 'only assembly which can furnish even a shadowy precedent for the great task that lies before the statesmen and peoples of the world'.[157] The paper was eventually printed and circulated at the Paris Peace Conference, where it received a mixed reception. Some in the British delegation, including Harold Nicholson, considered it essential reading, while others, such as President Woodrow Wilson proclaimed that there would be 'no odour of Vienna…brought into the proceedings'.[158] Despite Wilson's criticism, Webster, like Jebb, continued to look to the Concert of Europe as an important precedent for a future international order. But where Jebb saw the Congress system as an example of great power dominance, Webster saw the conference diplomacy of the period as the modern origins of internationalism.

In addition to his historical scholarship and his desire to influence politics, Webster also harboured a distinct worldview which was the product of his own intellectual journey. The historian T.G. Otte has called Webster a liberal internationalist; while other scholars, such as Ian Hall, have examined his international thought more closely, arguing that his thinking did not fit into the basic categories of realist or idealist.[159] Reynolds and Hughes, in their attempt to describe the complexity of Webster's thinking by the 1940s, posit that he was 'idealist in his

[156] Webster, unpublished autobiography, p. 1, Webster 23/6, LSE
[157] Webster, *Congress of Vienna, 1814-1815* (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1963), p. iii
[158] See Goldstein, 'Historians Outside the Academy', p. 203. Webster mentions this anecdote in the preface of the 1934 edition of his book *The Congress of Vienna*. See Webster, *The Congress of Vienna, 1814-1815* (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1963), p. 15
[159] Otte, '"The Confederation of Europe"?', p. 317; Hall, 'The Art and Practice of a Diplomatic Historian', p. 471-472

realism'.[160] While this thesis largely agrees with the analyses of Hall, Reynolds and Hughes, it is worth noting some of Webster's earliest writings as well as the fact that he held onto many of these views decades later.

As a postgraduate at Cambridge, he exhibited a rather radical idealism, arguing that a world state was not only a possibility but an inevitability. Citing the Geneva Convention of 1864, the Brussels Conference of 1874 and the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907, Webster argued that these landmark meetings had developed laws governing the use of force which could restrict a nation's ability to wage war. Furthermore, the establishment of the International Court of Arbitration in 1899 had created international machinery for arbitration, which, he wrote, 'has come to be regarded as a practical alternative to war just as a trial was…regarded as an alternative to the family feud'.[161] The remaining stage in this evolution of a world state, Webster believed, would be reached once states abolished war in favour of compulsory arbitration, a transition which had been undertaken in the domestic context but remained elusive in the international system. Far from a fleeting dream of a young idealist, Webster wrote in the pages of *The Times* in 1938 that, 'The ultimate objective of those who wish to bring peace to the world should be a world state.' Moreover, such a world state would not 'be made by a single act but will come gradually into existence', largely through global institutions such as the League of Nations and the International Court.[162] This conception of a progressive, evolving internationalism is one which has not previously been highlighted in studies of Webster's thought, but it is one which is central to understanding his approach to what would

[160] Reynolds and Hughes, *Historian as Diplomat*, p. 91. Elsewhere, Inderjeet Parmar builds on Reynolds and Hughes analysis of Webster, yet he classifies Webster as a 'realist'. Parmar, *Think Tanks and Power in Foreign Policy*, p. 103

[161] Webster, 'The Evolution of a World State', unpublished paper, p. 3, Webster 21/1, LSE. Webster wrote years later that after reading the *Federalist* for the first time in 1908, he wrote this paper for a discussion group at King's College which was led by Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson. See Webster, 'The World State', *The Times*, 25 July 1938

[162] Webster, 'A Matter of Gradual Evolution', *The Times*, 16 July 1938

become the United Nations.[163]

Another important component of Webster's outlook was his admiration for Lord Castlereagh and President Woodrow Wilson, two figures who many placed at opposite ends of a political spectrum. Though the latter looked to the European politics of the nineteenth century as crude and destabilising, Webster saw this period as one in which the great powers developed a workable and largely peaceful international order. Lord Castlereagh, in particular—on whom Webster had completed a two-volume study in 1925—he credited as the 'founder' of the Concert of Europe. He praised Castlereagh's ability to secure the 'special rights and privileges' for the great powers as well as certain protections for the smaller powers. This achievement, Webster noted, was due to the Foreign Secretary having 'as deep an interest in the reconstruction of Europe as he had in purely British interests'.[164]

Webster's praise for Castlereagh sat alongside his affection for Woodrow Wilson, despite the President's criticism of his paper at the Paris Peace Conference. Wilson, Webster declared in a speech in 1930, had been 'one of the main intellectual and moral influences' of his life.[165] The post-war international organisation which Wilson had done so much to design had not only 'provided the greatest experiment in political machinery that the world has known', but it had also served to become the 'organized moral force of men throughout the world'.[166] Still for all his praise of it being a moral force, Webster understood that the League, if it was to survive, could not rest on this aspect alone. It would need sufficient force and more

[163] Hall's article, as well as Reynolds and Hughes' book, do not mention this 'Evolution of a World State' paper. Though he also does not mention the Webster draft paper, Hidemi Suganami has highlighted Webster's effort to harmonise the 'great power alliance theory' with the 'League theory', writing that, 'The United Nations…can be regarded as an attempt to transform the structure of international society one step closer to that of domestic society.' Hidemi, Suganami, *The Domestic Analogy and World Order Proposals* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 127

[164] Webster, *British Diplomacy, 1813-1815* (London: G. Bell and Sons, 1921), p. xli. Ian Hall also notes that Webster admired British statesmen who tied British interests to those of the European continent. Hall, 'The Art and Practice of a Diplomatic Historian', pp. 483-4

[165] Webster, 'What the World Owes to President Wilson', p. 1, copy in Webster 22/47, LSE

[166] Webster, *League of Nations in Theory and Practice* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1933), pp. 54-55. See also Webster, 'What the World Owes to President Wilson', Extract from the Congressional Record for 10 January 1930 (League of Nations Union, 1930), p. 17, copy in Webster 22/47, LSE

importantly, the willingness to employ it. Indeed, theories aimed at ending war through increasing economic ties or altruistic calls for 'brotherhood' were, Webster warned, 'just about as powerful as cobwebs across the mouth of a cannon'.[167]

As the League of Nations became increasingly fragile throughout the 1930s, a frustrated Webster implored his countrymen to defend it. In a line which echoed his point that Castlereagh had seen British interests as intimately bound up with the European continent, Webster wrote that '[Britain's] salvation lies in making effective the 'League system'.[168] Still, despite his pessimism with the League of Nations, he believed that an international organisation of nation-states was the only option going forward. 'The world', he insisted, 'is gradually discovering that it must provide itself with machinery for international co-operation if civilization is to survive'.[169]

By the Second World War, Webster's long association with Chatham House, his reputation as one of the most prominent British historians of the period and his prolific commentary on League of Nations affairs in the interwar years meant that he was a well-respected voice when it came to discussions of British foreign policy. Far from a hermetic historian, Webster had cultivated relationships with influential figures on both sides of the Atlantic. Within Britain, Webster could call on government ministers such as Leo Amery and Stafford Cripps; while in the United States, he visited with senior State Department officials at the behest of the Minister of Information Duff Cooper.[170] As the war progressed, these contacts, coupled with his own expertise, brought Webster ever-closer to the levers of

[167] Webster, 'What the World Owes to President Wilson', p. 15, copy in Webster 22/47, LSE. Here Webster was borrowing a line from one of his doctoral examiners, Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson, who, in his 1916 classic *The European Anarchy*, wrote of men who believe that international law is 'as fragile as a cobweb stretched before the mouth of a cannon'. Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson, *The European Anarchy* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1916), p. 150

[168] Webster, 'Why the Crisis? Is there a way out?' *News Chronicle*, undated, Webster 22/1, LSE

[169] Webster, *League of Nations in Theory and Practice*, p. 306

[170] On 31 August and 2 September 1942, for example, Webster visited with Amery and Cripps, respectively, and discussed issues concerning the post-war international system. See Reynolds and Hughes, *Historian as Diplomat*, p. 17. On Webster's visit to the United States between 31 March and 15 May 1941, see ibid, pp. 13-15; and Parmar, *Think Tanks and Power in Foreign Policy*, pp. 79, 85

policymaking, a reality which meant that he might finally become a 'man of action' himself.

The Engineer: Alexander Cadogan

If Jebb and Webster were the chief architects, Cadogan, in his position as Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office from 1938 to 1946, was the engineer responsible for seeing the plans through the negotiating stages. He played a central role during the drafting of the Atlantic Charter, and as the Economic and Reconstruction Department progressed on their plans throughout the war, Cadogan provided crucial direction when necessary.[171] His experience leading the League of Nations section in the Foreign Office for a decade between 1924 and 1934 provided him with invaluable knowledge—and subsequent opinions—on the structure and functioning of international organisation. Not only was this essential to the British planning for an international organisation, but his earlier work also provided him with a knack for navigating the trenches of conference diplomacy, a trait which would serve he and future British delegations well during the war.[172]

Similar to Jebb, Cadogan attended Eton and later Oxford, where he studied history at Balliol College from 1903 to 1906. Two years later, he was accepted into the Diplomatic Service, serving first in Constantinople and then Vienna in 1913. In his latter posting, Cadogan found an Austro-Hungarian Empire that had 'survived into senility', he later wrote.[173] In little over a year, war would grip the continent and Cadogan would return to London and the Foreign Office, where he quickly distinguished himself. Eyre Crowe, the Permanent Under-Secretary in the Foreign Office from 1920 to 1925, considered him 'the best man in the office', and

[171] Jebb noted in the summer of 1943 that Cadogan 'takes a personal interest in the problem'. Jebb to John Maynard Keynes, 28 June 1943, FO 371/35397/U2626

[172] There has been little scholarship focusing directly on Alexander Cadogan and his work. Exceptions include Keith Neilson and T.G. Otte, *The Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 1854*-1946, pp. 234-257; David Dilks (ed.), *The Diaries of Alexander Cadogan,* pp. 4-15; Saville, *The Politics of Continuity*, pp. 13-14

[173] Cadogan, 'First post in Vienna, 1913-1914', unpublished draft of personal memoir, unnumbered pages, Papers of Alexander Cadogan, Churchill College Archives Centre, University of Cambridge [hereafter ACAD] 7/1

subsequently decided to make him the Head of the League of Nations Section within the Western Department in 1923.[174]

In his capacity as a lead advisor on League of Nations affairs, Cadogan won the respect of colleagues, with some describing him as a 'magnificently capable and imperturbable'.[175] But his composed facade masked a man frustrated, at times, by the cumbersome nature of League processes. He wrote of crucial discussions 'floundering' as they wore on, and as a result, the entire atmosphere could be 'depressing'.[176] Reflecting in later years, he wrote that 'there was no lack…of starry-eyed enthusiasts' in Geneva. While the more cynically-minded often brought them 'down to earth' every now and then, such cynics were also guilty of lacking imagination and avoiding 'bold initiative'. 'Cynicism is easier', he said, but this did not make it the preferred approach.[177]

Much of his frustration stemmed from the action—or inaction—of his own government. After the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931, Cadogan warned that a weak League response would undermine the influence of the organisation in future, a position which was at odds with members of the Far Eastern Department of the Foreign Office.[178] 'The League is in rather a bad way', he complained to his wife in 1932, 'owing to the way our Government treat it'. The problem, in his view, was that the Foreign Secretary at the time, John Simon, often arrived at the Disarmament Conference without clear direction from the Cabinet. This left the British delegation on the back foot and at the mercy of the proposals of other powers. 'The fault is that we've got a government of old women who can't even make up their minds', he wrote.[179] It was an experience in conference diplomacy which would shape his approaches both

[174] Quoted in Dilks (ed.), p. 4. For background on Cadogan's career, see Neilson and Otte, pp. 234-257
[175] A.C. Temperley, *The Whispering Gallery of Europe* (London: Collins, 1939), p. 108
[176] Letters from Cadogan to Theo Cadogan, 24 and 27 February 1933, ACAD 3/6
[177] Cadogan, 'Sir J. Simon', unpublished draft of personal memoir, unnumbered pages, ACAD 7/1
[178] McKercher, *Transition of Power*, pp. 117-18
[179] Cadogan to Theo Cadogan, 12 October 1932, ACAD 3/5

as Permanent Under Secretary—especially in the way he worked with Churchill—and as the head of the British delegation to the Dumbarton Oaks Conference in 1944.

After a decade travelling between London and Geneva, Cadogan was sent to China, where he served as British minister for two years. It was there that Cadogan saw first-hand the increasingly aggressive nature of the Japanese regime, the weakness of the Chinese government and the precarious nature of Britain's position in the Far East. Upon returning to London and the Foreign Office in 1936, he found himself in a battle with the Permanent Under-Secretary, Sir Robert Vansittart, and in the midst of an unstable European continent. Anthony Eden, by then in his first stint as Foreign Secretary, had brought Cadogan back with the intention of taking over the top job at the Foreign Office.[180] In the meantime, however, Cadogan set about on an ambitious initiative to reform the League of Nations.

It is a proposal which offers insight into the way in which Cadogan viewed the notion of international order—or, to put it another way, the way in which he thought British officials could re-order an international system before it fractured beyond repair.[181] Despite his support for the League and his optimism that it might survive, the Abyssinian and Rhineland crises had been its collective deathblow. The Covenant, he insisted, 'doesn't work'. This was due, in part, to its being built on the 'rotten foundation' of the Versailles settlement, a treaty which the League seemed to 'perpetuate'. In the first place, the terms dictated to Germany were too harsh and it was unreasonable to expect that the country could be tied down for so long. 'Germany could be held to the Treaty', Cadogan wrote, 'only for so long as the necessary force was there, and available, to compel her, and that time is long since past [sic].' An added problem had been the fact that the Covenant had been buttressed by 'superfluous' international agreements in the years since 1919, many of which, in Cadogan's view, served to weaken the force of the League

[180] Brian McKercher has noted that Cadogan, like Eden, was open to more collective means of ensuring British security. McKercher, 'Old diplomacy and new: the Foreign Office and foreign policy, 1919-1939', p. 105

[181] Neilson and Otte have written that Eden asked Cadogan for proposals because the former was 'looking for alternatives to Vansittart's stark insistence on re-armament'. Neilson and Otte, p. 236

itself. Among these were the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the various non-aggression pacts, such as that signed between Germany and Poland in January 1934. 'Multiplication of pacts is like the inflation of a currency by the printing press', he wrote.[182]

What he suggested, however, was to first review the settlement negotiated at Versailles and then to revise the Covenant. In doing so, they might create a 'more durable basis for the decent regulation of international affairs'. What it came down to, he said, was a 'question of machinery'. First and foremost, the provision allowing for mandatory sanctions would need to be scrapped, given that the experience of the League had shown that countries were not willing to commit to such action pre-emptively. He next suggestion was to look into the possibility of 'regionalising' of the League, so as to make it more functional in various parts of the world. While neither a detailed nor a comprehensive list of suggested revisions, Cadogan wrote that these changes would likely reduce the League to a 'consultative pact' when it came to the maintenance of peace, but this was not to be written off necessarily.[183]

The importance of an ordered international system and the way in which international machinery could bring this about remained a theme in Cadogan's proposals during the Second World War. A point which he continued to stress was that Foreign Office planners should avoid too rigid a design, which he thought might constrain governments from taking action when it was most necessary. Importantly, however, he did not exhibit an over-reliance on international organisation. Even towards the end of the war, when the prospect of a United Nations Organization was drawing ever closer, he entertained the idea of a more basic great power alliance, assuming this would ensure future cooperation between the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union.

[182] Cadogan to Eden, 13 May 1936, ACAD 4/1
[183] Cadogan to Eden, 13 May 1936, ACAD 4/1. Vansittart replied to Cadogan's proposal saying that 'the remedy proposed would prove to be too heroic.' Quoted in Neilson and Otte, p. 236

The search for British war aims, September 1939 – November 1940

From the earliest days of the conflict, much of the thinking about post-war policy on the British side was shaped by the need to counter German propaganda. Just three weeks into the war, the head of the Foreign Office's Political Intelligence Department, Rex Leeper, wrote to Cadogan that the task of developing British propaganda against Germany immediately brought up questions of 'high policy'.[184] It was not enough to simply state what they were fighting against. To convince the populations of Europe that their safety and prosperity laid outside the German Reich, the British government would need to articulate what they were fighting *for*.[185] Cadogan understood that war aims served an important purpose in the struggle, but he admitted that he saw 'awful difficulties' ahead.[186] War aims and peace aims, he wrote elsewhere, were 'loose terms', and they should take one step at a time. 'Get rid of Hitler: that is my *war* aim—not peace aim. Do that first: then you will win the war.'[187]

Though the Foreign Office were just coming around to the consideration of post-war aims in the first months of the war, there were other individuals and groups who had been thinking along these lines for some time. In September, Lord Robert Cecil and the League of Nations Union submitted to the Foreign Office a list of twelve points outlining in broad terms the future organisation of the world.[188] One prominent member of that grouping was Lord Davies, an outspoken and committed internationalist, who was pressuring the Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax to make a statement in the House of Lords.[189] His vision—and one shared by a number of politicians and intellectuals in the period—was for a confederation on

[184] Leeper to Cadogan, 22 September 1939, FO 800/325. Sir Reginald (Rex) Leeper was an Assistant Under-Secretary in the Foreign Office from 1940 to 1943.
[185] Author's emphasis. Memorandum by Leeper on War Aims, 28 September 1939, FO 800/325.
[186] Cadogan diary, 23 September 1939, Dilks (ed.), pp. 219.
[187] His emphasis. Cadogan diary, 7 October 1939, in Dilks (ed.), p. 221-222. Other senior officials made comments on war aims though these remained vague. See Rothwell, *War Aims in the Second World War*, p. 66
[188] Lord Cecil, 'Note on World Settlement After the War', 22 September 1939, FO 800/325/50-51. Robert Cecil, 1st Viscount Cecil of Chelwood, had been one of the key architects of the League of Nations on the British side.
[189] Lord Davies, 'Memorandum on War Aims', 28 September 1939, FO 800/325/59

the continent, under the heading 'The United States of Europe'.[190] One supporter of this idea was Anthony Eden, the man who was to replace Halifax as Foreign Secretary only months later.[191] In September, Eden had written to Halifax that the 'only possible solution is on the lines of some form of European federation' which would include a common defence policy, a customs union and shared currency.[192]

Elsewhere, a grouping of preeminent British academics associated with the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House) were engaging in a collective effort to study the future of international order.[193] In February 1939, Lionel Curtis, one of the founders of the organisation, spoke about the need for a future world order, which in his view should consist of a 'world commonwealth embracing all nations and kindreds and tongues'. He had been inspired by a number of contemporary writers on the subject, including Clarence Streit and his book *Union Now*.[194] In July 1939, Chatham House created the 'World Order Preparatory Group' which was soon to be renamed the 'World Order Study Group'. Armed with a generous donation from the Rockefeller Foundation, the grouping of academics led by historians Arnold Toynbee, Alfred Zimmern and Charles Webster set about on a programme in which they would solicit papers from contributors, all with a focus on the future organisation of peace.[195] Though their work would be disrupted by the start of hostilities, as the war progressed, many of these

[190] Lord Davies, 'Letter to the Editor: War Aims: A Plea for Concrete Proposals', *The Times*, 7 October 1939. See Federal Union pamphlet titled 'Federal Union: Let's not make the same mistake twice', copy in FO 371/28902/W9396

[191] Eden was Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, September 1939 - May 1940, and Secretary of State for War, May 1940 - December 1940, before becoming Foreign Secretary.

[192] Eden to Halifax, September 1939, FO 800/325/71-73

[193] On the activities of Chatham House before and during the Second World War, see Inderjeet Parmar, *Think Tanks and Power in Foreign Policy: A Comparative Study of the Role and Influence of the Council on Foreign Relations and the Royal Institute of International Affairs* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, pp. 48-107. See also Andrea Bosco and Cornelia Navari (ed.), *Chatham House and British Foreign Policy, 1919–1945* (London: Lothian Foundation Press, 1994); Christopher Thorne, 'Chatham House, Whitehall, and Far Eastern Issues: 1941-45', *International Affairs* 54:1 (1978): 1-29

[194] Lionel Curtis, 'World Order', *International Affairs* 18:3 (1939): 301-320, here pp. 310-316

[195] Lionel Curtis to John Fischer Williams, 8 November 1939, MS. Curtis 111, Papers of Lionel Curtis, Bodleian Archives, University of Oxford

historians were brought closer to the policymaking realm, first under the Foreign Research and Press Service (FRPS) and later the Foreign Office Research Department (FORD).[196]

By the summer of 1940, the war situation had changed somewhat drastically. France had fallen and there was now a new government, led by Winston Churchill. Government ministers and Foreign Office officials were still not prioritizing the idea of stating detailed war aims, but the topic continued to be forced on them because of manoeuvres by Hitler who continued to hold the military and diplomatic momentum. The need to counter Hitler's schemes for Europe, in particular, forced Foreign Office officials to think about the fundamental economic and political principles on which a future British and European—and perhaps world—order would rest.

Some, such as Nigel Ronald, argued that because Britain was dependent on export trade, the government would need to commit to a 'better ordering of international economic relations'.[197] Others, such as Frank Roberts of the Northern Department, continued to assert that it was necessary to show British military mettle by making some headway against the Germans. If they failed to do this, elaborate schemes for the future regional and international order would be seen by the rest of the world to be 'impractical or typical British cant and hypocrisy'.[198] For the time being, the Foreign Office felt that the promotion of basic principles should come before more detailed proposals. As the Deputy Under-Secretary, Orme Sargent, noted, 'We shall do best to stick to simple, short-term ideas, based on certain fundamental,

[196] Here they were responsible for furnishing press reports and research memoranda for Foreign Office officials. Parmar, *Think Tanks and Power in Foreign Policy*, pp. 86-90; See also William H. McNeill, *Arnold J. Toynbee: A Life* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 179-182; Ian Hall, '"Time of Troubles": Arnold J Toynbee's twentieth century', *International Affairs* 90:1 (2014): 23-36. See also Robert H. Keyserlingk, 'Arnold Toynbee's Foreign Research and Press Service, 1939-43 and Its Post-War Plans for South-East Europe', *Journal of Contemporary History* 21:4 (1986): 539-558

[197] Memorandum by Ronald, 'Suggested points for inclusion in speeches replying to Hitler's promise of an economic paradise', 24 July 1940, FO 371/25207/W9283

[198] Roberts minute on paper by Julian Huxley, 1 August 1940, FO 371/25207/W9699

permanent principles…and to eschew, however alluring and plausible they may be, far-reaching and all-embracing Utopias.'[199]

Just as the Foreign Office was wrestling with fundamental questions of future European and world order, the Cabinet began their own efforts to articulate 'war aims'. Spurred on by Duff Cooper, then the Minister of Information, as well as Cadogan and Halifax, the Cabinet decided on 23 August to create the War Aims Committee.[200] At this meeting, the Prime Minister used the opportunity to introduce his vision for Europe. He ruled out a 'vindictive settlement' and outlined a plan which would see the five great powers of Europe joined by three groups of smaller confederated states: Northern Europe, Middle Europe, and the Balkans. He thought the five great powers and the three confederations might be joined together by a 'Council of Europe'. Furthermore, there would be a court to handle all disputes between countries, as well as an international air force which might help maintain peace.[201] Though Churchill's views were not taken up in any formal way at the time, his conception of a 'Council of Europe', as well as a world court and international air force, would be issues with which the Foreign Office would subsequently take into account.

During these months, Churchill put forward a recommendation which would have important—if often undervalued—influence on the Atlantic Charter and the United Nations Declaration, both of which would be signed the following year. During a Cabinet meeting on 24 October, Churchill suggested the revival of the Supreme War Council, which had been created during the previous war in 1917. The new grouping—made up of the Free French, Holland, Belgium, Norway, Poland, Czechoslovakia and the Dominion governments—would pledge themselves to fighting against Germany and Italy and to establishing a 'new order in

[199] Sargent minute on paper by Julian Huxley, 10 August 1940, ibid
[200] War Cabinet conclusions, WM (40) 233, 23 August 1940, CAB 65/8. As Minister of Information, Cooper was tasked with countering Hitler's plan for Europe. War Cabinet conclusions, WM (40) 213, 26 July 1940, CAB 65/8. Duff Cooper: Minister of Information, 1940-41; Minister of State in Far East, 1941-42; British representative with the French National Committee of Liberation (FCNL), 1943-44; Ambassador to France, 1944-47
[201] War Cabinet conclusions, WM (40) 233, 23 August 1940, CAB 65/8

Europe' which might involve 'the cooperation of free peoples in a system of military, economic, and social security'.[202] Though this initiative was stalled due to the refusal of the Greek government to join, it would be taken up once again the following summer.

The War Aims Committee went on to meet five times in the autumn of 1940, and while its suggestions never became the stated policy of the government, it was the most significant attempt thus far to formulate the basic tenets of a British post-war policy.[203] Outside of the selected government ministers, there were a few individuals invited to participate in the work of the committee. One was Arnold Toynbee, who, in coordination with Duff Cooper, helped to outline some early suggestions for war aims. Although vague in its early stages, Toynbee's vision was in line with the internationalism he had long espoused. While not quite approaching the schemes for world government which had marked some of his writing and speaking in the interwar period, he nonetheless spoke of the need for a 'community of nations'.[204]

This type of visionary idealism proved unattractive to Foreign Office officials, and it was a distaste of this brand of intellectualism which would become a mark of Foreign Office planning throughout the war. Even at this early stage, officials criticized Toynbee for being both vague and unrealistic. Some considered it a 'typically Toynbee production' while others wrote that they were filled with 'despondency' after reading it.[205] While the Foreign Office still lacked a dedicated planning body of its own, senior officials from various departments offered their views on what a post-war policy might look like. The Southern Department felt that they should not put their trust in elaborate security schemes but to focus on the distribution of power

[202] War Cabinet conclusions, WM (40) 276, 24 October 1940, CAB 65/9. The text quoted here is from a draft resolution produced after the Cabinet meeting and sent around to the foreign governments mentioned. See Sharpe, p. 61.
[203] The committee met five times between its first meeting on 4 October and its last on 13 December. For an account of the committee and its work, see Christopher Hill, *Cabinet Decisions on Foreign Policy,* pp. 188-215
[204] Memorandum by Toynbee, 'Suggestions for a Statement on War Aims', 22 October 1940, CAB 87/90. For an example of Toynbee's public lectures during the interwar period, see Arnold Toynbee, 'World Order or Downfall?', *BBC*, 10 November - 15 December 1930, MS. 13967/80, Toynbee Papers, Bodleian Library, University of Oxford
[205] Collier minute, 28 September and Makins minute, 24 September 1940, FO 371/25208/W10484. Laurence Collier: Head of the Northern Department, 1937-41; Minister/Ambassador to Norway, 1941-51

within the international system. 'Responsibility devolves on states in accordance with the power they exercise', one official wrote.[206]

Others argued for a new order to be constructed, but they were wary of attempting, at this stage, to give it an international scope. Nearly all of their considerations were shaped by the perception of American post-war intentions. Nigel Ronald took a view that while the United States might be involved in the 'police work' on the continent immediately after the war, they could not be relied upon to continue such responsibility indefinitely. Moreover, any peace settlement, he warned, must 'not take the form of any ambitious all-foreseeing written constitution'. He continued, 'let immediate aims be modest and let us at once abandon all League-of-Nations-Union ideas about uniformity, world-wide scope, theoretical equality and so forth.' His suggestion was for the creation of 'regional groupings of small Leagues' which states would be able to join, depending on 'the geographical situation of its interests'.[207]

Similarly, the Head of the American Department, John Balfour, insisted that they focus on building a European order rather than a world system. Here he thought Ronald's idea for regional groupings would be a good start, especially for Europe. He added that any arrangement on these lines would have to avoid one of the weaknesses of the League's design, namely the requirement that there be an unanimity of states in order to take collective action. Furthermore, any attempt to recreate the League, he added, would lead to American disinterest in future questions of European order.[208]

The following month, Orme Sargent took up this question in his own memorandum titled 'Some Observations on Peace Plans'. He wrote that the countries of Europe had suffered a 'moral collapse' in which many had lost the 'will to self-preservation'. Moreover, they looked

[206] Nichols minute, 25 September 1940, FO 371/25208/W10484. Sir Philip Bouverie Bowyer Nichols: Head of the Southern Department, 1939-41; Ambassador to the Czechoslovakia, 1942-48
[207] Ronald minute, 22 September 1940, FO 371/25208/W10484
[208] Balfour minute, 27 September 1940, ibid. John Balfour: Head of the American Department, 1938-41; Moscow Embassy, 1943-45

to the United Kingdom and found a power consistently reluctant to stand up for them.[209] As to a future European order along British lines, Sargent believed that it was based on Britain being willing to back up its principles with force of arms. If there was one thing they should have learned from the Germans by now, he said, it was 'the rule of guns instead of butter'.

Like Ronald and Balfour, Sargent acknowledged the significance of American involvement in the post-war world. Not only was Britain's influence in Europe dependent on the 'support and encouragement' they would receive from the United States, but support from Washington, he warned, would only come if Britain was willing to be involved on the continent.

> They will wish Great Britain to play Sparta to their Athens, and if we show any tendency to imitate Sybaris instead, we must not be surprised if they quickly wash their hands of us and make other plans for their own defence which might well prove fatal to this country.[210]

In reviewing the paper, Halifax felt that Sargent offered an important counter argument to some of the 'intellectual optimism' which characterized the plans of Toynbee and others.[211] Likewise, Cadogan agreed with Sargent to a large extent; and in his comments, he offered his most significant views to date on the post-war world. Echoing an argument of E.H. Carr, who had, the year before, published his book *The Twenty Years Crisis*, Cadogan said that the events of the last seven years 'have put Force securely on its throne'.[212] What mattered was not that states—large and small—could organise themselves along idealistic principles and common interests. These ideas, Cadogan argued, had been 'blown to bits' by the brute force of highly industrialized revisionist powers such as Germany, Italy and Japan. Moreover, Britain could not afford to ignore its own military strength. 'All bluffs have been called', he said. Since the

[209] Memorandum by Sargent, 'Some Observations on Peace Plans', 28 October 1940, FO 371/25208/W11399
[210] Memorandum by Sargent, 'Some Observations on Peace Plans', 28 October 1940, FO 371/25208/W11399
[211] Halifax minute, 8 November 1940, FO 371/25208/W11399. Elsewhere, Halifax had written of the need to form some 'definite programme', and that this work could not be left to the 'professors and propagandists'. Lord Halifax to Duff Cooper, 9 August 1940, FO 800/325
[212] Cadogan had read EH Carr's *The Twenty Years' Crisis* just a few months after its publication in September 1939. He found it 'good'. Cadogan diary, 6 January 1940, Dilks (ed.), p. 243

last war, they had lived on bluffs in Europe, and in other regions such as the Far East, they had lived on bluffs 'for nearly half a century'. In the future, the United Kingdom would need to cultivate and maintain a great degree of military power in order to play a role, first in Europe and then in other regions of the world. In closing, Cadogan was clear that Britain would need outside help. 'Everything, it seems to me, will be dependent on the willingness and the ability of the US to share our burden.'[213]

John Maynard Keynes and the advance of post-war thinking

Throughout the autumn, the War Aims Committee continued with their work, though there was little in the way of substantive progress. Ministers were paralysed by concerns that they would either make empty, 'platitudinous' statements or commit to guarantees which they could not meet. All the while, the need to counter German designs for a 'New Order'—an economic plan announced in July 1940 by Walther Funk, the German Economic Minister—became more pressing.[214] Reports from the British Ambassador in Switzerland, David Kelly, indicated that Swiss and European business leaders, doubting that Britain could offer an alternative system, had begun planning for German leadership across economic and financial sectors. Additionally, there was a concern towards the end of the year within the Cabinet and the Foreign Office that if the government could not produce a constructive plan for the future, the opportunity might be seized by the Roosevelt administration, perhaps as soon as the President's inauguration speech in January. With this in mind, Lord Halifax recommended that the Cabinet

[213] Cadogan minute, 31 October 1940, FO 371/25208/W11399

[214] Under this proposed system, Germany and Italy would take the lead in providing for the reconstruction of European countries, and there would be established a new currency system with its centre in Berlin. Robert Skidelsky, pp. 195-6

enlist the help of John Maynard Keynes, the renowned economist who was now working in the Treasury.[215]

In response, Keynes wrote that what European countries desired, more so than even political independence, was social security. This, he said, must be the policy at home and on the continent. The avoidance of post-war starvation, currency crises, and 'the wild fluctuations of employment, markets and prices' would have to be the focus of the British post-war planners, and for this, they would need to secure the cooperation of the United States. To help stem the inevitable humanitarian crisis at the end of the war, Keynes proposed the establishment of a 'European Reconstruction Fund' which would provide credit to central banks on the continent, which would then, in turn, be able to purchase stocks of food and raw materials from Britain. The preservation of 'economic health in every country', Keynes wrote, was the key to future peace.[216]

Keynes's paper received much praise from the Foreign Office, where many officials saw his work as representative of innovative yet practical ideas which would ensure that Britain could influence the discussion of the post-war order. Cadogan thought it offered 'the most practical and hopeful contribution' to the wider discussion over a future economic order for Europe.[217] The new Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, found it to be 'most useful' and asked that the Foreign Office 'hasten its most effective employment'. He was soon to give his first speech as Foreign Secretary, and he hoped that Keynes's argument might be incorporated.[218]

On 29 May, Eden delivered the first substantive statement on war aims from the British government. It relied heavily on Keynes's paper from November 1940, specifically the points

[215] War Cabinet conclusions, WM (40) 292, 20 November 1940, CAB 65/10; Lord Halifax to Kingsley Wood, 19 November 1940, FO 371/28899/W587. Throughout the war, Keynes occupied an 'anomalous position' within the Treasury. Skidelsky, p. 135

[216] Memorandum by John Maynard Keynes, 'Draft Statement to Counter the German "New Order"', 1 December 1940, FO 371/28899/W426. See also Skidelsky, pp. 196-199

[217] Cadogan minute, 27 December 1940, FO 371/28899/W426

[218] Eden became Foreign Secretary for the second time on 22 December 1940. Eden wrote that Keynes' ideas 'represents my sentiments, though my knowledge is less than anyone's'. Eden minute, 28 December 1940, FO 371/28899/W426

about post-war relief, currency stabilisation and a system of international exchange.[219] The speech drew interest in the United States, where Leo Pasvolsky, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, wanted to find out more about the development of Eden's views.[220] Keynes, who was in the United States for an extended period during these months, wrote to the Foreign Office that the speech was well-received, although Roosevelt remained 'extremely averse' to publicly declaring post-war aims.[221] Instead, in these months, it was the American Under-Secretary of State, Sumner Welles, who took the lead on the American side in speaking publicly about the post-war world.

In July, Sumner Welles spoke of the need for international machinery to help maintain the peace—'instrumentality', he argued, which must also allow for peaceful change.[222] Welles's remarks were well received in London, where one Foreign Office official commented that 'the chief apostle of…the dependency of American welfare on the state of the rest of the world is very noteworthy—and encouraging.'[223] Cadogan expressed some satisfaction with the remarks, although he reserved full praise for Welles until he could work out what exactly he envisioned as the future 'instrumentality' in regards to post-war territorial adjustments. Cadogan added that he had his own idea on this subject but that it 'might shock Mr Welles'. It involved, in his view, 'the crude form of an Anglo-American policing of the world for some years'.[224]

One of the more significant developments relating to the post-war world which took place in the summer of 1941 was one which, though the United States was not involved, had

[219] Eden speech at Mansion House, 29 May 1941, copy in FO 371/28899/W6513
[220] Notter, *Postwar foreign policy preparation, 1939-1945*, p. 29. Pasvolsky was curious as to whether the contents of the speech were the result of internal policy formation or an idea from outside of government. Toynbee to R.A. Butler, 19 July 1941, FO 371/28902/W9396
[221] Keynes to Nigel Ronald, 2 June 1941, FO 371/28900/W7131
[222] 'Speech by Sumner Welles at the dedication of a new wing of the Norwegian delegation, Washington, DC', 22 July 1941, FO 371/28902/W9028
[223] Foreign Office minute, 28 July 1941, FO 371/28902/W9028
[224] Eden wrote that Cadogan 'puts the position pungently and accurately'. See Eden minute, 30 July 1941 and Cadogan minute, 28 July 1941, FO 371/28902/W9028

important implications for the Atlantic Charter and the United Nations Declaration which would be signed in August and December, respectively.[225] Building on an earlier recommendation by Churchill in October 1940 to revive the Supreme War Council, the Foreign Office had been working to organise a meeting of allied governments in London.[226] On 12 June, 14 representatives, including the leaders of the governments in exile in the British capital, signed what became known as the St James's Agreement.[227] It contained much of the phrasing originally recommended during the previous winter, and pledged the signatories to continue the fight against Germany and Italy and to build up a post-war order.[228] Though this agreement has often been overlooked, it provided an important precedent for the more famous declaration which would be signed two months later.

Cadogan and the Atlantic Charter

By August 1941, Britain had been at war with Germany for nearly two years. The country had staved off a German air assault, deterred an amphibious invasion and weathered incessant, indiscriminate bombing throughout the preceding year. In the seven weeks prior to the Atlantic meeting, Hitler had launched Operation Barbarossa and the British and Soviets had signed an agreement on 12 July pledging assistance and promising not to negotiate a separate peace with Hitler. Despite an eastward lurch, the war was exhausting the British military and crippling its society. Lend-Lease had been enacted in March 1941, but the goods were only trickling in. Decisions by the United States to freeze Japanese assets and extend an oil embargo on 26 July and 1 August, respectively, meant provoking a hungry regime infamous for its predations.

[225] Charles Sharpe has written that this meeting represented the moment when the 'allied representatives…took the first step towards the creation of what would become the "United Nations."' Sharpe, p. 87
[226] War Cabinet conclusions, WM (41) 58, 9 June 1941, CAB 65/18
[227] The agreement was signed by the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa, the Government of Belgium, the Provisional Czechoslovak Government, the Governments of Greece, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland and Yugoslavia, and the Representatives of General de Gaulle, leader of the Free French. See '"Until Victory is Won"', *The Times*, 13 June 1941
[228] *United Nations Documents, 1941-1945* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1946), p. 9

British interests in the Far East now sat in the crosshairs. It was against this backdrop that Churchill and Roosevelt came together for their first wartime meeting off the coast of Newfoundland.

At dinner on the first night of the conference, Cadogan found himself seated between Roosevelt and General George Marshall. The conversation was lighthearted at the start, but as the focus turned towards more pressing matters, two ideas came to the fore: first, that parallel statements by the American, British and Dutch governments addressing Japanese action in the Far East might be drafted and circulated; and second, the possibility of drafting a joint declaration of principles which might be signed by the President and Prime Minister. Cadogan recalled years later that, on the morning after the dinner, he was eating eggs and bacon on a writing table when Churchill stormed into the cabin demanding drafts of the parallel and joint declarations. After listing broad ideas of the shape that each should take, Churchill left and Cadogan set about on his drafts. By the time he finished, five handwritten clauses were presented to the typist.[229] Of his original draft, the text of the preamble and the first three clauses, with the exception of a few words and phrases, remained the same through to the final copy. His fourth and fifth clauses were changed from their original text, but far from being ignored, their general concepts were split across the five new clauses.

When the Americans returned the draft to Churchill and Cadogan during a meeting on the morning of 11 August, there were several points of contention, though only the subject of a post-war organisation will be addressed here.[230] While Cadogan had spoken of an 'effective international organization' in his fifth clause, the Americans had scrapped the mention of an international organisation altogether.[231] This was due primarily to the political tight rope

[229] Draft of Cadogan's unpublished memoir, unnumbered pages, ACAD 7/2

[230] The clauses concerning self-determination and imperial preference were the most notable, and have been covered in depth in previous accounts of the meeting. Among these, see Louis, *Imperialism at Bay*, pp. 121-133; Hoopes and Brinkley, *FDR and the Creation of the U.N.*, pp. 36-40; Wilson, *The First Summit*, pp. 191-197

[231] Cadogan's fifth clause read: 'They seek a peace which will not only cast down forever the Nazi tyranny but by effective international organization will afford to all States and peoples the means of dwelling in security within

Roosevelt was walking back home. To speak openly of a post-war international organisation was to draw America—a country still outside the war—into post-war commitments around the world. Such a statement, the President believed, would be easy fodder for the explosive isolationist factions within Congress and the public.[232]

Churchill himself was surprised by the veracity and tone of the American amendments dealing with the maintenance of peace. It was, he said, 'most remarkable for its realism'. The Prime Minister, while sensitive to Roosevelt's domestic reality, also had his own national interests which included a public desirous of a system for promoting and guaranteeing peace after the war. Thus, he sought the addition, after the word 'essential', of the line 'pending the establishment of a wider and more permanent system of general security'. In his telegram to London, Churchill admitted that the President, while disapproving of the amendment, was sure to accept it. 'He will not like this very much, but he attaches so much importance to the joint declaration, which he believes will affect [the] whole movement of U.S. opinion that I think he will agree.'[233]

In fact, Roosevelt accepted the change without much hesitation. For one, it did not infringe on his primary post-war aim in August 1941, which was the establishment of a transition period in which the United States and Great Britain would commence a policing of the world. According to Welles's notes of the meeting, Roosevelt saw no objection to the amendment because it made clear that 'the permanent international organisation would only be set up after that experimental period had passed.' Furthermore, Roosevelt had no intention of

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their own bounds and of traversing the seas and oceans without fear of lawless assault or need of getting burdensome armaments.'

[232] Wilson, *The First Summit*, p. 198

[233] Telegram from the Prime Minister to the Lord Privy Seal, No. 15, 11 August 1941, W.P. (41) 203, CAB 21/4005

allowing the mention of international organisation become the focus of the clause. The disarmament of 'aggressor nations' was to be the priority.[234]

Through this back and forth, it becomes clear Cadogan and Churchill were the ones pushing for the inclusion of language relating to a post-war international organisation. Even at this early stage, it was viewed as a way to bind the United States to the future maintenance of peace in Europe, an idea which had, by then, become something of a central aim for Cadogan and others in the Foreign Office. For the Americans, and Roosevelt in particular, the topic of international organisation, at least at this point in the war, was simply a beehive in domestic politics. Espousing such aims was sure to awaken the masses of isolationists, which at the time was perceived as a menacing prospect. Instead, it was Churchill and Cadogan who ensured that there was some explicit mention to the aim of a post-war international organisation.

The Atlantic Charter and Anglo-American relations

As the British delegation made their way back to London—on a trip that would take nearly a week—it was left to the Deputy Prime Minister to announce the signing of the joint declaration. While a remarkable statement, it largely feel on deaf ears within Britain, a country now suspicious of Prime Ministers returning to the country waving pieces of paper.[235] There were no formal commitments and no declaration of war.[236] Upon their return to London, Churchill and Cadogan were met by Eden who seemed a 'little puzzled' that the meeting did not produce more concrete commitments.[237] Within the Foreign Office, the reception to the Charter was mixed. Eden's Private Secretary, Oliver Harvey, saw little utility in the declaration,

[234] 'Memorandum of Conversation by the Under Secretary of State (Welles)', 11 August 1941, *FRUS*, 1941, Vol. I, Document 371, pp. 364-367
[235] H.V. Morton, *Atlantic Meeting* (London: Methuen and Company, 1944), p. 127
[236] The German press labeled the declaration a 'wordy effusion of two old fogies'. The reception in *The Times* was more favourable, although they noted that there was little in it that had not been spoken of by Roosevelt or Churchill previously. *The Times*, 15 August 1941, copy in CAB 21/4005.
[237] Draft of Cadogan's unpublished memoir, p. 9, ACAD 7/2

commenting in his diaries that it was 'a terribly woolly document full of all the old clichés of the League of Nations', but that there was 'no alternative but to accept it'.[238]

On 19 August, just a week after the final text of the charter was agreed, Thomas North Whitehead, a professor on leave from Harvard University and working as an advisor on American affairs, wrote a memorandum which was to serve as the first official assessment of the eight points.[239] He took a cynical view of America's post-war commitments both to the European continent as well as to post-war agreements binding the country to responsibilities outside the Western Hemisphere. Regarding the reference alluding to a new international system in point eight, he wrote, 'In practice, Americans will be loth [sic] to consider a system of world organisation which would involve handling wide and unaccustomed powers to their own Government; nor is their Constitution well designed for the assumption of such powers.'[240]

When the Foreign Office departments were asked for their opinions on the subject, many relayed their hesitancy in attempting to formulate a post-war policy based on the eight points of the declaration.[241] The main reason was that it was still too early to tell what the position of the United States and the Soviet Union might be at the time of the settlement. That Russia experienced its revolution in the last years of the previous war and that the United States entered the conflict late—only to back out of the Versailles settlement that ended the war—led many in the Foreign Office to be wary of assuming what the world would look like at the conclusion of hostilities.

Despite these reservations, there was some alignment as to the basic requirements of a British post-war strategy. It was understood that the United States, given its military and

[238] Harvey diary, 12 August 1941, Harvey (ed.), *The War Diaries of Oliver Harvey, 1941-1945*, p. 31. Oliver Harvey: Private Secretary to the Foreign Secretary, 1941-43; Assistant Under-Secretary of State, 1943-46
[239] Whitehead was then on leave from Harvard University and working as an advisor on American affairs within the Foreign Office.
[240] Memorandum by Thomas North Whitehead, 'The Eight Points of the Joint Declaration by the Prime Minister and the President: Notes on Future of Anglo-American Relations', 19 August 1941, FO 371/28909/W14302
[241] William Roger Louis has discussed the British reactions to the clause dealing with self-determination. 'The Atlantic Charter', he says, 'immediately brought into play with in high government circles divergent ideas about the future and purpose of the Empire.' Louis, *Imperialism at Bay*, p. 126

economic prowess, would have to remain involved in the world, most importantly in Europe. It was thought that Germany needed to be permanently disarmed, and that the Soviet Union should be deterred from moving westward given the vacuum created by Germany's military defeat. Given the need for American assistance, focus began to concentrate how they might lead the United States to accept some post-war responsibility for European security. The clause relating to a future international organisation, in particular, was viewed by some as a way to ensure American involvement. As one official put it,

> Unless the Americans give continued support to an international organisation it will be quite impossible to prevent one or the other of the great Continental powers from making, after a suitable interval, exactly the same attempt to dominate the continent as Germany is making now.[242]

This Anglo-American partnership is what many British diplomats viewed as the most important piece of an uncertain post-war puzzle. At the same time as Churchill and Roosevelt were meeting off the coast of Newfoundland, officials in the British Embassy in Washington were drafting a document outlining the importance of Anglo-American cooperation after the war. The memorandum would be produced as a Cabinet paper under Lord Halifax's name by November. It followed a similar line to that of the officials in London who had been analysing the impact of the Atlantic Charter, in that it spoke of the need for a close working relationship with the Americans after the war and the need to convince the American public and Congress of this involvement. As Ronald Campbell had laid out in the original draft on 15 August, a 'close association' between Britain and the United States 'is essential for the establishment and maintenance of a tolerable international order and for the safeguarding of peace'.[243]

Just as important, though, was that Britain should work out an arrangement in which it would be an equal to the United States, as opposed to a subordinate power at the mercy of Washington. It was essential, the memorandum read, that 'British views may retain an

[242] R.P. Heppel minute, 10 November 1941, FO 371/28909/W14302
[243] Draft memorandum by Campbell, 15 August 1941. This eventually became a Cabinet paper, 'Viscount Halifax to Mr Eden, 19 November 1941', FO 371/26151/A9358

appropriate degree of influence' in world affairs. To achieve this position in conjunction with an Anglo-American relationship would require tactful diplomacy on the part of British statesmen. Therefore, Campbell argued, 'We must eschew any appearance of trying to impose a solution of any question by insistence on a superior British wisdom.'[244] Whitehall needed to understand American needs and to remove suspicion of British intentions. If this could be accomplished, they might be able to overcome expected confrontations with the American Congress, a body which had delivered the veto on a global role for the United States during the last war.

A 'Volga Charter'

Between the Atlantic Charter and additional memos espousing the necessity of trans-Atlantic cooperation, the autumn of 1941 seemed to be one in which the focus was very much on the United States. Nevertheless, the reality remained that America was not a formal belligerent, whereas the Soviet Union now was.[245] While declarations like the Atlantic Charter set out admirable principles, there was little in the way of immediate tangible support. Conscious of the need to not alienate the Soviet Union by the appearance of an exclusive Anglo-American partnership, some in the Foreign Office, such as Orme Sargent, advocated the need for a diplomatic agreement with Russia, something he referred to informally as a 'Volga Charter'.[246] Such an understanding with Russia might, on the one hand, help to allay fears in Moscow of an Anglo-American alliance working to undermine Soviet interests, but more importantly, it might offer Britain the opportunity for increased leverage vis-a-vis their negotiations with the Americans.

[244] Draft memorandum by Campbell, 15 August 1941, FO 371/26151/A9358
[245] Hitler launched the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union, known as Operation Barbarossa, on 22 June 1941.
[246] Harvey diary, 14 November 1941. See also Folly, *Churchill, Whitehall and the Soviet Union*, pp. 36-37

Despite the fact that they now shared a common enemy, suspicion of the British within Moscow had been intensifying. While Churchill had pledged aid to Russia in a speech on the night of Hitler's invasion, and that Moscow and London had signed the Anglo-Soviet agreement on 12 July, Stalin remained wary of Britain's commitment. Almost immediately after Germany's advance into Russia, Stalin had begun to press Churchill about opening a second front in France.[247] Moreover, the Soviets were conscious that the Anglo-American joint declaration in August had been made without prior consultation with Moscow. Their Ambassador in London, Ivan Maisky, brought this up with Eden in a meeting on 26 August in which he explained that Anglo-American 'declarations…in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean' did not engender trust in Moscow. 'The impression has been created that Britain and the USA imagine themselves lords and masters, judging the rest of the sinful world, including the USSR.' Maisky warned the Foreign Secretary that, 'You can't forge friendship on such a basis.'[248]

With the German army on the outskirts of Moscow, an exasperated Stalin wrote to Churchill complaining of the lag in Anglo-Soviet relations. He felt that no 'clarity' existed at present between Moscow and London, a situation which he warned might make it 'difficult to secure mutual confidence'. Not only was there no agreement on military matters concerning the fight against Germany, but there was no understanding 'on war aims and on plans of the post war organisation of peace'.[249] When Maisky visited Churchill to discuss Stalin's message, the Prime Minister pointed out that for all of their demands to open a second front, it should be remembered that only four months ago they were allied with Hitler. As to the question of war aims, Maisky recorded Churchill as saying, 'So, Stalin wants to know our post-war plans? We

[247] Maisky and Beaverbrook discussed this point on 27 June, and Stalin sent Churchill a telegram on this point, which the Prime Minister read on 20 July. See Maisky diary, Gorodetsky (ed.), pp. 372-5. Ivan Maisky: Russian Ambassador in London, 1932-43; Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, 1943-46
[248] Maisky diary, 26 August 1941, Gorodetsky (ed.), p. 381
[249] Stalin to Churchill, 8 November 1941, FO 371/29471/N6540

do have such plans—the Atlantic Charter! What else can be said at the present moment?'[250]

Stalin's message forced an important reaction within the Foreign Office, where officials now felt that there needed to be a more concerted effort to reassure Moscow. As the Head of the Northern Department, Christopher Warner, noted, the Russians undoubtedly felt that the post-war aims of the United States were 'diametrically opposed' to their own and that Britain would likely side with Washington. It was time, he felt, to 'allay their suspicions, even if we cannot meet their wishes'.[251] One approach offered was for Eden and Churchill to make it clear that there was room for a collaborative effort on post-war aims. Britain could indicate to Moscow that their own war aims remained primarily focused on Hitler and did not go beyond the Atlantic Charter, a document for which Maisky had expressed his support in September.[252] Moreover, several points from a recent speech by Stalin, on 6 November, could be squared with their own, namely those concerning Stalin's pledge not to seize foreign territory and to liberate populations under Nazi control.[253]

The Foreign Office view took shape after a meeting between Cadogan, Law, Sargent, Strang, Harvey and Ronald on 18 November. There had been a frank discussion, first about what were the likely war aims of the Russians and second, how far Britain was prepared to go in meeting these aims. The difficulty, they agreed, was that Britain had yet to develop its own policy about the political economic aspects of a post-war settlement; and furthermore, they had promised the Americans that they would not make such arrangements prior to the end of the war. While the Atlantic Charter may have brought them closer to the United States, at the same time, it had limited their diplomatic manoeuvrability and left them 'at a serious disadvantage' when it came to discussing matters with the Russians. Improving relations with the Russians

[250] Maisky diary, 11 November 1941, Gorodetsky (ed.), pp. 402-3
[251] Warner minute, 12 November 1941, FO 371/29471/N6540
[252] Memorandum by Dew, 21 November 1941, FO 371/29472/N6839. Armine Dew: Northern Department, 1941-45.
[253] Warner minute, 12 November 1941, FO 371/29471/N6540

thus came to be seen as a way to strengthen Britain's strategic autonomy. As one official noted, 'bringing in Russia in this way might in fact serve to help us in our dealings with the Americans on these matters.' One way of doing this was to indicate to Stalin, in clear terms, that they intended to treat Russia 'on a basis of equality' and that the post-war settlement—far from being an Anglo-American project—'would be largely dictated by these three powers'.[254]

In Churchill's response to Stalin—a message which had been drafted by Cadogan—he said that he would be willing to send Eden to Moscow to discuss a number of matters. On the post-war organisation of peace, the Prime Minister was clear that Britain was to remain in the fight with Russia against Nazi Germany. He added that he expected 'Soviet Russia, Great Britain and the United States will meet at the Council table of the victors as the three principal partners.'[255] Meanwhile, within the Foreign Office, Orme Sargent took to drafting a kind of 'Volga Charter' which Eden could take with him to Moscow in the hope of getting some kind of agreement with Stalin. Despite Churchill 'violently' opposing the draft, an eventual consensus was reached, though Cadogan thought it 'as thin as restaurant coffee'.[256]

Eden, Cadogan and Harvey set off for Moscow on 7 December.[257] At their first meeting nine days later, Stalin told Eden that a declaration amounted to 'algebra' while an agreement was 'practical arithmetic'.[258] Stalin instead presented the British with two draft treaties, one of which concerned mutual military assistance and the other which related to political collaboration now and after the war. Stalin also proposed a secret protocol which would settle post-war frontiers, most notably a return to Russia's western boundaries as they stood in June

[254] Memorandum by Dew, 21 November 1941, FO 371/29472/N6839; Ross, 'Foreign Office Attitudes to the Soviet Union 1941-45', p. 523
[255] Churchill to Stalin, 21 November 1941, FO 371/29472/N6499
[256] Cadogan diary, 27 and 28 November 1941, Dilks (ed.), p. 414. For a copy of the draft, see FO 371/29472/N6835; War Cabinet conclusions, WM (41) 124, Minute 5, 4 December 1941, CAB 65/24
[257] On their way to one of the northernmost ports in Scotland, they learned from a porter that the United States had been attacked at Pearl Harbor. Cadogan diary, 7 December 1941, Dilks (ed.), pp. 416-7
[258] Quoted in Dilks (ed.), *The Diaries of Alexander Cadogan*, p. 420. For an overview of the meeting, see Woodward, *British Foreign Policy in the Second World War,* Vol. V, pp. 70-79

1941.[259] Eden explained that they were not looking to sign formal treaties at this stage, and that the question of a secret protocol was 'asking the impossible' of him, as it would mean violating the earlier agreement with the Americans to not settle such matters before the end of the war.[260] He instead sought to convince Stalin that an agreement along more general lines—one which would correspond to the Atlantic Charter—might be more useful at this stage.[261]

The War Cabinet agreed with Eden's line to Stalin and by 20 December, it was clear to the Russians that the British would not budge on this question. It was agreed that the two governments would issue a joint communiqué which spoke of the need for a full defeat of Germany and the need to ensure that Germany could not wage war in the future. Perhaps more importantly, the communiqué also committed the British and the Russians to future discussions 'relating to post-war organisation of peace and security'. When Eden described the visit to the Cabinet upon his return to London, he said that he had been 'struck by the absence of constraint' by Stalin and his advisors, as compared with his last trip in 1935. He felt that Stalin's push for recognition of frontiers was rooted in Russian suspicion of Britain and the desire for Britain and the United States to 'treat Russia on equal terms'. It helped, he thought, that they had been able to reassure Stalin, but there remained an 'underlying suspicion' of Britain within Russia which could be 're-aroused' at any time.[262]

A United Nations Declaration

Just as Eden and Cadogan were meeting with Stalin in Moscow, Churchill was in Washington,

[259] Telegram from Moscow to Foreign Office, No .13 HECTIC, 17 December 1941, copy in CAB 65/24
[260] Privately Eden found these demands 'deplorable'. Telegram from Moscow to Foreign Office, No. 24 HECTIC, 18 December 1941, FO 371/29472/N7013
[261] Eden was determined to reach some general agreement with the Russians which would 'convince [them] of sincerity of our collaboration both now and in the future'. Telegram from Moscow to Foreign Office, No. 14 HECTIC, 17 December 1941, copy in CAB 65/24. See also Telegram from Moscow to Foreign Office, No. 22 HECTIC, 18 December 1941, FO 371/29472/N7013
[262] War Cabinet conclusions, WM (42) 1, 1 January 1942, CAB 65/29. Martin Folly has focused attention on the Foreign Office realising 'Soviet sensitivities' and the way in which this influenced their policy towards the Soviet Union. Folly, *Churchill, Whitehall and the Soviet Union*, pp. 89-100

where discussions with Roosevelt would lead to the next great development towards a post-war order. Here, the initiative came solely from the Roosevelt administration, but at a critical juncture, the War Cabinet in London added in language which gave important mention to the place of small powers. From the start, the discussions were intended to lay a foundation for a joint Anglo-American military strategy to defeat the Axis powers. Although conversations were primarily of a military nature, the State Department proposed a draft declaration on 14 December which would pledge collective action against the Axis powers along the lines of the Atlantic Charter.[263] It was a draft declaration which built on the earlier St James's Agreement in June. This early draft included as principal signatories the United States, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and 'other signatory powers', but it was soon redrafted by State Department officials between 14 and 19 December to include as the principal signatories, the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and China.[264]

The War Cabinet in London largely approved of the declaration with some minor changes. They strongly favoured the inclusion of a number of smaller powers, to 'give the necessary emphasis to the fact that this war is being waged for the freedom of small nations as well as great'.[265] They also requested, in line with the Atlantic Charter, that there be included some mention of 'social security' into the text. Although the latter request was ignored in Washington, the Cabinet gave their approval to the declaration at a meeting on 29 December.[266]

After Churchill and Roosevelt had decided on the name 'United Nations', all that was left was to sign the document.[267] While a seemingly trivial detail, the signing ceremony was

[263] The first proposal on 14 December included as signatories the 'United States, Great Britain, China, the Netherlands, and Other Governments'. 'Draft Joint Declaration', 14 December 1941, *FRUS,* The Conferences at Washington, 1941-42, and Casablanca, 1943, Document 13; Hull, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, Vol. II*, pp. 1114-1115

[264] See Roosevelt to Hull, 27 December 1941, *FRUS,* 1942, Vol. I, pp. 13-14. See also Ruth Russell's discussion of Cordell Hull's recommendation for a 'four-power Supreme War Council' of the United States, United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and China. Russell, *A History of the United Nations Charter*, pp. 50-51

[265] Telegram from Lord Privy Seal to Prime Minister, No. 185, 24 December 1941, CAB 65/20

[266] War Cab conclusions, WM (41) 137, 29 December 1941, CAB 65/20

[267] Roosevelt had suggested the term 'United Nations'. Andrew Roberts, *Churchill: Walking with Destiny* (London: Allen Lane, 2018), pp. 705-706; Russell, *A History of the United Nations Charter*, p. 53

symbolic in that the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and China signed a full day before the 22 other signatories.[268] It was clear that these powers were to be leaders of the rest, both in war and in peace; and it was a development which would have important implications as the Foreign Office began their work on more detailed plans for a post-war international organisation.

By the New Year 1942, the United Kingdom had contributed to three joint declarations—the St James's Agreement, the Atlantic Charter and the United Nations Declaration—which revealed the government's intention to work with allies both during and after the war. More importantly, the work of the Foreign Office—including the debates taking place within and across departments—began to focus on the need to establish a workable international system at the end of the war, and crucially, the ways in which the relationships with the United States and the Soviet Union would need to be managed.

This chapter has set the stage for a more detailed examination of the post-war planning which took place within the Foreign Office from 1942 onwards. The discussion of the individual backgrounds of Jebb, Webster and Cadogan has revealed approaches to foreign policy which, shaped by historical study and experience, valued ordering mechanisms within the international system. For Jebb, this was to be found in a 'workable balance of power'; for Webster, the future lay in a more robust international organisation; while for Cadogan, the goal was an ordered system but the difficulty remained the 'question of machinery'. The more realist views of Jebb contrasted with the internationalism of Webster, and the way in which these approaches balanced against one another would influence what would, in later years, define the 'realist-internationalism' which coloured British plans for the United Nations Organization.

Next, the chapter has shown how Foreign Office planning began progressing between 1940 and 1941. Thinking about the post-war world in these early years of the war did not come

[268] Russell, *A History of the United Nations Charter*, p. 52

naturally. The weight of the military conflict, especially after the defeat of France and the Battle of Britain, tipped the government's focus away from post-war questions. But as German propaganda relating to the post-war world continued to echo across the European continent, officials within the Foreign Office, in particular, began to advocate for a definitive announcement of war aims. The work of John Maynard Keynes in this period was crucial, and in many ways, his proposals for a new economic order in Europe helped to catalyse post-war thinking within the Foreign Office. Not only was this kind of innovative and proactive planning a way to galvanise European populations falling under the shadow of Nazi rule, but it provided a powerful tool in negotiations with the United States, a country which Foreign Office officials, even in the early years of the war and prior to American entry in the conflict, understood would exercise a disproportionate influence on the construction of a post-war political and economic order.

This reality was not lost on senior officials such as Cadogan, who, during the Atlantic Conference in August 1941, delivered the first draft of a joint declaration on the post-war world. The majority of historical scholarship addressing the Atlantic Charter has heretofore undervalued the role of Cadogan and it is a narrative which this chapter has sought to revise. Finally, the Foreign Office views of the Charter reveal two important insights which run through this thesis. First, officials were, at various points, sceptical about the joint declaration and American post-war policy more broadly. There was a feeling that American statesmen had a tendency to proclaim ambitious, moralistic statements with little regard for the way in which this might be achieved in practical terms. Second, officials in the Foreign Office remained cognisant of the sensitivities of the Soviet Union. Though some officials, Cadogan included, sought an Anglo-American partnership at the core of a post-war order, the majority of officials believed that they could ill-afford to package it this way, lest the Soviet Union—by then an ally in the military conflict—grow suspicious. This balancing act between, as one official was

soon to frame it, a ‘moral and distant America and an amoral but very present Russia’, would define to a great degree the nature and pace of Foreign Office planning in the years ahead.

Chapter Two

A 'Concert of the World': Foreign Office post-war planning begins, 1942

By the spring of 1942, there was a newfound urgency for post-war planning. If the early years of the war had been about the gradual acceptance of the need to plan for the post-war world, the year 1942 marked the beginning of a concerted effort by the Foreign Office to commence detailed planning. It was a period when debates within the Foreign Office and then the War Cabinet led to the first coherent policy recommendations aimed at British strategy for the post-war period. The Foreign Office drove the process throughout, first in setting up a department to examine post-war questions, and then in drafting the first substantive plans for both a future international order and a British post-war strategy. What had originally been called a 'Concert of the World' and later, a 'Four Power Plan', had, by December 1942, evolved into the 'United Nations Plan'. The underlying conception was for a nucleus of the three great powers—along with China and possibly France—to act as the central authority responsible for the maintenance of peace and security. It was this basic framework which would become the cornerstone for Foreign Office planning for a post-war international organisation.

To varying degrees, previous scholarship has examined the construction of the Four Power Plan and the Cabinet debate which it forced in November 1942.[269] Less attention has been paid to the institutional and conceptual origins of this planning, however, and this chapter

[269] Lewis, *Changing Direction*, pp. 36-37; Hughes, 'Winston Churchill and the Formation of the United Nations Organization', pp. 181-183; Greenwood, *Titan at the Foreign Office*, pp. 151-158; Russell, *A History of the United Nations Charter*, pp. 102-103; Rothwell*, War Aims in the Second World War*, p. 75; Woodward, *British Foreign Policy in the Second World War*, Vol. V, pp. 1-21; Reynolds and Hughes, *Historian as Diplomat*, p. 19; Simpson, *Human Rights and the End of Empire*, pp. 222-227. Raymond Douglas has gone into the most detail regarding the Four Power Plan and the subsequent Cabinet debate, although his overall argument is flawed in a crucial way. He has written that the Four Power Plan had a 'virtual parallelism' to, and 'had clearly been derived' from a paper written by Arnold Toynbee the previous summer entitled 'British-American World Order'. As this chapter will show, Jebb and others in the Foreign Office, as they began to articulate their post-war views more concretely in the autumn of 1942, expressed in explicit terms their opposition to the ideas of Toynbee and others within the Foreign Research and Press Service. Douglas, *Labour Party*, pp. 104, 110-122. The quote referenced here comes from p. 112.

will address both points in turn. The creation of the Economic and Reconstruction Department within the Foreign Office in June was the most significant step in this direction, and it was this body which was primarily responsible for Foreign Office planning for the remainder of the war.[270] The new department owed its existence, in part, to the intervention of Nigel Ronald as well as two ministers, Stafford Cripps and Richard Law, both of who feared that the government might enter a future peace settlement as unprepared as they had been in 1919.[271] It was of the utmost importance for this new body to begin developing, in Law's words, a 'grand strategy of peace'.

On a conceptual level, Gladwyn Jebb, who had been nominated as the head of the nascent department, made clear from the start that his grouping was to focus on crafting 'long distance schemes'. Previous historical scholarship has examined in some detail the contents of the Four Power Plan, but less attention has been paid to its precursor, a paper entitled 'Relief Machinery—the Political Background'.[272] Moreover, scholars have often overlooked the debate which grew up within the Foreign Office on this paper and the ways in which this influenced the Four Power Plan. In addition to examining this crucial exchange of views, the chapter will also describe some of the more immediate reasons that Jebb and his colleagues took on this question of post-war international order at this stage.

If fears over Hitler's New Order had driven post-war thinking in 1940 and 1941, the feeling that the United States was well ahead of the United Kingdom in planning served as the new impetus within the Economic and Reconstruction Department. Perceptions of American post-war intentions shaped the earliest Foreign Office conceptions of a post-war international order. Officials in the early months of 1942 continued to stress the importance of bringing the

[270] The creation of the department and its early work has been discussed in several historical studies. Lewis, *Changing Direction*, pp. 24-25; Simpson, *Human Rights and the End of Empire*, p. 222; Greenwood, *Titan at the Foreign Office*, pp. 149-151; Reynolds and Hughes, *Historian as Diplomat*, p. 18; Douglas, *Labour Party*, p. 112
[271] Julian Lewis has discussed in depth the influence of Nigel Ronald on the development of a Foreign Office body dedicated to post-war planning. Lewis, *Changing Direction*, pp. 10-25
[272] One of the only mentions of this provocative paper is in Greenwood, *Titan at the Foreign Office*, pp. 151-152

United States into European commitments, thus it was necessary to understand and incorporate the basic parameters of American thinking on post-war questions. What they could discern from American pronouncements was a conception of the four great powers operating at the centre of a wider grouping of United Nations. Far from simply adopting the American idea wholesale, however, British officials were determined to shape this basic conception 'on the anvil of [their] experience'.[273]

Jebb was responsible for the first draft strategy for the post-war international order, and in it, he took on the idea of four powers working together at the centre of a larger grouping of nations. Significantly, he couched this conception in a nineteenth-century precedent, specifically the Concert of Europe. In the same way that Britain, France, Russia and Austria-Hungary cooperated in the decades after the Napoleonic Wars, so too might Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union, China and eventually France cooperate at the end of the present war. Added to this basic conception was Jebb's idea for regional structures to be created, which, operating under the authority of the great powers, might help facilitate relief and reconstruction in Europe and Asia. These ideas were eventually redrafted into the Four Power Plan, which became the recommended policy of the Foreign Office.

Towards the end of the year, the Four Power Plan would face a number of counter proposals from Cabinet ministers. The Prime Minister himself was the greatest hindrance to post-war planning in these months, as he urged Eden and the officials under him to focus on the task at hand, namely the defeat of Nazi Germany. Other ministers such as Stafford Cripps, however, put forward what Foreign Office officials considered more realistic schemes, certain aspects of which were adopted. By December 1942, the Economic and Reconstruction Department worked to redraft the Four Power Plan in such a way that Cabinet ministers were appeased and more importantly, planning remained in their hands.

[273] Extract from letter by Ronald Campbell, 26 July 1942, FCO 73/264/Pwp/42/17

'Between a moral and distant America and an amoral, but very present, Russia'

Early efforts to infuse British foreign policy with more forward planning were bedevilled by depressing news from the frontline. In the final weeks of 1941, Japanese forces had begun their advance into the Philippines, a territory which would soon fall under their control. By February 1942, the 80,000 troops defending Singapore—'the Gibraltar of the East' and the 'Impregnable Fortress'—had surrendered and were imprisoned.[274] In Eastern Europe, the German army had conquered swaths of western Russia throughout the autumn of 1941. Despite the failure to seize control of Moscow during this winter campaign, German troops continued to press the Red Army along multiple fronts as Hitler began preparing for a large-scale summer offensive. Elsewhere, Nazi U-Boats continued their relentless assault on Allied shipping convoys in the North Atlantic, while in North Africa, the Panzer Army Afrika under Erwin Rommel's command recaptured the port city of Tobruk, Libya, on 21 June.

The defeat at Tobruk struck the Prime Minister particularly hard. Eden recalled that Churchill, who was in Washington meeting with Roosevelt, 'felt the humiliation bitterly'.[275] To make matters worse, the Prime Minister returned to London to face his second vote of confidence that year alone.[276] 'The ship of State', as Jebb later recalled, 'was almost on its beam ends'.[277] It was hardly a time to think about what the world might look like after the war, yet it was against this backdrop that the United Kingdom began to develop a strategy for the post-war period.

When it came to planning, the two most important considerations in the early months of 1942 were the post-war intentions of the United States and Soviet Union. Concerning the United States, a desire by officials in the Roosevelt administration and the State Department to

[274] William Roger Louis has written that, 'With the fall of Singapore in February 1942, British prestige in the Far East suffered an irreparable collapse.' Louis, *Imperialism at Bay*, p. 7
[275] Eden, *The Reckoning*, p. 331.
[276] This vote of no confidence called into question the entire direction of the war. Churchill won the vote of no confidence 475 to 25. *Hansard*, House of Commons Debate, Vol 381, cols. 527-611, 02 July 1942
[277] Jebb, *The Memoirs of Lord Gladwyn*, p. 109

make future Lend-Lease aid conditional on Britain ending its system of imperial preference caused some alarm in the Foreign Office.[278] Officials feared that the Roosevelt administration was using its leverage to weaken—and perhaps eventually dissolve— the British Empire. 'United States policy is exaggeratedly moral, at least where non-American interests are concerned', one official complained, while others pointed to a feeling in the United States that the British were nothing more than 'Machiavellian European schemers'.[279] Regardless, it was accepted that the United States would be central to British post-war objectives. 'Our constant aim must be to do everything calculated to keep America permanently interested in the preservation of world order', one major memorandum read.[280]

Meanwhile, however, Foreign Office officials were wary of moving too close to Washington at the expense of relations with Moscow. As one major review put it, 'we may find ourselves between a moral and distant America and an amoral, but very present, Russia.'[281] Indeed, the position of Russia constituted one of the great question marks for the post-war European order. Given the defeat of Germany and the collapse of France, officials warned that there would be 'no counterweight' to Russia on the continent. It was essential, therefore, for the British both to establish—with the Americans—some kind of military presence on the continent and for the Foreign Office to reach an agreement with Russia which would ensure some measure of Anglo-Soviet cooperation in the post-war period.[282] Though some senior

[278] The Lend-Lease Agreement between the United States and United Kingdom was eventually signed by Sumner Welles and Lord Halifax on 23 February 1942. Article VII of this agreement spoke of the two powers working towards 'the elimination of all forms of discriminatory treatment in international commerce, and to the reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers'. For background, see Russell, *A History of the United Nations Charter*, pp. 29-32, 47-50

[279] Memorandum by Eden, 'Policy Towards Russia', 28 January 1942, WP (42) 48, FO 371/32875/N563; Memorandum by Ronald and Whitehead, 'Co-operation between Great Britain and the United States', 19 February 1942, FO 371/30685/A1684

[280] Memorandum by Ronald and Whitehead, 'Co-operation between Great Britain and the United States', 19 February 1942. Eden considered this paper 'very valuable'. Eden minute, 28 February 1942, FO 371/30685/A1684

[281] Quoted in ibid.

[282] Memorandum by Eden, 'Policy Towards Russia', 28 January 1942, WP (42) 48, FO 371/32875/N563. See also 'Orme Sargent's memorandum of 5 February 1942 on the possible development of the Russo-German War', FO 371/32905, copy in Ross, *The Foreign Office and the Kremlin*, pp. 87-90. Kitchen, *British Policy Towards the Soviet Union,* pp. 114-119

officials such as Cadogan and William Strang noted that the Russians were difficult to work with given their 'almost insane suspicion', the view which held was the need to establish a measure of trust within their diplomatic relationship.[283] Orme Sargent had earlier suggested a 'treaty of alliance' with Moscow, a policy which was eventually adopted and culminated in the 'Twenty-Year Mutual Assistance Agreement' signed in May 1942.[284] This agreement, along with the Atlantic Charter, now marked the so-called 'fixed points' of Britain's approach to the post-war world.[285]

Towards a 'Grand Strategy for Peace': The Spur to Planning

Although the attempts to settle British policy towards the United States and the Soviet Union marked an important first step, the Foreign Office was still lacking an overarching long-term policy. A number of ministers and officials had begun raising concerns about this lack of planning in the early months of 1942. As Julian Lewis has shown, Nigel Ronald, in talks with the Chiefs of Staff, was pushing for the Foreign Office to have more input on strategic planning.[286] Others, such as the Parliamentary Under-Secretary to the Foreign Office, Richard Law, warned that strategic missteps in preparing for the peace during the First World War had led to the current conflict. 'It was in our strategical thinking, in the strategy of peace, that we made our mistakes. It was because our strategy was wrong that our tactics, whatever they were—and they were various—never worked out.' Warning that the same outcome was

[283] Cadogan minute, 4 March 1942, FO 371/32876/N1156; Strang minute, 20 February 1942, FO 371/32876/N927. Portions of this debate are covered in Ross, *The Foreign Office and the Kremlin*, pp. 20-21, 90-94

[284] See 'Orme Sargent's memorandum of 5 February 1942 on the possible development of the Russo-German War', FO 371/32905, copy in Ross, *The Foreign Office and the Kremlin*, pp. 87-90. War Cabinet conclusions, WM (42) 68, 26 May 1942, CAB 65/30; Steven Miner, *Between Churchill and Stalin: The Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the Origins of the Grand* Alliance (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988), pp. 184-251. The treaty did not sit well with the Roosevelt administration. Welles wrote that, 'The attitude of the British Government is not only indefensible from every moral standpoint, but likewise extraordinarily stupid.' Quoted in Kitchen, *British Policy Towards the Soviet Union*, p. 121. For the Foreign Office approach to the Anglo-Soviet Treaty, see ibid, pp. 100-123.

[285] Strang minute, 24 August 1942, FCO 73/264/Pwp/42/20

[286] Lewis, *Changing Direction*, pp. 10-25

possible should Britain repeat these mistakes, he said, 'If now we do not develop a grand strategy of peace, we shall be wrong again—and we shall have another war.'[287]

These views were shared by the Lord Privy Seal, Sir Stafford Cripps, who just months later wrote to the Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden calling for the creation of a joint committee which would focus on developing political and economic policy for the post-war period. On the economic side, the British had gone some way to create the Official Committee on Post-War External Economic Problems, yet there continued to be a lack of coordinated political planning within the British government. 'Until we have undertaken some forward planning in both the political and the economic sphere', Cripps warned, 'it will not be possible for us to meet the Russians or the Americans on equal terms.'[288]

Senior officials within the Foreign Office agreed, and on 4 June, they established the Economic and Reconstruction Department, which, under the leadership of Jebb, would serve as the locus of Foreign Office post-war planning for the remainder of the war.[289] Initially housed in the 'attics' of the Foreign Office, Jebb and his team were given a brief which ranged from refugees and armistices to wheat supplies, currency issues, and colonial questions.[290] In Jebb's view, however, the essential aim of the department was to direct British policy towards the settlement that would conclude the war. The new body, he said, should not be bogged down by short-term, day-to-day work, but it must continue to focus on 'long distance schemes'.[291]

There were three reasons that this body, despite its original charter, went on to become the generator of British post-war grand strategy. One was the personal initiative of Gladwyn Jebb, whose desire to grapple with the grand topics of British policy were no secret, and who

[287] Richard Law, 'Speech to Cambridge Society for International Affairs, 18 March 1942', *Time and Tide*, 21 March 1942, copy in FO 371/35363/U830
[288] Memorandum by Cripps, 'A Note on the Planning of International Reconstruction', 18 May 1942, FO 371/31538/U1903
[289] Cadogan diary, 4 June 1942, Dilks (ed.), p. 456
[290] Serving under him were Professor T. North Whitehead, Sir Evelyn Baring, Viscount Samuel Hood, and later, Paul S. Falla, John E. Coulson and Jim Lambert.
[291] Jebb to Sargent, 20 June 1942, FCO 73/263/Misc/42/1. See also, Sargent minute, 4 June 1942, FO 371/31538

wasted no time in carving out a central role for the new department. Jebb had long sought positions within the Foreign Office which would give him the opportunity to shape key decisions. As his career progressed, he developed an attitude—shared by many officials of his generation—which held that British foreign policy needed to be active and robust as opposed to reactive and stale. In one of his first major recommendations, written eleven years earlier, he advocated a forward approach for British statecraft. 'There is no doubt that we are in the dog fight along with everybody else, and that if we don't sharpen our teeth and claws and emit terrifyingly diabolical snarls we are in danger—well, not perhaps of being eaten up, but at least of not getting the bone.'[292] This attitude would continue to colour his management of the Economic and Reconstruction Department throughout the war.

The next reason for the department's contribution to matters of so-called 'high policy' was the nature of the work. Relief and reconstruction efforts, in order to be successful, would require an overarching security and political structure based on the cooperation of the three great powers. This idea of political structures coming before those dealing with economics and finance was one of Jebb's operating principles, and one which was best captured in his line, 'freedom from fear must precede freedom from want'.[293] Questions of relief and reconstruction were thus bound with those of a future regional and international order.

Thirdly, and most importantly, there was a perception amongst British officials that the Foreign Office needed to 'catch up' with the planning progress of the State Department. In June, Lord Halifax wrote in his weekly report from the American capital that there was a group within the State Department, called the Advisory Committee on Post-war Foreign Policy, which was responsible for examining post-war political questions.[294] In a follow up later that

[292] Memorandum by Jebb, 'Notes on Sir Victor Wellesley's proposal to establish a politico-economic intelligence department in the Foreign Office', 10 December 1931, FCO 73/263/Mis/31/1
[293] Jebb minute, 13 October 1942, FCO 73/264/Pwp/42/36
[294] Halifax to Foreign Office, 11 June 1942, quoted in John Saville, *The Politics of Continuity,* p. 181. See also Lawrence Weiler and Anne Patricia Simons*, The United States and the United Nations: The Search for International Peace and Security* (New York: Manhattan Publishing, 1967), pp. 17-37

month, Halifax described a meeting with Sumner Welles in which the Under-Secretary of State mentioned the need for the British and Americans to come for agreement on all matters 'of common concern' before the conclusion of the war.[295] Welles explained that American plans were in no way finalized, but recommended that in two-to-three months' time, the governments might be able to exchange papers on the subject. These suggestions served as arguably the most important catalyst for planning within the Economic and Reconstruction Department in the summer of 1942.

'Our diplomacy should be equal to this task'

Although it was clear that State Department officials were thinking seriously about post-war questions, their objectives remained a mystery. Roosevelt himself had long been thinking about grand schemes for the post-war world, but many of these comments had been kept private. As far back as September 1941, the President had spoken of a 'trusteeship' of great powers, while in a May 1942 conversation with the Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov, he described what would be known as his 'four policemen' idea.[296] Meanwhile, in the State Department, Cordell Hull was overseeing an Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy, which by April 1942 had gone as far as to produce a draft outline for an 'interim UN'.[297] Nevertheless, officials in the Foreign Office knew little of these ideas, much less the extent to which the administration was organising specific planning bodies. Instead, they began to construct, through other sources, a conception of the administration's vision for the post-war world.

[295] Telegram from Lord Halifax to Foreign Office, No. 304, 30 June 1942, FO 371/31515/U48
[296] John Lewis Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-47* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), pp. 24-25
[297] Stephen Schlesinger, *Act of Creation: The Founding of the United Nations* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2003), pp. 37-40. Schlesinger also mentions an interview Roosevelt gave to the *Saturday Evening Post* in April 1942, in which he mentioned the four policemen idea. See also Hoopes and Brinkley, *FDR and the Creation of the U.N.*, pp. 45-51.

The signing of the United Nations Declaration in January had itself been revealing. The fact that the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and China had signed the document a full day in advance of the other signatories offered a hint that the Roosevelt administration might be considering these powers to be in a different category altogether.[298] Months later, on 30 May, Welles had spoken of 'an international police power' in the future, along with the United Nations becoming 'the nucleus of a world organisation of the future'.[299] This chimed with the details Molotov shared with British Officials, after his recent meeting with the President. Speaking to Churchill, Attlee, Eden and Cadogan on 9 June, the Soviet Foreign Minister said that Roosevelt envisioned a post-war world in which all powers would subscribe to a disarmament regimen, but that the four great powers themselves, acting as a kind of international police force, would retain a disproportionate level of arms in order to keep the peace.[300]

An additional source of insight for Jebb and others in the department came from the reports of Sir Fredrick Leith-Ross, then the British representative to the Inter-Allied Postwar Requirements Bureau which was meeting in Washington.[301] For months, he had been engaging with State Department officials over the design of post-war relief bodies, and from these conversations, a picture began to emerge in London. In essence, the Americans were seeking to initiate a relief effort that was under the auspices of the United Nations but directed by a 'policy committee' of four powers: the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and China.[302]

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[298] According to Hoopes and Brinkley, after the signing of the United Nations Declaration, Roosevelt began to refer to the four great powers as the 'four policemen', though this was not revealed to the Foreign Office. Hoopes and Brinkley, *FDR and the Creation of the U.N.*, p. 46

[299] Sumner Welles delivered a speech in Arlington, Virginia on 30 May 1942. This was cited in a Foreign Office memorandum, 'Recent American Speeches about the Post-war World', 10 December 1942, FO 371/31515/U1682

[300] 'Meeting with the Soviet Delegation at No. 10 Downing Street', 9 June 1942, FO 954/25B/257

[301] Sir Frederick Leith-Ross was the Chief Economic Advisor to the British Government, 1932-1945.

[302] Telegram from Ronald Campbell to Foreign Office, No. 3578, 4 July 1942, FO 371/31501/U49. The talks which Leith-Ross was participating in would eventually lead to the establishment of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA).

The view in the Foreign Office was one of wary approval. Relief and reconstruction were reliant on finance and material, and no one was confused as to the country that would be supplying the majority of both. Nevile Butler warned, however, that the relief plans put forward by the Roosevelt administration contained 'political dynamite' in the United States, and it remained to be seen whether a balance could be struck in that country between the desire to help rebuild Europe and the harsh reality of having the American public foot the bill.[303] By early July, however, officials in the Economic and Reconstruction Department had moved closer to the idea of four powers at the centre of both a relief organisation as well as a future international organisation. When officials in the State Department considered expanding the membership of the 'executive committee' beyond the four great powers, Evelyn Baring of the Economic and Reconstruction Department wrote that, 'we are still emphatically of the opinion that the membership should not exceed four; and that if the relief scheme is to be the pattern of [the] future world organisation we are confirmed in this opinion.'[304]

While Foreign Office thinking in these months was shaped to a large degree by what they perceived to be the American position on a post-war order, officials and ministers understood that future British planning could not simply adopt wholesale the State Department view. To do so would be an abdication of British diplomatic influence. It was a view held by Jebb and others in the Foreign Office, including the Foreign Secretary who insisted that Britain take a lead on post-war questions, especially when it came to Europe. 'They [the Americans] know very little of Europe and it would be unfortunate for the future of the world if US uninstructed views were to decide the future of the European continent. Our diplomacy should be equal to this task.'[305]

[303] Butler minute, 15 July 1942, FO 371/31501/U161
[304] Jebb wrote that he agreed with this line. Baring minute, 6 July 1942, FO 371/31501/U49
[305] Eden minute, 25 July 1942, cited in Eden, *The Reckoning*, p. 341

'A Concert of the World'

It was with the perception of American progress and British delay that the Economic and Reconstruction Department set about developing a grand strategy for the post-war world. The first paper dealing directly with this subject was produced by Jebb at the beginning of August. It was titled 'Relief Machinery: the Political Background' and sought to address the over-arching political framework between the Americans, British and Russians that would help facilitate post-war relief efforts.[306] If the relief discussions had first opened the door to questions of post-war cooperation among the great powers, Jebb's memorandum on the issue in early August elevated the discussion to one of future regional and international order.

He left no doubt that the topic they were grappling with concerned, in his words, the 're-organisation of the world'. For Britain to have a stake in the order, he wrote, it was necessary that 'we…make up our own minds on what we want as a Nation. For only so shall we succeed in being the master, and not the victim, of events.'[307] In devising a policy, they would need to take heed of certain considerations. First, the 'facile idealisms of the [H.G.] Wellsian or Clarence Streit variety' would need to be ignored altogether.[308] These schemes, Jebb believed, were utopian visions devoid of reality. It was an old battle for Jebb, but as he had written numerous times in the previous decade, it was necessary to construct practical policies based on the 'interplay of living forces'.[309] The failure of the peace settlement in 1919—a creation Jebb derided as the 'Professors' Peace'—was that it was rooted in theory rather than practice.[310]

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[306] Draft memorandum by Jebb, 'Relief Machinery: The Political Background', August 1942 FCO 73/264/Pwp/42/8
[307] Ibid, pp. 8, 12
[308] Ibid, p. 10
[309] Memorandum by Jebb, 'Defence of the West', 25 April 1938, FCO 73/257/Def/38/1/A. Jebb minute, 'Probable consequences of closing or failing to close the Suez Canal to Italy', undated (but likely December 1936), FCO 73/262/It/36/8. Jebb wrote elsewhere that, 'All the professors are in hiding awaiting their chance to leap forth from Chatham House and elsewhere to give us just such another.' Quoted in Greenwood, *Titan at the Foreign Office*, pp. 163-4
[310] Quoted in Greenwood, *Titan at the Foreign Office*, p. 163

Next, there was a delicate political balance to be struck between on the one hand, pleasing the Roosevelt administration and keeping them involved and on the other hand ensuring that Britain was influencing the post-war order. The latter half of this balance depended on not igniting the isolationist tendencies of an American public still suspicious of British intentions and European politics more broadly. Jebb wrote that if the Americans once again opted out of a post-war international order, as they had in 1919, it would be 'a tragedy for the rest of the world'.[311] A Europe devoid of American power, he warned, might lead to a German revival or a Russian expansion westward. Equally, however, it was crucial not to alienate other states—first and foremost the Soviet Union—in designing a new political arrangement. Here, Jebb was conscious also that such a system might appear to be an 'Anglo-Saxon tyranny, machine made and revolutionary'. Not only would this dissuade the American public, but it might also alienate the populations of smaller powers.

The pivotal question, however, was whether the Foreign Office would choose to go along with what they perceived to be American aims, or whether they would introduce their own plans. Building upon the information gathered over the previous months, Jebb wrote that all signs were pointing to the Roosevelt administration thinking about a post-war world organisation which would be based on the countries calling themselves the United Nations and directed by a 'policy committee' of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and China. This 'supreme council' would oversee an 'Assembly' of the United Nations. The 'loose system', as Jebb referred to it, was to rely on Anglo-American air and sea power as well as Russian land power in order to keep the peace. Jebb labelled it a 'Concert of the World' which might 'keep the peace for the next hundred years in the same way as the Concert of

[311] Draft memorandum by Jebb, 'Relief Machinery: The Political Background', August 1942, p. 9, FCO 73/264/Pwp/42/8

Europe…more or less kept the peace in Europe between the Battle of Waterloo and the beginning of World War No. 1'.[312]

Though Jebb recommended that they adopt the basic conception of the Americans, he suggested that they 'render them more practicable by an admixture of our own political sense'. In other words, they might take the more 'revolutionary' approach of the Roosevelt administration and meld it with the more 'conservative' approach of the Foreign Office. Specifically, he recommended that they infuse the four power conception with their own 'regional idea' which might give the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union their own 'spheres'. Not only would this help to create a balance of power between the three great powers, but it would also allow Britain to shape the European continent to its interests. The foremost danger to Britain, Jebb wrote, was a European continent united against it, a scenario which would be made all the worse without the support of the United States.

> Consequently our aim should presumably be, if possible with the co-operation of America, to organise some measure of unity in Western Europe, leaving the East to be guided either by some association of the West Slavs with Russia in the background or possibly (if we could not prevent it) by Russia herself. In this way we should avoid the menace of Continental unification, and present ourselves as a real support to Western Europe, rather than appearing to them to be ourselves a menace.[313]

These twin pillars of great power authority along with a regionalist system would make up Jebb's basic recommendation for the structure of the post-war international order in August 1942.

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[312] Draft memorandum by Jebb, 'Relief Machinery: The Political Background', August 1942, p. 9, FCO 73/264/Pwp/42/8, p. 2

[313] Ibid, p. 7. In a separate minute, he explained his idea for a western regional grouping. He referred to it as 'our 'hinterland' and our 'glacis', adding that, 'It is essential for us at least to have this conception also in the back of our minds, not of course because we want to play 'realpolitik' in the Nazi way, but because we simply cannot afford to run the risk of being friendless in the post-war world.' Jebb to Ronald, 5 August 1942, FCO 73/264/Pwp/42/7

'The Americans are going to make our world or mar it'

Jebb's memorandum led to, as yet, the most important Foreign Office debate on post-war matters; and while there was broad support for his insistence that Britain develop its own strategy, there were differences over whether the United Kingdom could rely on the United States going forward. Richard Law, having recently returned from an extended visit to the United States, wrote a lengthy report in which he stated that, 'the Americans are going to make our world or mar it', and that this would all depend on whether the British could engender their trust and exert some degree of influence over their policies.[314] The memories of November 1919—when the American Senate voted against the ratification of the Versailles Treaty—loomed large, as did fears that isolationist reactions could swell at any moment. Some officials, such as Butler, felt that even in light of the attitude of the Roosevelt administration, Britain could not count on sustained American involvement in the post-war period. For one, there was no telling how long the United States might remain committed to Europe, and there was pessimism as to whether the American government or public would agree to shoulder the burden of post-war security. 'The principal danger seems to me that…in the course of five or six years [the American public] have found that the world is a collection of ungrateful and small-minded countries there may be a violent revulsion towards isolationism.'[315] Other officials were even more cynical, feeling that the entire premise

> underestimates or misinterprets America's sense of mission. [The Americans] want the palm without the dust, and their sense of mission is not…accompanied by anything akin to the idea of the 'White Man's Burden', with the emphasis on the burden.[316]

The question of American intentions for British, French and Dutch colonies in the Far East alarmed some. Roosevelt's comments to Molotov, which were eventually relayed to the British in June, as well as Richard Law's recent conversation with Welles in Washington,

[314] Memorandum by Richard Law, 21 September 1942, FO 371/31514/U841
[315] Butler minute, 6 August 1942, FCO 73/264/Pwp/42/9
[316] Minute by Jebb, 17 August 1942, FCO 73/264/Pwp/42/16

seemed to point to an administration intent on forcing international trusteeship onto European colonial territories in the Far East.[317] Jebb acknowledged that he feared the 'Weltanschauung' of Roosevelt and State Department officials involved the dissolution of the British Empire and the United States assuming oversight of the Far East, Africa and the Western Hemisphere.[318] Some officials, such as the Head of the Central Department, Frank Roberts, were resigned to the fact that Britain would need to sacrifice certain interests to preserve others, though he was vague on what exactly they might concede. The need for American support, he said, 'implies giving way to a great many American pretensions, which may not in themselves be justified, in the hope that we may thereby involve America in a policy of undertaking international responsibilities extending to Europe'.[319]

The one opinion which seems to have resonated with Jebb was from the British Minister in Washington, Ronald Campbell, who wrote on 26 July, prior to Jebb's first draft, that while the United Kingdom could expect American assistance in the immediate aftermath and for some years after, the support would eventually dry up. Thus, Britain could not base its plan solely on the assumption that the United States would remain committed to Europe. What is more, the Foreign Office needed to display some tact in getting the most out of the Americans while they could. 'We must lead and teach without appearing to do so, while taking their good ideas and forging them into practical tools on the anvil of our experience.'[320]

There was another question in these months which held particular importance for the way in which American and British officials perceived of a future world order. It touched on a point raised by Richard Law, who had described the United States as a country which, led by a

[317] See 'Meeting with the Soviet Delegation at No. 10 Downing Street', 9 June 1942, FO 954/25B/257; Memorandum by Law on a conversation with Sumner Welles, 4 September 1942, FO 371/31514/U778
[318] Jebb minute, 26 September 1942, FO 371/31514/U778
[319] Roberts minute, undated (but between 6 and 10 August 1942), FCO 73/264/Pwp/42/10. Nevile Butler also agreed. Butler minute, 4 October 1942, FO 371/31514/U841
[320] This text would be cited by Jebb in his Four Power Plan. Extract from letter by Ronald Campbell, 26 July 1942, FCO 73/264/Pwp/42/17

visionary President, was viewing 'world problems through a telescope where [Britain] look[s] at them through a microscope'. Americans, he said, were 'thinking in centuries and continents' as they pursued their ideal version of world order.[321]

> There is the evident conviction, disturbed by no inner questionings whatever, that the United States stands for something in the world—something of which the world has need, something which the world is going to like, something, in the final analysis, which the world is going to take whether it likes it or not.[322]

This struck a chord in the Foreign Office, where officials understood how notions of national spirit or purpose could influence foreign policy. T. North Whitehead wrote that, 'We are accused…of exhibiting ourselves as a nation somewhat devoid of vision, or of courage for the future of our civilization.'[323] On this point, Jebb agreed, though he admitted that Britain could not simply develop some kind of 'morale aim' which could compete with the same 'intensity' as the New Deal.

> What we can legitimately hope for in this country, I think, is that the nation at large should be inspired with a sense of its own importance in any world order—in other words, that we shall be a realistic and temperate force capable of toning down the conflicting world ideologies possessed by other nations.[324]

Jebb's view in these months was conservative in that he remained wary of grand schemes for the future. Even the supposed vision of the Roosevelt administration struck him as too idealistic in many ways. But his solution was far from a resignation to anarchic power politics. His relief machinery proposal, even relying as it did on the preeminent position of the great powers, was a form of internationalism, albeit one that would have seemed undemocratic to an Arnold Toynbee or Clarence Streit. It was based, first and foremost on concentrating authority in the hands of the great powers and then binding these countries together in the maintenance of international peace and security. In this way,

[321] Memorandum by Law, 21 September 1942, FO 371/31514/U841
[322] Memorandum by Law, 21 September 1942, FO 371/31514/U841
[323] Whitehead minute, 5 October 1942, FO 371/31514/U841
[324] Jebb minute, 8 October 1942, FO 371/31514/U841

Britain could achieve its dual aims of maintaining its position as world power and bringing the United States into European commitments.

Towards a 'Four Power Plan'

In addition to the debates over what could be expected from American post-war commitments, there remained crucial differences on two of Jebb's most important tenets in the Relief Machinery paper: the concept of regional spheres of influence and whether to encourage the division of Germany after the war. The former issue was arguably the most important debate within the Foreign Office in the early drafting stages, and it would go on to be the key issue in the larger Cabinet debate months later. It was this subject that forced the question of British strategic identity going forward. Would the United Kingdom be an imperial power, maintaining her global reach through connections to its Dominions and Colonies? Was it to turn more towards Europe and take responsibility for organising the continent along political and economic lines that might keep the peace? Did its great power salvation rest in a system of Anglo-American hegemony or, as the Americans were suggesting, a four-power system in which the great powers cooperated amongst themselves to maintain a secure international order?

Replying to Jebb's paper, Frank Roberts, Head of the Central Department, came out in strong opposition to the idea of regionalism. While an international order along these lines would undoubtedly strengthen the United States, the Soviet Union and China, it would weaken the United Kingdom. The country would be forced to focus on the European continent at the expense of its overseas connections, leading inevitably to the loss of its 'power and greatness'. Britain's overseas connections, which had for so long allowed it to play a powerful role in 'counterbalancing' the stronger nations of Europe, would have to be sacrificed in order to focus on the continent. 'If we are to regard ourselves purely as a European nation, we cannot possibly

hope to maintain ourselves even as the first among equals.'[325] British power, he believed, would be better served by maintaining the overseas Empire and acting as 'a bridge' between the United States and Europe.

Elsewhere, Roberts voiced his opposition to the regional council which he thought would draw the ire of smaller states. He recommended that Jebb 'disguise the hegemony of the leading powers more carefully', perhaps by bringing in more states under a system that would resemble a reconstituted League of Nations. This would avoid a scenario in which the victorious powers were seen to be dictating terms to nations across the world. The current Foreign Office policy towards the League, he reminded Jebb, was to 'maintain the skeleton' of that defunct organisation in order to prevent such a post-war council of righteous, victorious powers.[326]

Roberts was joined in his opposition to regionalism by Christopher Warner, Head of the Northern Department, but their views as to the role and power of the Supreme Council differed. Like Roberts, Warner viewed regionalism as a 'fatal' proposition, but not for the aforementioned likelihood of having to give up the Empire. Instead, a regional approach in which a great power was solely responsible for one region would lead inevitably to the great powers being at 'loggerheads' with one another. This would lead to a fundamental breakdown in relations, undermining the very reason for a four-power concert. His recommendation was for the concert—or supreme council—not to act in their self-interest in their assigned regions, but to emphasise 'the conception that the world is an indivisible whole and that all three powers of the Concert, as trustees for the other United Nations, have an equal interest in every area'.[327] In his view, this would represent a system more akin to that which was instituted at the Congress of Vienna in 1815.

[325] Roberts minute on Relief Machinery paper, undated, FCO 73/264/Pwp/42/10
[326] Roberts minute, undated, FCO 73/264/Pwp/42/10
[327] Warner minute, 18 August 1942, FCO 73/264/Pwp/42/18

The next major debate involved the application of the four power idea to the European continent after the war. Here the fulcrum of continental policy was the attitude towards Germany. While all agreed on the necessity of preventing future German aggression, the solutions diverged. Where Jebb wanted to 'encourage separatist tendencies and to get the western Germans associated with an Atlantic civilisation and the Eastern Germans with some kind of 'Mitteleuropa' block'', others such as Sargent warned against dividing Germany in two.[328] The latter's proposal was to balance Germany, first with some kind of western Anglo-French alliance in the west, coupled with two confederations of smaller states to Germany's east and southeast.[329] Additional opposition came from the Northern Department, where Warner wrote that dividing Europe into 'two halves' would lead to future chaos. He reiterated his earlier recommendation that the great powers work together in a kind of 'three power hegemony' which, assuming it could be accepted by smaller states, would address such questions on a collaborative basis.[330] It was this latter conception of great power cooperation which would become an essential pillar of Britain's approach to the post-war world.

After considering the comments of his colleagues, Jebb submitted a redraft of the Relief Machinery paper—now titled the 'Four-Power Plan'—which was to become the first major Foreign Office proposal for the post-war international order. Jebb wrote that his intention was to develop an approach which would allow the government to establish a 'guiding principle' for subsequent policies. He was clear that, for Britain to remain an influential great power, they would need to join into a larger world system and to show themselves ready to make the necessary sacrifices therein. 'We can only hope to play our part either as a European Power or as a world Power if we ourselves form part of a wider organisation.' This did not necessarily

[328] Jebb to Sargent, 23 September 1942, FCO 73/264/Pwp/42/27
[329] Sargent had outlined this plan in a memorandum from 1 June 1942. For extracts of the memo, See Ross, *The Foreign Office and the Kremlin*, pp. 108-9. See Jebb's response to Sargent, on 17 August 1943, FCO 73/264/Pwp/42/16
[330] Warner minute, 18 August 1942, FCO 73/264/Pwp/42/18

mean an organisation resembling the League, but it did imply building up 'the machinery of international co-operation' from the existing members of United Nations. 'We should regard the conception of the Four Powers, working within the framework of the United Nations, as the present basis of our foreign policy', he wrote.[331] In commenting on the revised version, Cadogan thought that it provided 'the foundation of an ordered world' though he was quick to warn that 'what we can ultimately build on that foundation remains to be seen, and will depend on the material to hand.'[332]

The conceptual framework of the Four Power Plan remained largely similar to Jebb's earlier draft on relief machinery, though he diluted his original support for spheres of influence by working in the suggestions of Sargent and Warner. Adopting the recommendations of the latter, in particular, Jebb said that the great powers might take joint responsibility for various regions of the world, even if this was 'in token form'. 'What we want to avoid', Jebb wrote, 'is any system whereby one Great Power has, so to speak, "to hold the baby" alone in any given area. For apart from anything else, this would mean that our European "baby" might prove to be too heavy for us unaided to hold.'[333] Nevertheless, Jebb held to the notion that Britain had an essential role to play in Western Europe—an area he considered to be the 'cradle and matrix of the civilisation which has now spread to almost every corner of the globe'. Without British leadership in this region after the war, he warned, there was a risk that 'our particular type of civilisation must inevitably crumble, or merge into something very new and strange.'[334]

It was clear to the officials involved that post-war Europe—and British power more broadly—would depend on American support in the months and years after the war, but this did not mean accepting the American proposals without reservation. Going forward, it would

[331] Covering Memorandum by Eden, 'The "Four-Power" Plan', WP (42) 516, 8 November 1942, p. 3, copy in FO 371/31525/U783.
[332] Cadogan minute, 5 December 1942, FO 371/31515/U1547
[333] Memorandum by Jebb, 'The "Four-Power" Plan', 20 October 1942, p. 11, copy in FO 371/31525/U783
[334] Ibid, pp. 10-11

be necessary to put a British stamp on it where possible. As Jebb wrote, 'Only by taking up the vague ideas now floating about the world and expressing them boldly and even recklessly *in our own terms* can we hope to play the role which is proper to us.'[335] At the tactical level, the paper recommended a balanced approach to Washington and Moscow. Much of this new line had been recommended by Cadogan and Sargent, both of whom were conscious of not alarming or isolating the Soviet Union. Doing so would make it nearly impossible for Britain to develop a working relationship with Stalin should the Roosevelt administration not be able to guarantee a post-war commitment to the continent. As Sargent wrote, 'The Soviet connexion [sic] must always remain a second string to our bow, and we must be careful therefore not to mislay this string while practising our archery with the Americans'[336]

In the final draft of the Four Power Plan, Jebb took on these suggestions and made it clear that the future policy of Britain was neither to follow the Americans blindly nor to accede to outlandish Russian demands. In a section titled 'Suggested Grand Strategy', he recommended approaching the Americans and Russians regarding the Four Power Plan, but doing so strategically. If the Americans made their terms 'too stiff' they should not hesitate to forge a 'close and exclusive working alliance with Soviet Russia', he wrote. At the same time, if the Kremlin were 'too grasping', then Britain should make it known that they would attempt to move closer to the United States while effectively isolating the Soviet Union. 'Here indeed', Jebb wrote, 'if we play our cards properly, are all the elements of a real world balance of power.'[337]

[335] His emphasis here. This was a part of what Jebb referred to as the 'grand diplomatic strategy'. Memorandum by Jebb, 'The "Four-Power" Plan', 20 October 1942, p. 17, copy in FO 371/31525/U783
[336] Sargent minute, 23 August 1942, FO 371/31525/U742
[337] Memorandum by Jebb, 'The "Four-Power" Plan', 20 October 1942, pp. 16-17, copy in FO 371/31525/U783

A Recipe for Jugged Hare: Churchill's Initial Resistance

By the end of September, the Foreign Office had agreed on the four power idea as a basis of post-war policy, and attention now turned to securing the approval of the War Cabinet. One of the great hindrances to Foreign Office planning in these months was the Prime Minister himself. Not only was he not concerned with long-term planning at this stage in the war, but when he did elaborate on his ideas for the post-war world, they were largely at odds with the recommendations of the Economic and Reconstruction Department. The first that Churchill heard of the Four Power Plan was on 16 October 1942, when Eden had left him with a copy of it at Chequers.[338] Commenting on the draft, Churchill wrote that,

> Any conclusions drawn now are sure to have little relation to what will happen…I hope that these speculative studies will be entrusted mainly to those on whose hands time hangs heavy, and that we shall not overlook Mrs. Glass's Cookery Book recipe for Jugged Hare—'First catch your hare'.[339]

In a fiery response to Churchill, the Foreign Secretary expressed his frustration at the lack of approval for even a general direction in foreign policy. 'I am most disappointed at your reply', he wrote, adding that he had hoped the Four Power Plan would not be viewed as 'a vague project for an indefinite future' but instead as a 'basis of a foreign policy… [which] should carry us over into the peace'. Echoing Jebb's insistence on Britain acting with a concerted strategy so as not to be left behind, he said,

> It is from every point of view bad business to have to live from hand to mouth where we can avoid it, and the only consequence of so doing is that the United States makes a policy and we follow, which I do not regard as a satisfactory role for the British Empire.[340]

Churchill approved, but in a longer response, he also took the opportunity to, for the first time, describe his vision for the post-war order. These were proposals which would continue to frustrate officials in the Economic and Reconstruction Department for the next two

[338] Harvey diary, 19 October 1942, Harvey (ed.), p. 170.
[339] Churchill to Eden, 18 October 1942, M461/42, PREM 4/100/7
[340] Eden to Churchill, 19 October 1942, PM/42/229, PREM 4/100/7

years. Regarding Russia, Churchill was uncertain about Stalin's intentions in Europe, but he was quick to note that 'it would be a measureless disaster if Russian barbarians overlaid the culture and independence of the ancient States of Europe.' On China, Churchill questioned whether one could even consider the Chungking Government as a world power. The presence of China on a world council, he believed, was a move by Washington to ensure that it had a 'faggot vote' in their efforts to dissolve the British Empire.[341] His foremost concerns, he admitted, 'rest primarily in Europe', and he was open about his desire to see the continent modelled on the federalism of the United States. This would be accomplished through first establishing a 'Council of Europe' which might eventually become a 'United States of Europe'.[342] Churchill ended his note by reiterating the priorities at hand, of which post-war issues were unquestionably secondary. 'Unhappily the war has prior claims on your attention and on mine...I am sure we should be wise to wait longer before trying to formulate conclusions.'[343]

The Prime Minister's prioritisation of military affairs in this period can hardly be criticised, given that, during these weeks, British and American forces were undertaking one of the most important military operations to date. The British 8th Army launched a second offensive at El Alamein on 23 October, followed by a surprise invasion of Vichy-controlled French North Africa as a part of Operation 'Torch'.[344] The latter had been an approach Churchill had been championing, even in the face of steady opposition from American military leaders, most notably General George Marshall. On the eastern front, the Red Army was weathering a German advance towards the Caucasus, with the focal point being the city of

[341] As Greenwood has noted, the term 'faggot vote' essentially meant 'puppet'. See Greenwood, *Titan at the Foreign Office*, p. 158

[342] The Council of Europe which Churchill envisioned would be made up of 'ten units' comprising the great powers of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, along with new Scandinavian, Danubian and Balkan confederations. These units would contribute to a regional police force which might keep 'Prussia' permanently disarmed.

[343] Churchill to Eden, 21 October 1942, M474/2, PREM 4/100/7

[344] For a discussion of this campaign, see Gerhard L. Weinberg, *A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 431-447

Stalingrad. Stalin wrote to Churchill in September that the situation in the city had 'deteriorated', though the worst of the fighting was still to come.[345]

The military situation led to a degree of tension within the War Cabinet, and the differences between the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary over post-war planning eventually came to a head during a meeting on 3 November. Churchill, in a view that would mimic Leo Amery's proposal weeks later, argued that Britain, Russia and America needed to stay out of European affairs at the end of the war, so that a council of great powers including Prussia, Italy, Spain and a Scandinavian Confederacy might establish a working political and economic order. Eden responded with the Foreign Office view that, unless Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union took an interest in post-war Europe, there would most likely be another war in the coming decades. Growing increasingly perturbed, the Foreign Secretary then complained that the Four Power Plan had yet to be discussed in Cabinet and that he felt this was due to Churchill's personal opposition to the idea. Eden warned that if the Prime Minister continued to block the plan from Cabinet discussion, he would have to find a new Foreign Secretary.[346]

Counter-proposals from Cabinet Ministers

Though the tension between Eden and Churchill eased for the time being, it was nearly three weeks before the latter finally agreed to circulate the Four Power Plan.[347] Jebb's paper was well-received by officials and ministers outside the Foreign Office.[348] Sir Wilfred Eady, representing the Treasury, agreed with Jebb that the government should take the decisive lead

[345] Stalin to Churchill, 3 October 1942, in Reynolds, *Kremlin Letters*, pp. 155-156. On 19 October, the War Cabinet had been informed that the northern portion of the city was captured by the Germans. War Cabinet conclusions, WM (42) 142, 19 October 1942, CAB 65/28

[346] Harvey diary, 3 November 1942, Harvey (ed.), pp. 175-76

[347] News coming out of the United States once again led to action in Whitehall. On 17 November, Sumner Welles had delivered a speech addressing post-war reconstruction. Cited in Foreign Office memorandum, 'Recent American Speeches about the Post-war World', 10 December 1942, FO 371/31515/U1682

[348] Lionel Robbins wrote months later that, 'as a piece of draftsmanship it reminded me of the great State papers of pre-1914'. Lionel Robbins to Nigel Ronald, 25 February 1943, FCO 73/258/Eu/43/1

in Europe and work towards reversing the distrust that many on the continent felt towards the United Kingdom during the interwar period. More importantly, Jebb's plan, he felt, might provide the British people with the self-confidence required for the nation to be a leading power.[349] The President of the Board of Trade Hugh Dalton and Minister for Labour Ernest Bevin, both Labour Party stalwarts, agreed with the basic premise of Jebb's plan, but urged that the Foreign Office develop economic plans in tandem with the political designs being put forward. Bevin, who had played an influential role in getting economic considerations incorporated into the Atlantic Charter, commented that 'while man as a political animal tends to look backwards, as an economic animal he is forced, whether he likes it or not, to look forward.'[350]

Sir Stafford Cripps, then the Lord Privy Seal, agreed with the broad parameters of the Four Power Plan, namely that the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union should work together at the end of the war to facilitate world reconstruction. But he also argued that the plan did not go into enough detail as to the direction the British should take. Of the twenty-four points in Cripps's proposal, a few central arguments emerged. First, both the reconstruction and future management of Europe would be the most important post-war issues. Here, the size, geographic position and economic prowess of Germany remained potential threats; and the United Kingdom should, through elaborate political and economic designs, work to restrain Germany. One way to do this, he suggested, was to create federal unions of smaller European states which might be able to compete from an economic standpoint with German production. A second major point was that the four powers needed to act as a policing force 'to maintain order and to prevent the building up of aggressive states'. Cripps envisioned

[349] Eady to Ronald, 26 November 1942, FO 371/31525/U1507
[350] Bevin to Eden, 8 December 1942, FO 371/31525/U1798; Dalton to Eden, 19 November 1942, FO 371/31525/U1796. For a detailed study of the post-war views of Labour Party intellectuals and politicians in the 1930s and 1940s, see Douglas, *Labour Party*.

this arrangement eventually growing into an international police force which might rely on the air and naval strength of the great powers to deter aggression. Third, and perhaps the most important ministerial recommendation which would influence Foreign Office planning debates, was the creation of a Council of Europe to deal with social, economic and political matters. The Council would be led by Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States, and be joined by a Pan-American Union led by the United States, a Council of Asia led by China, the British Commonwealth of Nations led by Great Britain, and a region led by the Soviet Union. These would become the 'five world councils' which would make up a body Cripps referred to as the 'Supreme World Council'.[351]

A second counter-proposal to the Four Power Plan came from the Secretary of State for India Leo Amery, though his paper did not receive a warm welcome within the Foreign Office. In a memorandum entitled 'Europe and the Post-war Settlement', Amery agreed that the great powers would need to cooperate in the immediate post-war period, but he doubted whether this great power alignment could serve as the foundation of a world organisation or whether it could maintain peace in Europe. The United States, he predicted, would 'once again wash its hands' of European problems; while the Soviet Union, under the leadership of Stalin, would practice a form of 'elementary realism' in which they would focus more on their own domestic issues and regional interests in Asia. As for Britain, its concerns should rest with its Empire and Commonwealth, as opposed to continental questions. The nations of Europe, he suggested, would need to organise themselves in some kind of 'European Commonwealth' which might 'offer to a chastened and weakened Germany an outlet for her economic life and for the exercise of a peaceful influence in a freely-shared "living-space" which alone can console her for defeat'.[352]

[351] Memorandum by Cripps, 13 November 1942, pp. 3-4, WP (42) 516, FO 371/31525/U1505
[352] Memorandum by Amery, 12 November 1942, p. 3, WP (42) 524, ibid

Jebb replied to both Cripps's and Amery's papers on the same day, 15 November, but his critiques could not have been more different. He, along with the Foreign Secretary, expressed his surprise at the Lord Privy Seal's seemingly congruent outlook, noting that 'Sir Stafford is clearly on the side of the angels.'[353] His points reflected virtually the same as those made in Jebb's original draft, namely that the great powers would need to not only take the lead in international affairs but also cooperate in the post-war period. While Jebb would go on to disagree with Cripps on more specific points, he, Cadogan and Eden now viewed Cripps as a possible ally once the Four Power Plan came up for discussion in the Cabinet. Amery's paper, on the other hand, sparked disbelief. Amery, Jebb wrote, was being 'more woolly minded than even the most visionary idealist', and if the Cabinet agreed to accept his thesis, he warned that 'we shall be in grave danger of losing the peace.'[354] The paper was resoundingly criticised within the Foreign Office ranks, with the Foreign Secretary remarking that it was 'sad fustian'.[355]

Towards a United Nations Plan

Though the Prime Minister remained uninterested in post-war planning at this stage, it was clear that his colleagues were growing interested in such questions. The discussion that had grown up around Jebb's paper put the Foreign Office—and importantly, the Economic and Reconstruction Department—firmly at the centre of post-war planning. Into December, the Foreign Office continued to advocate for a decided policy, and when the Cabinet finally met to consider these post-war questions, it was suggested by Eden that the Four Power Plan and Cripps's proposal be combined into one workable document.[356] There was now serious

[353] Jebb minute, 15 November 1942, FO 371/31525/U1505
[354] Jebb minute, 15 November 1942, FO 371/31525/U1506; also quoted in Greenwood, *Titan at the Foreign Office*, p. 156
[355] Eden minute, 20 November 1942, FO 371/31525/U1506
[356] War Cabinet Conclusions, WM (42) 161, 27 November 1942, CAB 65/28

momentum building towards a British policy for the post-war world, a development which seemed nearly out of reach just months before.

Addressing the House of Commons just days after the Cabinet decision, the Foreign Secretary recommended three points related to the post-war world, each of which was in line with the basic idea of the Four Power Plan. First, the great powers must be involved in the post-war international order; second, there must be a degree of unity among them; and third, they must be willing to use force to counter aggression. Furthermore, the central nucleus of powers, he urged, should be set against the backdrop of a larger body comprising the United Nations.[357] In what was welcome news to officials in the Foreign Office, Lord Halifax cabled from Washington that State Department officials, including Cordell Hull and Sumner Welles, admired the statements from the Foreign Secretary.[358] Just as promising—but perhaps more surprising—was the approval of the Russian Ambassador back in London.[359]

A day after Eden had delivered his speech in the House of Commons, Jebb set about redrafting the Four Power Plan, to include the Cripps proposal as well as the comments of Eady and Bevin. In one of his major changes, Jebb wrote of the necessity of a world council consisting of Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union, '(pro forma) China', and possibly France. Though the Foreign Office had long viewed the revival of France as a crucial post-war objective, Jebb's redraft was one of the first explicit mentions on the British side of the five-power council which would go on to form the nucleus of the United Nations Organization. The primary responsibility of this council, Jebb wrote, was to resolve disputes between states and to protect against future aggression from Japan and Germany.

[357] *Hansard*, House of Commons Debate, Vol 385, cols. 1181-260, 02 December 1942
[358] See Telegram from Halifax to Foreign Office, 4 December 1942 and Telegram from Foreign Office to Halifax, 8 December 1942, FO 371/31515/U1644. For Hull's views of Eden's speech, see Telegram from Halifax to Foreign Office, 15 December 1942, FO 371/31515/U1830
[359] Harvey diary, 4 December 1942, Harvey (ed.), pp. 530-31. Jebb was also pleased with Eden's speech. See Dalton diary, 4 December 1942, Pimlott (ed.), pp. 530-1

The new draft also included the possibility of forming either an 'assembly' of nations or following a more 'regional' approach. Jebb admitted his support for the regional arrangement, but he also cautioned, as he had in the original draft, that one power theoretically responsible for keeping the peace in a given region could lead to numerous issues, among them a lurch towards domination of that region by one power or an inability to police the region sufficiently.[360] One of the more important recommendations here was for an 'Armistice Commission', which would be made up of the great powers as well as the smaller European allies and 'represent a large-scale experiment in European international administration'.[361] Not only did this suggestion embody Jebb's regionalist aims, but it also contained the seeds of what would become, by the winter of 1943, the European Advisory Commission.[362]

In an effort to reassure Hugh Dalton and Ernest Bevin—both of whom had emphasised the importance of economic considerations—Jebb expressed the view that addressing economic issues should be a key responsibility of the great powers. To Bevin's point, in particular, he stressed that it was of the 'highest importance' to continue the International Labour Organisation and other institutions which might help to 'smooth out such discrepancies before they become acute'. Furthermore, it would be beneficial for the great powers to adopt the Clearing Union and Commodity Control plans—ideas recently suggested by John Maynard Keynes—so that a stable and prosperous system of world trade and finance might envelop the countries of the world. Despite his assurances that economic considerations would remain in any accepted Four Power Plan, Jebb was clear on his longstanding precept that political aspects must come before economic ones. 'Politics comes first, and…no world system will work unless

[360] Jebb, redraft of the Four Power Plan, 17 December 1942, p. 4, FO 371/31525/U1805
[361] Ibid, p. 6
[362] Weeks later, the proposed Armistice Commission would be referred to as the 'Inter-Allied Armistice Commission'. Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 'The United Nations Plan', 16 January 1943, WP (43) 31, p. 3, FO 371/35396/U2329

the political foundation is secure…But that does not mean that I ignore the economic or social aspects. Far from it.'[363]

Regarding Cripps's proposal, which the Foreign Secretary had explicitly requested be combined with the Four Power Plan, Jebb included a number of points though he resisted others. He and other members of the Foreign office viewed Cripps's idea to create five regional councils as 'egregious', arguing that the Council of Europe was unfeasible and the overlapping interests and responsibilities of the five councils would sow the seeds for disagreement and ultimate breakdown.[364] The immediate concern, however, was obtaining Cabinet approval for the general line of foreign policy; and Jebb's recommendation was thus to finalise the draft in such a way that the Cabinet would agree to broad principles of the plan and leave the more detailed designs to officials in the Foreign Office. 'I hope', he wrote on New Year's Eve, 'that the Cabinet will be asked only to bless *in principle*, leaving details to be worked out between the [departments] principally concerned. I do not see how otherwise we are likely to make much progress.'[365] If this meant accepting Cripps's ideas on regional councils—including the proposal for a Council of Europe—then this would be the necessary price to pay.

In an effort to reclaim some ground, Jebb wrote that if these regional councils were to be included in the combined plan, the ultimate authority within any international organisation would rest within the world council made up of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, along with China and eventually France. Jebb added in the text of the revised document that the regional councils

> would ultimately be subordinate, so far as political issues are concerned, to some Council of the World which, in the early stages after the war at any rate, can for all practical purposes only consist of the representatives of the Four Powers and possibly also of France, who would represent in their turn all the United Nations.[366]

[363] Jebb, redraft of the Four Power Plan, 17 December 1942, pp. 6-7, FO 371/31525/U1805
[364] Orme Sargent used the word 'egregious' in describing Cripps' Council of Europe idea. Sargent to Jebb, 30 December 1942, FO 371/31525/U1805
[365] His emphasis. Jebb minute, 31 December 1942, FO 371/31525/U1805
[366] Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 'The United Nations Plan', 16 January 1943, WP (43) 31, FO 371/35396/U2329

This stipulation, in effect, placed the largest responsibility in the hands of the great powers, a theme which was the essence of Jebb's original paper outlining the Four Power Plan.

The combination of Jebb's and Cripps's plans became a new document, entitled the 'United Nations Plan', which was submitted to the Cabinet on 16 January 1943. The text of the memorandum made clear that this was to be a 'less ambitious and more practical' scheme than the League of Nations, but that its aim was still to build up the 'machinery of international cooperation'. A 'World Council'—which was to consist of the four powers (and eventually France)—would sit atop subordinate regional councils and would be ultimately responsible for the maintenance of peace and security throughout the world. Added to this wider system would be a 'World Economic Council', which would include the great powers as well as the smaller powers. This economic council would oversee bodies such as the Clearing Union, Commodity Control, the International Labour Organisation, the League of Nations Humanitarian and Economic Services, and the Relief Organisation. The plan contained, in theory, all the measures necessary to ensure Britain's dual aim of maintaining its status as a world power and creating international mechanisms to help keep peace in Europe. Both of these objectives, the paper made clear, could only be achieved if Britain was to 'form part of a wider organisation'.[367]

This chapter has examined post-war political planning within the British Foreign Office and Cabinet between the summer of 1942 and January 1943. It has argued that the Foreign Office, and in particular Gladwyn Jebb—as head of the nascent Economic and Reconstruction Department—drove the process in these months. Their efforts were spurred, in part, by the perception that British planning was well behind that of the United States. In setting out their own plans for the post-war world, the Economic and Reconstruction Department understood

[367] Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 'The United Nations Plan', 16 January 1943, WP (43) 31, FO 371/35396/U2329

that their ideas would need to appeal to the Roosevelt administration in some way. Thus, the approach was to take the rather nebulous conception of 'four policemen', which Roosevelt had spoken of privately, and to mould more detailed British ideas on this foundation. The Four Power Plan represented this main conception of four powers operating 'in concert' at the centre of a wider international order, but importantly, there was a distinct regionalist structure within Jebb's plan, a conception which would underpin his recommendations for at least another year.

There were significant hurdles to overcome both within the Foreign Office and within the Cabinet—bureaucratic realities which would continue to exert influence on the shape and pace of planning with the Economic and Reconstruction Department. This chapter has offered one of the first sustained treatments of the way in which the Four Power Plan was developed and discussed within the Foreign Office and Cabinet, and the way in which these critiques altered the document. Jebb's original 'spheres of influence' conception, present in the Relief Machinery paper, was tempered by officials from various departments; while the larger Four Power conception was challenged by several counter-proposals within the Cabinet. Indeed, the debate which took place within the Cabinet in November 1942 marked the most consequential discussion on post-war planning up until that point. Surprisingly, the discussion was almost prevented entirely, given Churchill's reluctance to commit to such issues at this stage. Here, the Foreign Secretary, until then somewhat removed from post-war planning, played a key role in forcing the issue to come before the Cabinet, even going so far as to threaten resignation should the matter fail to be taken up.

The Cabinet debate was essentially a clash between visions of a future international order, with the future position of the United Kingdom and the British Empire at stake. Understanding the profundity of the subject and desiring a central role for the Foreign Office, Jebb pushed for the Cabinet to agree to the Four Power Plan 'in principle' and to leave the details to be worked out amongst officials within the Foreign Office. He considered the views

of Cabinet members, especially the Prime Minister and Leo Amery, to be woefully short-sighted—a product of either ignorance or whimsical musings. Ministers such as Stafford Cripps, however, were closer to the thinking of the Economic and Reconstruction Department and hence, were viewed as allies for the time being. Yet Jebb and officials understood that once planning returned to the Foreign Office, they would exert more of a free reign over the more detailed planning process. Over the next six months, a wider circle of stakeholders, including Commonwealth officials, would debate the United Nations Plan, and as a result, the document would undergo another significant redraft by July 1943.

Chapter Three

The United Nations Plan for Organising Peace and Welfare, January – July 1943

By late 1942, the Foreign Office planning process had become more organised and advanced, largely in response to inter-allied competition. Partly through the efforts of Jebb—and reflected in the increasing importance of the Economic and Reconstruction Department—the imperative of developing a 'grand strategy for peace' had won more converts. As much as anything, this had been triggered by a growing concern on the British side that the Americans were setting the post-war agenda within the wartime coalition. Crucially, the advocates of planning had convinced the Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, of the necessity of thinking along these lines; and with varying degrees of success, he had made his case to The Prime Minister. The Economic and Reconstruction Department had also established itself as the engine of planning within the British government, seizing control of the pen when it came to early blueprints for a putative post-war international order. As the previous chapter noted, Jebb had done this by carving out a niche role as the bridgehead between the more idealistic and utopian thinking about world order as well as the inertia of the Cabinet when it came to lending their attention to these questions. This was a staging point in the development of the realist-internationalism approach—predicated on an understanding of great power relations as the determining factor in international relations but also forward-looking in seeking to build international structures around this reality.[368] Although the plans had yet to be developed into a mature tableau, Jebb's team had nonetheless put down the early sketches for what a future world organisation might look like by the turn of the year. These plans were to provide the starting point for British negotiators thereafter.

[368] The concept of realist-internationalism, as it pertained to the approach of the Economic and Reconstruction Department towards a post-war organisation, will receive a more sustained treatment in chapter 4.

This chapter covers the evolution of planning between January and July 1943, a period which, in previous descriptions of British post-war planning for a world organisation, has often been covered too briefly or overlooked altogether.[369] In addition to shining light on this crucial period of Foreign Office planning, this chapter puts forward three central arguments, in particular. First, the views of Churchill became more pronounced and more known to individuals outside of the British policymaking apparatus, and this influenced Foreign Office planning in critical ways.[370] Churchill's comments—first to the President of Turkey and later to Roosevelt himself—were seen by members of the Economic and Reconstruction Department as a threat to their own planning. While officials disagreed with the Prime Minister on a number of details—especially regarding his idea for a 'Council of Europe'—they understood that his views could not be ignored. Their work between May and June thus involved developing structures for post-war Europe which might appeal to the Prime Minister, all while ensuring that this kind of regional structure might feed into their version of a future international organisation. Ironically, for all of the Foreign Office criticism of the Prime Minister's views in this period, Churchill's statements concerning the post-war world helped to instil a feeling among members of the Roosevelt administration that the United Kingdom, at this stage at least, was progressing ahead of their own planning.

The second major argument in this chapter is that the spring of 1943 was the moment when British plans entered into a more deliberative process—namely with members of the US State Department. During a trip to the American capital in March, British planners learned just how advanced the American planning efforts were; and while there were welcome similarities,

[369] Simpson, *Human Rights and the End of Empire*, pp. 226-229; Reynolds and Hughes, *Historian as Diplomat*, pp. 18-22; Greenwood, *Titan at the Foreign Office*, pp. 159-170

[370] The comments made by Churchill here concerning the post-war world—known as his 'Morning Thoughts'—have been mentioned in numerous studies of the period, but less attention has been given to the response of the Foreign Office and the way in which this affected planning within the Economic and Reconstruction Department. Hughes, 'Winston Churchill and the Formation of the United Nations Organization', p. 184, 186; Martin Gilbert, *Winston S. Churchill, Volume VII: 1941-1945, Road to Victory* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1986), pp. 321-325; Douglas, *Labour Party*, pp. 124-125; Russell, *A History of the United Nations Charter*, p. 104; Simpson, *Human Rights and the End of Empire*, pp. 227-228; Barker, *Churchill and Eden at War*, p. 207

tensions were also apparent. The Roosevelt administration viewed the future international order as one based around the influence of the great powers and especially around their ability to design and facilitate an international organisation. The Foreign Office, on the other hand, were viewing questions of future international order through the lens of the great powers first establishing regional structures to deal with armistice questions, and then building up worldwide machinery based on this cooperation. The two approaches represented, in effect, top-down and bottom-up approaches to the establishment of an international order. This fundamental difference in American and British conceptions—as well as the meeting between the groups of officials more generally—has been given less attention in previous scholarship.[371] Moreover, the Foreign Office views of certain members of the Roosevelt administration in this period, including the President himself, has also been undervalued. Though British officials were doubtful of certain aspects of American thinking, they understood that British plans would need to go some way towards the American position, in order to guarantee their support in the post-war period. In the months after the visit, Jebb sought to square Britain's post-war priorities in Europe with the wider ambitions of the Roosevelt administration. In other words, the desire of the Americans to assume a global role should, in his view, be made to work for British interests in Europe. Jebb continued to hold firm to earlier ideas of regionalism, though he sought a 'middle ground'—between regionalism and a universal organisation—which might appeal to the United States going forward. Jebb's attention thus turned to developing more detailed plans for a post-war organisation which could reconcile these two approaches.

A third key argument here is that, within the Economic and Reconstruction Department, the very conception of a post-war international order altered in fundamental ways, due largely to the gradual incorporation of Charles Webster into the Economic and Reconstruction

[371] These meetings in Washington in March 1943 have been discussed briefly in previous works. See Greenwood, *Titan at the Foreign Office*, pp. 161-163; Russell, *A History of the United Nations Charter*, pp. 89-91; Kimball, *Forged in War,* pp. 200-208; Barker, *Churchill and Eden at War*, p. 212; Woodward, *British Foreign Policy in the Second World War*, Vol. V, pp. 31-38

Department.[372] As a professor of international history at the London School of Economics prior to the war, Webster was considered the foremost British historian of international organisations dating back to the Congress of Vienna. Though an avid proponent of the League of Nations in the interwar years, Webster escaped Jebb's aversion to academics largely because, in the latter's words, he was a 'great power man' and had an 'encyclopaedic knowledge of the League'.[373] Over the next two years, Webster brought to the department a unique perspective on internationalism and British foreign policy which, like Jebb, was often grounded in historical precedent. His expertise, especially surrounding past peace settlements as well as previous international organisations, was one reason that the department was able to maintain its position as the brain trust behind the planning for a post-war organisation. Webster's earliest suggestions—ones which fed directly into a revised version of the United Nations Plan—were for a future world organisation to make sufficient room for the position of smaller powers; for there to be economic and social organs which might provide crucial linkages in a future international system; and for the entire conception of a post-war international order to be based on 'principles' to which all members would agree. The result was a new plan which, although based on the Four Power Plan and the United Nation Plan before it, went much further in outlining the structure and function of a future world organisation.

'Morning Thoughts': Churchill's challenge to the Foreign Office

By the New Year 1943, the United Nations Plan had become the bedrock of Foreign Office thinking about the post-war world. Officials were intent on controlling the publicity of such plans, however, as they engaged in a delicate balancing act. On the one hand, they needed to draw the Americans into post-war agreements; while on the other, they needed to avoid stirring

[372] Webster's work in these months has been covered only briefly by Reynolds and Hughes, *Historian as Diplomat*, pp. 18-22
[373] Jebb, *The Memoirs of Lord Gladwyn*, p. 120; Lord Gladwyn, 'Founding the United Nations: Principals and Objects', p. 34

up the suspicion of both the Russians as well as the Republican factions within the United States, the latter of whom were determined to avoid European commitments. The tactful approach received an unwelcome jolt, however, when the Prime Minister, in a bold stroke, put forward his own vision of a post-war world.

Fresh off a conference with Roosevelt at Casablanca, Churchill flew to Cairo and then Adana, Turkey, where he met with the Turkish President İsmet İnönü.[374] On 1 February, Churchill passed a document to İnönü—and later to the Americans—which outlined his view of the post-war world. The paper was titled 'Morning Thoughts' and through it, he hoped to secure Turkish military commitments by encouraging them to 'play a part and win her place in the council of the victors'.[375] The portion of the document that would draw the scorn of the Economic and Reconstruction Department, however, was the Prime Minister's scheme for an international order after the war, a conception which echoed his designs from the previous autumn. He spoke of the 'Chiefs of the United Nations' creating a world organisation which might include a European Government that would 'embody the spirit but not be subject to the weakness' of the League of Nations. Furthermore, Scandinavian, Danubian and Balkan confederations should be organised in Europe, while similar structures might be developed in the Far East. The wider organisation, he said, would be held together by the superior air forces of the great powers, combined with the continued disarmament of the Axis nations. He warned of dire consequences should the great powers—and to a lesser extent smaller powers such as Turkey—not join in this system. Another world war, he believed, 'will destroy all that is left

[374] At Casablanca, Churchill and Roosevelt had agreed to demand the 'unconditional surrender' of the Axis powers and had decided on an invasion of Italy prior to opening a second front in France. Andrew Roberts, *Masters and Commanders: How Four Titans Won the War in the West, 1941-1945 (New York: Harper Collins 2009),* pp. 316-345

[375] For Churchill's 'Morning Thoughts', see Memorandum by the Prime Minister, 'Notes on Post-War Security', 1 February 1943, FO 371/35363/U549. See also Hughes, 'Winston Churchill and the Formation of the United Nations Organization', pp. 184-86. For Jebb's reaction, see Greenwood, *Titan at the Foreign Office*, pp. 159-160. Simpson also addresses these remarks, claiming that Churchill's views 'were by now much closer to Amery than to Jebb and Eden'. Simpson, *Human Rights and the End of Empire*, p. 227

of the culture, wealth and civilization of mankind and reduce us to the level almost of wild beasts'.[376]

Upon hearing of the Prime Minister's comments to the Turkish and American governments, the Foreign Office scrambled to contain what they believed might become a 'major disaster'.[377] Jebb was angered by Churchill's propensity to ignore Foreign Office opinion and to elaborate on his own personal ideas. In a draft minute, he wrote that the paper 'seems to betray not only ignorance of the facts but also the absence of any prolonged process of thought'. Jebb would dilute his criticism before forwarding his thoughts on to other departments, but his earlier drafting reveals both frustration at the Prime Minister's maverick contributions and a conviction that the leader of the British government should keep a distance from post-war planning. In an added jibe, Jebb recommended that Churchill heed the warning in the latter's earlier autobiography, in which he wrote that 'those who can win a war well can rarely make a good peace'.[378]

While these comments were removed from his official minute, Jebb was no less stinging in his critique. He thought Churchill's paper represented an 'astonishing scheme', in which 'horror quickly follows horror'. The Prime Minister's plans for confederations, he believed, were ill-conceived. For one, the Norwegians would likely refuse a Scandinavian bloc, while the Czechs were unlikely to be willingly involved with the Hungarians, Austrians and Romanians, all of whom remained enemies of Czechoslovakia. Meanwhile, that the plans for confederations could be reapplied to the Far East were as vague as they were impractical. Furthermore, the Prime Minister had spoken of a 'coalition of resistance' which Jebb felt

[376] Memorandum by the Prime Minister, 'Notes on Post-War Security', 1 February 1943, FO 371/35363/U549
[377] Jebb minute, 5 February 1943, FO 371/35363/U549
[378] Jebb's draft minute from 3 February 1943 can be found in FCO 73/264/Pwp/43/2. See Churchill's autobiography entitled *My Early Life: A Roving Commission* (London: Mandarin, 1990), p. 346

smacked of notions of collective security. This mention, he felt, 'increases my impression that the Prime Minister's real intention is to set up something like the old League'.[379]

Like other officials in the Foreign Office, Jebb felt that the Prime Minister should immediately contact Stalin—either directly or through the British Ambassador in Moscow, Archibald Clark Kerr—to explain that his views were not the official policy of His Majesty's Government but only the result of an ambitious attempt to bring Turkey into the war.[380] Cadogan, however, tempered these plans, noting that he had been in attendance during the meeting with President İnönü and that the Prime Minister had made it clear that his views did not reflect the official policy at present. As Cadogan sought to calm some of the growing hysteria within the Economic and Reconstruction Department, he opined that 'Mr Jebb has seen a lot of ghosts', but that outreach to the Russians should remain coordinated and measured.[381] In fact, Cadogan noted in his diaries that he 'didn't see anything much wrong with it' and that it did not contradict the Four Power Plan. Both he and Eden supported the idea, Cadogan claimed. As to Jebb and the other officials in his department, Cadogan noted privately that, 'It always happens when one goes abroad, that the little quill-drivers in their cells pass a fine tooth comb through everything and wail that we have "sold the pass." Do them a lot of good to go abroad—and stay there.'[382]

Despite his role in the drafting of the Atlantic Charter, Cadogan remained less interested in sorting out the details of the post-war world in 1942 and in the early months of 1943. It was not that he believed these plans less important in the long run. Instead, he, like Churchill, simply viewed them as less pressing at that point in the war. Importantly, however, Cadogan

[379] Jebb minute, 3 February 1943, FO 371/35363/U549
[380] Archibald Clark Kerr was British Ambassador in Moscow from 1942-46
[381] Cadogan minute, 5 February 1943, FO 371/35363/U549
[382] Cadogan diary, 7 February 1943, Dilks (ed.), p. 513; also quoted in Greenwood, *Titan at the Foreign Office*, p. 160

served as the crucial link between the planning operations and the political point of delivery, an influence which was only to become more important as the war progressed.

Eden, too, despite attaching his name to the Four Power Plan and the United Nations Plan, remained somewhat aloof from the more detailed schemes being developed within the Economic and Reconstruction Department. One could hardly blame the Foreign Secretary for this lack of attention to such issues, however. Since November, Eden, in addition to leading the Foreign Office, had been doubling as leader of the House of Commons, where he was in regular attendance to field questions on behalf of the government.[383] His Private Secretary, Oliver Harvey, noted towards the end of 1942 and throughout the first months of 1943 that the dual responsibility was taking its toll on the Foreign Secretary. Foreign affairs, Harvey complained, 'are left to the fag end of the day or to hasty moments snatched between parliamentary business'.[384] He admitted that the arrangement would be more manageable should Eden be more willing to delegate work to senior officials. The Foreign Secretary, however, was hesitant to do so, largely out of fear that his own authority over foreign affairs would be curtailed from above.

Churchill, as evidenced by the Turkish excursion, was convinced of his diplomatic capabilities and wasted few opportunities to exert his control over foreign policy. This was not lost on his Foreign Secretary, who Harvey recorded as growing increasingly frustrated—even resentful—by what he viewed as the Prime Minister's 'intrusion into foreign affairs'.[385] It was under this awkward arrangement that Eden began his push for a meeting between himself and members of the Roosevelt administration.[386] In late December, he had spoken with Churchill

[383] Eden had been acting Leader of the House of Commons since 11 March 1942 when he replaced Sir Stafford Cripps. This position was made permanent on 22 November.
[384] Harvey diary, 19 January 1943, Harvey (ed.), pp. 210-211
[385] Harvey diary, 28 January 1943, Harvey (ed.), p. 215. This had long been a concern for Eden. See Dilks, 'The British Foreign Office Between the Wars', p. 199
[386] See Halifax conversation with Sumner Welles. Memorandum of Conversation by the Under Secretary of State (Welles), 30 November 1942, *FRUS,* 1943, Vol. III, pp. 1-2

about travelling to Washington to engage in discussions on 'postwar and other foreign matters'.[387] For Eden, this would offer a chance to exert his authority over foreign affairs by meeting with Britain's chief ally in the war and its essential partner in the peace. Furthermore, it would offer him a chance to circumvent stalled Cabinet discussions concerning post-war issues. As Harvey noted weeks before the trip, 'The chief value of the visit would be to enable [Eden] to put the screw on the Cabinet here by showing how far ahead the Americans were thinking.'[388]

'A Mad House': Foreign Office officials visit Washington

The military situation by the spring of 1943 had improved somewhat from the previous year, when German and Japanese advances in eastern Europe and the Pacific, respectively, had led to pessimism within certain quarters of Whitehall. By the beginning of February, signs pointed to the Red Army having successfully repelled the German invasion of Stalingrad, though the casualties suffered were enormous.[389] In North Africa, the Anglo-American push towards Tunisia was a mounting success; and by May, Churchill and Roosevelt would finalise plans to invade Sicily followed by the Italian mainland.[390] In the Pacific theatre, the Japanese army had, by March, switched to a more defensive posture, seeking to maintain their hold on occupied territories.[391]

It was in this context that a Foreign Office delegation including Eden, Harvey and Jebb arrived in Washington on 11 March. By the time they touched down, they were relieved to find

[387] Harvey diary, 23 December 1942, Harvey (ed.), p. 202. The Prime Minister agreed to the meeting in principle but did not contact Roosevelt until early February. Harvey diaries, 8 February 1943, Harvey (ed.), pp. 217-18.
[388] Harvey diary, 17 February 1943, Harvey (ed.), p. 220; also quoted in Greenwood, *Titan at the Foreign Office*, p. 161
[389] Weinberg, *A World at Arms*, pp. 453-454
[390] The third wartime conference between Churchill and Roosevelt, codenamed 'Trident', took place in Washington from 12 to 25 May. Here, the invasion of Sicily was finalised and the subsequent invasion of Italy decided. The British and Americans also made the decision to postpone the invasion of Western Europe until May 1944. Roberts, *Masters and Commanders*, pp. 357-375
[391] Weinberg, *A World at Arms*, pp. 589-590

that post-war matters had become a popular topic in the political discourse.[392] In the months preceding the trip, British officials had been receiving information on the trends in American thinking when it came to the country's global responsibility after the war. As one journalist wrote for *Time* magazine:

> There is [now] a movement of the mind of men. The plans for the postwar world are beginning to take shape…The news of the postwar world was one news of planners, politicians, theoreticians. It is becoming news of the hopes of plain people all over the globe.[393]

A recent Gallup Poll had found that 64% of Americans believed that the United States should 'set up with our Allies a world organisation to maintain the future peace of the world'.[394] Even in the Senate—the body that had prevented American involvement in the League of Nations—there had recently been resolutions introduced which called for the Roosevelt administration to take the lead in forming a United Nations organisation, an idea they considered as 'the best hope for maintaining world peace and stability after this war'.[395]

The British delegation remained in Washington for the next two weeks, and during conversations with their American counterparts, they began to better understand the range of views within the Roosevelt administration.[396] There was Harry Hopkins, described by Harvey as the 'eminence grise' of the President, who revealed that Roosevelt thought highly of Churchill as a leader during wartime, but at the same time, was 'horrified at his reactionary attitude for after the war'.[397] As to the dynamics of policymaking within Washington, the

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[392] Cadogan was supposed to join the party as well, but he fell ill shortly before the trip and had to remain in London.
[393] Robert Cantwall, 'Background for Peace', *Time*, undated, quoted in 'American Opinion on War Aims and Postwar Problems, No. 10 - Points of Interest, March 16-24 1943', FO 371/35367/U1552
[394] Ibid
[395] The B2H2 Resolution, for example, called for the United States take the lead in forming a new international organisation, and for the organisation to create an international military force. See F.P. King, *The New Internationalism: Allied policy and the European peace, 1939-1945* (Connecticut: Archon Books, 1973), pp. 159-160
[396] The scholarship has tended to overlook these high-level meetings between American and British officials. Historians such as Ruth Russell and William Roger Louis have focused almost entirely on the colonial policy dimension of these talks. Russell, *A History of the United Nations Charter*, pp. 89-91; Louis, *Imperialism at Bay*, pp. 227-230. Exceptions include Woodward, *British Foreign Policy in the Second World War*, Vol. V, pp. 31-38
[397] Harvey diary, 11 March 1943, Harvey (ed.), p. 228

British delegation was, at times, left wondering who had the deciding vote. The divisive relationship between the Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, and the Under-Secretary of State, Sumner Welles, was known to diplomats within the Foreign Office; but other instances—such as Welles not informing John Winant, the US Ambassador to London, of Eden's arrival time on 11 March—revealed additional jealousies and internecine struggles for influence. These snubs were not lost on Eden, who remarked to Harvey that it was 'all rather like a mad house' and that he felt 'more at home in the Kremlin'.[398]

Despite these initial impressions, British and American officials engaged in the most substantial Anglo-American conversations on post-war matters since the conference between Roosevelt and Churchill in Placentia Bay in August 1941. As the talks progressed over the next two weeks, there were developments which calmed and encouraged officials in the Foreign Office. There was an understanding that cooperation between the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union—and to a lesser extent the countries making up the United Nations—was a necessity; and second, that some substantial agreement among the great powers—including China, at the behest of Roosevelt—would need to be settled before the conclusion of hostilities.[399]

In all of these discussions, an inescapable question was the attitude of Russia and what the Americans and British should expect of Moscow in the post-war period. In conversation with Roosevelt and Hopkins over dinner on 14 March, Eden expressed his view that relations with the Soviet Union was, for the moment, the most difficult problem facing the Atlantic allies. He thought that Russia preferred cooperation with the Americans and British over post-war Europe for the simple fact that Stalin was not prepared to deal with European problems on

[398] Eden added that 'There [in the Kremlin] at least they meant business. Here all is confusion and woolliness.' Harvey diary, 13 March 1943, Harvey (ed.), pp. 228-29. John G. Winant: United States Ambassador in London, 1941-46; US representative on European Advisory Commission, 1943-47

[399] For the American approach to the talks, see Memorandum by Winant, 10 March 1943, in *FRUS,* 1943, Vol. III, Document 11, pp. 7-9

his own.[400] As to what the Russians would demand at the conclusion of hostilities, Eden noted that Stalin would likely lay claim to the Balkans and cite the 1939 plebiscites as evidence of domestic support.[401] In his report to the Cabinet, Eden said that the attitude toward Russia in the United States was noticeably 'less friendly' than in Britain, but that the general feeling during these talks was that Russia and China were undoubtedly central players without which the post-war order would falter. Importantly, however, was a mutual understanding between the British and Americans that their coordinated efforts would be the essential driver of post-war planning.[402]

On the issue of a future international organisation, arguably the most complex and consequential on the agenda, the British delegation was content to listen to the American plans rather than elaborate on their own. This reserved approach represented a tactic of the Foreign Office—the Americans could not be led to think that the United Kingdom harboured grand designs which would bind them into far-reaching commitments. The British delegation heard first from Sumner Welles, the President's most trusted mind on post-war matters, and later, from the President himself. Both expressed similar views, though Roosevelt, in a meeting on 27 March, discussed more in depth certain details of his vision for a three-tiered United Nations organisation. There would be a 'general assembly' made up of the United Nations which, by meeting once a year, would give the smaller countries the opportunity 'to blow off steam'. In reality, their influence would be more of an illusion—the true power would rest with an 'executive committee' made up of the four powers. This grouping would be responsible for the most important decisions and would be tasked with wielding the 'police powers of the United Nations'. The third major body would sit between the executive committee and the general

[400] In his conversation with Ivan Maisky on 10 March, Eden heard of a Soviet plan for a United Nations bloc in Europe, led by the United Kingdom and Soviet Union. See Eden to Clark Kerr, 10 March 1943, FO 371/36991/U1605. See also Maisky diary, 11 March 1943, Gorodetsky (ed.), pp. 495-498
[401] Memorandum by Harry Hopkins, 15 March 1943, in *FRUS*, 1943, Vol. III, pp. 13-18.
[402] War Cabinet Conclusions, WM (43) 53, Minute 2, 13 April 1943, CAB 65/38/2

assembly and would be known as the 'advisory council'. It was to be made up of representatives of the four main powers as well as six-to-eight representatives of smaller powers, the latter grouping being elected depending on region and the size of population. The advisory council, Roosevelt posited, would meet from 'time to time' to settle various disputes that might be raised. Added to this three-tiered structure would be one individual who would serve as the leader or 'moderator' of the organisation.[403]

Importantly, Roosevelt and State Department officials seemed to be adamant that the four great powers retain the main responsibility in the wider organisation, a view which was in line with Jebb's Four Power Plan. There remained significant differences between the American and British ideas, however. When Eden relayed his reservations about the inclusion of China in this four-power arrangement, Roosevelt explained that China's position on the executive committee was due more to domestic political concerns than anything else. In order for the American public to accept international responsibilities after the war, they must be convinced that the organisation was worldwide in scope, as opposed to another scheme aimed at keeping peace among the Europeans.[404] Eden later explained this position to the Cabinet and added that the American position on China stemmed, in part, from the fact that they 'hated Japan far more than they hated the Germans', and furthermore, that they viewed the stability of China as a balance not only against Japan but against Russia as well.[405] A second difference was that American designs, as described by both Welles and Roosevelt, would need to be squared with the Prime Minister's idea of a Council of Europe, a concept which Churchill had recently outlined in a speech four days earlier.[406] Welles understood that the British were determined to bring the United States into the maintenance of the European order at the end of

[403] Telegram from Lord Halifax to the Foreign Office, No. 1470, 28 March 1943, FO 371/35366/U1430; see also Woodward, *British Foreign Policy in the Second World War*, Vol. V, pp. 33-36
[404] Telegram from Lord Halifax to the Foreign Office, No. 1470, 28 March 1943, FO 371/35366/U1430
[405] War Cabinet Conclusions, WM (43) 53, Minute 2, 13 April 1943, CAB 65/38/2
[406] Churchill, 'Four Years' Plan for Britain', in Charles Eade (ed.), *The War Speeches of Winston Churchill, Volume 2* (London: Cassel and Company, 1965), pp. 425-437

the war, but he was quick to point out to British officials that it could not be presented in this manner. The American public would instead have to be convinced of the country's global responsibility, as opposed to the idea of the United States being used to sort out the problems of Europe.[407]

While the meetings of the principal statesmen were significant, the discussions between the heads of the respective planning bodies were important in their own right. It was here that the minutiae of international machinery began to be deliberated. The conversations initially focused on the recovery of Europe at the conclusion of the war, a topic on which Jebb soon realised his American counterparts were not as advanced. He took the opportunity to describe his idea for a 'United Nations Commission for Europe', which had become the latest iteration of his earlier suggestion for an Inter-Allied Armistice Commission. This body, comprised of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, would be responsible for coordinating the multiple armistice commissions on the continent at the end of the war. As Jebb reported in his minutes of the meeting, 'It seemed to us that three-Power action in the war would lead…to three-Power collaboration in the re-establishment of order after the cessation of hostilities.' He and Strang noted that the Americans were receptive to this idea, with some State Department officials agreeing that a body which could establish order in Europe after the war would be proof to the American public that the country's involvement in Europe was worthwhile.[408] More importantly for Jebb, however, was his thinking that upon this foundation of great power cooperation in Europe might be constructed a wider international order. It was a view he thought Leo Pasvolsky, one of the lead planners within the State Department, also shared to a certain extent. Jebb wrote to his colleagues in the Foreign Office that Pasvolsky's views were 'more in accordance with British interests than the more daring and "cosmic"

[407] Memorandum of conversation between Eden, Halifax, Welles, and [Norman] Davis, 25 March 1943, FO 371/35368/U1679
[408] Jebb, 'Discussions with the United States Administration on Armistice Problems', 24 March 1943, WP (43) 217, CAB/66/37/17.

schemes of many of the New Deal members of the Administration'. The important consideration for the Foreign Office was how influential Pasvolsky would remain as post-war planning progressed. 'The only question is how far this slow-moving little man can really put anything across…Mr Pasvolsky is certainly the tortoise of the State Dept.'[409]

There were no public communiques or declarations to come out of the nearly three weeks of meetings; but nonetheless significant progress was made. The British found that American thinking on the post-war world—especially the most basic idea of the four powers being responsible for the maintenance of peace and security—was roughly in line with their own, though there remained important differences when it came to the future of Europe and the concept of a wider organisation growing out of regional structures.[410]

On the American side, it was clear that the visit by British officials was a welcome development, and one which had stimulated the need for further planning on their side. Sumner Welles wrote that the visit by Eden and Foreign Office officials was 'extraordinarily helpful to all of us', and expressed optimism about the two countries working together in the future.[411] Reports coming from certain quarters of the State Department even indicated that leading American officials felt that the British were more advanced in their own post-war planning.[412] Roosevelt, in his press conference which took place just hours after Eden had departed for Canada, explained that the talks were only 'exploratory' in nature but for those wishing to be 'didactic', that the Americans and British were in agreement on roughly 95 percent of the issues. Highlighting this emerging Atlantic consensus, he said, 'That's an amazing statement…I wish some people would put that in their pipes and smoke it.'[413]

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[409] Jebb minute, 'Views of Mr Pasvolsky on the future of the world', 29 March 1943, FO 371/35396/U1546
[410] War Cabinet conclusions, WM (43) 53, Minute 2, 13 April 1943, CAB 65/38/2
[411] Welles was quoted in a telegram from Lord Halifax to Foreign Office, No. 1644, 7 April 1943, FO 371/35368/U1645
[412] Paul Gore-Booth wrote that a member of the State Department had relayed to him that some American officials were 'conscious of being less prepared than we were'. Gore-Booth minute, 30 March 1943, FO 371/35369/U1724
[413] Roosevelt Press Conference, 30 March 1943, *FRUS,* 1943, Vol. III, pp. 41-43

'The President's mind is usually in the stratosphere': Foreign Office views of the Washington talks

While encouraging, Roosevelt's statements masked important differences between the ways in which American and British officials were conceiving of the post-war international order. While the United Nations Plan had spoken of an eventual organisation with structures similar to those described by Roosevelt, the Foreign Office felt that, in order to create a stable international order after the war, they must first construct regional structures which might stabilise war-torn countries and facilitate relief efforts. These efforts were to be conducted primarily by the great powers, and their cooperation might provide the foundation upon which a wider organisation might be built up. This was especially true for Europe, which remained the most important region for British officials. For the Americans, on the other hand, the priority was to first establish a world organisation led by the great powers. As Jebb noted, instead of 'building from the bottom upwards' through regional institutions, the United States 'would prefer to concentrate on world machinery and then work out the way in which this could be applied to regions later'.[414]

Added to this was a concern among senior Foreign Office officials about the way in which Roosevelt and his administration were planning to address Europe. Though many continued to emphasise the necessity of American involvement, others felt that the President's mind was in the 'stratosphere'.[415] Nigel Ronald wrote that Roosevelt's views on the dismemberment of Germany and the 'relegation of France to the rank of a third rate power' would have dangerous ramifications. Unlike Roosevelt, the British were 'nearer the firing line' and thus would suffer from this 'lack of political judgment' on the part of the President. Should the British fail to bring the he and his administration around to their way of thinking, Ronald

[414] Memorandum by Jebb, 28 March 1943, FO 371/35366/U1535
[415] See Foreign Office minute from 31 March 1943, FO 371/35366/U1430

warned, then the 'outlook is indeed black'.[416]

Orme Sargent, who had earlier considered a suggestion by the President to disarm all nations except the great powers to be 'crack-brained', raised the fact that Roosevelt's proposal clearly went against the Prime Minister's idea of a Council of Europe, which Churchill had described once again during a speech in March.[417] He posited that this was likely not the result of Roosevelt's aversion to the idea as much as his fear that the issue might be seized upon by American isolationists and used, in Sargent's words, as 'a stick with which to beat himself'. Such a consideration, he believed, would need to be taken into account on the British side if the idea for a Council of Europe was to be advanced. It remained, in Sargent's view, the best proposal for dealing with the inevitable chaos on the European continent after the war.[418]

Although Jebb considered Churchill's views to be 'rash' at this point, he understood that they could not be ignored. The question was how to square Churchill's wish for a Council of Europe with Roosevelt and Welles's vision of a world organisation. The Americans themselves, Jebb thought, were likely opposed to a Council of Europe because of their concern over the power this might afford Britain and the Soviet Union going forward.

> In terms of Realpolitik it may be that [the Americans] imagine that both the United Kingdom and Soviet Russia might increase their power and their ability to play a world role comparable to that of the United States if they were regarded as the natural leaders of certain groups of European states.[419]

Despite this risk, Jebb understood the necessity of American inclusion in post-war institutions. A plan skewed to the interests of the United States would be better than no plan at all. Therefore, he advocated British acquiescence to the broad parameters of American planning, but at the same time, he suggested a concrete agreement among the great powers to

[416] Ronald minute, 30 March 1943, FO 371/35366/U1430
[417] For older comment on Roosevelt's disarmament idea, see Sargent minute, 7 September 1942, FO 371/31514/U636. Speech by Churchill, 'A Four Years' Plan', 21 March 1943, in Eade (ed.), *The War Speeches of Winston Churchill*, Volume 2, pp. 425-437
[418] Sargent minute, 3 April 1943, FO 371/35366/U1430
[419] Memorandum by Jebb, 28 March 1943, FO 371/35366/U1535

establish a working order within Europe. If the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United States could agree to focus on 'cleaning up the frightful mess' that was expected in Europe at the conclusion of hostilities, they could hopefully create an organic structure—in the form of a United Nations Commission for Europe—which could be applied on a larger scale.[420] Moreover, such a structure would go some way towards appeasing Churchill's concern with the future of Europe, though Jebb would address his Council of Europe idea head-on in the coming weeks.

In the background of these discussions was a view emerging within the Foreign Office that not only was it necessary to first build up regional structures, but that it was also wise to not rush into detailed designs of a post-war organisation. In his review of the discussions in Washington, Jebb had warned against constructing too much 'rigid machinery'—in this case Roosevelt and Welles's idea for regional groupings to elect members onto an Advisory Council—which might make it difficult for the great powers to maintain control of a chaotic post-war environment. Although inclusive to smaller powers, certain schemes recommended by Roosevelt and the State Department, at least at this stage, could complicate the process. For the sake of efficacy and expedience, the key decisions in the immediate aftermath of the war should be in the hands of the great powers, a principle which had first been articulated in the Four Power Plan. Regionalism, Jebb felt, should instead be allowed to develop out of 'the machinery which will have to be established for grappling with Armistice problems'. The United Nations, he continued, must come to understand that the major questions of security must remain in the hands of 'the Powers who possess the requisite force, namely...the Big Four'.[421]

Throughout these discussions on the future regional and international order, the legacy

[420] This was an extension of what he had earlier termed an Inter-Allied Armistice Commission. Jebb minute, 13 April 1943, FO 371/35368/U1679
[421] Ibid

of failures within the League of Nations continued to cast a shadow over Foreign Office thinking. Like Jebb, Cadogan believed that planners could aim to construct a flawless international organisation, and yet the entire structure might still be undermined by impotence or inaction.

> The history of the last 20 years has surely shown us that no "machinery" for keeping the peace will work unless there is the power to drive it, and the will to use the power. For 20 years the League polished the machine which one by one the sources of power were cut off.

Cooperation amongst the great powers, along with those powers maintaining their military capabilities, would be required, Cadogan wrote, lest the designs of post-war planners become 'card castles'.[422]

At this stage, the most important issue for Cadogan was to obtain agreement among the Americans, British and Russians as to the broad parameters of post-war cooperation. The essential issues were not yet the machinery of a future world organisation, but the more immediate challenges that would face Europe at the end of the war. Among these, Cadogan noted the need for an agreement on the shape of an armistice, the way in which enemy countries would be occupied, how to coordinate disarmament among enemy powers, and how to administer relief and reconstruction schemes.[423] Similar to Jebb's thinking on organic regional structures of post-war cooperation, Cadogan felt that should the three great powers be able to cooperate on the European continent, they might be able to apply this system to other regions of the world. Only when agreement among the great powers was secured and this arrangement applied to cleaning up the 'European mess' could the 'future Palace of Peace' find its legs.[424]

[422] Cadogan minute, 13 April 1943, FO 371/35366/U1535
[423] Ibid
[424] Eden agreed with these comments and asked that they soon meet to discuss in more detail. See Eden minute, 18 April 1943, FO 371/35366/U1535

Moving towards an international organisation: A revised plan for the post-war world

Though British officials were more intent on creating regional structures—especially in Europe—prior to any wider international organisation, this did not mean that they ignored the latter altogether. Indeed, one of the great insights from the meetings in Washington was an understanding of just how far the Americans had been thinking in terms of post-war organisation. Towards the end of his trip in the American capital, Jebb had been putting the final touches on a document which was intended to give more detail on the British approach towards a future international *organisation*, as opposed to broader concepts of a future international *order*. Titled 'Suggestions for a Peace Settlement', the paper adapted some of the views originally outlined in the Four Power Plan and the United Nations Plan. The necessity of four power cooperation after the war remained preeminent, but there was more attention given to the role that smaller powers might play in a future organisation. The great powers, he believed, would be responsible for world security, whereas the smaller powers might exert considerable influence over economic issues, a move which would give them a feeling of responsibility within the organisation. Borrowing well-known phrases from the Roosevelt administration, he said that 'freedom from fear' must be the responsibility of the great powers, while 'freedom from want' might be 'handled by wider assemblies, whether on a world basis or on regional lines'.[425]

Much of the concern for the role of smaller powers stemmed from the reaction of the Dominions—as well as of governments such as the Netherlands and Belgium—to British post-war planning.[426] Canada had already come out in strong opposition to the Four Power Plan, writing to the Dominions Office in January that the government 'will not be able to co-operate cordially in any post-war system in which authority is concentrated exclusively in the four big

[425] Memorandum by Jebb, 'Suggestions for a Peace Settlement', 26 March 1943, p. 3, FO 371/35396/U1823
[426] For example, see E.N. van Kleffens, 'Great and Small Nations', *The Times*, 25 March 1943

powers'. Officials in Ottawa also opposed any suggestion that the United Kingdom might represent Canadian interests on the key councils of the international organisation. Such an arrangement would mean that each nation in the Commonwealth 'enjoys something less that [sic] the status of full nationhood'.[427] In a subsequent note, the Secretary of State for the Dominions, Clement Attlee, wrote that the continuance of the Commonwealth could only be maintained if the Dominions were 'satisfied that the general order which is to be set up after the war takes sufficient account of their interests and responsibilities'.[428] It became clear to officials in the Economic and Reconstruction Department that while agreement among the three powers—and to a lesser extent China—would be the most crucial aspect, the system would falter without the consent of the smaller powers.

Elsewhere in Jebb's redrafted paper, the focus on Europe as the hinge of the post-war order remained; and it was this concern, more so than any other at this stage, which influenced his preference for regionalism. Europe, Jebb believed, was more significant than the Far East, for the simple fact that it had been the cradle of conflict for the last thirty years. If adequate measures were not taken, Germany, with its industrial capacity, population and geographic position at the centre of Europe, might return to wreak havoc once again. To stem this possibility, Jebb elaborated on his idea for a United Nations Commission for Europe, an idea which had crystallised since his meetings in Washington. This body, with its great power leadership and its plans for the incremental inclusion of other European countries, might lead one day to a Council of Europe—an obvious reference to the Prime Minister's plan—and potentially serve as a blueprint for a wider international organisation.

Importantly, Jebb also considered the construction of regional structures as a way to increase the influence of smaller powers within the organisation.[429] As he later wrote, one of

[427] Telegram from Canada to the Dominions Office, No. 179, 23 January 1943, FO 371/35396/U402
[428] Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, 'The United Nations Plan', WP (43) 44, 28 January 1943, FO 371/35396/U402
[429] This was a view put forward by Jebb in a minute from 2 February 1943, FO 371/35396/U402

the lessons of the League—made most evident by the Manchurian crisis—was that only countries whose interests were directly threatened by aggression could be expected to take up action.[430] Thus the formation of regional councils, he believed, might allow for states to come together to make decisions on pressing political and economic issues. In what would become an important provision in the years ahead, Jebb insisted that regional councils remain subordinate to the World Council should it be established. Added to this, was his recommendation that regional bodies might help to address certain issues surrounding colonial trusteeship, a subject which Roosevelt had raised in the Washington discussions, and one to which the United Kingdom, given its overseas dependencies, was particularly sensitive.[431] Regional commissions, he suggested, might help in assisting with the security and economic needs of 'backward areas with the status of colonial dependencies'.[432]

Related to these regional bodies was the question of a general assembly, a body which Roosevelt had mentioned but Jebb felt 'might only exist in theory'. Instead of Roosevelt's idea of an assembly meeting regularly, Jebb thought that disputes might be raised, deliberated and resolved in the regional councils, which might meet in a permanent location. The Executive Committee—or eventually the Council of the World—would meet when necessary, but this body would, like the Concert of Europe in the nineteenth century, only be 'consultative and peripatetic'.[433] This reflected Jebb's fear that attempting to fix a permanent location for such meetings would lead to unwelcome animosity between the four powers.

Overall, the draft took on a different tone and aim from Jebb's earlier papers. Where the Four Power Plan had been a suggested British grand strategy, the 'Suggestions for a Peace Settlement' was intended to be a blueprint which might be adopted by other powers, namely the United States and Russia. As such, points that had been a part of Jebb's original plan in the

[430] Lord Gladwyn, 'Founding the United Nations: Principals and Objects', p. 31
[431] Louis, *Imperialism at Bay*, pp. 227-230
[432] Memorandum by Jebb, 'Suggestions for a Peace Settlement', 26 March 1943, p. 3, FO 371/35396/U1823
[433] Ibid

summer of 1942—such as the necessity of Britain joining a wider organisation in order to maintain her status as a European power and world power—were removed. Furthermore, there was more of a direct appeal to American interests, including an explicit reference to the Atlantic Charter. His idea was to square the recent statements by Churchill—namely the calls for a Council of Europe and a Council of Asia—with those of the President, whose views on the post-war world had recently been publicised under the title 'Roosevelt's World Blueprint'.[434]

While Jebb's paper represented a concerted effort to chart an independent British policy with regard to constructing an international organisation, his approach was not shared by all officials in the Foreign Office. William Strang, for one, who had been present at the meeting with Roosevelt on 27 March, said that in light of the President's recent public statements, the Foreign Office should look to adopt his views more generally.

> Since what we all want is that the United States should share in international responsibilities after the war, and since the Administration at Washington may have some difficulty in persuading the legislature and public opinion, we ought, so far as we can with due regard to our own interests, to fall in with the President's proposals and let him play his own hand as a matter of tactics.[435]

For his part, Jebb felt that the new plan was entirely 'in harmony' with American ideas, except on the issue of France, the establishment of a Council of Europe and the question concerning the disarmament of smaller powers. The pressing concern, he felt, was the view of the Dominions, which along with India, would need to be consulted before the plan could be presented to the United States and the Soviet Union.[436] Indeed, the issue of the Dominions' reception raised essential considerations within the Foreign Office. Their support was vital, but whether they would be represented under the British Commonwealth or as independent nations

[434] Jebb's draft was admittedly vague on the specific machinery and structure of the postwar organisation, a point which he believed allowed it to be 'more capable...of being reconciled with President Roosevelt's views'. Memorandum by Jebb, 'Suggestions for a Peace Settlement', 26 March 1943, FO 371/35396/U1823. For copy of the article 'Roosevelt's World Blueprint', see FO 371/35433/U2377. See also Telegram from Halifax to Eden, No. 384, 16 May 1943, FO 371/35433/U2377

[435] Strang minute, 30 April 1943, FO 371/35396/U1823

[436] Memorandum by Jebb, 'Suggestions for a Peace Settlement', FO 371/35396/U1823

was still undecided. The eventual answer would have major consequences for Britain's power and standing relative to the United States and the Soviet Union.[437]

In considering these minutes and the future development of policy, Eden convened a meeting on 13 May which marked the most important Foreign Office discussion to date concerning the plan for a post-war international organisation.[438] The Foreign Secretary opened the discussion by offering views which appeared to support a return to the League of Nations. The more he thought about it, he said, 'the new international machinery, if it were ever established, would be something like the League of Nations.' The Provisional Executive Committee made up of the four powers which Jebb had proposed would likely be necessary in the immediate aftermath of the war, but this could not last indefinitely. Such an 'inner council' of the four powers might help to alleviate controversial disputes between other nations, but Eden felt that this would, in time, need to be replaced by a larger assembly of nations.

In a telling response, Cadogan argued a point that was more in line with Jebb's view than that of the Foreign Secretary. While he noted that they may end up returning to an arrangement like the League, they must emphasise that the great powers—and most importantly, their cooperation—should remain the centrepiece of the organisation. 'After this war', he said, 'our principal energies should be devoted to facilitating co-operation between the Great Powers', which, if achieved, would allow everything else to 'fit into its place'. He echoed his earlier points that there should not be a rush to create complex machinery before the end of the war. Instead, the primary focus must remain on the practical problems, namely those concerning relief and reconstruction in Europe. If Britain could get the Americans and Russians to agree to a type of United Nations Commission of Europe as proposed by Jebb, then

[437] Jebb wrote elsewhere that the support of the Dominions was essential to their ability to influence a post-war order. 'Unless we can get some or all of the Dominions to agree with us on first principles, we are severely handicapped in putting forward any proposal of a general nature for world order after the war to the Americans and the Russians.' Jebb to Michael Wright, 7 June 1943, copy in FCO 73/266/UN/43/1

[438] In attendance were Eden, Cadogan, Sargent, William Malkin, Strang, Harvey and Jebb. Record of meeting in the Foreign Office, 12 May 1943, FO 371/35396/U2196

they might succeed in bringing them into a design of their making. 'Our major Allies', he said, 'might be insensibly drawn into some kind of world organisation which, if put to them in the form of a logical scheme, might be rejected'.[439] On the back of his comments, it was decided that a new Cabinet papers should be drafted—one laying out the major issues likely to face Europe at the end of the war and another detailing Jebb's proposal for a United Nations Commission for Europe. This would hopefully serve as the policy which might be presented first to the Dominions and then to the Americans and Russians.[440]

The 'Great Power Man' enters the Economic and Reconstruction Department

The gradual incorporation of Charles Webster into the Economic and Reconstruction Department beginning in the spring of 1943 fundamentally altered British planning thereafter.[441] Since January 1943, Webster had been producing a series of papers on the armistices and peace settlements from the period 1918-19.[442] This historical knowledge, both of the detailed aspects of peacemaking and the intricacies of international organisation, came to be seen by Jebb and others within the Economic and Reconstruction Department as invaluable.[443] Though in later years Jebb wrote that Webster was a 'great power man', his comment undervalues, to a large extent, Webster's insistence that the four powers would need to operate within the framework of an inclusive international organisation. Crucially, Webster consistently stressed that the concerns of smaller states be respected, in a way that also made him a 'small power man', so to speak. This was a characteristic of his internationalist leanings,

[439] Record of meeting in the Foreign Office, 12 May 1943, FO 371/35396/U2196
[440] Ibid
[441] Webster was not to join the department formally until January 1944, but Jebb and Ronald began consulting him more beginning in January 1943.
[442] As a part of his work for the Foreign Research and Press Service, Webster had been drafting documents related to the armistice and peace settlements between 1918 and 1919. Copies of these papers, along with other memoranda, can be found in Webster 11/1 and 11/2, LSE. These historical accounts were, in turn, circulated to British diplomats. See Jebb to Clark Kerr, 11 February 1943, FCO 73/264/Pwp/43/4A.
[443] Jebb wrote that Webster was 'frightfully good' at producing 'short and snappy documents' which were useful to the Foreign Office. Jebb to Michael Wright, 7 June 1943, FCO 73/266/UN/43/1

but he also considered the United Kingdom's role as a leader in larger organisations—as well as its concern for the interests of smaller powers—to be a tradition of British foreign policy dating back to Castlereagh.[444]

In one of his first direct contributions to the Economic and Reconstruction Department, Webster offered some reflections on the direction of Foreign Office thinking about post-war matters. The Atlantic Charter, he felt, was to make up 'the basis of the whole system', a point which reflected his earlier view that while an 'Anglo-American partnership' might raise a number of difficulties, it could also benefit 'the interests of the world as a whole'.[445] These principles in the Charter, however, would need to be 'amplified' and defined in more specific terms. Importantly, the idea of members of an organisation ascribing to a set of 'principles' was one which Webster would suggest throughout the planning stages and one which reflected a rules-based approach to the international system. On the one hand, it would serve to guide the behaviour of states, while at the same time serving, in theory, as a check on the authority of the great powers. This was one of the only ways, Webster believed, that the smaller powers might support a system in which the great powers were predominant for a period of time after the war.

Webster's concern for smaller powers was one of his central contributions to the Economic and Reconstruction Department at this stage. The current shape of British plans, he warned, placed too much emphasis on the position of the great powers. While the smaller states might accept their outsized role in the immediate post-war period, their support for such an arrangement would likely fade thereafter. In order to get the smaller powers to agree to a long-

[444] Webster, 'Castlereagh or Canning', 24 July 1945, copy in Webster 15/2, LSE; also see a paper Webster prepared for Richard Law, 'Covering brief for 'Future World Organisation: Forthcoming Conversations at Washington', 16 April 1944, FO 371/40686/U3128

[445] Note by Webster, 'Some Considerations on a United Nations Organisation', 6 May 1943, FO 371/35396/U2066. For his earlier view of Anglo-American cooperation, see Memorandum by Webster, 'Future Relations between the United States and the United Kingdom', 27 July 1941 in Webster 8/11, LSE. Also quoted in Reynolds and Hughes, *Historian as Diplomat*, p. 16

term organisation, they would need to be assured that they were included on discussions which involved their interests. This effort to more effectively involve the smaller powers, he noted, was a principle which dated back to the Conference of Aix la Chapelle in 1818.[446] Furthermore, if the new organisation could establish functional bodies relating to economic and social issues, smaller powers would be able to participate in matters which 'transcend continents', and thereby give these countries an important stake in the wider organisation.

Another of Webster's contributions to the British planning effort at this stage was his emphasis on the need to construct adequate machinery to deal with political and legal disputes. The peaceful settlement of disputes was, in theory, what the majority of states desired; but its practical application had been one of the most difficult issues for the League of Nations. Furthermore, the ability to devise such mechanisms was essential to the maintenance of an international order. The ideas currently floating between the American and British schemes envisioned regional councils attempting to settle disputes between nations, and when this was not possible, the matter would be taken up by the great power executive committee. This was inherently flawed, he noted, for the fact that, 'No small power will accept a distasteful regional decision if it has the right of appeal to the Great Power Committee.'[447] His recommendation was first to recommend the development of 'technical bodies', namely a World Court which might be responsible for handling legal or 'justiciable' disputes. This was based in large part on his view, expressed elsewhere, that the Permanent Court of International Justice had been a 'great achievement' of the League of Nations.[448]

At the same time, however, a World Court could not handle all disputes, especially those of a political nature and those dealing with the interests of the great powers. While

[446] Webster's understanding of the Conference of Aix la Chapelle went back to his doctoral thesis at Cambridge. See Webster, Introduction, 'Studies in Foreign Policy, 1814-1818', Dissertation, 1909, KCAC/4/11/1/Webster
[447] Note by Webster, 'Some Considerations on a United Nations Organisation', 6 May 1943, FO 371/35396/U2066
[448] Webster, 'Some Problems of International Organisation', p. 9

arbitration and conference diplomacy had come a long way over the last century, Webster felt that a better system was needed going forward. On this point, he remained somewhat vague on the more detailed mechanisms for resolving disputes within a World Council, though his response to Jebb's recommendation of peripatetic council meetings reveals an important insight. He noted that such 'spasmodic' meetings, lacking a set time and place and devoid of a central secretariat, would mean 'a return to the "Concert" system which, in fact, often means "crisis" meetings and the reluctance or even refusal to be present on the part of one of the powers.' Although he personally disagreed with this approach, Webster disguised his opposition in the paper. Instead, he invoked Austen Chamberlain, the British Foreign Secretary from 1924 to 1929, who Webster said had considered 'the regularity of the meetings of the principal statesmen as one of the greatest contributions of the League to international affairs'.[449]

'The PM will take matters entirely out of the hands of the experts': Churchill visits the United States

As the Economic and Reconstruction Department were working to consolidate their views into a Cabinet paper, Churchill travelled to Washington where he would once again deliver views contrary to those of the Foreign Office. Although not a planned subject of conversation, post-war matters were thrust into several discussions, most notably during a luncheon at the British Embassy on 22 May. During the course of the meal, Churchill took the opportunity to explain his personal views of the post-war settlement, which were largely a restatement of his 'Morning Thoughts' of early February and a more recent radio address in March.[450] He placed the chief responsibility for peace on the United States, Great Britain and Russia, a three-power grouping

[449] Note by Webster, 'Some Considerations on a United Nations Organisation', 6 May 1943, FO 371/35396/U2066
[450] Speech by Churchill, 'A Four Years' Plan', 21 March 1943, in Eade (ed.), *The War Speeches of Winston Churchill*, Volume 2, pp. 425-437

which might make up a Supreme World Council. He would not object to China joining this group, so long as it was understood that its influence was not comparable to the three main powers. Under this 'Supreme World Council', there would be three regional councils: one European, one for the Americas, and one for the Far East. As he explained to Vice President Henry Wallace, his idea was for a type of 'three-legged stool', with the World Council atop three Regional Councils.[451] Added to this basic structure would be an enforcement mechanism in the form of national and international armed forces. The latter would be under the direction of the respective regional council and then the world council.

Though Churchill's views found a receptive American audience, the Foreign Office was once again upset with the Prime Minister ignoring the department and expounding on his personal views.[452] Though the United Nations Plan had yet to be taken up by the Cabinet—and thus there was no official policy on either the post-war settlement or a future international organisation—there had been a bevy of work completed by members of the Foreign Office, a fact which Churchill knew. While the Prime Minister was clear that his views were his own and not the official view of the government, it was a cunning attempt to get his views across and thus, to exert more of his influence over the conduct of British foreign policy.[453] As Oliver Harvey complained in his diaries, 'It is high time the old man came home. The American atmosphere, the dictatorial powers of the President and the adulation which surrounds him there, have gone to his head.'[454]

Within the Economic and Reconstruction Department, Jebb and Webster were

[451] 'Memorandum prepared by the British Embassy after luncheon on 22 May 1943', *FRUS,* 1943, Conferences at Washington and Quebec, Document 65, pp. 167-172

[452] Lord Halifax, who was present at the meeting, reported that the Americans 'were much impressed and appeared to be in warm agreement'. Halifax to Eden, 28 May 1943, FO 371/35435/U3060. See also King, *The New Internationalism*, pp. 162-3

[453] Even when he returned to London, Churchill did not bring up this exchange in his report to the Cabinet. See Cabinet minutes, 5 June 1943, WM (43) 81st Meeting, CAB 195/2. He eventually circulated a record of this meeting to the Cabinet on 10 June 1943. See Note by the Prime Minister, 'The Structure of a Post-War Settlement', WP (43) 233, CAB 66/37/33

[454] Harvey diary, 24 May 1943, Harvey (ed.), p. 261. Eden, for his part, wrote to the Prime Minister that he agreed 'generally' with his views on the post-war security order. Eden to Churchill, 9 June 1943, FO 371/35435/U3060

frustrated by the Prime Minister's personal initiative. Jebb considered Churchill's proposal to develop confederations in Central and Southeastern Europe to be 'positively dangerous' while his concept of an International Police Force—especially based on national and international 'contingents'—was 'of doubtful soundness'.[455] Jebb's new consultant on the planning process was even more acerbic in his remarks. Writing in his diaries on 15 June, Webster said that the Prime Minister's comments:

> shews [sic] the danger which I have foreseen all along that these preparations & studies will be made and then precipitate and unconsidered action by the PM will take matters entirely out of the hands of the experts…Here he is trying to shape the whole of the future without saying a word to his Cab[ine]t, For[eign] Sec[retary] or their officials. The scheme is crude in the extreme and is more like that of a too donnish thinker than of a man of action. It is often so when men of action deal with something on which they have little experience.[456]

It was not that Jebb and Webster disagreed entirely with the Prime Minister's scheme. Indeed, Jebb had earlier advocated for such a council of the four great powers and certain regional bodies, and Churchill had gone some way towards bringing the Americans around to the necessity of four power cooperation in the post-war period.[457] Instead, Jebb and Webster believed that other points—such as the concern for small powers and the responsibility of great powers within regional councils—were either butchered or ignored altogether and would thus 'wreck the whole scheme'.[458]

Although Churchill's comments on post-war matters contrasted in important ways with those of the Economic and Reconstruction Department, they had run—at least through the spring—largely parallel to the plans of the Foreign Office. This was not lost on Eden, who wrote to the Prime Minister that he agreed 'generally' with the views put forward in

[455] For Jebb's comments on the Prime Minister's conversations in Washington, see Jebb minute, 12 June 1943, FO 371/35435/U3060
[456] Webster diary, 15 June 1943, quoted in Reynolds and Hughes, *Historian as Diplomat*, pp. 20-21
[457] Jebb drafted a Cabinet paper in response to Churchill's views. See Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 'Post-war Settlement', 1 July 1943, WP (43) 292, FO 371/35435/U3061
[458] Webster diary, 15 June 1943, quoted in Reynolds and Hughes, *Historian as Diplomat*, pp. 20-21

Washington.[459] As much as the Prime Minister had been ignoring certain details favoured by the Economic and Reconstruction Department, officials understood that in order for the Cabinet to approve their proposals, they would need to appeal, at least in part, to a number of Churchill's proposals.

Foreign Office blueprints for a post-war international order

By June, the Economic and Reconstruction Department had produced two papers for the War Cabinet—one concerning the creation of regional machinery in Europe and another outlining a wider international order—which marked the crystallization of views that had been evolving since January. The first was titled 'Armistices and Related Problems' and it proposed the establishment of Jebb's idea of a 'United Nations Commission for Europe' which would be made up of the United Kingdom, the United States, the Soviet Union and their European Allies, with a 'steering committee' of the three great powers and in some cases France. Cooperation on a number of issues surrounding the European armistice, the memorandum read, 'would go a long way towards preserving the unity of the United Nations and laying the foundations for any future World Order that may be established'.[460] The plan represented the Foreign Office preference for regional structures to serve as the building blocks of a wider international order. It was a conception of regionalism, Jebb later noted, which reflected 'an evolutionary approach to international organisation'.[461]

Crucially, the plan also reflected a desire to bind the Soviet Union into a post-war agreement in Europe. It was a view based on a warning from the British Ambassador in Moscow, Archibald Clark Kerr, which said that,

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[459] Eden to Churchill, 9 June 1943, FO 371/35435/U3060
[460] Memorandum by Eden, 'Armistices and Related Problems', 25 May 1943, WP (43) 217, CAB 66/37/17
[461] Lord Gladwyn, 'Founding the United Nations: Principals and Objects', p. 31. For more on Webster and Jebb's thinking on regional security structures, see Memorandum by Webster, 'Regional Organisation', 17 June 1943, copy in Webster 11/8, LSE

> The Soviet Government, as hard-headed realists, are not going to be carried away, or levitated off the ground, by any long-term reconstruction plan which does not bear tangible relation to the condition existing in Europe at the end of the war.[462]

An additional consideration was that such an agreement might prevent Stalin from negotiating a separate armistice with Germany, an outcome that would likely allow the Kremlin to erect a separate and independent system in Eastern Europe.[463] When it was presented to the Cabinet, ministers agreed that Eden should approach both the Americans and Russians on these points, with the intention of reaching an agreement before the end of the war.[464] An aide memoire was eventually sent to John Winant and Ivan Maisky for circulation to their respective governments.

The British initiative sent waves through the State Department, where American officials, sensing that their counterparts in London were advancing on this aspect of post-war planning, began addressing more urgently certain outstanding questions on their end. As Ruth Russell has noted, the aide-memoire 'forced the Department of State to consider together the various lines of thought and action that had been developing more or less independently in the politico-security field and in the economic-social field'.[465] The idea for a United Nations Commission for Europe, in particular, led to a reckoning on the issue of regionalism, which Sumner Welles had favoured and Cordell Hull had vigorously opposed. By the end of the Moscow Conference three months later, the idea for a European commission would be realized in the form of the European Advisory Commission.

The second paper submitted to the War Cabinet was titled the 'United Nations Plan for Organising Peace and Welfare' and it focused more on the construction of international machinery which might give rise to a durable international order after the war. Based on the

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[462] Dispatch from Clark Kerr to Eden, 25 November 1942; received 5 January 1943. Copy in Ross, *The Foreign Office and the Kremlin*, pp. 115-117

[463] Memorandum by Eden, 'Armistices and Related Problems', 25 May 1943, WP (43) 217, CAB 66/37/17

[464] War Cabinet Conclusions, WM (43) 86, 16 June 1943, CAB 65/34. Cadogan asked Jebb to draft the aide-memoire which would be sent to the Americans and Russians. See Jebb minute, 30 June 1943, FCO 73/268/Wg/43/4

[465] Russell, *A History of the United Nations Charter*, pp. 114-15. For a copy of the aide-memoire see 'Suggested Principles Which Would Govern the Conclusion of Hostilities with the European Members of the Axis' 14 July 1943, *FRUS,* 1943, Vol. I, pp. 708-710

recent work by Jebb and Webster, the paper was not simply a plan for a future United Nations organisation, but a plan for a post-war *order*, from which the international organisation would eventually develop.[466] The essential framework remained the great powers operating within a wider grouping of United Nations; but the revised plan, Jebb noted, was based on reconciling the leadership of the great powers with the concerns of smaller states.

On the whole, the United Nations Plan for Organising Peace was a more internationalist conception in spirit than either the Four Power Plan or the United Nations Plan. Due in large part to the earlier suggestions of Webster, the revised version gave more attention to the role of the smaller powers in a future order, as well as the creation of economic and social organisations. In fact, one of the principal ways that smaller states were to contribute to the post-war order was through economic and social bodes. These powers, the plan argued, 'should have a real voice in the direction of [economic] affairs', while the great powers—because they harboured overwhelming military force—might take the lead on political questions. Added to this was mention of the need for 'judicial and arbitral machinery' which might facilitate the peaceful resolution of disputes. While they remained vague on the exact form of such mechanisms, both Jebb and Webster felt that such designs had been one of the successes of the League and should be carried over.

While more internationalist in nature, the recent draft remained rooted in realist calculations of power. Jebb's earliest conception of a 'Concert of the World' was still evident; but now, in a nod to the Prime Minister, he changed the name to Churchill's preferred 'World Council'. The great powers—a group which included China and possibly France—would need to develop a 'common world policy' in order to prevent each country from going its own way after the war, with their smaller allies in tow. Within the World Council, the great powers

[466] Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 'The United Nations Plan for Organising Peace', WP (43) 300, 7 July 1943, CAB 66/38/50

would agree to settle differences between themselves and take primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security throughout the world—a decision which would be the great powers 'acting unanimously'. An important addition to this revised plan was the suggestion that smaller powers would be represented on the World Council—especially when their own interests were involved—and they would be able to contribute armaments or military bases as a way of ensuring their place in the international system.

Operating outside of, but subordinate to, the World Council were to be regional bodies—for example the United Nations Commission for Europe or the United Nations Far Eastern Commission—which might serve as a check on Germany and Japan, respectively, while also administering armistice terms and facilitating relief and reconstruction.[467] Despite the views of the Roosevelt administration, Jebb and Webster continued to advocate that regionalism remain an integral part of a future international system.[468] Regional bodies, they argued, would sow the seeds of great power cooperation, especially along security lines, and it would allow smaller countries belonging to these regions to play their part.

The conception of a World Council overseeing regional structures—both of which would involve smaller powers—was one which, Jebb and Webster wrote, might give rise to a more cohesive international organisation in the future. In their view, regional bodies could elect representatives to sit on the world council, which, numbering around 11-12 members could serve as the 'final Court of Appeal for all political or economic issues capable of threatening the peace'.[469] On Webster's recommendation, there was also mention of a possible General Assembly of Nations meeting every two years to discuss various political and economic matters. Moreover, the Assembly might be given the responsibility of electing seven or eight

[467] Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 'The United Nations Plan for Organising Peace', WP (43) 300, 7 July 1943, CAB 66/38/50
[468] They wrote elsewhere that, 'a world organisation would be too unwieldy without some degree of local devolution.' Memorandum by Webster, 'Regional Organisation', 17 June 1943, copy in Webster 11/8, LSE
[469] Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 'The United Nations Plan for Organising Peace', WP (43) 300, 7 July 1943, CAB 66/38/50, p. 8

representatives to sit on the world council with the great powers, should the regional representation scheme prove ineffective. The paper closed with a recommendation for the establishment of a permanent secretariat which might incorporate current staff from the League of Nations. It was thought that the economic and social organisations (as well as the permanent secretariat) might be located in a fixed location, while the meetings of the World Council and Assembly could take place there or elsewhere.[470]

In what was something of an anti-climax for the Economic and Reconstruction Department, the paper came before Cabinet on 29 July only to be referred to a new Cabinet committee which was to focus on such questions going forward.[471] Although Jebb, Webster and other officials were left frustrated that the Cabinet had yet to take a definitive position on post-war matters, the momentum was moving—albeit slowly—in the direction of Foreign Office plans becoming official government policy.

This chapter has traced the evolution of planning within the Economic and Reconstruction Department between January and July 1943. The progression from the United Nations Plan to the United Nations Plan for Organising Peace was due to three factors in particular. First was the influence of the Prime Minister, who, without prior consultation with the Foreign Office, described his vision of the post-war world during discussions with heads of state, most notably the President of Turkey and later Roosevelt himself. Though they disagreed with the timing of these statements—as well as more specific details within Churchill's proposals—officials in the Economic and Reconstruction Department could not simply ignore his views. There was thus an effort made, albeit reluctantly, to incorporate the Prime Minister's idea for a Council of Europe into the Foreign Office plans. It is important to

[470] Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 'The United Nations Plan for Organising Peace', WP (43) 300, 7 July 1943, CAB 66/38/50

[471] War Cabinet Conclusions, WM (43) 107, 29 July 1943, CAB 65/35. Both Eden and Cadogan had been pushing for such a sub-committee, as a way of helping get the Foreign Office plans approved. Cadogan minute, 28 July 1943, FO 371/35397/U3216

note that, although members of the department did not recognise it at the time, Churchill's statements, coupled with their own planning efforts, led State Department officials to believe that the work taking place in London was more advanced than that which was ongoing in Washington.

The second contributing factor was the gradual incorporation of Webster into the Economic and Reconstruction Department, a move which ended up altering certain elements of Foreign Office planning during the period. For one, more attention was given to building up a durable and more inclusive structure based on agreed principles, as opposed to an international order simply dictated by the three great powers. Added to this was a general understanding that for any post-war order to be effective and enduring, planners would need to be sensitive to the concerns of smaller powers going forward. By May, Webster had become, along with Jebb, one of the most important intellectual forces within the Economic and Reconstruction Department.

Thirdly, the exchange of views with the United States beginning in March shaped Foreign Office planning in important ways, a development which has been relatively undervalued in previous historical literature. During these meetings, it was clear that the Roosevelt administration was thinking differently about key aspects of the post-war international order. While American and British officials agreed on the fundamental point of a future order being dependent on great power cooperation, the British were more intent to establish regional structures which might then serve as the building blocks of international structures, namely an international organisation. The view shared by senior members of the Roosevelt administration, on the other hand, was more concerned with establishing worldwide machinery and then addressing regional questions.

Understanding the need to go some way towards meeting American aims, the decision was made within the Economic and Reconstruction Department to work towards a middle

ground, in which the American objective of setting up a worldwide organisation at the end of the war would be joined with the British desire to see the great powers facilitating the stabilisation and reconstruction of Europe. This recalibration on the part of the Economic and Reconstruction Department was most evident in Jebb and Webster's planning documents towards the beginning of summer 1943. What had begun as a kind of British strategy for the post-war world—in the form of the Four Power Plan and the United Nations Plan—now became more of a blueprint both for the European post-war settlement as well as a wider international organisation. Importantly, the latter would be more than just a security apparatus and would involve judicial, economic, and social components which would foster international cooperation. At its heart, however, would be the nucleus of great powers, a concept which remained the cornerstone of the Foreign Office approach to the post-war world. In the months ahead, the focus of officials within the Economic and Reconstruction Department would turn towards securing a formal agreement between the great powers on this point.

Chapter Four

The Balancing Act of a Great Power Peace: the Moscow Conference, Anglo-Soviet relations, and the Balance of Power, August 1943 – December 1943

Whereas the previous chapter addressed the initial Anglo-American discussions and the advance in British planning by the summer of 1943, this chapter examines how these plans collided with a new set of diplomatic realities in the period, and how British planners, in turn, sought to balance a number of competing interests. By focusing in on the work of the Foreign Office during this period, the chapter adds to a body of historical scholarship which has largely viewed these months as a quiet period of post-war planning for an international organisation.[472] The pivotal moment in these months was the Moscow Conference, where, for the first time, the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed in principle to establish a post-war international organisation.[473] The proceedings of the conference have been covered in detail by a number of historians, though fewer scholars have focused on the post-war planning of the Foreign Office both before and after the meeting of Foreign Ministers in Moscow.[474] The period preceding the conference led the Foreign Office to order its thinking on the post-war organisation, and in the months after the conference, the Economic and

[472] Greenwood, Reynolds and Hughes have paid scant attention to the months spanning August - December 1943. Greenwood, *Titan at the Foreign Office*, pp. 171-172; Reynolds and Hughes, *Historian as Diplomat*, pp. 22-25

[473] The three governments agreed to 'recognize the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organization, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states, and open to membership by all such states, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security'. See 'Tentative Draft of Joint Declaration' in 'Record of the proceedings of the Foreign Minister's Conference held in Moscow from 19th October to 30th October 1943', p. 72, FO 371/37031/U6921

[474] One exception is Sainsbury, *The Turning Point: Roosevelt, Stalin, Churchill and Chiang-Kai-Shek, 1943, The Moscow, Cairo, and Tehran Conferences* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp 21-31. On the Moscow Conference, see Sainsbury, *The Turning Point*, pp. 53-109; Woodward, *British Foreign Policy in the Second World War*, Vol V, pp. 70-79; Russell, *A History of the United Nations Charter*, pp. 125-146; Divine, *Second Chance*, pp. 149-151, 154-155; Feis, *Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin*, pp. 206-234; Kitchen, *British Policy Towards the Soviet Union*, pp. 165-169; Vojtech Mastny, 'Soviet War Aims at the Moscow and Teheran Conferences of 1943' *Journal of Modern History* 47:3 (1975), pp. 481-493; Weinberg, *A World at Arms*, pp. 619-624; Rothwell, *Britain and the Cold War,* pp. 107-111.

Reconstruction Department began to focus more on the relationship *between* the great powers, as opposed to their relationship with the medium and small powers of the world.

Several factors caused this shift in focus. First and foremost was the view of the Soviet Union, which officials in the Economic and Reconstruction Department had, to a certain extent, taken for granted. Although British planners viewed Anglo-American relations as the fundamental basis of a future international order, as these months progressed, the need to bring the Soviet Union into these discussions became an immediate priority.[475] Second, the Roosevelt administration remained in favour of creating international machinery as opposed to the regional structures recommended by the Foreign Office. Jebb, in turn, continued to look for a 'middle way' between these American and British approaches. Third, as they began to take into account the intentions of the Soviet Union and the United States in the aftermath of the war, officials in the Economic and Reconstruction Department began to grapple with ways that a balance of power might help to underpin their plans for a post-war order.

Throughout the period, the Foreign Office officials continued to advocate for improved relations with the Soviet Union, a move which would lead to significant progress in bringing the three powers together on the question of a future international order. Soviet leaders made it clear by September that they felt dangerously marginalised by Anglo-American diplomatic cooperation. Furthermore, major Soviet military victories—most notably at the Battle of Kursk in August 1943—coupled with the lack of a formidable Anglo-American military presence on the European continent, led Foreign Office officials to approach post-war questions with increased urgency.[476] Believing that Anglo-Soviet cooperation was essential to the future

[475] Previous scholarship has noted the urgency within the Foreign Office during these months to improve relations with the Soviet Union, but less emphasis has been given to the way in which concerns over a future world organisation, in part, drove this thinking. Folly, *Churchill, Whitehall and the Soviet Union*, pp. 94-96, 102; Kitchen, *British Policy Towards the Soviet Union*, pp. 162, 164-165

[476] The Soviet Union made significant gains in eastern Europe throughout the summer and autumn of 1943. The Battle of Kursk resulted in a Soviet victory in August, while the Red Army liberated Kiev in early November. Weinberg, *A World at Arms*, pp. 604-607. Anglo-American forces had invaded Sicily in July 1943 but were not to land on the Italian mainland until September.

stability of Europe, a number of officials, especially from the Northern Department, pushed for Churchill and Eden to improve relations with Moscow.[477] The Moscow Conference in October went a long way towards alleviating certain Russian suspicions. As the British Ambassador in Moscow, Archibald Clark Kerr, reported, 'For the first time the Russians felt they had been admitted freely and on terms of complete equality to the most intimate councils of ourselves and the Americans.'[478] More importantly, however, was that at the conference, the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to set up two structures for the post-war order. First was the European Advisory Commission—an example of the 'permanent machinery' which might, on the one hand, facilitate the stabilisation and reconstruction of Europe, and at the same time, give rise to the great power coordination which might underpin a wider international order.[479] Second, the powers agreed to a Four Power Declaration which included a provision that the three governments would work to establish an international organisation in the future.

Getting the great powers to cooperate at the centre of a future international order remained a central objective of the Economic and Reconstruction Department throughout the summer of 1943. Frustrated by the pace at which Cabinet members were addressing post-war questions, Jebb travelled to the United States to meet with State Department officials for the second time in five months. There, he presented once again his plan for a United Nations Commission for Europe, which he hoped might be substituted for the Prime Minister's plan for a Council of Europe and serve as a 'bottom up' approach for a future international order. Though American officials resisted such a commission at this stage, it was here that Jebb began to accept more fully the need to accommodate American aims which prioritised the

[477] The role of the Northern Department in these months has been highlighted by Barker, *Churchill and Eden at War*, pp. 286-287. See also Ross, 'Foreign Office Attitudes to the Soviet Union 1941-45', p. 526
[478] Telegram from Clark Kerr to the Foreign Office, No. 1252, 5 November 1943, FO 371/37031/N6575
[479] 'Record of the proceedings of the Foreign Minister's Conference held in Moscow from 19th October to 30th October 1943', pp. 29, FO 371/37031/U6921

establishment of an international organisation as soon as possible. Importantly, this did not mean that Jebb and Webster moved away from regional considerations within an international organisation, but that the latter slowly began to be prioritised over the former. As Jebb helped to prepare Eden for the Moscow Conference, he continued to stress the need for the Foreign Office to offer a 'middle way' between the proposals of the Roosevelt administration and those of the Economic and Reconstruction Department. By the time he left for Moscow, Eden was convinced of this approach and made clear that, though Churchill had continued to put forward his own plans, he was intending to follow those of Jebb and Webster.

Finally, in the months after the great powers agreed at the Moscow Conference to work together in the post-war period, Jebb and Webster began to think about what the relationship *between* these powers might look like, and how this would affect the wider international order. These considerations led to a more distinct system which they hoped to bring forward—one that was more than mere realpolitik but markedly different from the idealised versions of internationalism with which they, at times, came into contact. Specifically, notions of balance of power and collective security—long thought to be conceptions diametrically opposed to one another—instead provided a more distinct framework of 'realist-internationalism' through which they would order their subsequent planning.[480]

An inefficient Cabinet Committee on Post-war Settlement

After the Cabinet had decided in late July to establish the Committee on Post-war Settlement, this group of ministers met four times between 5 and 25 August 1943.[481] Though it had been created in order to examine major post-war planning proposals, including the United Nations

[480] This thesis will not discuss the Tehran Conference in December 1943, where Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin met together for the first time. This is due, in part, to the fact that the topic of a world organisation was only discussed briefly between Roosevelt and Stalin. For a discussion of this conference, see Sainsbury, *The Turning Point*, pp. 217-280.

[481] The brief existence of this committee has been noted by Reynolds and Hughes, *Historian as Diplomat*, pp. 23-25.

Plan for Organising Peace, the ministers assembled never reached final agreement on this paper. There was a doubt whether the Foreign Secretary even took an interest, despite his conversations with Roosevelt in March and his efforts to bring forward the plans of the Economic and Reconstruction Department. According to his Private Secretary, Oliver Harvey, Eden 'has yet only superficial ideas of what our future plans are and is not anxious to commit himself'.[482] In fact, there were two reasons for the committee's perceived inefficiency and ultimate dissolution. First, the gravity and complexity of the questions necessitated detailed study, and ministers were often preoccupied by other matters. Second, British planning was forced to respond to military developments. On 25 July, Mussolini and his Fascist regime in Italy had been ousted from government. The capitulation, while a great boon for the allies, soon gave way to apprehension about the future of Europe. For Britain, as well as other allied governments, the need to come to a working agreement with the Russians over the future of Europe became the foremost objective.[483] It was understood that without such an agreement with the Kremlin, even an Anglo-American relationship—which was far from guaranteed—could not ensure that territories within Central and Southeastern Europe would be respected after the war.

Despite the short life of the committee, events in Italy convinced its members of Jebb's opinion that the great powers would need to work together to establish an effective executive control over Europe. Although none of these powers were themselves a Continental European state—ministers within this committee, for instance, did not consider Britain to be a European power in this case, so much as a global Empire—they would be chiefly responsible for overseeing Europe's stabilisation, relief and reconstruction.[484] Here Jebb's proposal for a

[482] Harvey diary, 24 August 1943, Harvey (ed.), pp. 286-7
[483] Memorandum by Bruce Lockhart, 'Russia and the Allied Governments', 9 August 1943, FO 371/36992/N4531. Robert Bruce Lockhart: Political Intelligence Department, 1939-41; Director-General, Political Warfare Executive, 1942-45
[484] Record from the 4th meeting of the Committee on Postwar Settlement, 25 August 1943, CAB 87/65

United Nations Commission for Europe—an evolved form of his earlier Inter-Allied Armistice Commission—would serve as the primary machinery for great power cooperation and function. The committee, echoing one of the Prime Minister's earlier recommendations for post-war European order, suggested that this United Nations Commission for Europe might be a type of 'embryonic Council of Europe'.[485]

Despite their acceptance of Jebb's plan, the committee came to be seen by the Economic and Reconstruction Department as an inefficient body. Jebb complained that everything was happening in 'rather slow motion', noting that perhaps 'there is not all that urgency over plans for the future of the world!'[486] Webster, too, felt that the delay in the committee was 'ridiculous' and that it was high time they come to a decision on the United Nations Plan so that it might be put before the wider Cabinet.[487] The object now, Jebb urged, was to reach agreement on 'principles' of the post-war settlement so that they might be able to initiate discussions, first with the United States and later with the Soviet Union. As before, the impetus to action was a feeling that the State Department planners were edging ahead of officials in the Foreign Office. 'The Americans…are thinking in terms not dissimilar to our own, and now is the moment to influence them, before their own proposals have actually crystallised and received approval from the highest authority.'[488]

'Go out and start things up': Jebb returns to Washington

In August, Jebb returned to Washington in what was the latest example of the Economic and Reconstruction Department—and the Foreign Office more broadly—attempting to drive the planning process forward. His primary objective was to push for an agreement between the

[485] Record from the 4th meeting of the Committee on Post-war Settlement, 25 August 1943, CAB 87/65
[486] Jebb to Clark Kerr, 8 August 1943, FCO 73/266/UN/43/8
[487] Webster diary, 10 August 1943, Reynolds and Hughes, *Historian as Diplomat*, p. 23
[488] Note by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs for the Committee on the Post-war Settlement, P.S. (43) 10, 31 August 1943, CAB 87/65.

great powers on how they might develop a 'common world policy' in the post-war period. Only when this was agreed upon could the three powers begin to address the range of post-war problems. As he wrote to Ronald, 'the only conceivable way of getting some kind of real planning going is for somebody at this end who has done the planning to go out and start things up.'[489] Ronald was supportive of Jebb's request, noting that such talks on 'fundamental principles and ideas' were an 'essential prerequisite in the formation of all plans for a better world order'.[490]

In the course of his meetings with State Department officials, Jebb was presented with two proposals which would have significant implications for his own planning. The first was a draft Four Power Declaration which outlined an agreement whereby the four powers—the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and China—would commit themselves to continuing their wartime cooperation.[491] The draft declaration was welcomed by the Foreign Office, and in particular Jebb, who had first proposed such a four-power system in August 1942. In a letter to Cadogan which addressed each of the eight points, Jebb wrote that a kind of 'four power dictatorship' was the only arrangement which might effect change in the post-war period. The British, he felt, should take the American proposal and 'swallow it practically whole and without suggesting additional articles'. It was likely that the Chinese would sign on, but there would need to be delicate outreach to the Russians, who must not think the arrangement to be an entirely Anglo-American conception.[492] It was a line which Cadogan quickly approved.[493]

[489] Jebb to Ronald, 24 July 1943, FCO 73/264/Pwp/43/10
[490] Ronald minute, 22 July 1943, FO 371/35461/U3653
[491] Telegram from Ronald Campbell to Foreign Office, No. 3690, 14 August 1943, FO 371/35438/U3624. State Department Officials had been discussing the possibility of such a declaration since October 1942. See 'Background and Development of the Four-Nation Declaration, in the Light of Records in the Division of Political Studies, 13 December 1943', National Archives of the United States, Harley A Notter File, Record Group 59, Entry 496, Box 19
[492] Jebb to Cadogan, 21 August 1943, FO 371/35438/U3624
[493] Cadogan minute, 21 August 1943, ibid

Closely related to the draft Four Power Declaration was a second document, titled 'The United Nations Protocol', which called for the members of the United Nations to sign a document pledging their commitment to setting up an international organisation at the end of the war. The protocol was along the same lines as that mentioned to Churchill during his most recent visit to Washington, but it contained more detailed outlines of the structure of the organisation, including how representatives might be elected to a world council.[494] Despite it originating in the State Department, the document did not have the support of the President, who felt that it was, at this point in time, a step too far and one that might lead to backlash both within the Senate and amongst the American public. Jebb, too, felt that the time was not right for such a proposal, noting that, 'All kinds of controversial points would at once be debated in the press and militate against a general acceptance of the first and more important document.'[495] The objective at the moment was to get Allied agreement on the most fundamental points and leave the more detailed planning questions to later meetings.

During the conversations, Jebb also took the opportunity to share a revised version of his United Nations Commission for Europe, a scheme which he still envisioned becoming a type of foundational machinery on the European continent. There was considerable pushback from American officials, however, who explained to Jebb that the administration viewed this arrangement as Churchill's 'Council of Europe' under a different name. It was a design the Roosevelt administration had long been opposed to, seeing it as a potential source of criticism from isolationists. Even after clarifying the differences between the Prime Minister's Council of Europe and his own idea for a Commission for Europe, Jebb was unable to convince his American counterparts, who felt that if any system were to be established, it would need to follow the creation of a wider international security organisation led by a nucleus of the four

[494] Memorandum by Jebb, 'Report on a Visit to the United States', 29 August 1943, FO 371/35461/U4056
[495] Telegram from Ronald Campbell to Foreign Office, No. 3691, 14 August 1943, FO 371/35438/U3625

powers.[496] It was not that they disagreed with such a European Commission, but the only way they envisioned being able to drag the American public into such a scheme was through a worldwide organisation, as opposed to a European system that gave off an image of an Anglo-American alliance.[497] It was once again the bottom-up versus top-down approach favoured by the British and Americans, respectively. Regarding the latter, Jebb wrote to the Foreign Office that the American approach was still guided, in part, by traditional fears of European entanglements.

> People who knew anything about foreign affairs in the United States admitted that something along the lines of an alliance was essential if peace was to be preserved but, owing to deep rooted feelings of distrust of entangling alliances in America, it could not be represented to the American Nation in that way.[498]

Jebb's proposal for a United Nations Commission for Europe would be placed in reserve for now, though it would soon become a symbol of allied cooperation during the Moscow Conference. As for the Four Power Declaration, the Foreign Office officials back in London were encouraged by the idea of the four powers agreeing to cooperate in the post-war period.[499] Among other things, such a declaration at this point in time, one official noted, would do well to counter Nazi propaganda. Two recent lines from Berlin had warned that there were serious rifts within the collective United Nations front and that British and American leaders were prepared to turn the continent over to communism.[500] A declaration of the kind proposed by officials in Washington would—apart from advancing collaboration between the three powers—be a symbolic display of Allied unity.

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[496] State Department officials wrote to Roosevelt that, there were 'grave dangers' in having the world organisation rest solely on regional foundations. Memorandum for the President, 11 August 1943, quoted in Rofe, 'Prewar and wartime postwar planning', p. 24

[497] Memorandum by Jebb, 'Report on a Visit to the United States', 29 August 1943, FO 371/35461/U4056

[498] Telegram from Ronald Campbell to Foreign Office, No. 3692, 14 August 1943, FO 371/35439/U3626

[499] See the minutes from Foreign Office officials in FO 371/35397/U3673

[500] Harrison minute, 19 August 1943, FO 371/35397/U3673. Geoffrey Harrison, Central Department, 1942-44; German Department, 1944-45

Balancing relations with Washington and Moscow

As Jebb's meetings with State Department officials were wrapping up in Washington, Churchill and Roosevelt were settling in to their sixth wartime conference which would have important ramifications on the relationship between the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union. Similar to their previous meetings, Churchill and Roosevelt arrived more intent to focus on military matters but ended up addressing key post-war issues in the process.[501] The Americans presented the draft Four Power Declaration to Churchill who—along with Eden and Cadogan—expressed general approval, but also acknowledged that the Cabinet would have to be consulted before a final decision could be taken.[502] Elsewhere, they agreed on the terms of the Italian surrender, plans for an invasion of France in May 1944, and the need for increased cooperation with the Soviet Union on post-war questions.[503] The latter of these topics would have the most important implications both for the European settlement as well as the future international organisation.

That Moscow needed to be brought more formally into these discussions was a line the Foreign Office had been advancing for months. In contrast to the seemingly unified vision developing in Anglo-American relations, the present state of Anglo-Soviet relations was one of tension and suspicion. Stalin was repeatedly perturbed by the lack of a second front in Europe, a point which was repeated in stern telegrams to Churchill.[504] The Prime Minister, in turn, was increasingly frustrated with Stalin's messages. He told Ivan Maisky before the latter's

[501] This conference has been examined in detail by a number of historians, many of whom have focused on the military side of the discussions. Roberts, *Masters and Commanders*, pp. 391-398, 403-411; Gilbert, *Road to* Victory, pp. 462-488; Kimball, *Forged in War*, pp. 218-221. Others have written about the discussions at Quebec which related to the post-war world. See Russell, *A History of the United Nations Charter*, pp. 122-124; Divine, *Second Chance*, pp. 136-137; Hoopes and Brinkley, *FDR and the Creation of the U.N.*, pp. 83-85; Louis, *Imperialism at Bay*, p. 276

[502] See FO 371/35398/U3876; Woodward, *British Foreign Policy in the Second World War*, Vol. V, p. 71

[503] One topic not discussed in detail here was Roosevelt passing to Churchill a draft 'Declaration of National Independence', which ended up infuriating the Prime Minister. For Foreign Office views of this draft declaration, see Louis, *Imperialism at Bay*, pp. 243-258

[504] Archibald Clark Kerr wrote to Churchill that, 'Our weakness lies not in our ability to open the second front but in our having let [Stalin] believe we were going to.' Quoted in Kitchen, *British Policy Towards the Soviet Union*, p. 161.

recall to Moscow that he was 'getting rather tired of being scolded, and did not see much use in keeping up a personal correspondence if it only became a vehicle for recrimination'.[505] To worsen the situation, Churchill only notified Stalin of his upcoming meeting with Roosevelt at the last minute. The deterioration in relations concerned officials in the Foreign Office. William Strang warned in the first days of the conference that, 'Moscow has not had its due share of United Nations business: and Soviet collaboration in the post-war security system is so vital to us that we must spare no effort to secure it.'[506] Officials in the Northern Department noted that this behaviour—of negotiating with the United States and only notifying Moscow afterwards—was going to 'land us in one hell of a mess'.[507] While the department accepted that Russian policies were often the root cause of Anglo-Soviet tension, they acknowledged that the British must be prepared to do what was necessary to foster workable relations. 'This Office is the only place where it is realized that, in spite of all these things, we just *have* to get along with [the Soviets] or Europe will be a ghastly place for a long time.'[508]

The concern within the Foreign Office made its mark on the Prime Minister as well. Conscious of the need for Soviet cooperation and sensitive to the idea of the Four Power Declaration looking like another Anglo-American creation, Churchill and Roosevelt eventually wrote to Stalin informing him of the content of discussions taking place in Quebec and reiterating their desire to have Anglo-Soviet-American talks in the near future. If they could not agree on a meeting of the three leaders, then it was suggested that 'exploratory' discussions between the Foreign Ministers might be arranged.[509] Seven days later, a message arrived from

[505] 'Record by the Prime Minister of a conversation with the Soviet Ambassador on July 2, 1943', FO 371/36955/N3894. At the end of June, Ivan Maisky and Maxim Litvinov were recalled from London and Washington, respectively. Weinberg, *A World at Arms*, p. 610
[506] Strang minute, 19 August 1943, FO 371/35397/U3673
[507] Wilson to Clark Kerr, 8 August 1944, quoted in Ross, *The Foreign Office and the Kremlin*, pp. 134-35. Geoffrey Wilson: Moscow Embassy and Northern Department, 1940-45
[508] Wilson to Clark Kerr, 8 August 1944, quoted in Ross, *The Foreign Office and the Kremlin*, pp. 134-35. See also Memorandum by Robert Bruce Lockhart 'Russia and the Allied Governments', 9 August 1943, FO 371/36992/N4531
[509] Telegram from Churchill and Roosevelt to Stalin, 18 August 1943, *FRUS,* 1943*,* Vol. I, p. 514; and Reynolds, *The Kremlin Letters*, p. 287-88

Stalin. Feeling as though the Kremlin was being purposely kept in the dark regarding the Italian armistice negotiations, he wrote: 'I have to tell you that it is impossible any longer to tolerate such a situation.'[510]

The tone of the message shocked Churchill and Roosevelt, who, in turn, had to be calmed by Cadogan and Eden.[511] In a telegram to Attlee and the War Cabinet, the Prime Minister wrote that Stalin had an 'ill temper and bad manners' and that the only 'black spot' on the conference in Quebec was the 'bearishness of Soviet Russia'.[512] Despite their initial outrage, Churchill and Roosevelt were encouraged by another message from Stalin which arrived the following day, on 26 August. He had agreed both to a tripartite meeting between himself, Roosevelt and Churchill, as well as to a meeting of the Foreign Ministers beforehand. As to the latter, he pressed for these to not just be 'exploratory discussions' but 'practicable and preparatory' which might lead to concrete agreements between the three leaders.[513]

A 'Middle Way': Foreign Office proposals prior to the Moscow meeting

The imminent arrival of the Moscow Conference forced officials in the Foreign Office to order their thinking on future relations with the Soviet Union as well as on the shape of an international organisation. [514] On the question of Anglo-Soviet relations, military developments—namely the Red Army's victory at Kursk and their advance westward—was welcome news; but at the same time, Soviet victories also caused concern amongst Foreign

[510] To help avoid such exclusive dealings on post-war European matters, Stalin recommended the creation of a 'politico-military commission' which would comprise representatives from the three great powers and be responsible for addressing armistice terms with the countries which might break off from the Axis powers. Stalin to Roosevelt and Churchill, 22 August 1943, copy in Reynolds, *Kremlin Letters*, p. 291
[511] Cadogan diary, 24 August 1943, in Dilks, p. 555.
[512] Churchill to Attlee and War Cabinet, No. 421 WELFARE, 25 August 1943, CAB 121/155
[513] Stalin to Roosevelt and Churchill, 24 August 1943, in Reynolds, *Kremlin Letters*, pp. 293-4
[514] Few historians have focused on the preparation which took place within the Foreign Office, especially as it related to ongoing planning for a post-war international organisation. On this subject, Keith Sainsbury is one exception, yet he downplays the attention the Foreign Office gave to the question of a future organisation at this stage. Sainsbury, *The Turning Point*, p. 22

Office officials about the future of Soviet influence in Eastern Europe.[515] The future boundaries of Russia's western frontier, in particular, returned as a crucial priority. Given his earlier conversation with Stalin, Eden felt that the frontier issue remained the key to unlocking Soviet cooperation on other matters, and that Stalin was 'likely to be suspicious and unco-operative' until he could receive assurances on this point.[516] As the Foreign Office wrestled with this question in the period preceding the conference, officials speculated to what extent Russia would increase its influence in Europe. Some members of the Northern Department argued that the Kremlin had 'an inordinate opinion of their own power, are resolved to exercise it and are even more imperialist than in the days of the Czars'.[517]

A meeting on 24 September sought to address a number of these questions, notably the creation of political 'machinery' within Europe to facilitate post-war cooperation. Jebb ensured that Webster was invited to the meeting, and the professor's own paper on 'The Problem of Eastern Europe' from February 1943 was used as a basis of discussion.[518] More importantly, however, was Webster's recommendation that the Foreign Office might propose a list of 'principles' which could guide the negotiations in Moscow.[519] As Jebb explained after the meeting, such principles—if agreed to by the three powers—could prevent 'chaos in Eastern Europe' which was inevitable, especially if London, Moscow and Washington were not cooperating in the post-war period. If the great powers could not work 'in concert', he warned, they would fall back on the 'time-honoured but regrettable principle of spheres of influence'.[520] On the recommendation of Jebb and Webster, the Foreign Office now prioritised the effort to

[515] The Soviet victory in the Battle of Kursk between July and August 1943 was, as Gerhard Weinberg has noted, a 'shattering defeat' for the German army. Weinberg, *A World at Arms*, p. 604.
[516] Eden to Churchill, 19 August 1943, FO 371/36992/N5060. In July, the Foreign Office had written to Lord Halifax acknowledging that such a settlement concerning the frontier questions would drive 'a coach and horses through the Atlantic Charter'. Quoted in Kitchen, *British Policy Towards the Soviet Union*, p. 165
[517] Cavendish-Bentinck minute, 16 October 1943, FO 371/37031/N6851. Victor Cavendish-Bentinck: Head of Dominions Intelligence, 1941-43; Head of Services Liaison Department, 1944-45
[518] Memorandum by Webster, 'The Problem of Eastern Europe', 6 February 1943, copy in Webster 11/2, LSE
[519] Webster diary, 24 September 1943. Reynolds and Hughes, *Historian as Diplomat*, p. 24
[520] Record of meeting at the Foreign Office, 24 September 1943, FO 371/35399/U5368

have the great powers arrive at an agreement based on a set of principles. Such an agreement might have the dual purpose of relieving Anglo-Soviet tension and laying the foundation for a European and international order.[521]

It was understood that the question of a future world organisation would inevitably arise at the forthcoming conference, and it was here that the Economic and Reconstruction Department's work became particularly useful. After Roosevelt had indicated his desire to see the subject discussed in Moscow, Eden asked for Jebb's views on the matter.[522] Jebb noted that the key difference between the President's and Prime Minister's plans remained how European problems would be dealt with after the war. The Americans, he said, might be open to Churchill's idea for a Council of Europe in the future; but their priority now was the construction of a World Council which would deal with European disputes. Going forward, there might be a way to bring a Council of Europe under the authority of a World Council, but that was a detail which would have to be worked out in later stages. Again, the question of maintaining a European order from the top-down (World Council) or the bottom-up (Council of Europe) remained a key Anglo-American divergence.

His next point concerned the question of authority and was more of a direct criticism of Roosevelt's plan. Jebb highlighted the problem inherent in Roosevelt's scheme that the four powers would be bound to two different—potentially competing—groups: the World Council and the Executive Council. If, in this system, the former was to hold the ultimate authority, the latter council would become, Jebb warned, 'a laughing stock' because of its futility. Moreover, the disparity in power exercised by the four powers compared to the smaller powers would create bitter hostility. His next objection concerned the mechanisms to maintain peace. Roosevelt had mentioned his idea of 'tripartite machinery' keeping the peace after the war, but

[521] The following week Jebb and Webster prepared a draft for a 'Joint Declaration on Joint Responsibility for Europe' which was later taken to Moscow. For a copy of the draft principles, see FO 371/35399/U5368
[522] Eden minute on Telegram from Churchill to War Cabinet, Iz. 3297, 14 September 1943, FO 371/35440/U4349

Jebb thought that such a monopoly of force—the President's earlier views on this held that only the four great powers would be allowed to possess significant armaments—would make it difficult to erect any regional security schemes, a point which remained in the Foreign Office plans.

In addressing these questions, Jebb also laid out the basic view of the Foreign Office as it pertained to these questions, a position he referred to as a 'middle way' between the more worldwide desires of the Roosevelt administration and the regional needs of the United Kingdom.[523] It was largely unchanged from the earlier United Nations Plan for Organising Peace and Welfare, and again described a World Council of the four powers along with France, a country which continued to be left out of Roosevelt's plans. Included in this World Council might be a few smaller nations, elected based on their region of the world. It would serve as a vehicle for the great powers to 'smooth out any frictions' and its primary function would be to prevent aggression and oversee the peaceful settlement of disputes. Importantly, the smaller powers on the Council would be allowed a say in any discussion, but the ultimate decision would 'rest with the World Powers, acting unanimously'. Elsewhere, there might eventually be a wider Assembly of nations, though the problems in the period immediately after the war would need to be addressed primarily by the World Council. To help with post-war security and reconstruction, Jebb recommended that regional organisations might be set up, though they would, from the start, be subordinate to the World Council.[524]

In what was an important tactical decision, Foreign Office officials recommended to Eden that while such discussions on this subject might be encouraged at the Moscow Conference, he should move slowly and not commit to any big decisions. It was essential that these matters be taken up by the relevant experts in the three countries, as opposed to being

[523] Jebb minute in response to telegram from Churchill at Quadrant, 14 September 1943, FO 371/35440/U4349
[524] Draft telegram by Jebb for Eden, FO 371/35440/U4349

finalised before details could be worked out.[525] Cadogan was one of the chief advocates of moving slowly on the question of world organisation, but at the same time he recommended a careful approach with American officials, whose enthusiasm he did not want to dampen. Given his earlier experience negotiating with members of the Roosevelt administration, he pointed out that the Americans 'have a funny way of doing business—a feature of which is that the President occasionally talks at large'. While it was 'untidy' to some, he did not feel that it was worth it, at least at this stage, to single out single phrases uttered by the President to the Prime Minister and analyse them as official American policy. His recommendation was to support the American Four Power Declaration as a first step, and then to enter into negotiations in Moscow 'with a fairly open mind'.[526] Eden agreed that discussions at the conference should only be along the most general lines. He was also adamant, however, that the British allow the Americans to chase their policy, saying that, 'I don't want to discourage the Americans in any of this enterprise.'[527] Moreover, a recent proposal by the Prime Minister to recommend 'a system of a League of Nations which will include a Council of Europe' was one which Eden intended to ignore, at least in the presence of his American and Soviet counterparts.[528]

The primary item on the American agenda remained the draft of the Four Power Declaration; and on this all-important issue, the Foreign Office view was split at first. One official felt that 'the declaration consists of high-sounding phrases which mean little', and it would instead be better to have a meeting of the great powers prior to any agreement.[529] Most officials, however, came around to the idea of the great powers issuing a statement about their

[525] Jebb minute in response to telegram from Churchill at Quadrant, 14 September 1943, FO 371/35440/U4349; see also Strang minute, 30 September 1943, FO 371/35440/U4349
[526] Cadogan minute, 5 October 1943, FO 371/35440/U4349
[527] Eden minute, 26 September 1943, ibid
[528] 'Notes by the Prime Minister for Foreign Secretary at the Forthcoming Meeting', 11 October 1943, FO 371/34400/C12155. Eden wrote that, 'I do not take this document too literally or too seriously, nor of course will I show it to any foreign government.' Eden minute, 7 October 1943, FO 371/34400/C12155
[529] Lambert minute, 23 August 1943, FO 371/35398/U3876

intention to work together in the post-war period.[530] For Jebb, this represented the culmination of a four power plan he had envisaged a year before. Now was not the time for delay. Echoing what he had said to Cadogan weeks before, Jebb wrote that, 'The mere fact that we are in the presence of an American initiative of this magnitude is of great importance…So far as we are concerned I should have thought we ought to foster the idea by all means in our power.'[531] The declaration, he felt, should not be viewed as an end in itself, but as a big step in the right direction. As the progression of his Four Power Plan into the United Nations Plan for Organising Peace over the last year had shown, the potential of a future international organisation rested on a nucleus of great powers, and the American proposal certainly embodied this thinking.

In a meeting on 6 September, the War Cabinet had expressed general approval for the declaration, although they suggested some minor alterations. One concerned the clause relating to the establishment of a world organisation, namely that smaller powers not only be allowed to join but that they would also be able to 'play their part'.[532] The Foreign Office had also expressed similar sentiments, noting that the original document produced by the State Department sounded like a 'sort of four-power dictatorship' which would be unpalatable to smaller states. Their amendments—namely the substitution of 'with a view to joint action' for 'act jointly' in point 5—would serve as a kind of 'middle way'.[533] An important consideration here was the view of the Dominions, and in particular Australia. H.V. Evatt, the Australian Minister for External Affairs, wrote to Eden that, 'step by step the Dominions are being excluded' from influence in the post-war world. He felt that, if anything, the British

[530] Law wrote to Eden that the Four-Power Declaration offered 'advantage from our point of view'. Telegram from Law to Eden, No. 477 CONCRETE, 22 August 1943, FO 371/35398/U3875
[531] Jebb minute on Telegram from Law to Eden, No. 477 CONCRETE, 22 August 1943, FO 371/35398/U3876
[532] War Cabinet conclusions, WM (43) 124, 6 September 1943, CAB 65/35
[533] Telegram from Foreign Office to Washington Embassy, No. 23 EXTRA, 2 October 1943, FO 371/35398. See also, 'Observations by the Foreign Office on the British Amendments to the Draft Four-Power Declaration', National Archives of the United States, Harley A Notter File, Record Group 59, Entry 496, Box 19

Commonwealth should be included as one of the powers instead of solely the United Kingdom.[534] Though the Foreign Office resisted Evatt's last recommendation, the draft returned to the State Department had given considerable attention to the position of smaller states.[535] It was this version of the Four Power Declaration which would be carried to Moscow.

The Moscow Conference

The Foreign Secretary approached the meetings in Moscow with a heightened sense of urgency, and wrote in his diaries upon arriving that, 'I want to get on as fast as I can.'[536] Officials in the Foreign Office expected the proceedings to be 'difficult', while Roosevelt and Churchill had few expectations. If anything, the major decisions would be left to the upcoming conference between themselves and Stalin.[537] Just two days into the conference, however, Eden reported to London that the conference was in 'unexpectedly smooth waters'.[538] The relationship with these 'incalculable people', Eden later reported to Churchill, seemed to be 'on a footing of permanent friendship'.[539] He continued, 'I do not think that any of us sufficiently understood hitherto...how much these people have suffered from a feeling of exclusion which the extent and scope of their victories has only served to intensify. However unjustified this feeling may be, it is real.'[540]

The Four Power Declaration was the most important agreement concerning a future international organisation which was to come out the conference.[541] It was first taken up on the

[534] Telegram from Evatt to Eden, 20 September 1943, FO 371/35398/U4747
[535] Telegram from British Embassy in Washington to Foreign Office, No. 13, 28 September 1943, FO 371/35398/U4658
[536] Eden diary, 18 October 1943, Avon Papers, Cadbury Research Library, University of Birmingham [hereafter Avon Papers], AP 20/2/1 - 20/3/11
[537] Sainsbury, *The Turning Point*, p. 21; Reynolds, *Kremlin Letters*, pp. 319-20
[538] Telegram from Moscow to the Foreign Office, No 46 SPACE, 20 October 1943, FO 371/37030/N6166
[539] Telegram from Eden to Churchill, No. 112 SPACE, 29 October 1943, CAB 120/107. For 'incalculable people', see Telegram from Eden to Churchill, No. 158, 2 November 1943, CAB 121/155
[540] Telegram from Eden to Churchill, No. 158, 2 November 1943, CAB 121/155. See also Telegram from Clark Kerr to the Foreign Office, No. 1252, 5 November 1943, FO 371/37031/N6575
[541] Telegram from Cadogan to Halifax, No. 7370, 29 October 1943, FO 371/37030/N6447

third day of meetings, when Cordell Hull, opening the discussion with an impassioned plea for post-war internationalism, said the Four Power Declaration was 'an extension of the spirit and sense of the United Nations Declaration'. Eden echoed the American Secretary of State and emphasised that the declaration would go a long way towards securing a 'basis of cooperation' between the great powers from which the post-war order would emerge. The only hiccup in these discussions was the insistence of the Soviet Foreign Minister, Vyacheslav Molotov, that it be a declaration of three powers instead of four.[542] That China should be a signatory even while absent from the conference did not sit well with the Kremlin. This was eventually dropped after convincing arguments from both Hull and Eden; and by the fifth day of the conference, the ministers assembled were in agreement on the text of the declaration, which was eventually signed on 30 October 1943.[543]

Though the conference did not dwell on matters concerning a world organisation, on 26 October Molotov proposed that the three powers might form a commission to examine questions surrounding its establishment in the future.[544] Hull and Eden were initially in favour of Molotov's proposal being included in the Four Power Declaration itself (under the fourth paragraph), but this was eventually dropped, largely at the urging of Hull who wanted to avoid sparking isolationist sentiment in the United States.[545] The three powers instead agreed that it would be best for each government to work on its own plans and to discuss them informally in due course.[546] At last, the Economic and Reconstruction Department had a four power agreement as well as the prospect of future conversations on the creation of a world organisation.

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[542] 'Record of the proceedings of the Foreign Minister's Conference held in Moscow from 19th October to 30th October 1943' [hereafter 'Record of Proceedings'], pp. 22-28, FO 371/37031/U6921
[543] Ibid, pp. 34-35. For text of the 'Declaration of Four Nations on General Security', see Annex 1, pp. 6-7. Back in London, Churchill wrote to Eden that he was 'very pleased' with the declaration. Telegram from Churchill to Eden, No. 205 EXTRA, 1 November 1943, CAB 120/109.
[544] 'Record of Proceedings', p. 52, FO 371/37031/U6921
[545] Ibid, p. 66
[546] Ibid, p. 66

The next achievement of the conference—the creation of the European Advisory Commission—was an outgrowth Jebb's idea for an Inter-Allied Armistice Commission and its later variation, a United Nations Commission for Europe.[547] Spurred on by the need for the great powers to consult on post-war questions such as the Italian armistice, Eden presented a proposal to establish 'a permanent body which would act as a clearing house for European problems of common interest connected with the war'.[548] While the Russians and Americans had offered proposals for collaboration on certain questions, namely the Italian armistice, the British position was—in line with Jebb's primary aim in these months—to give any future commission wide powers of authority and more importantly, to establish 'permanent machinery for consultation between the three powers'. Furthermore, Eden wanted authority solely in the hands of the great powers, an arrangement whereby the three powers would have a veto over decisions. When Molotov suggested that other allied nations might be invited, Eden said this would be a mistake because of the cumbersome nature of so many smaller countries being involved.[549] This view was the product of the Economic and Reconstruction Department's desire to not only establish international machinery by way of regional structures, but to also place the primary responsibility for armistice questions in the hands of the great powers. It was this agreement which Eden considered to be the true success of the conference.[550]

The draft declaration of principles which Jebb and Webster had developed prior to the conference was eventually dropped during the course of conversations. Hull thought that they

[547] For the agreed text of the European Advisory Commission, see Annex 2, 'Record of Proceedings', pp. 7-8, FO 371/37031/U6921. See also Bruce Kuklick, 'The Genesis of the European Advisory Commission', *Journal of Contemporary History* 4:4 (1969): 189-201, though Kuklick does not give credit to Jebb for this development of this idea.
[548] 'Record of Proceedings', p. 29-31, FO 371/37031/U6921. Eden wrote to Churchill that if they could get the commission set up in London, 'then the conference will have justified itself'. Telegram from Eden to Churchill, No. 74 SPACE, 24 October 1943, CAB 120/107
[549] 'Record of Proceedings', p. 61, FO 371/37031/U6921
[550] *Hansard*, House of Commons Debate, Vol. 393, cols. 1323-54, 11 November 1943; 'Mr Eden on Peace Structure', *The Times*, 2 November 1943

should stick to more general principles; while Molotov felt that in the immediate post-war period, smaller states must be allowed to 'find their feet without outside pressure'. Though the irony in Molotov's statement seemed stunningly clear, Eden, feeling that the mood was 'unpropitious', eventually withdrew the draft declaration altogether.[551] Jebb wrote that it was 'very sad' that these principles were declined at the conference, while Sargent noted that 'it would have been a great comfort to the lesser allies.'[552] Importantly, the concept of principles guiding the behaviour of states was one which the Economic and Reconstruction Department would continue to advance, and one which would influence later discussions between the three powers.

For all the success on the Four Power Declaration, British officials made little progress in coming to terms with the Soviets about the shape of post-war Eastern Europe. Given Eden's openness—at least privately—to 'yield' to the frontier aims of the Soviets, there ended up being little discussion of these subjects. As Christopher Warner of the Northern Department noted towards the end of the conference, 'We are no wiser as to the Russian attitude on questions concerning Eastern Europe.'[553] It was this uncertainty over Russian intentions in post-war Europe which was to drive later Foreign Office efforts to develop additional regional machinery—in the form of alliances, most notably—in Europe.

New Considerations for the Foreign Office: The Balance of Power and Notions of Internationalism

While the agreements at the Moscow Conference marked a considerable advance in the direction of a future international organisation, the experience of this three-power negotiation also led Foreign Office officials to consider more seriously two issues: the relationship of the

[551] Telegram from Moscow to Foreign Office, No. 100 SPACE, 27 October 1943, FO 371/35399/U5369
[552] Jebb minute, 29 October and Sargent minute, 30 October 1943, FO 371/35399/U5369
[553] Memorandum by Warner on the progress of the Moscow Conference, 29 October 1943, FO 371/37031/N6789. See also Telegram from Cadogan to Halifax, No. 7519, 4 November 1943, FO 371/37030/N6447

great powers to the smaller powers and Britain's future position vis-à-vis the United States and the Soviet Union. The momentum in the direction of a more internationalist order was thus met with more fundamental calculations concerning power politics. Indeed, as Secretary of State Cordell Hull returned to the United States boasting of an end to spheres of influence, balances of power, and alliances, officials in London considered such aspirations to be 'wishful thinking' and geared more towards winning over American public opinion.[554] If there was to be a system capable of maintaining order after the war, it would need to be based on the realities of great power politics.

Even as more detailed planning for a post-war organisation had slowed somewhat since the drafting of the United Nations Plan for Organising Peace, officials in the Economic and Reconstruction Department continued to grapple with larger conceptual debates about the future international order. One of the most important discussions stemmed from a paper sent to the Foreign Office by Professor Arnold Wolfers of Yale University. On the question of the relationship between the great powers to the rest of the world, Wolfers suggested that if it was agreed that such a 'nucleus' of powerful states should be responsible for the maintenance of peace at the end of the war, then there would need to be an elaboration on the position of the medium and small states. These countries, Wolfers argued, made up a vital element of the international order and thus could neither be coerced nor ignored. But at the same time, when it came to security in the post-war world, they must not be afforded positions which could stifle the action of the great powers. Indecision within the League of Nations—largely the result of too many powers having too much say—had paralysed that organisation's ability to maintain the peace.

[554] Wilson minute, 20 November 1943, FO 371/37031/N6879. For Hull's comments, see 'Allies on the Offensive', *The Times*, 19 November 1943. Hull had given his first press conference after Moscow on 15 November. See 'Mr Cordell Hull on Moscow', *The Times*, 15 November 1943

A second but equally important question was the relationship between the great powers themselves. In Wolfers's view, the fundamental intellectual foundation of the future international order would rely on the seemingly 'paradoxical' conceptions of balance of power and collective security.[555] The latter would be carried out nearly entirely by a 'nuclear coalition' of the great powers, and it would, in essence, rely on a disequilibrium of power—the great powers would have far greater military capabilities than the rest of the world.[556] Just as important for Wolfers, however, was that a balance of power exist between the great powers, which might 'lead them to serve as a check on each other'.[557]

Wolfers's work was admired by members of the Economic and Reconstruction Department who thought his emphasis on respecting the rights of smaller powers and his idea of how the great powers might relate to one another was a valuable contribution. Jebb thought it an 'excellent paper' after reading it on the flight to the United States in August, and he even passed it to some members of the State Department during his visit.[558] For Webster, the paper was an admirable work, but he warned that this view might not be shared in the United States. Wolfers, he said, has a 'European background and it would be unwise to assume that American thinking will accept this realistic approach'.[559] As to the relationship between the great and small powers, Webster argued,

> Power and responsibility must be commensurate with each other. If the Great Powers are to obtain the consent of the lesser Powers to their assumption of world leadership they must convince the latter of their intention and capacity to guard the worlds peace, while at the same time respecting the rights of their smaller neighbors.[560]

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[555] Arnold Wolfers, 'The Small Powers and the Enforcement of Peace', 1 August 1943, Yale Institute of International Studies, copy in FO 371/35397/U3814

[556] He used Walter Lippmann's idea of a 'nuclear alliance' of the four powers as his starting point. Lippmann, *US Foreign Policy: The Shield of the Republic* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1943), pp. 161-177

[557] Arnold Wolfers, 'The Small Powers and the Enforcement of Peace', p. 9, copy in FO 371/35397/U3814

[558] Memorandum by Jebb, 'Report on a Visit to the United States', 29 August 1943, FO 371/35461/U4056

[559] Webster minute, 9 September 1943, FO 371/35397/U3814

[560] Webster had spoken about this on a number of occasions. See Webster, 'Some Problems of International Organisation', Montague Burton Lecture at the University of Leeds, 15 October 1943, Webster papers E(1)/946, LSE Nigel Ronald said something similar at the beginning of 1943, writing that, 'The international duties of any state are commensurate with the degree of power of which it disposes.' Ronald minute, 15 February 1943, FO 371/35396/U2329

Importantly, however, was Webster's more substantive proposal to create a rules-based system which might include a functional Assembly of Nations under the Security Council. In keeping with his earlier suggestions, he thought it would be necessary to lay out principles, along the lines of the Atlantic Charter, which might formally express such benevolent intentions on the part of the great powers. Furthermore, he thought it would be necessary to have an assembly 'where the lesser powers can make themselves heard', as well as a more codified or constitutional system whereby the great powers might be held to certain expectations and procedures.[561] On this point, the majority of the Economic and Reconstruction Department were in agreement that there needed to be a type of constitutional basis which might formulate the position and function of the great powers. Indeed, this had been a central element in the United Nations Plan for Organising Peace in July 1943. But as the months passed and the plans became more detailed, the breadth and depth of great power responsibility was a topic which was to be constantly debated. It was paramount that the great powers have the freedom to confront aggression quickly and resolutely, but it was also essential that the rights of small states not be trampled upon in the process.

Wolfers's discussion of the balance of power and collective security also touched on a subject that members of the Economic and Reconstruction Department, in their own way, had been considering for some time. Though Webster did not exactly agree with Wolfers that there needed to be an emphasis on a balance of power between the three great powers, he himself had written a paper for the Foreign Office Research Department addressing this very subject. Like Wolfers, he argued that, in reality, the terms were not all that different—both involved the combination of states to deter aggressors—but over the course of history they had come to represent two intellectual camps in opposition to one another.[562] Webster, himself a scholar of

[561] Webster minute, 9 September 1943, FO 371/35397/U3814
[562] Charles Webster's notes on the Balance of Power, undated, Webster 11/2, LSE

both nineteenth-century European politics as well as the League of Nations, had wrestled with these conceptions for decades. While he had championed the internationalism of Woodrow Wilson, he also valued the balance of power, provided it ensured stability.[563]

Just as with Webster, the concept of a post-war balance of power was never far from Jebb's mind.[564] While Webster did not exactly go as far as Wolfers to say that the future relationship between the great powers should be based on a balance of power, Jebb did just that in a lecture to the Canning Club at Oxford University in February 1944. The distribution of power between the United States, the Soviet Union and Great Britain, was, for Jebb, the predominant factor in the construction of a future world order.

> We therefore arrive at a post-war picture in which the three Great Powers will perforce have to take the lead, and the burden of my argument is that it is on their relation between each other that the prospects of future peace will primarily depend. On what, then, will these relations themselves depend? Surely, they can only depend on comprehension of and respect for each others' 'vital interests'. This is what is meant by politics, and it is on the handling of the tension thus created that the balance of power will rest.[565]

A Realist-Internationalism takes shape

Though previous studies have described a relatively quiet period of post-war planning within the Foreign Office during the second half of 1943, as this chapter has demonstrated, the period was in fact a busy and consequential time within the Economic and Reconstruction Department. Frustrated by the slow pace in which the new cabinet committee under Attlee was examining proposals for the post-war world, Jebb advocated for discussions with members of the State Department and later, with the Soviet Union, as soon as possible. A motivating concern, though somewhat misplaced, was that Britain's window of opportunity

[563] For examples, see Letter from Charles Webster to Sir Stafford Cripps, 23 September 1942, Webster 1/23, LSE; Webster, 'Review of *Europe's Classical Balance of Power* by Edward Vose Gulick', *The English Historical Review* 72:282 (1957): 131-132

[564] Months earlier, Jebb had asked Webster to write a paper on 'What is meant by the balance of power?' See Jebb to Michael Wright, 7 June 1943, FCO 73/266/UN/43/1. For Webster's drafts of this paper, see Webster 11/2, LSE

[565] Gladwyn Jebb, Lecture on 'The Balance of Power' delivered to the Canning Club, Oxford University, 21 February 1944, FCO 73/263/Mis/44/1

with the United States was closing. If they failed to influence the broad parameters of State Department planning before their ideas 'crystallised', then the structure of the international system—to say nothing of Britain's place within it—would be less favourable to British interests. In fact, when Jebb did meet with his American counterparts in August, he found them still resistant to his idea of a United Nations Commission for Europe, although they were offering a proposal which was strongly in line with the central principle underlying his four-power conception from the previous year.

This development, coupled with a Foreign Office push to improve relations with the Soviet Union, led to the British, American and Soviet foreign ministers coming together at the Moscow Conference in October 1943. Years later, William Strang, who had accompanied Eden to Moscow, wrote that this particular conference was 'the most productive of all the war-time tri-partite Ministerial meetings'.[566] Eden's dominant performance among Molotov and Hull has been noted by other historians, but less discussed is the preparation which took place within the Foreign Office prior to the conference.[567] It was during this time that Jebb, as one of the principal advisors to Eden in the run-up to the meeting, began to advocate for a 'middle way' between the more universal proposals of the Roosevelt administration and the regional designs which he had earlier advocated. Importantly, his recommendation for a United Nations Commission for Europe was accepted and carried forward into the conference, where it would be agreed upon by the three governments.

As important as the diplomatic negotiations and agreements in these months was the ongoing work of the Economic and Reconstruction Department. Indeed, during this period, one can see growing evidence of the existence of a distinct approach by Jebb and Webster

[566] Lord Strang, 'Prelude to Potsdam: Reflections on War and Foreign Policy', *International Affairs* 46:3 (1970): 441-454, here p. 441
[567] Kitchen, *British Policy Towards the Soviet Union*, p. 167; Mastny, 'Soviet War Aims at the Moscow and Tehran Conferences', p. 483

toward the problem of constructing a post-war international order. While not representing a standalone or neatly categorized theory of international politics, their views, taken collectively, might be best understood as realist-internationalism. Though Jebb placed more importance on power considerations and the ways in which the great powers might facilitate the maintenance of peace and security, by the end of 1943, he had accepted that modern conceptions of internationalism, while at times descending into more utopian schemes, represented a force of modern politics which could not be ignored. On the other hand, Webster leaned more towards internationalism than raw calculations of state power; yet, like Jebb, he understood that certain realities in international politics—namely the inequalities in military and economic power—could not be overlooked. Thus, the position and responsibility of the great powers remained, for him, an essential aspect of a post-war international order, as evidenced in his oft repeated line that 'power and responsibility must be commensurate with each other'.

Equally important was the way in which both men looked to the history of the nineteenth century, and how, in turn, this application of history accounted for their rather non-scientific and non-theoretical view of international order. For Jebb, the Concert of Europe represented a shining example of great powers cooperating to maintain an international system. Webster, on the other hand, saw the concert system not only as a model for great power cooperation but more importantly as the first modern example of an inclusive internationalist system. It was the inclusion of the smaller powers in this wider system of conference diplomacy, which, he thought, served as the most valuable lesson for the present day. This was most clear in his recommendations throughout 1943, many of which stemmed from a desire for the United Kingdom to become a champion of smaller powers by protecting their interests in a wider international structure. One way of doing this, as his comments in September suggested, was to create an organisation which might ascribe to principles and be guided by a kind of

constitution which, while not as rigid as that of the Americans, might serve to reassure the smaller powers. As Webster was to argue in the coming months, the effort to construct such a system, far from being an idealist aim, was in the 'great tradition' of British foreign policy.[568]

At the heart of their approach to the post-war world was also an inherent tension between the national interest and wider universal aspirations. Indeed, throughout 1943, Jebb came to an understanding that the ability of the United Kingdom to protect its interests in the post-war period increasingly depended on their willingness to adopt more universalist American approaches to international order. While Webster began from a different starting point than Jebb, in that he had long believed that the interests of the United Kingdom were tied up with the creation of a more internationalist system, he never thought of advocating for an international organisation at the expense of British interests. Indeed, for Webster, the potential of such an organisation relied to a great degree on maintaining the power of the United Kingdom and its Empire.

The realist-internationalist view was thus the combination of preconceived notions as well as responses to concurrent politics. The phrase itself reflects an approach to the post-war world which, Jebb noted, was between 'idealistic nonsense and stony mountains of half-baked 'Real- and Geo-politik"'.[569] Its practical application is perhaps best reflected in the Economic and Reconstruction Department's work in 1944, for it was here that officials, while undertaking the most detailed planning for an international organisation to date, also recommended the creation of a regional alliance. Though seen as a potential buttress of the future international organisation, it was, to a greater degree, viewed as a more realistic way to protect British interests on the continent.

[568] See Richard Law, Covering brief for 'Future World Organisation: Forthcoming Conversations at Washington', 16 April 1944, FO 371/40689/U3128

[569] Jebb used this description to describe Arnold Wolfer's paper, which he said was 'entirely in line' with their own United Nations Plan. Jebb minute, 2 July 1943, FO 371/35435/U2896

Chapter Five

Making the Machine: Planning for the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, January – July 1944

By the late summer 1943, the primary focus of the Economic and Reconstruction Department was on achieving general agreement between the great powers to cooperate in a systematic way in the post-war period. Only after this basic foundation had been laid, they believed, could the Foreign Office policy of four powers operating at the centre of a wider international order develop. The Moscow Conference—and later the Tehran Conference—marked a great achievement on this front, as the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed not only to cooperate after the war, but also to take steps to create an international organisation.[570] This experience, coupled with increasing suspicion of Soviet intentions in Eastern Europe, led to crucial considerations by officials in the Economic and Reconstruction Department. In particular, Jebb and Webster had begun to think that, in order for the three powers to maintain their cooperative relationship in the post-war period, a balance of power between them was necessary.

This chapter covers the period from January to August 1944, when Foreign Office planning came to be defined by two overarching objectives. First was the need to design, in detail, the *machinery* of a future world organisation, so that the Foreign Office could enter into future discussions on the subject with American and Soviet officials. Beginning in January, the Economic and Reconstruction Department took the initiative and developed an 'agenda' which was sent to Moscow and Washington. This effort, as it turned out, helped to shape the basic

[570] The Tehran Conference has not been examined in these chapters, due largely to the limited role played by Foreign Office officials. For an account of this meeting between Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin, see Sainsbury, *The Turning* Point, pp. 217-280. On Anglo-Soviet relations in this period, Martin Folly has written that by the start of the new year 1944, there was 'a rough agreement' between the War Cabinet and Foreign Office that 'the Soviets could be involved in postwar cooperation; cooperation in terms of a political alliance.' Folly, *Churchill, Whitehall and the Soviet Union*, pp. 114-115

framework of the future organisation.[571] Importantly, when officials turned to their own drafts, they looked to the precedent of the League of Nations more closely. Webster's historical expertise on this subject was increasingly influential, as the department focused on the more detailed mechanics of the future organisation, including the machinery which might facilitate the 'peaceful settlement of disputes' and the 'military aspect' of the future organisation. Moreover, the British plans continued to emphasise the necessity of the smaller powers playing a substantial role in the World Council and the Assembly, a point which senior officials in the State Department acknowledged went beyond that laid out in their own plans as they stood in April 1944. By July, the Economic and Reconstruction Department had produced five memoranda which outlined in considerable detail the structure and functioning of a post-war organisation. While previous historical scholarship has given some attention to these five documents as they developed in the spring of 1944, this chapter offers one of the first dedicated analyses of these plans.[572]

A second and related objective for the Economic and Reconstruction Department was that, in addition to articulating in detail the machinery of a future international order, they should develop a separate system to ensure the security of the post-war European order. Jebb continued to recommend the creation of a more effective United Nations Commission for Europe, especially as the European Advisory Commission which had come out of the Moscow Conference began to appear as a hollow version of his original conception. More importantly, building on their earlier discussion of how a balance of power between the three great powers

[571] This British effort to set the agenda in January 1944, and the influence this had on the shape of American and Soviet plans, has often been undervalued. See Russell, *A History of the United Nations Charter*, pp. 166-167; 222-223; Roberts, 'A League of Their Own', p. 315

[572] Woodward, *British Foreign Policy in the Second World War*, Vol V, pp. 89-116; Hilderbrand, *Dumbarton Oaks*, pp. 48-55. Luard, *History of the United Nations, Vol. I*, pp. 24-27. Sean Greenwood has pointed out that other histories of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, such as Luard's *A History of the United Nations, Vol. I* and Hilderbrand's *Dumbarton Oaks*, incorrectly claim that the only detailed plans were those of the United States, and they were thus used as the basis of discussion. See Greenwood, *Titan at the Foreign Office*, p. 175. While Greenwood is right in this regard, his chapter on the period 1942-45 does not discuss in detail the contents of these British proposals. Reynolds and Hughes have examined this period as well, yet their focus remained primarily on the work of Charles Webster. Reynolds and Hughes, *Historian as Diplomat*, pp. 26-38

might aid an international organisation, Jebb and Webster worked to advance a suggestion that Britain should form a defensive alliance with the democracies of Western Europe, a development which would increase its power relative to the United States and Soviet Union.[573] They recommended that this grouping of states would buttress the world organisation—and importantly, fall under its authority—by protecting against a revanchist Germany in the first place, and to a lesser extent, by serving as an insurance policy against a potentially expansionist Russia. It was this conception, colouring as it did the Economic and Reconstruction Department's plans throughout the spring of 1944, which offered the most concrete articulation of what has been described as a 'realist-internationalism'.

By the end of May, as the department was working to have its plans approved by the Cabinet, there was a consensus within the Foreign Office that Britain's post-war policy would stand on three pillars, namely: a world organisation, a United Nations Commission for Europe, and a Western Security Group. Importantly, throughout this process, the plans of the Prime Minister—who was now recommending a 'United States of Europe'—began to fade into the background, due, in part, to the fact that a number of Dominion governments began to side with the ideas of Jebb and Webster.[574] It was these plans—set within the confines of a new British grand strategy—which gave shape and purpose to the British delegation which, in August, arrived in Washington to discuss the creation of an international organisation.

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[573] There has been considerable scholarship undertaken on the subject of a Western Security Group as it developed between 1943 and 1944. Many of these studies have examined the concept especially as it related to the development of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1949. John Baylis, 'British Wartime Thinking about a Post-War European Security Group', *Review of International Studies* 9:4 (1983): 265-281; Baylis, *The Diplomacy of Pragmatism: Britain and the Formation of NATO, 1942-49* (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1993), pp. 8-36; Cees Wiebes, Bert Zeeman and John Baylis, 'Baylis on Post-War Planning [with Reply]', *Review of International Studies* 10:3 (1984): 247-252; Julian Lewis, *Changing Direction*, pp. 98-177; Folly, *Churchill, Whitehall and the Soviet Union*, pp. 118-130. More so than countering or revising the arguments of these works, this chapter offers a detailed reading of some of the core Foreign Office memoranda and correspondence dealing with the western security group. Importantly, it examines these documents in the context of planning for a world organisation, arguing that the purpose of this western security group was, in addition to protecting against Germany and insuring against Russia, a way to tangibly increase its power vis-a-vis the United States and Soviet Union.

[574] The period between the production of the five Foreign Office memoranda and their acceptance, first at the meeting of the Dominion Prime Ministers and then within the War Cabinet, was initially discussed by Woodward, *British Foreign Policy in the Second World War*, Vol V, pp. 116-234

The Foreign Office sets the agenda for three power discussions

In the first two weeks of the New Year 1944, there was increased urgency to begin three power talks on a possible international organisation; but at the same time, officials in the Foreign Office feared that they were still well away from developing concrete plans. A telegram from Washington in early January reported that officials in the State Department were progressing with their own plans and had indicated their willingness to begin three-power talks on a future organisation by the end of the month.[575] Jebb was alarmed by the message. In no way were the British prepared for the task of meeting the Americans and Russians on these matters, especially if a meeting was to be held in late January. Such short notice, he wrote, is 'really rather frightening, since we have…no considered basis for instructions to our representative…and with the best will in the world, it will be difficult to achieve one in the time available'.[576] Still, it was important that the Foreign Office encourage rather than dampen American enthusiasm, and it was with this mindset that Jebb outlined a plan for how the department would tackle the preparation of such plans in the coming months.

The proposed agenda was split into seven categories, A through G, and covered topics ranging from the origins of British planning to the concept of regionalism. Jebb was to oversee the process, while also taking on primary responsibility for the plans relating to the security dimension of a future organisation. As important as the written work was the need to lobby various stakeholders across government in order to secure their support. On this point, however, Jebb suggested that Eden not openly discuss the planning process of the Foreign Office with his Cabinet colleagues just yet. The fear was that they might be led to think that they could influence the process, and hence the department would be swarmed with proposals.

[575] Telegram from Lord Halifax to Foreign Office, No. 5629, 13 December 1943, FO 371/40685/U7427; See also Telegram from Lord Halifax to Foreign Office, No. 130, 9 January 1944, FO 371/40685/U180
[576] Jebb minute, 10 January 1944, FO 371/40685/U180

Ronald was in agreement here, noting that the 'responsibility of the government should not be engaged too soon'.[577]

The views of the State Department, however, would be invaluable to British planners. Jebb and Ronald wrote to the embassy in Washington asking whether they could supply more information on the specific details of American planning.[578] The subjects included the design of the world council, the proposed relation of the world council to the regional councils, the structure and responsibilities of a future international police force, and the relation of economic bodies to the world council. As Ronald instructed British officials in Washington, 'By pumping [James] Dunn, [Leo] Pasvolsky or Norman Davis you get hold of some straws to show the way the wind is blowing these would certainly be of great value in the preliminary discussion of such matters which are taking place here.'[579] Details on the American schemes would come, most notably during the visit of the Under-Secretary of State, Edward Stettinius, and several State Department officials in April; but in the meantime, the Economic and Reconstruction Department focused on developing their own plans as well as setting the parameters of the debate.

Charles Webster became increasingly important to the planning process in these months, as the professor—having now moved into a formal role within the Economic and Reconstruction Department—was responsible for papers dealing with the structure and nature of the organisation to the way in which disputes between states might be settled. Though he speculated that his new job would 'very likely lead to nothing at all', Webster was conscious that he now at least had the opportunity to personally shape British planning.[580] He wasted no

[577] Ronald minute, 28 January 1944; Jebb minute, 27 January 1944, FO 371/40685/U637
[578] Telegrams from Foreign Office to Washington, No. 360, 14 January 1944 and No. 584, 22 January 1944, FO 371/40685/U180
[579] Telegram from Foreign Office to Washington, No. 584, 22 January 1944, FO 371/40685/U180. James C. Dunn, Leo Pasvolsky and Norman H. Davis were members of the 'Informal Political Agenda Group' which had been created in late 1943 and was responsible for undertaking plans for the post-war organisation. See Russell, *A History of the United Nations Charter*, pp. 220-22.
[580] Webster diary, 5 January 1944, Reynolds and Hughes, *Historian as Diplomat*, p. 26

time in his new appointment. Towards the end of January, he wrote to Jebb listing seven points which he felt should be the 'principles' for the future discussions with the Americans and Soviets. Chief among these was an insistence that the inclusion of the United States and the Soviet Union into a world organisation was 'more important than the exact form of the organisation itself'. Furthermore, the great powers were to make up a world council and this body was to be charged with 'final responsibility for the preservation of peace in every part of the world'. Proposals for regional councils which had been submitted by the Prime Minister were nowhere near as important as the establishment of a world council with extensive responsibility. In what would become an increasingly important consideration for Foreign Office officials throughout the spring of 1944, Webster also indicated that regional arrangements such as a 'Western European security organisation or a North and South Atlantic system' would be beneficial to the United Kingdom, especially if, by some chance, a world organisation could not be agreed.[581]

At the end of January, J.G. Ward of the Economic and Reconstruction Department met with Leo Pasvolsky and Harley Notter at the State Department, where it was agreed that the Americans and British should first consider exchanging ideas and plans amongst themselves, prior to opening discussions with the Russians.[582] Though the Americans recognised the 'dangers and difficulties of such a proceeding', it was understood that without solid Anglo-American coordination on a future organisation, such a scheme would have little chance of coming into existence.[583] Ward and his State Department counterparts then agreed to exchange papers on the general outline of an agenda for three power talks, which would read as a kind

[581] Memorandum by Webster, 'Principles for the Washington Discussions', 21 January 1944, copied in Reynolds and Hughes, *Historian as Diplomat*, pp. 28-9
[582] J.G. Ward: Central Department, 1941-42; General Department, 1941-42; Economic and Reconstruction Department, 1943-46
[583] Paul Gore-Booth letter to Michael Wright and Redvers Opie, 22 January 1944, FO 371/40685/U1973

of 'table of contents'.[584] Taking this up in London, the Foreign Office decided in early February to put forward an agenda to the Americans and Russians. Jebb explained that this might allow them to 'start the discussions on lines favoured by us…rather than putting forward ours as amendments to the American list'.[585] In this way, they might have some control over the scope of the talks, and to a greater extent, some influence on the shape of the organisation.

A 'summary of topics' was subsequently sent by the Economic and Reconstruction Department to the State Department on 12 February, and five days later, the State Department sent over their own 'topical outline'.[586] Both the American and British draft agendas were strikingly similar, a product of discussions between State Department and Foreign Office officials over the previous year. Each outlined an organisation which would have an Assembly, a Council, a Court, and a Secretariat; and both mentioned the need for a system of general security as well as economic and functional organisations. The one major difference on the American side—a topic which was to cause tension in the months ahead—was the mention of future territorial trusteeship.[587] The Foreign Office and State Department then sent their outlines to Moscow for consideration. While seemingly a trivial detail, the exchange of draft agendas accounts for the similarity of the plans which the three powers would present six months later at Dumbarton Oaks.

Learning from the League

As the planning process began to delve into more functional details, officials naturally looked, once again, to the precedent of the League of Nations. Thus far, the organisation had loomed

[584] Paul Gore-Booth, 'Note of a meeting held at the State Department on Saturday, January 29th', 29 January 1944, FO 371/40685/U1973
[585] The decision was made during a meeting in Richard Law's room on 10 February. Jebb minute, 12 February 1944, FCO 73/266/UN/44/9
[586] Notter, *Post-war Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939-1945*, pp. 581-582
[587] A copy of the British 'Summary of Topics' is in the Telegram from Dominions Office to Dominion Governments, No. 241, 17 February 1944; and a copy of the American's 'Topical Outline' is in Telegram from Dominions Office to Dominion governments, No. 264, 22 February 1944, FO 371/40686/U2409

in the background of the Foreign Office planning, though references to it had been more negative than positive. Officials noted that the organisation had been successful in dealing with economic and social matters; but from a security standpoint, it had failed miserably in the preceding decade, and thus references to it contained a certain toxicity. Now, however, as officials entered a critical moment of needing to plan for more detailed aspects of a future organisation, the League offered a useful blueprint.

This encouraged a process of exploring the failures of internationalism in the recent past. Two weeks into the New Year, Webster had dinner with his friend Lord Robert Cecil, a man who he considered to be one of the key architects of the League.[588] The 'essential failure', Cecil told Webster, was that they did not make it clear to citizens that they needed to put the requisite force behind the League in order to ensure its efficacy. Both men agreed that in addition to hard power, there needed to be put before the world an institution which could inspire the masses, lest they fall back on more selfish, dastardly actions to preserve their own security.[589] On that same day, Webster had submitted a paper assessing which functions of the League might be carried into a future United Nations organisation.[590]

Having suppressed talk of the League previously, Jebb felt that the question of which aspects of the League would be applied to the new organisation was now a matter of increasing urgency, especially as Eden began to think about how the United Nations Plan might be 'recast' in future discussions with the Americans. In Jebb's opinion, some League institutions such as the Economic and Financial Sections, the Health Section and the International Labour Organisation might be carried over, but there could be 'no question of a return to Geneva'.[591] He continued to hold a wariness of plans which might be 'entirely intellectual', noting that,

[588] Webster, *The Art and Practice of Diplomacy*, pp. 71-72
[589] Webster diary, 15 January 1944, Reynolds and Hughes, *Historian as Diplomat*, p. 26-27
[590] Memorandum by Webster, 'The United Nations Plan and the League of Nations', 15 January 1944, FO 371/40685/U350
[591] Jebb minute, 19 January 1944, FO 371/40685/U350

> The League system...was about as perfect as the human mind could derive. The only trouble about it was that it wouldn't work. The reason why it wouldn't work was in the first place because the existing Great Powers could not agree as among themselves on certain essential things. And until we do get agreement between the World Powers on these essential things no international machine however perfect will ever work.[592]

Cadogan, who had spent ten years as Head of the League of Nations Section in the Foreign Office, was clear that the old organisation, despite its well-known failures, had had some successful component parts; and it would be a waste to disregard the last twenty-plus years of experience gained in Geneva. Certain characteristics of the League would need to be discarded, but those that were effective, Cadogan suggested, might be brought back 'under another guise'. These functional organisations would need to be directed by a central body—a type of Secretariat—which Cadogan referred to as the 'machine' of the international organisation. Like Jebb, Cadogan believed that certain aspects of the League were, in theory, perfectly designed, but in practice, they failed to deliver on their objectives. But this did not mean that at this stage they should not aim to design the best structure possible for the future United Nations organisation. 'The "machine" of the League became the golden calf', Cadogan wrote, 'and we musn't lapse into that idolatry again. But if we are to have an "international organisation", we must have a machine to serve it, and it is important to get the best design.' Similar to Jebb's thinking that the machine would ultimately depend on the cooperation and willingness of the great powers, Cadogan wrote, 'I don't think it's difficult to construct a perfectly good machine. But it's useless without the power and dangerous without the steering gear.'[593]

[592] Jebb minute, 1 February 1944, FO 371/40686/U2198. This was in response to a paper by Philip Noel-Baker which called for the League system to be reconstituted and expanded. See also FCO 73/266/UN/44/6
[593] Cadogan minute, 4 February 1944, FO 371/40686/U2198

Structure and machinery of an international organisation

In February, Parliamentary Under-Secretary Richard Law brought together a group of officials from across government to coordinate the planning operation. This inter-departmental body was later made a Cabinet sub-committee under the title 'Committee on Future World Organisation'.[594] The committee—which included members from the Treasury, the War Cabinet, the Dominions Office and the Ministry of Labour, among others—met over a number of weeks, with its primary task being to coordinate the drafting of various papers that were to be presented to the Americans and Soviets. The rough outline followed that which was laid out by Jebb in January, and as time went on, the focus of papers expanded or contracted based on what was deemed essential in the upcoming negotiations.

Between March and April, a number of papers drafted by the Economic and Reconstruction Department were submitted to the committee. They were separated into five memoranda, A through E, and covered the 'Scope and Nature of the Permanent Organisation'; 'The Pacific Settlement of Disputes, The Question of Guarantees and How and When the Guarantee Should Come Into Operation'; 'The Military Aspect of Any Postwar Security Organisation'; 'Co-ordination of Political and Economic International Machinery'; and 'Method and Procedure for Establishing a World Organisation'.[595] The first three memoranda were the most important in terms of laying out the structure and aims of the organisation, as well as the special position of the great powers.

Across the five memoranda, there were key points which emerged. First, while all states would be equal in theory, the four powers were to retain a special position and responsibility within the organisation. Their continued cooperation, Memorandum A read, was more important than 'any other single factor'. The grouping of great powers—eventually including

[594] Reynolds and Hughes, *Historian as Diplomat*, p. 26
[595] For overview of the memoranda, see Woodward, *British Foreign Policy in the Second World War*, Vol V, pp. 89-116

France (once its 'greatness was restored') and possibly the addition of other states based on election by the Assembly—would make up the World Council. This body would be considered a 'centre of action' while the wider World Assembly was to be the 'centre of discussion'. The primary purpose of the Assembly, moreover, would be to 'focus public opinion on the objects of the organisation', while the purpose of the World Council would be the 'preservation of peace'.[596]

To help ensure the latter, there would need to be in place a method to facilitate the peaceful settlement of disputes between states. This subject was a favourite of Webster's who, in drafting Memorandum B, wrote that, 'If war is to be abolished for a considerable period there must be in existence…a means to make those decisions which in the past have been made by violence.' All 'justiciable' disputes, he suggested, should be handled by a Permanent Court of International Justice, the establishment of which had just been recommended by an Inter-Allied Committee.[597] Other disputes, Webster wrote, would be handled by the World Council, which would be free to decide amongst themselves—and without input or consent from the parties involved in the dispute—how the matter would be settled.[598]

Closely related to the peaceful settlement of disputes was the question of when the international organisation would take action. Webster suggested that the entire procedure was to be guided by 'certain essential principles' more so than adherence to a strict constitution.[599] 'Flexibility' was a favourite word of British planners, all of whom believed that the League had been hampered by rules governing when they should use force. As Cadogan wrote, 'If we are to learn any lesson from the failure of the League, it is, I think, that procedure is rather a secondary matter. Everything depends on the unity of purpose of those powers who are able to

[596] 'Memorandum A: Scope and Nature of the Permanent Organisation', 24 March 1944, FO 371/40687/U2585
[597] 'Report of the Informal Inter-Allied Committee on the Future of the Permanent Court of International Justice', 10 February 1944, FO 371/40686/U2296
[598] Draft memorandum by Webster, 'The Pacific Settlement of Disputes, the Question of Guarantees, and the Definition of the Occasion for Action', 17 March 1944, FO 371/40686/U2295
[599] Ibid

impose their will.'[600] One of the major faults of the League, Webster argued, was Article X which guaranteed the 'territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members'. Introduced by Woodrow Wilson, this article was questioned early on by British officials such as Lord Cecil who thought the promise to maintain the territorial 'status quo', while not allowing for reasonable adjustments, would present problems going forward. When the territorial boundaries agreed by the Treaty of Versailles were challenged by revisionist powers, particularly in the 1930s, it became clear that many League members—including the United Kingdom—were not willing to take action in line with Article X.

The entire question, Webster said, could not in the future be dealt with by some constitutional clause. 'Too rigid a definition of the occasion for action', he wrote, 'is likely to hinder as to facilitate the preservation of peace and security.' Instead, such questions might be addressed by 'a continual process' of discussion and negotiation between the great powers, as well as the other states involved in the matter.[601] This reliance on great power negotiation was, Webster argued, 'in the great tradition of British policy' dating back to Lord Castlereagh, Lord Palmerston, Lord Salisbury and more recently, Lord Balfour and Sir Austen Chamberlain.[602] As for the guarantees of territorial integrity or political independence to all states, this would need to be scrapped in the future organisation, in order to avoid a situation in which the great powers were bound into taking action. Despite the emphasis on the 'flexibility' of the organisation and the freedom of action for the great powers, the British plans were not devoid of values. Indeed, the memoranda A and B made clear that there were to be certain 'principles and objects' which would guide the procedure and decisions of the Council and Assembly.[603]

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[600] Cadogan minute, 26 March 1944, FO 371/40686/U2295

[601] Draft of memorandum by Webster, 'The Pacific Settlement of Disputes, the Question of Guarantees, and the Definition of the Occasion for Action', 17 March 1944, FO 371/40686/U2295

[602] Webster drafted the covering brief for the memoranda which was presented by the Minister of State. See Richard Law, Covering brief for 'Future World Organisation: Forthcoming Conversations at Washington', 16 April 1944, FO 371/40689/U3128

[603] For the Principles and Objects of the Organisation, see 'Memorandum A: The Scope and Nature of the Permanent Organisation', FO 371/40689/U3128

When force was to be used was another crucial question facing British planners. This subject was addressed by Jebb in Memorandum C, which concerned the 'military aspect' of a future world organisation. Work on this paper had been ongoing since the end of 1943 and involved the Post-Hostilities Planning Sub-Committee, a body chaired by Jebb but comprised primarily of military officials. In their discussions, they ruled out the possibility of an 'international police force', which the Chiefs of Staff considered to be both impractical and 'too radical' an arrangement. Jebb, however, had put forward an idea for a 'Military Staff Committee'—working under the World Council—to direct 'earmarked national forces'. It was this machinery which Jebb and the Foreign Office believed might facilitate military cooperation among the four powers and serve as the enforcement mechanism of the world organisation.[604] Though the Chiefs of Staff initially opposed this proposal thinking that the Russians could not be brought into such an arrangement, they eventually agreed that this Military Staff Committee might be included in the British plans.[605]

These papers were discussed and redrafted in March and April, and after considerable delay, they were presented to the Cabinet's Armistice and Post-War (APW) Committee on 22 April 1944.[606] In laying out their case, Jebb and Webster emphasised the flexibility of the organisation, the reliance on principles as a basis for action and the central role of the great powers.[607] The Committee approved the papers by Jebb and Webster but pushed back on Memorandum D, covering the relationship of economic institutions to the world organisation, which they considered 'too theoretical and detailed'.[608] Webster was tasked with a redraft of

[604] Revised draft of 'The Military Aspect of Any Post-war World Security Organisation', 4 January 1944, PHP (43) 24A, FO 371/40605B/U279. For more on the Post-Hostilities Planning Sub-Committee, see Julian Lewis, *Changing Direction*, pp. 63-74
[605] For initial opposition, see Jebb minute, 19 February 1944, FCO 73/264/Pwp/44/1/A. For an explanation of how the Chiefs of Staff eventually agreed to the plans, see Lewis, *Changing Direction*, pp. 67-72
[606] This Cabinet Committee was created in April 1944. Saville, *The Politics of Continuity*, p. 27
[607] Richard Law, Covering brief for 'Future World Organisation: Forthcoming Conversations at Washington', 16 April 1944, FO 371/40686/U3128
[608] This paper was prepared by Marcus Fleming of the Economic Section within the War Cabinet Offices. Marcus Fleming served in the Ministry of Economic Warfare from 1939-42; and the Economic Section, 1942-51. Alec

the paper, but in the meantime, it was decided that the plans would now be submitted to the War Cabinet and then circulated to the Dominion governments, before being shared with the Americans and Russians.

A Western Security Bloc and a Revised British Grand Strategy

Even as they were attempting to craft far more detailed plans for a future international organisation, Jebb, Webster and other officials in the Foreign Office were addressing key policies towards the European continent. As important as the construction of a future world organisation was, this in itself was to be a constituent part of the international order. Not only was there a lingering fear that the United States or more likely, the Soviet Union, would back out of a world organisation, but there was also an acceptance that additional safeguards would need to be erected. Both Jebb and Webster had been considering such factors, especially in their earlier conversations on the balance of power and collective security, but as the planning for an international organisation became more serious, the discussion on the future of Europe became more pressing. In particular, the question of a future defensive alliance with the countries of Western Europe began to be viewed as a protection against a revanchist Germany, a buttress to the world organisation, and to a lesser extent, an insurance policy against a potentially hostile Soviet Union.

Though officials had been considering such varied arrangements of European states, the need for some kind of Western European grouping was increasingly encouraged by key British allies. On 25 November 1943, the Prime Minister of South Africa, Jan Smuts, delivered a speech to the Empire Parliamentary Association in which he spoke of the need for the United Kingdom to forge closer relations with the democracies of Western Europe, in order to increase

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Cairncross, *Economic Ideas and Government Policy: Contributions to contemporary economic history* (London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 33-52

its own power relative to the Soviet Union and the United States.[609] On 20 March 1944, he followed up with Eden on the subject, claiming that his speech months before was intended to spark discussion—something he called 'kite flying'. His message now, however, was more alarmist, and warned of the potential threat from Moscow coupled with what he believed to be London's passive stance.[610]

From a tactical standpoint, Foreign Office officials had been disappointed with the speech. Smuts had given the idea of the UK joining with the democracies of Western Europe in a defensive organisation 'an unfortunate balance-of-power flavour', a feeling which officials thought would always prove distasteful to the United States. The emerging Foreign Office view was that such a grouping would be an important mechanism in a wider world security system, but it was essential that it be framed in an appropriate manner. In other words, the primary purpose of a western security grouping would be to protect against an aggressive Germany. This point would have to be emphasised, as the Russians would likely approve of measures designed to resist future German aggression. The secondary purpose of such a grouping, however, would be to protect against the possibility of Russia extending its influence over the European continent. Unlike the first, this second purpose would need to be kept quiet so as not to provoke the Russians. At the very least, provocation would lead to Moscow seeking to build up an Eastern European bloc, and at the very worst, it would throw the entire construction of a world organisation into jeopardy. Though they didn't view the arrangement as one of 'selfish purposes', they pointed out that the Russians likely would, and thus there would develop a 'dangerous' system in which Europe was divided into two 'spheres'. At the same time, it was noted that Stalin, in comments made to Eden as far back as December 1941, had entertained the idea of British playing a greater role militarily in Western Europe. This comment, combined

[609] The speech was titled 'Thoughts on the New World'. See 'General Smuts on Shaping the New World', *The Times*, 3 December 1943.
[610] Telegram from Smuts for the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, 20 March 1944, No. 320, FO 371/40692/U4105

with the fact that the Soviet Union had recently concluded a treaty with Czechoslovakia, seemed to already justify any British moves towards the formation of a western bloc.[611]

In Jebb's view, Smuts's idea of Russia as the 'new colossus' which would take advantage of the vacuum on the European continent was somewhat overblown. This underestimated the extent to which the Soviet Union would be weakened and exhausted by the war itself.[612] He felt that the idea of Britain binding itself more closely to other Western European democracies was a good one, however. This move towards a union would 'not only increase our political bargaining power but would also link our fortunes in an enduring way with the continent of Europe'.[613] Still, the timing was not the best for such 'heterodox ideas', and other officials such as Frank Roberts, while agreeing with the United Kingdom moving closer to the countries of Western Europe, felt that Smuts had 'retarded' the process at this stage.[614]

Given the connection to the larger subject of world organisation, the Economic and Reconstruction Department were asked to develop a response. In the weeks that followed, Webster and Jebb each submitted memoranda on 'Britain and Western Europe' and 'The Western Bloc', respectively. In his paper, Webster recommended the creation of an alliance between Britain, France, the Netherlands, Belgium and possibly Norway which, although not involving political or economic unification, might 'buttress a worldwide security system'. He cited the historical precedent of Austen Chamberlain negotiating the Locarno Treaties, agreements which were intended to support the League rather than undermine it. As Webster put it:

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[611] Record of meeting in the Foreign Office, 10 February 1944, FO 371/40606B/U1333. The Czechoslovakia-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Collaboration was signed on 12 December 1943. See 'Czechoslovakia—Soviet Union: Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Collaboration', *The American Journal of International Law* 39:2 (1945): 81-83

[612] Jebb minute on Smuts's speech, 19 December 1943, FO 371/35443/U6254

[613] Ibid

[614] Roberts minute, 22 December 1943, FO 371/35443/U6254

> Our main interest in Post-War Security is to obtain such definite commitments and practicable arrangements that we can rely on the United States and the USSR joining with us in the maintenance of world peace. This object, however, by no means excludes special arrangements for particular areas in which we have a special strategic interest if they are made in support of and not as alternate to the general world system. On the contrary such special arrangements may be essential in order that the worldwide security system may be able to function effectively in our defence.[615]

Jebb was in 'broad agreement' with Webster's paper, noting that alliances of mutual defence would 'reinforce' the future world security system, as opposed to undermining it. The entire question, he felt, was to 'decide how our whole European policy shall be fitted in to our policy towards the rest of the world'. He noted that British suggestions towards Europe had as yet been vague and remained without a decided policy, especially towards Germany.[616] His recommendation was to 'revive' previous Foreign Office proposals for a central European body such as the United Nations Commission for Europe (the European Advisory Committee had, since its creation at the Moscow Conference, fallen flat) which would operate under the 'umbrella' of the world organisation.[617] The additional element, however, would be the formation of 'defensive systems' in both the west and the east of Europe which might be directed against Germany. Here Britain and France would take the lead, and it was hoped that the United States might be involved in the 'background'. The eastern system, on the other hand, would 'depend primarily on the USSR'.[618]

The system which Jebb proposed was based on his understanding that for a future world organisation to be functional, there needed to be a balance of power between the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom. He wrote in another minute that

> Whatever 'World Organization' may be set up—and however 'loose' it may be—peace is not going to be preserved unless the Big Three are in a position to cooperate. This entails a) that they must regard each other as equals b) that they

[615] Draft memorandum by Webster, 'Britain and Western Europe', 11 April 1944, FO 371/40692/U4102
[616] Draft memorandum by Jebb, 'The "Western Bloc"', 12 April 1944, FO 371/40692/U4102
[617] The EAC, Eden later wrote, had been a 'flop'. Eden minute, 9 July 1944, FO 371/40699/U6441
[618] Draft memorandum by Jebb, 'The "Western Bloc"', 12 April 1944, FO 371/40692/U4102

> pay due regard to each others 'vital interests'. This is what is meant by the Balance of Power, and if its balance is unbalanced then trouble is bound to follow.[619]

The minutes which followed Jebb's comments revealed a number of officials who were in agreement with the line of policy but were concerned with the phrasing. 'This doctrine', one official wrote, 'if it is ever acted on, must be most carefully concealed from the US.' He continued, '"Power Politics"—"the balance of power"—"divide and rule"—are almost universally held to be both wicked and peculiarly British practices.'[620] The Head of the American Department, Nevile Butler, agreed, noting that while the United States was 'beginning to think much more realistically about power', they were still averse to certain stereotypes of European statecraft. Thus, the Foreign Office might pursue the policy as described by Jebb, but it was essential that they not get 'caught in the act'.[621]

Though both Jebb and Webster were basically in agreement on the essential points of a Western Security Group, it was Webster's paper—written in conjunction with both Jebb and Nigel Ronald—which was adopted by the Foreign Office in early May. Eden thought the recommendation 'useful', though he admitted that, 'I don't quite know what to do with it.'[622] Orme Sargent noted that it served as an important insurance policy against the chance of a hostile Russia. 'All the same, in practice this regional system might very well, in altered circumstances, develop into a bulwark against Russian penetration.'[623]

There was now a growing consensus within the Foreign Office—one driven by the work of the Economic and Reconstruction Department—that Britain's grand strategy for the post-war period rested on three pillars. First, there would be a world organisation 'based on a

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[619] Jebb's minute on 'The British Commonwealth and World Order', Sidney Ball Lecture delivered by Sir W Layton at Oxford on 3 March 1944, FO 371/40607B/U2283

[620] He said that, 'If we must do it, we must not be caught in the act.' Malcolm minute, 22 May 1944, FO 371/40607B/U2283. Angus Malcolm: British Embassy in Washington, 1938-1942; North American Department, 1942-1942

[621] Butler minute, 23 May 1944. Webster wrote that 'The consensus of opinion is striking.' Webster minute, 25 May 1944, FO 371/40607B/U2283

[622] Eden minute, 7 May 1944, FO 371/40692/U4105

[623] Sargent minute, 6 May 1944, ibid

tripartite Great Power alliance'. Second, there would be a United Nations Commission for Europe on which the three great powers (with the possibility of France at a future date) would sit on a 'steering committee'. Third, there would be the creation of a Western European defence system, the primary purpose of which was to protect against an aggressive Germany.[624]

Jebb and Webster challenge Churchill

In April, a delegation of State Department officials, led by the Under-Secretary of State Edward Stettinius, visited London to discuss post-war matters. Over a number of meetings, Stettinius and Isaiah Bowman relayed some of the progress that they and their colleagues had been making in planning for the world organisation.[625] On the design of the international organisation, officials in Washington were roughly in agreement with the basic components of an Assembly, a World Council, a Court and a Secretariat.[626] As to the size of the World Council, the State Department was thinking along the lines of four to five powers joining—on a rotating basis—the core four great powers.[627] The whole system, he said, should avoid 'too rigid a definition of the constitution', and instead allow for some flexibility in how the member states—especially the great powers—might respond to future crises.

The Foreign Office was encouraged by the visit, and from what they could tell, the American plans as they stood were 'remarkably close' to their own.[628] The primary differences involved the size of the council and the rights given to the great powers (the Americans seemed

[624] Jebb wrote that these had become the 'consistent departmental view' on the general post-war objectives of British policy. Jebb minute, 28 May 1944, FO 371/40691/U3704

[625] Dr Isaiah Bowman: President of Johns Hopkins University from 1935-1948; Special advisor to Secretary of State and Vice Chairman, Advisory Council on Post-War Foreign Policy. He was a delegate to the Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco Conferences.

[626] To the relief of the Foreign Office, Bowman said that they had scrapped Roosevelt's idea for an 'executive council'.

[627] Bowman told his British counterparts that his experience as an academic administrator, in particular, convinced him that the smaller the decision-making body, the better.

[628] Summary of discussion between Cadogan, Jebb, Webster and Bowman, 19 April 1944, FO 371/40690/U3409. Stettinius report to Hull that, 'British thinking is already very similar to our own, and we are convinced that when formal negotiations begin, we and the British will find ourselves in substantial agreement.' Stettinius to Hull, 22 May 1944, *FRUS*, 1944, Volume III, pp. 1-3

to want increased rights for the great powers), along with an American view that British officials thought was less interested in the 'susceptibility' of the smaller powers and less attentive to the relations of the political and functional organisations.[629] These differing conceptions as to the place and responsibility of smaller powers was noted by the American delegation which reported to Washington that, 'the composition of the Executive Council is more broadly conceived by the British than by our Government.'[630] Added to this was the divisive issue of what to do with colonial territories—namely those recaptured from enemy powers—which Webster thought might be the 'King Charles's Head' of future Anglo-American discussions.[631] Overall, the mood in the Foreign Office was optimistic given that the British and American plans were moving in the right direction. Webster, however, was still concerned about the views of Churchill, noting in his diaries that 'the old man may still blow the whole thing up.'[632]

For all the progress made in planning for the machinery of a future organisation, without clear political leadership, progress would inevitably be checked. With this in mind, Cadogan and Webster had been pressing Edward Bridges, the Cabinet Secretary, about ways to force the Prime Minister to examine and decide on the papers relating to world organisation.[633] At a Cabinet meeting on 27 April, Churchill expounded on his most recent vision for a post-war world organisation. It was a view which was in line with certain key elements of the current Foreign Office plans—namely that the great powers would be chiefly

[629] Summary of discussion between Cadogan, Jebb, Webster and Bowman, 19 April 1944, FO 371/40690/U3409
[630] 'Report on Conversations in London, April 7 to April 29, 1944', *FRUS*, 1944, Volume III, p. 15. Here the 'Executive Council' was taken to mean the 'World Council'.
[631] Summary of discussion between Cadogan, Jebb, Webster and Bowman, 19 April 1944, FO 371/40690/U3409
[632] Webster diary, 16 April 1944, Reynolds and Hughes, *Historian as Diplomat*, p. 28. His worry was not unfounded, for Churchill had recently hosted Bowman at Chequers where he relayed once again his own views for the post-war world. 'Account by Dr. Bowman of his private talk with the Prime Minister on Saturday, April 15th', FCO 73/266/UN/44/13
[633] Cadogan diary, 25 April 1944, in Dilks (ed.), p. 623; Webster diary, 26 April 1944, Reynolds and Hughes, *Historian as Diplomat*, p. 31

responsible for the maintenance of peace in the years after the war—but at the same time, it differed along old lines, especially with regards to the idea of regional councils.[634]

Shortly after the Cabinet meeting, Churchill spoke privately with Richard Law and expressed a view which was, until then, unheard of from the Prime Minister. He stated that when it came to the post-war world order, he wanted no international organisation at all but instead a 'continental League of Nations' and a four-power alliance.[635] In his mind, the priority was the maintenance of peace throughout the world, a task which he believed could be carried out by a close working alliance between the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and to a lesser extent China. The continental League of Nations would, in effect, be the Council of Europe which Churchill had long advocated, a solution he believed would right the ills of continent.

After his conversation with the Prime Minister, Law approached Webster about drafting a memorandum which would make the case against such a proposal. Late into the evening on 28 April, Webster set about making the case for a post-war international organisation. Across six pages, Webster argued that the only way to get a four-power alliance was through the creation of a wider international organisation. The Americans would simply have it no other way.[636] Without the wider organisation, Webster pointed out, Secretary of State Cordell Hull, who Webster considered more important than the President because of his influence within Congress, would withdraw his support. Without American support, Webster warned that the United Kingdom would be without its greatest ally 'in a world of uneasy and unstable

[634] War Cabinet conclusions, WM (44) 58, Minute 2, 27 April 1944, CAB 65/42
[635] This is mentioned in Webster diary on 28 April 1944, Reynolds and Hughes, *Historian as Diplomat*, p. 31
[636] In a separate minute, Jebb wrote that, 'The Prime Minister simply ignores the realities of the world...We have been repeatedly told that while the United States will take responsibility for world peace including that of Europe inside a world organisation they will refuse to take part in a purely European organisation.' Jebb minute, 3 May 1944, FO 371/40691/U4098. Indeed, the State Department delegation which had recently visited London noted the divide which existed between the Prime Minister and the Foreign Office and expressed their support for the latter which 'would put the weight of world security upon the World Organization rather than upon regional councils'. Moreover, they wrote that, 'it was clear that Mr. Churchill has not thought out the operations and complexities of regional councils.' 'Report on Conversations in London, April 7 to April 29, 1944', *FRUS*, 1944, Volume III, p. 17

alliances'. On regional organisations, which were a recurring theme of Churchill's plans, Webster thought that they could be 'made to buttress the general system of security', but without an overarching organisation, such regional groupings might morph into rival alliances. On Europe, he believed there was no sign of 'continental unity', but felt that if there were moves to bring the continent into some regional grouping, Britain must be included, lest it come to be dominated by Russia or Germany in the future.[637]

When the memorandum crossed Eden's desk on 30 April, the Foreign Secretary said he agreed 'emphatically' with Webster's thoughts, and even drew a diagram of the proposed world organisation in the margin of the document.[638] Despite Eden's agreement on the paper, both Webster and Jebb remained concerned that Eden did not fully grasp the complexities of the Foreign Office plans; and worse, they were uncertain whether the Foreign Secretary would stand up to the Prime Minister.[639] An exasperated Webster wrote in his diaries that, 'This is a really big issue on which the fate of the world may ultimately depend.'[640] Both Jebb and Webster had instead, by the end of April, put their faith in Cadogan, who they felt not only understood the fundamental issues but was also tactful enough to get the plans through Cabinet.[641]

A meeting of the Dominion prime ministers in May would serve as a crucial boon to the efforts of the Economic and Reconstruction Department. It was here that the plans of Jebb and Webster were approved over those of the Prime Minister. At this early stage, Eden found Prime Ministers Peter Fraser, John Curtin and Mackenzie King 'whole-hearted in approval' of

[637] Memorandum by Webster, 'Reasons for Establishing the General International Organisation for the Maintenance of Peace and Security in Accordance with Article 4 of the Moscow Declaration', 29 April 1944, FO 371/40691/U4036
[638] In fact, Eden's diagram appears to misunderstand the structure that Jebb and Webster were proposing. Eden minute, 30 April 1944, FO 371/40691/U4036
[639] As Webster later confided in his diaries, '[Eden] has very little knowledge of the original papers.' Webster diary, 10 July 1944, Reynolds and Hughes, *Historian as Diplomat*, pp. 37-38
[640] Webster diary, 2 May 1944, ibid, p. 32
[641] Webster diary, 21 April 1944, ibid, p. 30

the direction of British foreign policy.[642] Encouraged by the support from the Dominion prime ministers, Eden sent the papers on 'Future World Organisation' to Churchill on 4 May and urged him to circulate them among the Dominion delegations.[643] Churchill agreed, but not before drafting his own memorandum on the subject, which was to be sent around to the delegations along with the five memoranda from the Economic and Reconstruction Department. In what was a surprise to Foreign Office officials, Churchill wrote that he was in 'general agreement' with the department's memoranda on world organisation, and his differences were 'largely those of emphasis and degree'. A key divergence remained his vision for regional councils of Asia, Europe and the Americas, while he added in old and new ideas, such as a 'fraternal association with the United States' and a 'United States of Europe'.[644]

The papers were discussed among the Dominion prime ministers between 9 and 11 May, and much to the delight of Webster, Richard Law relayed that the leaders had supported the professor's papers on world organisation.[645] They expressed certain reservations, however. One concerned the issue of regional bodies. Peter Fraser, the New Zealand Prime Minister, had a 'violent reaction' to these proposals, arguing that not only was a Pacific or Asiatic region an 'unreal conception', but also, if the Dominions were incorporated into such regional councils, their influence would be limited geographically.[646] Given their involvement in two world wars over the preceding thirty years—conflicts which, they pointed out, they were not responsible for initiating—they desired a greater responsibility in world affairs, beginning with their position in the British Commonwealth. Perhaps more important, was the suggestion put forward in the Foreign Office papers, that the United Kingdom, from its seat on the World

[642] Eden diary, 4 May 1944, reprinted in Eden, *The Reckoning*, p. 442
[643] Eden to Churchill, 4 May 1944, FO 371/40691/U3872
[644] 'The Post-war World Settlement', Note by the Prime Minister, 8 May 1944, PMM (44) 5, FO 371/40692/U4194
[645] PMM (44) 12th meeting, 11 May 1944, CAB 99/28. Webster diary, 11 May 1944, Reynolds and Hughes, *Historian as Diplomat*, p. 34. Reynolds and Hughes have noted that the opinions of the Dominion prime ministers was the 'coup de grâce'. See ibid, pp. 86, 99-100
[646] Cadogan diary, 19 May 1944, Dilks (ed.), p. 630; Peter Fraser to Eden, 18 May 1944, FO 371/40693/U4562

Council, might act on behalf of the entire Commonwealth. This was a proposal to which nearly all of the Dominions were opposed.[647]

Despite some of their objections, Jebb and Webster both understood that the Dominion prime ministers represented a powerful check on Churchill's post-war plans. Thus, they viewed Dominion acceptance of the papers on world organisation as another tool with which to circumvent the Prime Minister. Now clearly the odd man out, Churchill withdrew his memorandum, having grown increasingly frustrated by the widespread opposition to his suggestions among the Dominion governments. He made clear, however, that 'his views remained unchanged in essentials.' He asked that the Foreign Office papers be 'reexamined from the point of view of emphasis' and redrafted in order to show some alternative solutions.[648]

As much as they wished, the Foreign Office could not afford to ignore the Prime Minister's views altogether. He remained the most influential voice within the government, and his support would be indispensable when it came to the future negotiations between the British, Americans and Russians. This was not lost on Webster, who, despite his opposition to the Prime Minister's views, understood that some concessions needed to be given in order to bring him more fully on board with the plans of the Economic and Reconstruction Department.[649] The decision was made to incorporate some of Churchill's views, but to do so superficially and on the terms laid out by the Foreign Office. The Prime Minister's views on regions would be included in the introductory section of the 'Future World Organisation' papers but would then be swiftly argued against.

[647] Meeting of Dominion Officials with Sir Alexander Cadogan on Wednesday, May 17, 1944. See also Letter from MacKenzie King to Anthony Eden, 29 May 1944, No. 96, FO 371/40693/U4406
[648] Cabinet minutes quoted in Cadogan's paper on 'Discussion with Dominions on World Organisation', 15 May 1944, FO 371/40692/U4367
[649] Webster diary, 11 May 1944, Reynolds and Hughes, *Historian as Diplomat*, p. 34

Jebb, on the other hand, was more outwardly frustrated, and had taken it upon himself to draft a note directly to the Prime Minister which would counter his views. As Jebb complained to Webster, no one had ever 'challenged him properly'.[650] To his friends, such as Hugh Dalton, Jebb confided that the Prime Minister's influence on foreign affairs was damaging, as his views were 'romantic and ill-judged'.[651] With the approval of Law, Jebb set about drafting a paper he titled 'British Policy Towards Europe'. Intended primarily for the Prime Minister, the memorandum would first explain why the idea of a 'United States of Europe' was both 'dangerous and impracticable', and then describe how the Prime Minister's objectives might be met through the 'mutually consistent' plans for a World Organisation, a United Nations Commission for Europe and a Western European Defence System.[652]

Given its collective industrial potential, a United States of Europe, Jebb argued, would upset the present balance of power between the Americans, British and Soviets. 'The balance of power would accordingly rest on four legs instead of three and seeing that the United Kingdom would be next door to such a colossus it might be in a most invidious strategical position.' This would be made all the worse by a continent dominated by Germany—a lingering fear of the Foreign Office—despite a weakening Nazi machine. Should such a European State exist, the Soviet Union would undoubtedly be fearful for its interests, leading to 'the encouragement of Communism and subversive movements all over Europe'.

A more likely outcome for the continent at the end of the war, Jebb believed, would be 'a loose association of European states' which might include the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. The goal then was to establish an order whereby the 'potential storm centre' of a divided European continent might be allayed and the 'machtpolitik' of the Soviet Union might be countered. Such an order could be established under an 'umbrella' of a world

[650] Reynolds and Hughes, *Historian as Diplomat*, p. 34. Webster referred to this as a 'crisis day'. See also FO 371/40692/U4367
[651] Hugh Dalton diary, 9 May 1944 and 9 June 1944, Pimlott (ed.), pp. 743-4, 755-6
[652] Draft memorandum by Jebb, 'British Policy Towards Europe', 12 May 1944, FO 371/40692/U4367

organisation led by the three great powers. A United Nations Commission for Europe—operating under a 'steering committee' of the United Kingdom, the United States, the Soviet Union and possibly France—might be established in order to direct a policing of the continent. The second pillar under this umbrella would be the Western European Defence System, provided that it was clear that the arrangement was directed against Germany and not the Soviet Union.[653] As with their earlier proposals for a western security grouping, Jebb, Webster and other officials in the Foreign Office understood that this scheme doubled as a future insurance policy against a hostile Russia.[654]

The papers were eventually forwarded to the Prime Minister on 16 May, but he swiftly stated that he would not force a Cabinet decision before the following Wednesday, when he was scheduled to give a speech in the House of Commons. The decision further rattled the worn nerves of Jebb and Webster, both of who feared that the window of opportunity was closing.[655] In the end, Churchill's speech was more in line with the views of Jebb and Webster than with his earlier proposals; though he still held on to his vision for a European council. [656] On 21 May, he wrote to Eden stating clearly that, 'The only thing I am pressing for is a United States of Europe in some form or other, with a Council of its own of which I trust Russia, Great Britain and the United States will be members.'[657] In the end, it was decided by Jebb, Webster and Cadogan to appease the Prime Minister by including a brief mention of a future European regional organisation in Memorandum A of the world organisation papers.[658]

Indeed, just as the Foreign Office were finalising their own papers, telegrams from Washington reflected a renewed sense of urgency on the part of the State Department, and in

[653] This scheme would involve mutual defence agreements between the United Kingdom and France firstly, and then agreements with the Low Countries, Norway and eventually Sweden, Spain, Portugal, and Italy.
[654] Draft memorandum by Jebb, 'British Policy Towards Europe', FO 371/40692/U4367
[655] Webster diary, 15 May 1944, Reynolds and Hughes, *Historian as Diplomat*, p. 35
[656] Jebb minute, 29 May 1944, FO 371/40694/U5050
[657] Churchill to Eden, 21 May 1944, M.583/4, FO 371/40693/U4635
[658] Jebb minute, 31 May 1944, FO 371/40694/U5050

particular the Secretary of State.[659] On 29 May, Hull relayed that discussions with members of Congress had advanced, and that the State Department was now ready to engage in negotiations with their British and Russian counterparts.[660] As Cadogan wrote, 'It seems pretty clear that the Americans…are in a hurry. We must not give the impression of drawing back.'[661] The Allied invasion of France on 6 June 1944 consumed much of the War Cabinet's attention throughout June. But by the end of the month, when British, American and Canadian troops had made gains in the north of France, there was a window in which other subjects could be taken up. On 7 July, the War Cabinet finally met to consider the papers on 'Future World Organisation', which comprised the memoranda A thru E. The Prime Minister, however, left the meeting early, before the topic of world organisation came up. As he left the room, Cadogan recorded Churchill as saying that he was leaving it up to the group to discuss 'the Peace of the World about which, in present circumstances, I am rather lukewarm'.[662] The Prime Minister's absence was a fortunate turn for the Foreign Office. In his absence, the Cabinet quickly approved the memoranda on world organisation, and agreed that the plans should now be shared with the Americans and Russians.[663] In the weeks ahead, the Foreign Office's focus would turn to the final preparation for the conference, as well as the all-important issue of post-war policy towards Europe.

British policy towards Europe

As the British plans for a future world organisation were nearing completion, there was also progress on the Foreign Office's approach towards Europe, due in large part to the work of

[659] See Ronald Campbell to Sir David Scott, 12 May 1944, FO 371/40693/U4745. David Scott: Assistant Under-Secretary, 1938-44
[660] Telegram from Washington to Foreign Office, No. 2857, 30 May 1944, FO 371/40694/U4874
[661] Cadogan minute, 2 June 1944, FO 371/40694/U4928
[662] Cadogan diary, 7 July 1944, in Dilks (ed.), pp. 645-46
[663] War Cabinet conclusions, WM (44) 88, 7 July 1944, CAB 65/43. American plans were sent to the British on 18 July, and the British plans were sent to the Americans on 21 July. See Telegrams from Foreign Office to Washington, No. 6539 and to Moscow, No. 2178, 21 July 1944, FO 371/40700/U6461

Jebb and Webster. The former's paper on 'British Policy in Europe', while originally intended to combat the views of the Prime Minister on a 'United States of Europe', ended up being considered as the Foreign Office's future policy towards the continent. In a meeting of the APW Committee on 1 June, it was decided that Jebb's paper should be combined with Webster's 'Western Europe' paper, which had advocated Britain joining a defence system with France, the Netherlands, Belgium and possibly Norway.[664] It was a suggestion which was gaining traction from some quarters of Britain's diplomatic establishment. A telegram from Britain's Minister in Algiers, Duff Cooper, arrived at the end of May which called for a Western European alliance in the face of what he considered to be a future Russian threat. Although Britain and Russia, under the Anglo-Soviet Treaty, were to be partners for the next 18 years, 'the alliance of the wolf and the lamb', Cooper wrote, 'is ever an uneasy partnership'.[665] The Foreign Office was in broad agreement of Cooper's call for an alliance. Jebb, in particular, went as far as to say that this alliance of western democracies might be more important than the world organisation itself. 'It is primarily in the right development of our "alliance potential" that the future of this country lies and not so much in the "mystical" idea of a world state or even, on certain definitions, in the idea of a World Organisation.'[666] A crucial difference between the Foreign Office view and that of Cooper, however, was that such an alliance could not be directed against Russia. Oliver Harvey, in a contribution which was supported by Eden, wrote that the western alliance should be directed against Germany, with Soviet Russia supporting the western allies in the endeavour. It was a scheme, Harvey insisted, which Stalin had already encouraged as far back as December 1941, when Eden had travelled to Moscow.[667] Orme Sargent, while agreeing with the need for a western security group, warned that when Britain and Russia no longer viewed Germany as the main threat—

[664] Record of Meeting held on 1 June 1944 at the Foreign Office, FO 371/40695/U5051
[665] Memorandum by Duff Cooper, 30 May 1944, p. 4, FO 371/40696/U5407; Charmley, *Duff Cooper*, p. 184
[666] Jebb minute, 18 June 1944, FO 371/40696/U5407
[667] Harvey minute, 25 June 1944, FO 371/40696/U5407

something he referred to as the 'cement' of their post-war relationship—their relations would deteriorate and the western bloc would then move from protecting against Germany to protecting against Russia. It would then be, he said, 'a most dangerous experiment which might well precipitate the evils against which it was intended to guard'.[668]

The view here was based on an earlier Foreign Office assessment, which warned about an over-assertiveness against Russia at this delicate moment. In other words, officials stressed that they must not stoke Russian suspicions by aligning too closely with the United States or developing policies which gave the impression of being directed against Russia.[669] As Cadogan wrote at the beginning of July, 'There is no doubt that our own policy must be directed to cooperation: if it fails, it must not be through our fault.' Eden agreed, adding that failure must also not come from 'an undue display of weakness on our part towards Russia'.[670]

On this point, the Foreign Office view ran contrary to other influential voices within government, most notably the Chiefs of Staff.[671] Throughout the summer of 1944, there was a widening split between the Foreign Office and the Chiefs of Staff over post-war policy towards Russia. On 6 June, the Post Hostilities Planning Staff (PHPS), which was made up mostly of military representatives, recommended as a 'precautionary measure' the build-up of armaments 'together with France and our other natural associates in Western Europe'.[672] But while this sounded similar to the plans being drawn up in the Foreign Office, the proposals of the PHPS

[668] Sargent minute, 30 June 1944, FO 371/40696/U5407
[669] 'Probable post-war tendencies in Soviet foreign policy as affecting British interests', 29 April 1944, copied in Ross, *The Foreign Office and the Kremlin*, pp. 147-155
[670] Cadogan minute, 4 July 1944 and Eden minute, 6 July 1944, quoted in Ross, *The Foreign Office and the Kremlin*, p. 146. See also Ross, 'Foreign Office Attitudes to the Soviet Union 1941-45', p. 522
[671] These differences have been discussed at length in John Baylis, *The Diplomacy of Pragmatism*, pp. 19-36; Baylis, 'British Wartime Thinking about a Post-War European Security Group', pp. 273-277; Lewis, *Changing Direction*, pp. 107-143; Rothwell, *Britain and the Cold War*, pp. 114-123. See also Elisabeth Barker, *Churchill and Eden at War*, pp. 286-292
[672] 'Effects of Soviet policy on British strategic interests', 6 June 1944, extracts in Ross, *The Foreign Office and the Kremlin*, pp. 166-68. The Post-Hostilities Planning Staff (PHPS) was established in May 1944. It followed the Post-Hostilities Planning (PHP) Sub-Committee of the Chiefs of Staff which had been established in August 1943, after the restructuring of the Military Sub-Committee. The PHP Sub-Committee was chaired by Jebb and designed to serve as a 'channel' between the Service Departments and the Foreign Office. See Lewis, pp. 44-54; 98-104

were, like Cooper's suggestions just a week prior, directed primarily against Russia. A month later, the Chiefs of Staff decided that such plans needed to go further, and in particular, take into account the ways that parts of Germany—assuming it might be dismembered after the war—might be brought into a grouping led by Britain.[673] Upon hearing these views, officials in the Foreign wrote that the service chiefs were, in addition to their resistance to a world organisation, suffering from an 'anti-Bolshevik complex', while the PHPS were 'wild acolytes'.[674] Similar to Sargent's warnings of a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy, Foreign Office officials warned that if Britain was to take certain steps in Europe—especially in regards to allying with parts of Germany against Russia—then the Kremlin would undoubtedly take measures to protect itself. The result would be a hostile Russia, the destruction of three power cooperation (and with it, the end of the world organisation), and Europe divided into blocs.

At the beginning of July, Eden approved the broad parameters of Cooper's paper, as well as the comments of Harvey and Sargent. In his mind, the Anglo-Soviet Treaty was to be a key pillar of British policy, along with a 'close association of UK and powers of Western Europe as the western buttress'.[675] A reply to Cooper—drawn along the same lines as Webster's and Jebb's earlier papers on European policy—was eventually drafted and circulated to the Cabinet. It was clear that the formation of a western security grouping was now a priority for the Foreign Office. It read, in part that,

> From the political point of view…our policy should be directed towards establishing some kind of defence system in Western Europe whether we are successful in creating a World Organisation or not. If we are unsuccessful the need for it will be immeasurably greater.[676]

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[673] The Chiefs of Staff were considering the paper on 'Security in Western Europe and the North Atlantic', P.H.P. (44) 17(0) (final). Chiefs of Staff meeting, 26 July 1944, C.O.S. (44) 248, Minute 14, quoted in Annex 3 of Lewis, *Changing Direction*, pp. 349-53

[674] Warner minute, 24 July 1944; Ward minute, 15 August 1944; and Jebb minute 28 July 1944, quoted in Ross, *The Foreign Office and the Kremlin*, p. 159, 162, and 160, respectively. See also Lewis, *Changing Direction*, pp. 37-40, 63-74

[675] Eden minute, 2 July 1944, FO 371/40696/U5407

[676] Eden's reply to Cooper, 25 July 1944, WP(44)409, copy in FO 371/40701/U6543

The burning question now, however, was whether they should reach out to these western governments before or after the Washington talks on world organisation, and it was here that Cadogan offered a more tactical approach. During a meeting in the Foreign Office on 7 July, Eden indicated that he favoured making contact on this issue soon.[677] Cadogan was in agreement with the idea of mutual defence arrangements in western Europe, but he was also mindful of the historical precedent—namely, how the Treaty of Locarno was an agreement which was, in theory, subordinate to the authority of the League of Nations. He differed, however, on the timing of the approach to other western governments.

> If I could order the world as I liked, I might even begin with the Western European System, and build on that. But we have to take things as we find them, and the fact is that we must try…to work out a World Organisation with the Americans.[678]

He suggested that the Foreign Office would be wise to hold back on discussing this topic with these countries. His fear was that such outreach by the British—without the support of the United States—might be hijacked by isolationist factions among the American public and Congress. For Cadogan, getting the Americans involved in a post-war security organisation remained the ultimate goal. 'We ought not to do anything to prejudice our chances of getting the United States committed to some kind of World Organisation, since if they were committed the whole peace structure would be greatly reinforced.'[679]

At this stage, it was decided that Eden might make subtle approaches to his Western European counterparts, but in a manner that was secret and 'in a general nature'. Eden agreed that the Foreign Office might wait to inform the Americans and Russians of the talks with the Western European allies, but in his view, such discussions on a potential security pact were a necessity. He admitted that he held an 'obstinate' view on this point. 'It is really bad', he wrote,

[677] Record of a meeting held in Eden's room, 7 July 1944, FO 371/40701/U6543
[678] Cadogan minute, 6 July 1944, FO 371/40701/U6588
[679] Record of a meeting held in Eden's room, 7 July 1944, FO 371/40701/U6543

'for [the] US government and Soviet to think that we cannot ever have so harmless a talk with our nearest neighbors without telling them in advance'.[680]

Plans for world organisation approved

After the 'Future World Organisation' papers had been approved by the War Cabinet on 7 July, attention turned to outlining the directives for the British delegation. Drafted by Jebb under the title 'Future World Organisation: Points for Decision', they contained some detailed points which had not been addressed in the original series of memoranda. These included the size of the World Council (to be no fewer than 9 or larger than 12, with France included as a permanent member); voting within the World Council (they recommended a unanimous vote of the Council in the settlement of non-justiciable disputes, but a two-thirds majority—including all of the great powers—of the Council for decisions to use force); the relationship of the Military Staff Committee to the Council; the advocacy of a United Nations Commission for Europe (which they hoped would play a more effective role than the EAC in the post-war period); and the permanent location of the Secretariat.[681]

On 4 August, the Cabinet approved the directives as outlined by Jebb and instructed Cadogan, who was to be the head of the delegation, that if the Americans were to broach colonial questions, he was to refer to London for further instructions. Churchill, for his part, recommended that the upcoming talks be 'for preliminary exploration', as opposed to seeking a more comprehensive agreement. Overall, the Prime Minister appeared pleased with the developments, though Cadogan felt he was 'cynically jocular' and not taking it seriously. The Prime Minister went so far as to state that he regretted the fact that the War Cabinet had not had more time to discuss these matters.[682] It was a comment to which Cadogan and Eden—not

[680] Eden minute, 10 July 1944, FO 371/40701/U6543
[681] 'Future World Organisation: Points for Decision', 17 July 1944, APW (44) 45, FO 371/40699/U6443
[682] War Cabinet conclusions, W.M. (44) 101, 4 August 1944, CAB 65/43. For final list of directives, see Telegram from Dominions Office to Dominion Governments, No. 1111, 8 August 1944, FO 371/40704/U6806

to mention the Economic and Reconstruction Department—shook their heads. By the time the directives had been approved, roughly half an hour after the meeting had started, Churchill remarked that, 'There now: in 25 min[ute]s, we've settled the future of the World. Who can say that we aren't efficient?'[683]

The next day, Cadogan made his way to Euston Station in central London. Weaving his way through crowds, he eventually boarded a train which took him to a waiting *RMS Queen Mary*. Over the next six nights, the former head of the League of Nations Section and now the Permanent Under-Secretary sailed with his delegation to what would be the first formal negotiations to consider a future international organisation.

This chapter has examined the period during which the most detailed and comprehensive planning to date was undertaken within the Economic and Reconstruction Department. The chapter has highlighted, in particular, the role of Jebb and Webster, who continued to be responsible for the most substantive planning. The way in which they and their colleagues in the Foreign Office sought to directly challenge the plans of Churchill—and subsequently the role of the Dominion governments in defeating the Prime Minister's plan in favour of Jebb and Webster's—has been covered in detail. Moreover, the decisions taken in January and February to send to the United States and the Soviet Union a 'summary of topics' to be considered at an eventual conference, it has been argued, allowed the Foreign Office to, as Jebb had hoped, 'start the discussions on lines favoured by us'. It was this initiative which led, in part, to the similarity between the British, American and Soviet plans—an alignment which will be described in the following chapter.

Next, the chapter has focused attention on the way in which Jebb, Webster and their colleagues in the Foreign Office began to examine more closely the League of Nations precedent in these months, a point which is often taken for granted. Indeed, as the task of

[683] Cadogan diary, 4 August 1944, Dilks (ed.), pp. 653-54

developing concrete plans for a world organisation became more pressing, certain structures of the League—including the Secretariat, the financial and economic sections and the Health Organisation—were considered valuable institutions, portions of which might be carried over into the future.

Perhaps most importantly, the chapter has discussed the central role that both Jebb and Webster played in the development of the 'western security group' idea, demonstrating that not only was this grouping conceived as a way of protecting against Germany and insuring against Russia, but it was also viewed as a way of increasing British power vis-a-vis the United States and Soviet Union. The latter point, in particular, was central to Jebb and Webster's belief that for the world organisation to function, there needed to be a balance of power among the great powers sitting at the heart of the organisation. As such, the work of the Economic and Reconstruction Department in the spring of 1944 was the most substantive expression yet of an approach which has been described (in chapter four) as a 'realist-internationalism'.

Chapter Six

Delivering on the plans: the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, the Veto Question, and a Western Security Group, August 1944 - January 1945

The planning which took place in the spring of 1944 had been the most detailed to date, and now the crucial three-power conference awaited. The Economic and Reconstruction Department, in preparation for upcoming these discussions, had developed five memoranda which addressed critical aspects, such as the structure of the organisation and the way in which it would settle disputes and enforce decisions. Just as important in these months was the development within the Foreign Office of a revised grand strategy. Their approach now rested on three main pillars: the creation of an international organisation, the formation of a United Nations Commission for Europe, and the development of a defensive alliance in Western Europe.

This chapter covers the period between August 1944 and January 1945, when the Foreign Office worked to deliver on these plans, most notably at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, where Cadogan, Jebb and Webster played the most important roles on the British side. The proceedings of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference have received a sustained and comprehensive analysis by the historian Robert Hilderbrand, whose book *Dumbarton Oaks: The Origins of the United Nations and the Search for Postwar Security* examined the conference in detail.[684] Other histories of the creation of the United Nations Organization have covered, more briefly, the history of the conference, as well as specific issues such as colonial trusteeship and domestic jurisdiction which delegates addressed to varying degrees in the course of their deliberations.[685] This chapter, not to mention the thesis as a whole, focuses more

[684] Robert C. Hilderbrand, *Dumbarton Oaks: The Origins of the United Nations and the Search for Postwar Security* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1990)
[685] From the American perspective, see Russell, *A History of the United Nations Charter*, pp. 147-226; Hoopes and Brinkley, *FDR and the Creation of the U.N.*, pp. 133-158; Plesch, *America, Hitler and the UN*, pp. 164-168. For the Soviet perspective, see Roberts, 'A League of Their Own', pp. 318-319; Dolff, 'The Creation of the United

on the planning and negotiation of the main political and security dimensions of the organisation, as opposed to more specific issues such as human rights, colonial trusteeship and domestic jurisdiction.

Though several scholars have focused on the work of the British delegation at the conference, few have examined in depth their preparation immediately prior to this meeting of the three powers. The work of the Foreign Office in this period, as this chapter will make clear, helped to define the delegation's approach to the conference. While Reynolds and Hughes have discussed Webster's analysis of the American and Soviet plans in these weeks, their writing relies more on Webster's diaries than on the files of the Economic and Reconstruction Department.[686] Hilderbrand has not given much attention to the British preparation in the weeks prior to the conference, though he has briefly discussed the Anglo-American conversations which took place in Washington the week before the conference.[687] Greenwood's work, on the other hand, does not examine the weeks prior to the conference in any detail. All of these scholars, however, have given significant attention to the British delegation's work during the conference.[688] This chapter builds on this research, and its main contribution to the history of the conference itself is to magnify the work of the British delegation, specifically on the question of great power voting rights as well as the crucial compromise proposal concerning the veto, which was put forward by Jebb during the conference.

This chapter advances an argument that the British delegation, led by Cadogan and supported by, among others, Jebb and Webster, played an indispensable role in helping to

Nations Organization as a Factor in Soviet Foreign Policy, 1943-46', pp. 90-181. For the question of colonial trusteeship, see Louis, *Imperialism at Bay*, pp. 378-391. For discussions related to the subjects of human rights and domestic jurisdiction, see Simpson, *Human Rights and the End of Empire*, pp. 239-249.

[686] Reynolds and Hughes, *Historian as Diplomat*, pp. 40-44

[687] Hilderbrand, *Dumbarton Oaks*, pp. 67-69

[688] For a discussion of British contribution at the conference, see Reynolds and Hughes, *Historian as Diplomat*, pp. 39-57; Greenwood, *Titan at the Foreign Office*, pp. 179-185; and Hilderbrand, *Dumbarton Oaks*, pp. 67-228.

define the position of the great powers relative to the rest of the United Nations. On the question of whether great powers should have the right of veto in disputes to which they were involved, Cadogan remained firm in his opposition against, at first, the Russians *and* the Americans. Though the American delegation eventually came around to the British view, the initial stand taken up by Cadogan had great implications for the nature of the organisation, and it is this factor which has been less emphasised in the previous studies by Hilderbrand, Reynolds and Hughes and Greenwood.[689] Where the Soviet Union may have seen it as more of a 'great power dictatorship', in which the permanent members of the World Council would always retain veto power, the British—and eventually the Americans—saw it as a slightly more democratic institution, in which the permanent members should, to a certain extent, be answerable to a majority of smaller states. Crucially, a recommendation made by Jebb during a meeting at Dumbarton Oaks—one which was intended to resolve the growing divide between the British and Soviet positions on the voting issue—was the compromise solution which would ultimately save the organisation.

Moreover, little scholarship has examined the Foreign Office planning for a world organisation in the crucial period between the end of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference and the beginning of the Yalta Conference in February 1945.[690] The historian Warren Kimball has even claimed that the disputes 'preoccupied the Americans…more than the British'.[691] However, as this chapter will demonstrate, the Economic and Reconstruction Department during these

[689] Hilderbrand has written that during these initial discussions between the Americans and British, 'The most important difference…was over trusteeship and colonial policy.' Hilderbrand, *Dumbarton Oaks*, p. 69. Greenwood notes that, 'The Americans blew hot and cold moving shortly before the Conference opened from an undecided position to one which supported the Soviet line but then shifting to the British view during the first week of proceedings.' Citing Reynolds and Hughes, Greenwood adds that Webster 'claimed credit for enticing the Americans into the British camp.' Greenwood, *Titan at the Foreign Office*, p. 181. See also Reynolds and Hughes, *Historian as Diplomat*, pp. 42-43.

[690] William Roger Louis has covered in detail the question of colonial trusteeship, especially the way in which officials in the Foreign Office and Colonial Office sought to address this issue during the autumn and winter of 1944-45. See Louis, *Imperialism at Bay*, pp. 392-447. A.W. Brian Simpson has also examined the questions of human rights and domestic jurisdiction in the period between the Dumbarton Oaks and Yalta conferences. See Simpson, *Human Rights and the End of Empire*, pp. 250-256.

[691] Kimball, *Forged in War*, p. 316

months was focused on salvaging the organisation and, at the same time, developing contingency plans in case it failed to come into existence. The question of voting—and in particular, the question of veto power—was one of the issues that had yet to be decided by the end of the conference. In the months after, Foreign Office officials worked to offer up compromises on this and other outstanding matters, such as the Kremlin's suggestion that the 16 Soviet republics be admitted as founding members of the future organisation.[692] The voting question, however, remained the most important; and while the British delegation's view at the conference was that the great powers should not have the right to veto in disputes in which they were involved, this was not necessarily the view shared by officials in the Foreign Office or the Cabinet. Indeed, the subject was debated throughout Whitehall in these months, with some, including Churchill and Eden, advocating the Soviet position and others siding with the view taken by the British and American delegations at Dumbarton Oaks. It was a debate which concerned the nature of the organisation—namely, whether it should be a kind of five-power alliance or whether it might adopt more inclusive characteristics. Though Jebb and others flirted with the former, in the end, it was Webster who played one of the most important roles in corralling opinion and directing the British opposition to the Soviet thesis.

The debate in this period reveals yet another indication of a view towards international organisation which can be described as realist-internationalism. On the one hand, the creation of an international body made up of great and small powers remained the overarching goal; yet equally, officials involved with the planning for such an institution, and most notably Cadogan

[692] The volumes of Foreign Office records on the veto question and the possibility of the 16 Soviet republics entering into the organisation, in particular, have yet to receive a comprehensive analysis in the historiography. Much of the planning was set against the backdrop of increasing suspicion of the Soviet Union, a point which has been covered in previous studies which portions of this chapter will draw upon. Lewis, *Changing Direction*, pp. 125-135; Folly, *Churchill, Whitehall and the Soviet Union*, p. 137, 140; Rothwell, *Britain and the Cold War*, pp. 123-128; Kitchen, *British Policy Towards the Soviet Union*, pp. 218-19, 227-246; Elisabeth Barker, *Churchill and Eden at War*, pp. 286-292 and *The British Between the Superpowers, 1945-50*, pp. 6-10; Kettenacker, 'The Anglo-Soviet Alliance and the Problem of Germany, 1941-1945', p. 452; Adamthwaite, 'Britain and the World, 1945-9: The View from the Foreign Office', p. 226

and Jebb, were favouring suggestions which would concentrate more power in the hands of the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union.

Despite the importance attached to the world organisation in this period, the Foreign Office did not view it as a panacea for its foreign policy objectives. There was a continuing search in these months for the machinery which would most effectively order the European continent. Even during the Dumbarton Oaks negotiations, the British delegation had been responsible for a provision stating that a future organisation should not 'preclude the existence of regional arrangements'.[693] Here the Foreign Office had in mind the creation of a Western Security Group, an idea which some officials continued to push in the months after the conference.[694] The Prime Minister's reluctance for such an alliance, coupled with French hesitance at the present time, would scuttle the Foreign Office scheme, however. On the other hand, a second alliance proposal caught the attention of some Foreign Office officials. Senator Arthur Vandenberg, an increasingly influential voice on post-war matters within the United States, recommended in January that the great powers, before establishing a world organisation, might form an alliance directed at Germany and Japan.[695] It was a suggestion which appealed to Jebb, Cadogan and even Eden, all of whom had a creeping doubt as to whether the world organisation could, in fact, secure British interests. Their discussions on the eve of the Yalta Conference reveal their fundamental view of the purpose of the organisation—namely to bring the United States into post-war commitments on the European continent.

Lastly, the work of the Economic and Reconstruction Department was hindered in varying degrees, once again, by the opposition of Cabinet ministers. Sir Stafford Cripps, who

[693] 'Dumbarton Oaks Proposals for a General International Organization', *Department of State Publication 2297, Conference Series 66* (Washington: US State Department, 1945), Chapter VIII, Section C

[694] Simpson has briefly covered the idea of a western bloc, but does not discuss the Foreign Office debate in detail. Simpson, *Human Rights and the End of Empire*, pp. 248-250. Baylis, 'British Wartime Thinking about a Post-War European Security Group', pp. 273-279; Baylis, *Diplomacy of Pragmatism*, pp. 22-35; Lewis, *Changing Direction*, pp. 138-143

[695] This speech is mentioned in Russell, *A History of the United Nations Charter*, pp. 484-487

had played an important role in the earliest stages of Foreign Office planning in the winter of 1942, now returned to the scene, this time effectively siding with the Soviet opinion that the great powers should wield veto power across all disputes within the World Council.[696] More significant, however, was the view of Churchill, who, despite his views fluctuating at times, sided with Cripps in favouring the Russian view.[697] Added to this was the Prime Minister's steady opposition to the idea of a Western Security Group—at least at this stage—which he managed to stifle for the time being. Though officials respected the Prime Minister's decisions, they also felt that, whether it concerned the voting issue or the western bloc, he was understanding neither the nature of the diplomatic challenge nor the policy recommended. This ignorance became abundantly clear between December 1944 and January 1945, when the Foreign Office was pushing to get Cabinet approval for their proposals prior to the next meeting between Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin. By the time of the Yalta Conference in February 1945, there was great uncertainty amongst Foreign Office officials whether the government was prepared to enter into negotiations with the United States and the Soviet Union.

A brief comparison of British, American and Soviet plans on the eve of Dumbarton Oaks

Generally speaking, the three powers put forward plans which were very similar to one another, especially in regard to the structure of the organisation.[698] Each recommended the creation of an Assembly, a Council, a Secretariat and a Court; and all three plans laid out basic principles on which the organisation would operate. While the primary focus of each government was on

[696] The views of some Cabinet ministers, including Cripps, has been discussed by Douglas, *Labour Party*, pp. 129-132

[697] Hughes, 'Winston Churchill and the Formation of the United Nations Organization', pp. 190-192

[698] The American proposal was titled 'Tentative Proposals for a General International Organisation', 18 July 1944, copy in Webster 12/2, LSE. The Soviet proposals were titled 'Memorandum on International Security Organisation', 12 August 1944. See FO 371/40705/U6845. The Chinese plan and the negotiations between the British, Americans and Chinese delegations from 29 September – 7 October will not be discussed in detail here. For a copy of the Chinese plan, see 'Chinese Government's Memorandum on International Organisation', 22 August 1944, copy in Webster papers, 12/2, LSE. For a description of the conversations with the Chinese at Dumbarton Oaks beginning on 29 September, see Hilderbrand, *Dumbarton Oaks*, pp. 229-244.

future international security, the American and British plans made specific reference to the creation of economic and social bodies which might be under the authority of the organisation.[699] Though the Soviets agreed with facilitating international cooperation along economic and social lines, they felt that these issues should be taken up by a world organisation separate from the international security organisation.[700] The result was a plan which focused largely on security matters, and one which appeared to Cadogan to be 'amateurish and…hastily constructed'. He doubted, as well, whether the Russian delegation would be given any leeway from Moscow.[701] On the issue of an international court of justice, the Soviets remained vague, while the Americans proposed the reconstitution of the existing court and the British recommended the adoption of the proposals laid down by the informal Inter-Allied Committee.[702] Each government proposed the establishment of a Permanent Secretariat, though the British plan was the only one which gave the Secretary-General, as head of the Secretariat, the power to recommended matters directly to the Council.

On the question of military aspects of the future organisation, the British plan recommended a Military Staff Committee which might coordinate the forces that member states put at its disposal; whereas the Soviet plan suggested the creation of an International Air Corps which might be made up of national contingents.[703] The American plan, on the other hand, only gave mention to a possible 'security and armaments commission' which might advise the Council. Furthermore, in what was a long standing aspect of British plans for a future

[699] Memorandum by Webster, 'International Organisation: Comparative Analysis of UK and US Documents', 21 August 1944, copy in Webster 12/2, LSE. Edward Stettinius, in a 1949 publication which briefly touched on the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, incorrectly notes that 'It was only the insistence of the United States that secured a provision for an Economic and Social Council.' Edward Stettinius, *Roosevelt and the Russians: The Yalta Conference* (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1949), pp. 16-17

[700] 'Soviet Government's Proposals Concerning an International Security Organisation', 12 August 1944, copy in FO 371/40710/U7242

[701] Telegram from Washington Embassy to the Foreign Office, No. 4434, 18 August 1944, FO 371/40706/U6988

[702] 'Report of the Informal Inter-Allied Committee on the Future of the Permanent Court of International Justice', 10 February 1944, FO 371/40686/U2296

[703] 'Soviet Government's Proposals Concerning an International Security Organisation', 12 August 1944, FO 371/40705/U6845; Dallin, p. 23

world organisation, the British document gave far more attention to the creation of regional political structures which they thought would be 'likely to encourage co-operation of smaller states in security measures' and to increase the efficacy of military action.[704]

The most important difference across the three proposals, however, was the power given to the Council. The United States and the Soviet Union had adopted the earlier British suggestion that France eventually join the Council as a permanent member; and both recommended that certain decisions of the Council—namely those concerning the prevention of aggression—could be arrived at by a majority vote, as opposed to the two-thirds majority the British had been contemplating.[705] Furthermore, in what Jebb felt was 'the greatest issue with which we shall have to deal', both the Americans and Russians proposed that the great powers could vote—and thereby reserve veto power—in disputes to which they were a party. In a manner which frustrated Webster, Jebb appeared open to the Soviet and American position on this issue.[706] For Jebb, great power cooperation would be jeopardised if there was a recurring chance that the great powers could sanction one another based on the decisions of the council. Worse, if it was ever decided that military action should be taken against a great power, this would mean another world war and thus, the dissolution of both the international organisation and the world order which it was intended to uphold.[707] Jebb's view, however, was opposed by Cadogan and Webster, with the former pointing out that such a procedure 'was equivalent to giving a litigant Great Power the right of voting in its own cause', and the latter having been responsible for the original provision in the first place.[708] The British position

[704] Memorandum by Webster, 'International Organisation: Comparative Analysis of UK and US Documents', 21 August 1944, copy in Webster 12/2, LSE
[705] Other studies have noted that the inclusion of France was specifically a British proposal. Deporte, *De Gaulle's Foreign Policy, 1944-1946*, pp. 102-103
[706] Webster diary, 15 and 16 August 1944, Reynolds and Hughes, *Historian as Diplomat*, p. 42; Greenwood, *Titan at the Foreign Office*, pp. 181-2
[707] Jebb minute, 14 August 1944, FO 371/40723/U8301; Jebb, 'Review of Reynolds and Hughes' *Historian as Diplomat*', p. 480
[708] Jebb minute, 14 August 1944, U8301/180/70, FO 371/40723/U8301. For Cadogan comment, see 'Record of a meeting held at the British Embassy in Washington', 16 August 1944, copy in Webster 12/3, LSE

throughout the conference thus remained one firmly opposed to the Soviet thesis.

On the American plan in particular, Webster wrote that he was surprised that the State Department planners had made 'such far reaching suggestions'.[709] He pointed out that, even aside from the veto question, the Americans were intending to give authority to the Council which had never before been bestowed on such a body. 'It will', Webster wrote, 'certainly be an immense advance towards the creation of a world state if such powers are given to the Council'.[710] Despite its extensive powers, Webster supported the idea of the Council having such powers, which, in his mind, was a modification of the procedure created by the Concert of Europe in the nineteenth century. It would undoubtedly face strong criticism from smaller powers, he thought; so, in order to win the support of other states, he felt that a section laying out the 'principles and objectives' of the organisation might serve as a check on the freedom of the great powers within the Council.[711]

In the days after the full British delegation arrived, Cadogan, Jebb and Webster began to meet with their American counterparts, in an attempt to settle the differences between their plans.[712] A major concern of the British at this stage was that the United States intended to construct an inflexible constitution for the organisation. On this point, Cadogan explained to the Americans that the British government was thinking more of a 'flexible' organisation which would rely on guiding principles, as opposed to a rigid one defined by 'constitution and procedure'.[713] This was a product of his experience with the League of Nations, in which Cadogan believed planners had put so much effort into constituting an inelastic system that it was a constraining force on the great powers. The Americans agreed to a certain extent and

[709] Webster diary, 8 August 1944, Reynolds and Hughes, *Historian as Diplomat*, p. 40
[710] 'The United States plan for the Pacific Settlement of Disputes and the Maintenance of Peace and Security', 9 August 1944, FO 371/40723/U8301
[711] Memorandum by Webster, 'The United States plan for the Pacific Settlement of Disputes and the Maintenance of Peace and Security', 9 August 1944 and Jebb minute on this paper, 14 August 1944, FO 371/40723/U6958. For his part, Jebb favoured the American plan. Jebb minute, 14 August 1944, FO 371/40723/U8301
[712] Due to a last-minute delay on the Soviet side, the American and British delegations were afforded several days to discuss their plans with one another.
[713] Telegram from Washington Embassy to Foreign Office, No. 4502, 22 August 1944, FO 371/40706/U6987

took on Webster's suggestion that there might be 'principles and objectives' brought into the organisation, as a way of guiding state behaviour.[714] On the controversial question of colonial trusteeship—which Webster had previously warned might be the 'King Charles' Head' of the negotiations—Cadogan admitted that he remained 'apprehensive' about the American position, but he was, at least for now, relieved that the Americans had agreed to put it in 'cold storage...for the time being'. If they were to bring it up, State Department officials assured, it would be 'during walks in the garden', as opposed to a more formal discussion within the conference. By 18 August, Cadogan was able to report to London that the 'points of divergence have been so narrowed down that there is now something like provisional agreement as between Americans and ourselves.'[715]

Even with the Americans and British agreeing on a number of points, there was still an issue which Cadogan felt 'dominates the whole situation', namely the question of whether the great powers would wield veto power over certain decisions taken within the council. The Americans had explained to the British that they supported an arrangement whereby great powers would have the right to veto any decision which concerned their own interests. The Americans explained that such a provision was likely a requirement in order for the Senate to approve of American participation in the world organisation. Cadogan wrote that such an arrangement was 'highly unpalatable' and would foster resentment among smaller powers, including members of the British Commonwealth. 'It seems to me impossible to present this to the United Nations.'[716] The British view, shaped by their experience in the League of Nations, was that countries which were parties to a dispute should not have the right to vote. Ironically, Cadogan saw a potential ally on this issue in the Republican presidential candidate, Thomas Dewey, who on 17 August, gave a speech warning the great powers to not fall into

[714] See Webster 12/2, LSE; quoted in Reynolds and Hughes, *Historian as Diplomat*, p. 114, fn 19
[715] Telegram from Washington Embassy to Foreign Office, No. 4434, 18 August 1944, FO 371/40706/U6988
[716] Ibid

'the abyss of power politics'.[717] Cadogan noted that Dewey's statement had 'set the cat among the pigeons', as American officials now scrambled to reconsider their position.[718] For his part, Webster lobbied hard on the issue in talks with American officials, some of whom admitted that, from their end, they had been thinking primarily about the possible objections of the American Senate as opposed to those of the smaller powers.[719]

The Dumbarton Oaks Conference [720]

The British, American and Soviet delegations arrived at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference riding a wave of confidence in the military effort. As the historian Michael Howard has written, these were 'halcyon days'.

> In the West, the German front in Normandy had broken, the Allies had landed in the south of France, Paris had been liberated, and Allied forces were pouring into Belgium and Holland. In the East, Soviet soil was being cleared of the invading forces, and Germany's allies—Finland, Romania and Bulgaria—were suing for peace. A spirit of high euphoria reigned.[721]

Under the heat of spotlights and camera flashes, the conference opened at 10:30am on 21 August. After photographs and introductory remarks, the heads of each delegation gave their opening speeches. James Reston of the *New York Times* pointed out that while the Americans spoke of an organisation based on sovereign equality of all nations, the Russians focused more on the position and responsibility of the great powers within the organisation. Cadogan's speech then seemed to take up the middle ground between the two.[722] 'No one wishes to impose some Great Power Dictatorship on the rest of the world', Cadogan told the

[717] 'Dewey Attacks Four-Power Move to Control World', *New York Times*, 17 August 1944
[718] Telegram from Washington Embassy to Foreign Office, No. 4434, 18 August 1944, FO 371/40706/U6988
[719] Webster diary, 16 August 1944, Reynolds and Hughes, *Historian as Diplomat*, p. 42
[720] For a comprehensive history of the Dumbarton Oaks conversations, see Hilderbrand, *Dumbarton Oaks*. For basic overview of Britain and Dumbarton Oaks, see Woodward, *British Foreign Policy in the Second World War*, Vol V, pp. 135-139. For a detailed history from the American perspective, see Russell, *A History of the United Nations Charter*, pp. 205-548.
[721] Howard, 'The United Nations: From War Fighting to Peace Planning', p. 7
[722] James Reston, 'Three Powers Urge Force for Security as Parley Starts', *New York Times*, 22 August 1944. This is also mentioned in Hilderbrand, *Dumbarton Oaks*, p. 70

delegations assembled, 'but it is obvious that unless the Great Powers are united in aim and ready to assume and fulfill loyally their obligations, no machine for maintaining peace, however perfectly constructed, will in practice work.'[723]

Given the magnitude of the conversations and the range of topics covered, the three delegations were able to reach agreement surprisingly quickly. Both Cadogan and Jebb represented the British on the Joint Steering Committee which was responsible for setting the parameters of the negotiations while also taking up the most important decisions of the conference.[724] The grouping just under this was the Formulation Committee, which Jebb and Webster both contributed to and which became the engine of the negotiations.[725] By the second day, Webster wrote that when it came to major questions of security, they had 'practically already got agreement on all points'.[726] By 4 September, there was an outline of a draft proposal and three days later, Stettinius was discussing with Cadogan the possibility of holding the conference on world organisation in a midwestern American town as early as October, on the eve of the Presidential election.[727]

In what became the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, the three powers agreed to establish an organisation made up of a General Assembly, Security Council, an International Court of Justice and a Secretariat, all of which would operate according to the 'principles' of the organisation. The assembly was to be responsible for budgetary questions, the acceptance of new members into the organisation, the election of non-permanent members of the Security Council, issues relating to disarmament and the regulation of armaments, as well as the work

[723] For a copy of Cadogan's speech, see Webster 12/4, LSE. James Reston wrote in his article that Cadogan's speech was the best of the three.
[724] Hilderbrand, *Dumbarton Oaks*, p. 70. It was decided that the Soviet proposals would make up the basis of discussion. Not only did they allow for broader discussions, but it gave the Soviets a feeling that their work was valued by the Americans and British. Cadogan diary, 21 August 1944, Dilks (ed.), p. 656
[725] Hilderbrand, *Dumbarton Oaks*, pp. 72-73. See also Jebb to Ronald, 15 September 1944, FO 371/40715/U7503
[726] Webster diary, 23 August 1944, Reynolds and Hughes, *Historian as Diplomat*, p. 44
[727] Telegram from Washington Embassy to Foreign Office, No. 4769, 4 September 1944, FO 371/40710/U7250. For Stettinius suggestion, see Telegram from Washington Embassy to Foreign Office, No. 4846, 7 September 1944, FO 371/40710/U7267

of the Economic and Social Council. The Security Council would be comprised of eleven members, including five permanent members (including France) and six non-permanent members. The council was given expansive authority to deal with any matter it deemed to be a threat to international peace and security. In terms of the organisation's enforcement mechanism, the Security Council was to work in conjunction with a Military Staff Committee made up of the chiefs of staff of the permanent members. This body would be in charge of coordinating any national forces that might be put at the disposal of the Security Council.[728]

The great question remained the voting rights of the great powers, and while Cadogan and Webster had been successful in bringing American officials over to their position, the Soviets remained defiant that the permanent members would have the power both to prevent a dispute from coming before the Council and to prevent action from being taken against itself.[729] The Russians considered it a 'cardinal point', despite Cadogan's warning that it would lead to an alienation of the middle and small powers, and a subsequent failure to erect an international organisation.[730] In a meeting of the Formulation Committee on 13 September, Jebb had proposed a compromise, in which a great power would not be able to prevent a discussion from coming before the Security Council, but it would be able, through its veto power, to prevent action from being taken by the Security Council.[731] It turned out to be a crucial proposal—and one which would eventually save the organisation after it was agreed to at Yalta—but for the time being, the three delegations opted to address the issue at a later date.

The experience of the conference had further convinced Jebb that the most important dimension of the future organisation—and indeed the wider international order—was the

[728] 'Proposals for the Establishment of a General International Organisation', 28 September 1944, FO 371/40716/U7585
[729] On the American position changing, see Campbell, *Masquerade Peace*, p. 40
[730] Telegram from Washington Embassy to Foreign Office, No. 4845, 8 September 1944, FO 371/40711/U7274
[731] Record of United Kingdom Delegation meeting, No. 24, 14 September 1944, Webster 12/3, LSE. Sean Greenwood has disputed the British influence on the compromise, while others have written that the suggestion came from the British side. Greenwood, *Titan at the Foreign Office*, pp. 183-4; Jebb, 'Review of Reynolds and Hughes' *Historian as Diplomat*', p. 480; Reynolds and Hughes, *Historian as Diplomat*, p. 104

relationship of the great powers. While he thought that the Soviets were 'on morally indefensible grounds' regarding the great powers and voting rights, it was clear from the behaviour of the Russian delegation that 'whatever we do or say the set-up of the world after this war will in fact be based on a number of Great Powers plus their own "client" states, and that whatever scheme we construct we must take this fact into consideration.'[732] It was not what the British wanted, per se, but it was what the interplay of power politics in this period necessitated. Nonetheless, he remained hopeful that the structures and principles worked out in the Dumbarton Oaks conversations could become the pillars of a future organisation, regardless of its exact shape. He warned Nigel Ronald, however, that should an organisation come into being, the three great powers would need to make it clear to the public that this was not to be some 'wonderful machine' which by its very existence extinguished war. On the contrary, Jebb wrote,

> In the present state of this wicked world, I am afraid that such an institution is impossible of achievement. The most we can hope for is that by meeting and cooperating together the Great Powers may be able to work out among themselves some system which will eliminate friction.[733]

A renewed Foreign Office push for a Western Security Group

That the great powers would remain cooperative was anything but certain, and the wider Foreign Office strategy towards the post-war world continued to take this into account. Throughout the Dumbarton Oaks discussions, one of the key objectives of the Foreign Office remained the construction of some kind of defensive alliance in Western Europe, which might serve as an ordering mechanism on the continent. This was designed chiefly to protect against a powerful Germany in the future, but it was also a way of increasing British power relative to the United States and the Soviet Union. This priority of the Foreign Office was such that, at

[732] Jebb to Ronald, 15 September 1944, FO 371/40715/U7503
[733] Ibid

the conference in Washington, the British delegation worked to have incorporated in the final proposals the mention that the international organisation would allow for regional arrangements directed at the maintenance of peace and security, provided that these ultimately fell under the authority of the Security Council.[734]

This provision was fuelled, in part, by British diplomats continuing to stress the need for a Western Security Group. Just days before the Dumbarton Oaks conversations began, Duff Cooper, then the British Ambassador to the French government based in Algiers, had reignited the debate by sending another paper to the Foreign Office urging the creation of a Western European bloc. 'The leadership of Europe will await us, but we may miss the opportunity of acquiring it if we hesitate to adopt a positive policy through fear of incurring the suspicion of Russia on the one hand or the disapproval of America on the other', he wrote.[735] Other British officials warned against such a move, at least in this manner. In a delayed follow up to a Foreign Office memorandum on the future policy towards Russia—originally sent in April—Archibald Clark Kerr wrote from Moscow about the importance of a tactful approach by the Foreign Office. 'The whole approach of the Soviet government to international problems', he said, 'is strongly influenced by a morbidly developed sense of inferiority.' The correct approach for the Foreign Office was one in which Britain did not unnecessarily ostracise the Kremlin.[736]

There was a meeting in the Foreign Office on 20 October which sought to square official thinking on a Western Security Group, in light of the recent Dumbarton Oaks negotiations. The officials in attendance agreed that the ultimate objective was to bring the countries of Western Europe, especially France and the Low Countries, into a multilateral agreement. First and foremost, it would be aimed at countering the power of Germany; and secondly, it might

[734]See Chapter VIII, Section C of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals. 'Proposals for the Establishment of a General International Organisation', 28 September 1944, FO 371/40716/U7585
[735] Telegram from Duff Cooper to Foreign Office, No. 508, 16 August 1944, FO 371/40706/U7004
[736] 'Clark Kerr on Soviet Policy', 31 August 1944, quoted in Ross, *The Foreign Office and the Kremlin*, p. 174

succeed in bringing these countries together along security and economic lines.[737] The Foreign Office forwarded their views onto the Post Hostilities Planning Staff who were in agreement and produced a report which was then approved by the Chiefs of Staff in early November.[738] Now that the Foreign Office and the Chiefs of Staff were in agreement on the necessity of an alliance, Eden instructed the Foreign Office to 'press on' with plans for a Western Security Group.[739] In the meantime, Eden raised the idea in conversation with Churchill who, in turn, dampened the mood. The Prime Minister considered the Western Allies to be 'liabilities' at the present time, writing that, 'I do not know how these ideas of what is called a "Western bloc" got around in the Foreign Office and other influential circles.' Though he recommended that they not oppose any outreach from these countries, he noted that any decision would require 'mature deliberation' within Cabinet and Parliament.[740]

The Foreign Office initiative was furthered hindered by a growing suspicion in Moscow that the United Kingdom was developing a grouping in Western Europe which might threaten its own interests on the continent. By mid-November, Soviet diplomats based in London began to question their Foreign Office counterparts on the subject, while recent press reports in Russia and France only fuelled the scepticism.[741] As a result, a decision was taken in the Foreign Office to let the Russians know, on a general level, about the talks with Belgium, Holland and France.[742] When Clark Kerr spoke with Vyacheslav Molotov on 28 November, the latter

[737] For a record of this meeting, see FO 371/40721/U7956. This is also mentioned in Simpson, *Human Rights and the End of Empire*, p. 249

[738] They suggested the group would include the UK, France, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Norway, Iceland, and possibly Sweden, Spain and Portugal. PHP (44) 26 (final), 6 November 1944, FO 371/40725/U8625

[739] Jebb minute, 4 November 1944, FO 371/40722/U8165

[740] Eden minute, 6 November 1944, ibid. Both Churchill and Eden had recently returned from a trip to Moscow. Ross, *The Foreign Office and the Kremlin*, pp. 46-47; Rothwell, *Britain and the Cold War*, pp. 128-136. Churchill's comments were from 25 November and are quoted in Simpson, *Human Rights and the End of Empire*, p. 249

[741] 'Moscow quotes 'Combat' on the Formation of a Western Security Bloc', Soviet Home Service, 15 November 1944. The quote appeared in the French newspaper *Combat* days before. See FO 371/40723/U8410

[742] Clark Kerr had written that any leniency granted to the Germans might be perceived as a design against Russia. Furthermore, Clark Kerr wrote that 'the Russians think of the future world order in terms of a concert of the three major allies.' Memorandum by Clark Kerr, 'Observations on the attitude of the Soviet Government towards possible formation of a group of Western European Democracies', 19 November 1944, copy in FO 371/40725/U8736

indicated that the Kremlin had indeed grown suspicious, beginning with Smuts's speech in November 1943 and worsening after conversations with Belgian and French diplomats. The conversation with Clark Kerr had helped to relieve fears, Molotov said, and he added that it was understood on their end that Britain would obviously 'play first fiddle' in any Western Security Group which might be formed at the end of the war.[743]

Still, the Foreign Office's initiative was soon put on hold, due to a move by the Prime Minister.[744] Days before Clark Kerr's conversation with Molotov, Churchill wrote to Stalin that he had been reading about a proposed Western Bloc in the news but had yet to give any go ahead for such plans. He was emphatic that the key relationship was between the great powers first and foremost.[745] An incensed Churchill then took up the issue with Eden, writing that France was still years away from being able to form a formidable army, and until this took place, 'There is nothing in these countries but hopeless weakness…That England should undertake to defend these countries…seems to me contrary to all wisdom and even common prudence.'[746] Churchill then raised the subject in Cabinet, at which point Cadogan, who was in attendance, wrote that it seemed that the Prime Minister had gotten 'the wrong end of the stick' in terms of understanding the issue, but that with a little explanation, he might 'be cured of his worst misapprehensions [on the subject of a Western Bloc]'.[747]

Cadogan continued to serve as the crucial link between the planning of the Foreign Office and the approval of the Cabinet. After Churchill's most recent outburst, he worked with Jebb to craft a reply—in Eden's name—to the Prime Minister, explaining the origins and

[743] Telegram from Clark Kerr to Foreign Office, No. 3549, 29 November 1944, FO 371/40723/U8430
[744] Baylis has claimed that the differences between the Prime Minister and Foreign Office 'stemmed from the disagreement which had arisen between Churchill and Eden over the form of a new world organisation', with the former wanting a more regionalist system and the latter advocating a universal organisation. Baylis, *Diplomacy of Pragmatism*, pp. 30-33
[745] Draft of letter from Churchill to Stalin, T. 2165/4, 23 November 1944, FO 371/40723/U8472. See also Churchill to Stalin, 25 November 1944, Reynolds, *Kremlin Letters*, pp. 501-2. Simpson has written that Churchill's 'shifts of opinion over the whole issue were little short of bizarre.' In fact, Churchill has resisted the idea of a Western Security Group from the start. Simpson, *Human Rights and the End of Empire*, p. 250
[746] Churchill to Eden, 25 November 1944, M.1144/4, FO 371/40723/U8473
[747] Cadogan diary, 27 November 1944, Dilks (ed.), p. 684

rationale of the western security idea. They noted that, despite some of these smaller countries being 'grossly unprepared' for war in the years after the First World War, 'the lessons of 1940 were to build up 'a common defence association in western Europe' which would prevent future aggressors from picking off countries 'one by one'. Such a grouping would allow Britain to share the burden of defence and hopefully ease the demands for the United Kingdom to maintain a full standing army. They also pointed out that the Chiefs of Staff had expressed their approval of such plans as far back as July, and even at the Dumbarton Oaks negotiations, room was made in the proposals for regional defence organisations to be constructed and put under the larger security umbrella of the world organisation.[748] Finally, Cadogan and Jebb highlighted that Stalin himself, as far back as December 1941, had expressed support for the idea of Britain assuming the leadership of Western Europe, which might add to the security of continent.[749]

The signing of the Franco-Soviet Treaty on 10 December put the question of a Western Security Group into a slightly different light, though Churchill's view would remain unchanged. Recent conversations with French officials had indicated that the Quai d'Orsay might be interested in creating a similar alliance with the British; but the state of Anglo-French relations, particularly in the Levant, led Churchill and Eden to the conclusion that any treaty initiative should come from Paris.[750] Furthermore, the Prime Minister still remained ambivalent, if not opposed, to the idea of a wider Western Security Group, believing it to be an asymmetric relationship. He warned that the British 'must be careful not to involve ourselves in liabilities which we cannot discharge and in engagements to others for which there is no corresponding return'. Moreover, the primary diplomatic objective of the moment,

[748] The Chiefs of Staff had approved of this in June. Report by the Post-Hostilities Planning Staff, 'Security in Western Europe and the North Atlantic', 20 July 1944, PHP (44) 17 (O), FO 371/40725/U8652
[749] Eden to Churchill, 29 November 1944, PM/44/732, FO 371/40723/U8473. See also, Interview with Marshal Stalin, 16 December 1941, quoted in minute by Ward, 13 November 1944, FO 371/40723/U8410
[750] Baylis has noted that Churchill 'was profoundly averse to any formal alliance with a France governed by de Gaulle'. Baylis, *Diplomacy of Pragmatism*, p. 31

Churchill said, remained the creation of a world organisation, 'on which it all depends'.[751] The Foreign Office, in turn, decided against a reply to Churchill on this matter throughout January and into February. Their decision was to wait to see what would come of the discussions over the Anglo-French Treaty, a development which they believed might create the nucleus of any future military association between the western allies.[752]

Foreign Office approaches to settling the question of voting in the council

In the months after the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, the Foreign Office sought to deal with the issues that had arisen from the proposed structure of world organisation. The question of great power voting rights was the issue on which the future of the organisation hinged, and it appeared that neither the British nor the Soviets would budge. For the Kremlin, the primary concern was ensuring that there would be great power unanimity on major decisions. Despite the best efforts of British and American officials to avoid alienating Moscow, Soviet leaders harboured suspicions as to Anglo-American intentions for the international organisation and broader post-war order. Echoing a message from Stalin to Roosevelt, Molotov explained to Clark Kerr that what the Soviet Union wanted was to rid the great power council of suspicion, and the way to do this was to demand that a great power not take action unless it was approved by the Council. In a follow up message, Clark Kerr explained that until recently, the Soviet Union had felt that other great powers considered them 'unfit for the structure of an international order'.[753] Now, however, they were not only an integral piece of the future international system but a power which could shape the very structure.

The opinion of Cabinet members on this issue fluctuated. During the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, Churchill had written to Eden that he was in 'very close agreement' with the Soviet

[751] Churchill to Eden, 31 December 1944, M.1259/4, FO 371/50826/U671
[752] See Foreign Office minutes in FO 371/50826/U671
[753] Telegrams from Moscow Embassy to Foreign Office, No. 2441 and 2442, 15 September 1944, FO 371/40713/U7393. See also Stalin to Roosevelt, 14 September 1944, copy in FO 371/40715/U7469

proposals, but in September, he had reversed his position, at least for the time being.[754] Others, including Clement Attlee and Viscount Cranborne, had expressed their opposition to the Soviet thesis, making clear that, 'We would prefer a show-down with the Russians to any attempt to gloss over real differences.'[755] Field Marshall Smuts, however, had sent in a memorandum supporting the view of the Soviets on this issue. He wrote that he was 'deeply perturbed' by the stalemate within the Dumbarton Oaks discussions, and argued that, because the establishment of a world organisation was paramount, that the United Kingdom and the United States should go some way towards accepting the Soviet thesis in order to ensure their support for the organisation.[756] Churchill replied days later, and reversing his position once again, said that he was in general agreement with Smuts on the Soviet voting formula.[757] He added that 'no further progress can be made on this dangerous path' until he, Roosevelt and Stalin could meet again.[758] It was a view shared by Roosevelt, who was confident that during the next meeting of the Big Three, they could get a compromise which might 'tide things over for a few years until the child learns how to toddle'.[759]

Despite Churchill's request to put the issue on hold, officials strove in these months to come up with recommendations for the Cabinet. It led to a heated debate within the Foreign Office, with some officials, such as Cadogan and Jebb, fluctuating in their views, and others, such as Webster, steadily defending the original British approach. Even as the British delegation was still days away from wrapping up the Dumbarton Oaks discussions, J.G. Ward

[754] Churchill to Eden, 23 August 1944, FO 371/40712/U7314
[755] Telegram from Deputy Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary, AMSSC to Octagon, No. 278 CORDITE, 15 September 1944, FO 371/40713/U7374. Viscount Cranborne: Secretary of State for the Dominions, 1940-42; Lord Privy Seal, 1942-43; Secretary of State for the Dominions, 1943-45; Leader of the House of Lords, 1942-45
[756] Telegram from Gen. Jan Smuts to the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary, 20 September 1944, FO 371/40716/U7593
[757] Mark Mazower has noted the intervention of Smuts here, writing that, 'thanks to Smuts, the Russians remained in.' This credit to Smuts ignores the way in which the Russians were actually brought around to the compromise on the veto. Mazower, *No Enchanted Palace*, pp. 59-60, 64
[758] Churchill minute, No. M(0) 13/4, 24 September 1944 and Telegram from Churchill to Smuts, No. 916, 25 September 1944, FO 371/40716/U7593
[759] Telegram from Dominions Office to South Africa, 29 September 1944, FO 371/40716/U7593

wrote that the Foreign Office, including Eden, had largely moved toward the position of the Russians, with the idea of the Soviet thesis being a 'lesser evil' than no organisation at all.[760] Some, such as Nevile Butler, saw the possibility of British imperial interests being protected by the Soviet thesis, provided that they could convince the Dominions and other smaller states to sign up.[761] Other officials, however, were opposed to siding with the Soviets. Frank Roberts noted that the Russian proposal seemed 'to smack too much of "Holy Alliance" methods', and that it would undoubtedly breed distrust of the great powers.[762]

Cadogan's opinion on the matter was significant in that it revealed an important calculation taking place within the Foreign Office in the period—namely, whether the organisation would simply be an alliance of great powers, or whether it would represent a more democratic and internationalist scheme. The significance was most glaring in the considerations of Cadogan and Jebb, both of whom had been central to the planning and negotiating process thus far. Just days after Cadogan returned from Washington, he addressed this issue at length, and moved somewhat away from his line at Dumbarton Oaks. 'The real choice', he said, 'lies between a Four or Five Power Alliance dominating a World Organisation, and a "democratic" universalised organisation to deal with all eventualities.' He said that while they had, until this point, been aiming at the latter, he was not sure this was the correct approach. There was an 'inherent vice', reminiscent of the League, he said, in the idea of a Charter which might lead to the great powers taking action against one another. Thus, while the idea of a four power alliance might be 'repugnant to many people', there could be ways to design 'variants' of such an alliance, whereby the great powers might be able to exercise

[760] Ward minute, 22 September 1944, FO 371/40715/U7469. Eden minute on Ward covering minute, 26 September 1944, FO 371/40719/U7664. The Chiefs of Staff were also in agreement with the Soviet view, noting that it contained 'a certain realism' which emphasised great power agreement as 'indispensable to world peace'. COS (44) 200, 6 October 1944, FO 371/40723/U8397
[761] Butler minute, 25 September 1944, FO 371/40715/U7469
[762] Roberts minute, 26 September 1944, FO 371/40719/U7664

unanimity among themselves.[763]

Though a stark suggestion from the Permanent Under-Secretary, it was a view which Jebb had long been entertaining. At one point, he wrote that 'it is arguable that we might, in the circumstances be better off without [a world organisation].'[764] On the one hand, he felt that if Britain did not envisage the ability to sanction the Soviet Union or the United States in the event of them 'misbehaving', then they should not set up a world organisation at all. At the same time, however, sanctioning a great power would mean war. To say otherwise would be leading populations around the world 'up the garden path' in believing that a world organisation had been designed to maintain peace indefinitely. 'This...is the greatest of all dangers, namely that we should build up our future world organisation on a sham.' For Jebb, the central issue remained both the position of the great powers as well as the relationship between them. In what was his most revealing statement in these months, he made it clear that if they could get a great power alliance, then that would be the preferred arrangement.

> The real snag…was that the idea of a 'naked' alliance was one which simply could not be put across in America and that in practice the only way to get America to accept world-wide commitments was by constructing a World Organisation in which the 'power politics' aspect would be discreetly veiled.[765]

In his view, not only was the World Organisation necessary for American involvement in the post-war world, but even within the organisation, it was necessary to oppose the Russian thesis in order to secure American participation.

Even as Foreign Office opinion fluctuated in these weeks, it was Webster who remained firmly opposed to the Soviet thesis and would eventually convince others—including Cadogan—of his position. His catalyst was a paper by Sir Stafford Cripps, who had remained largely removed from the planning process since his response to Jebb's Four Power Plan in the winter of 1942. In his paper, he called for the great powers to have the right to vote in disputes

[763] Cadogan minute, 2 October 1944, FO 371/40719/U7664
[764] Jebb minute, 19 October 1944, FO 371/40720/U7919
[765] Jebb minute, 16 November 1944, FO 371/40723/U8353

in which they were involved. Given that all would retain veto power, it was a view which aligned with the Russian position. He noted that the Security Council was not a 'judicial' body but a 'political' body, therefore certain realities would need to be honoured. Consent of the great powers, he said, was 'essential' and therefore each member must reserve the right to vote.[766] Jebb felt that Cripps's comments carried much 'force', but that the idea of countries not voting in a dispute 'is liable to land us in difficulties if it is pressed too hard'.[767] Both Webster and William Malkin, the Legal Advisor to the Foreign Office, took exception to Cripps's case, however, with Malkin noting that adopting Cripps's approach would represent a 'complete reversal of our attitude so far'. For Webster, this fundamental question of great power voting rights struck at the heart of the nature of the organisation. 'The real question', he wrote, 'is whether a system is to be set up in which there is one law for the Great Powers and another for the lesser states'.[768] He considered the idea of being able to sanction small powers but not great powers a 'sham' and advised that Britain not give up its 'position of principle' by yielding to the Soviet thesis. Moreover, he highlighted that the Dominions, especially Canada, were unlikely to sign up to such an organisation.[769]

The argument convinced Cadogan, who decided that Webster should draft the Foreign Office reply to Cripps's paper. In his draft, Webster stated clearly that if they were to accept the Soviet thesis,

> We should set up two entirely different systems, one for the Great Powers which would be subject to no control whatever except to the extent that they may be influenced by the other Powers, and another for the Smaller states which would be subjected to most drastic penalties if they refused to act as the Council decides.

He noted that they were still discussing ways that the Council—and specifically the body of great powers within it—might be tied to a larger organisation, but that giving the great powers

[766] Memorandum by Cripps, 7 October 1944, FO 371/40719/U7737
[767] Jebb minute, 14 October 1944, ibid
[768] Malkin minute, 17 October; Webster minute, 16 October 1944, ibid
[769] Webster minute, 26 October 1944, FO 371/40720/U7919; Webster diary, 25 October and 2 November 1944, Reynolds and Hughes, *Historian as Diplomat*, pp. 52-53

such unconstrained power would wreck the organisation. At the same time, however, to subject the great powers to sanctions or decisions of the Council would destroy the cooperation needed after the war.[770]

It was not enough to simply oppose the Russian thesis, however, and throughout October and November, the Economic and Reconstruction Department worked to deliver a compromise which might be presented to the Americans and Soviets. It was an example of the way in which officials, at times, altered aspects of their own plans in order to get agreement on the more essential points, namely the creation of an international organisation. It fell to Jebb to collate the various proposals which had been circulating in the Foreign Office. The first option was 'Compromise A', which was the same as that which had been offered by the British delegation at Dumbarton Oaks. Under this compromise, a great power would not be able to prevent the discussion of a dispute, but would be able to block—by using its veto power—any imposition of a settlement. That a great power would not be able to prevent a case being heard in the Security Council, Jebb noted, could give the organisation 'very considerable moral force' and give them about 80% of the original Anglo-American thesis. 'Compromise B' followed a line, originally developed by Jebb in September, in which the great powers, when party to a dispute, would simply form a 'consultative body' amongst themselves and attempt to settle the matter. In this grouping made up of only the great powers, there would be no voting and no question of enforcing a decision. The great powers would simply attempt to work it out amongst themselves, in a kind of modern iteration of the Concert of Europe.[771] 'Compromise C' would follow closely to 'Compromise B', but with one major difference: the Security Council would not be responsible for examining and discussing a dispute in which a great

[770] 'Letter to the Minister of Aircraft Production from the Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs', 30 October 1944, FO 371/40723/U8352. At the direction of Churchill, this paper was circulated in conjunction with Cripps's paper.

[771] Webster wrote that Jebb's idea for a 'consultative council' of the great powers 'appeals to me strongly because it is in essence a revival of the scheme sponsored by Castlereagh in 1815'. Webster minute, 'Note on Mr Jebb's paper, 18 September 1944, Webster 12/4, LSE

power was involved. This would instead be immediately put to the great power consultative body. In effect, any dispute involving a great power would be outside the world organisation as designed during the Dumbarton Oaks talks.[772]

Eden found Jebb's paper useful, but the Foreign Secretary also expressed his support for the Russian proposal. 'The more I think of the Russian proposal the less shocked I am by it as a practical method of dealing with a real problem.'[773] Just days before, Eden had read Cripps's memorandum in support of the Russian thesis and felt that there was 'much sense in it'.[774] Despite Cadogan's warning to Eden that the Cripps paper was 'based on false assumptions', in these weeks it appeared as though the Foreign Secretary and Prime Minister were siding with Cripps—and thus, the Soviet thesis—over the Foreign Office officials heretofore responsible for the planning for a post-war organisation.[775] On 21 November, Churchill agreed to circulate Cripps's paper along with a response by Cadogan.[776] The debate over the veto question would soon come to a crucial Cabinet decision.

Wavering approaches of the Cabinet and Foreign Office prior to Yalta

Between December and January, the Foreign Office was pushing for the Cabinet to make decisions on the issues of voting in the Security Council, as well as a related issue concerning whether the 16 Soviet republics would be admitted into the organisation as independent members.[777] A three-power meeting had been set for early in the New Year and officials had

[772] Note that Compromise C was also referred to as the 'Cadogan Plan', which in reality was a combination of a plan proposed by Jebb (effectively Compromise B) and a plan developed by William Malkin. Draft memorandum by Jebb, 'World Organisation', FO 37140723/U8353. This becomes 'Note by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 'World Organisation', APW (44) 117, 22 November 1944, FO 371/40723/U8381
[773] Eden minute, 20 November 1944, FO 371/40723/U8353
[774] Eden minute, 18 November 1944, FO 371/40723/U8352. Webster diary, 14 November 1944, Reynolds and Hughes, *Historian as Diplomat*, p. 53.
[775] Cadogan minute, 20 November 1944, FO 371/40723/U8352
[776] See WP (44) 667, FO 371/40723/U8352
[777] The latter question had been raised by the Soviet delegation at Dumbarton Oaks; and while it was never decided on, it was now seen by the British as a bargaining chip for the Soviets. See Memorandum by ADK Owen, 'The Claim of the Sixteen Soviet Republics to Membership of the new World Organisation', undated, FO 371/40711/U7269

been adamant that there be a decided British policy.[778] Both Eden and Churchill remained uncommitted on the voting issue, although both had expressed support for the Soviet position. But even as officials sought to bring the Foreign Secretary and the Prime Minister around to their view on these matters, they themselves began to doubt once again whether the world organisation would amount to the version they had imagined. As a result, they continued to weigh whether British interests could best be secured through a wider organisation or through some kind of alliance between one or more of the great powers. In the end, it was decided to press on with the formation of a United Nations organisation, but the discussions within the Foreign Office in this period—particularly over the possibility of developing an alliance with the great powers—reveal the importance they attached to securing American commitments in the post-war period.

Just as Jebb's paper on suggested voting compromises was brought before the Cabinet, a telegram arrived from Washington indicating that Roosevelt was hoping to discuss these matters. Importantly, when it came to 'judicial or quasi-judicial procedures' for the peaceful settlement of disputes, the President wrote that the great powers should not exercise their right to vote—a move he believed would 'immensely strengthen their own position as the principal guardians of the future peace'.[779] It was in line with Foreign Office thinking, but apparently not with that of the Prime Minister who wrote to Eden that, 'As far as I can see the Foreign Office view differs fundamentally from mine...I am in entire agreement with the Russians.' Added to this was his frustration with the pressure placed on the Cabinet to decide such matters. 'All these attempts to settle the world while we are still struggling with the enemy seem to me most injurious.'[780]

The Foreign Office responded to Churchill, pointing out that Roosevelt's proposal

[778] Cadogan diary, 20 November 1944, Dilks (ed.), p. 682
[779] Telegram from Roosevelt to Churchill, No. 666, 5 December 1944, FO 371/40725/U8635
[780] Churchill to Eden, M.1191/4, 6 December 1944, FO 371/40725/U8635

effectively amounted to 'Compromise A' in the Foreign Office memorandum.[781] This compromise, they noted, had originally been voiced by the British delegation during the Dumbarton Oaks discussions, and it was even discussed by Eden and Churchill at the second Quebec Conference in September 1944. This clarification did not seem to matter, however. When, on 20 December, the Cabinet convened to consider the voting question in light of Roosevelt's proposal, little progress was made.[782] Cadogan, who was in attendance, felt that it was 'a complete madhouse' and that Churchill was misunderstanding the basic facts. 'The old P.M. is failing', he wrote. Cadogan, like the rest of the Foreign Office, were adamant that the Cabinet must come to an agreed policy on the matter, so that they were not beholden to the decisions of Roosevelt and Stalin, not to mention the whims of Churchill. 'We want to have a mind of our *own* and no one will give any attention to it', Cadogan complained in his diary.[783]

On 11 January, the Cabinet finally decided on the questions of great power voting rights and the admittance of the Soviet republics. Cadogan wrote that after delaying the subject for as long as possible, Churchill finally got to the topic of world organisation, and with the help of Cadogan's explanation on the basic points, he was 'lumped over the hurdle'.[784] It was decided that the British would support Roosevelt's compromise, and that they would let the Americans take the lead on the question of the 16 Soviet republics.[785] But just as British policy had taken shape, a message from Washington threw the entire matter into the air once again. It stemmed from a message sent by Roosevelt which indicated that while he may be able to go some way towards accommodating the Soviet voting thesis, he would not be able to do the same for the issue of the Soviet republics. As Lord Halifax reported, Roosevelt 'frankly hoped

[781] Eden to Churchill, 12 December 1944, P.M./44/762, FO 371/40725/U8635; 'World Organisation', Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 18 December 1944, WP (44) 747, FO 371/40725/U8709
[782] War Cabinet conclusions, WM (44) 172, 20 December 1944, CAB 65/44
[783] His emphasis. Cadogan diary, 20 December 1944, Dilks (ed.), pp. 688-89
[784] Cadogan diary, 11 January 1945, Dilks (ed.), pp. 694-95
[785] Foreign Office informed the State Department who relayed their satisfaction with the British position. Brief for the Secretary of State, 'World Organisation: Voting in the Security Council', 23 January 1945, FO 371/50673/U626; War Cabinet conclusions, WM (45) 4, 11 January 1945, CAB 65/49

to horse trade one for the other'.[786] Jebb noted that if Roosevelt were to agree to the Soviet line on the voting question in return for the sixteen republics not joining the organisation as independent members, then this would change British calculations entirely.

It is here that Jebb and Cadogan expressed a cynicism towards the future organisation which was surprising given their roles in the planning and negotiation phases until that point. Roosevelt's comments played a part, but it was also a recent recommendation put forward by US Senator Arthur Vandenberg which fed into their reconsideration. Vandenberg had proposed that the five great powers develop a 'hard and fast treaty' against Germany and Japan. Importantly, Vandenberg aimed for the five-power alliance to be more of a backbone than a replacement to the world organisation.[787]

Jebb saw 'a great deal of advantage' in such a scheme, and in offering his thoughts, he went so far as to say that this kind of alliance might serve a more useful purpose than the organisation itself.[788]

> My own personal view has always been that it would not be a disaster if the World Organisation came into being in a limited or in a truncated form provided we got a hard and fast treaty with the Americans for the purpose of preventing renewed aggression by Germany and Japan. The only danger, as I see it, is that if the World Organisation does not materialise or does not pass through the American Senate we may get the worst of both worlds, namely no treaty and no organisation.[789]

Webster was alarmed by Jebb's comment, noting that Vandenberg, who had been considered a 'moderate isolationist' in the past, was himself a 'slippery customer'.[790] These types of proposals, especially when the world organisation was at stake, were 'bedevilling things', he wrote. Added to this was his concern that Roosevelt might agree to the Soviet thesis in return for Stalin abandoning the idea of the 16 republics. 'All this is expediency and trickery and there

[786] Telegram from Washington Embassy to Foreign Office, No. 483, 20 January 1945, FO 371/50672/U520
[787] Telegram from Washington Embassy to Foreign Office, No. 183, 9 January 1945, FO 371/50659/U263; For Vandenberg's speech, see FO 371/50659/U753
[788] Jebb minute, 18 January 1945, FO 371/50659/U378
[789] Jebb minute, 22 January 1945, FO 371/50672/U520
[790] Butler wrote that Vandenberg was a 'moderate isolationist' in minute on 17 January 1945, U378/5/70; Webster minute, 16 January 1945, FO 371/50659/U333

is no principle amongst these men', Webster wrote.[791] Other officials, however, saw the benefits of Vandenberg's proposal, provided that it could be tied to the world organisation going forward. Nevile Butler felt that this type of treaty represented a kind of 'foundational security', noting that during the Paris Peace Conference, there was an attempt to create an Anglo-American Guarantee Treaty with France, which, if it had materialised, would have served as an important structural support for the League of Nations.[792]

Cadogan weighed in on the debate, and his comments reveal an important dimension to his thinking on the fundamental bases of international order. He carried a certain cynicism of 'lovely and logical' plans for world organisation, which he felt crumbled under realities. There was, he said, 'no magic formula for keeping the peace of the world'. The great powers were the only countries which could pose a 'serious menace' to the peace of the world; and if any were intent on aggression, then no world organisation—whether under the Soviet or Anglo-American voting proposals—would be capable of preventing a war. The Vandenberg proposal, on the other hand, served a valuable purpose, because it represented 'realistic and rough and ready methods' to quell two potential danger spots, namely Germany and Japan. Importantly, Cadogan understood that to write off the world organisation—as Jebb had briefly suggested—in favour of Vandenberg's proposed five power alliance was not exactly a choice, given the momentum, especially since Dumbarton Oaks, which had been moving in the direction of establishing a world organisation. Furthermore, to accept the Soviet thesis would likely mean that the smaller powers, including the Dominions, would not join the organisation.[793]

For all of the variance of opinion within the Foreign Office since the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, officials had come to a decided line prior to the Yalta Conference. First and

[791] Webster diary, 22 January 1945, Reynolds and Hughes, *Historian as Diplomat*, p. 55
[792] Butler minute, 17 January 1945, FO 371/50659/U378
[793] Cadogan recommended, however, that if the Soviet position was agreed to, they should forego a United Nations organisation for the time being and instead attempt to operate under a kind of five-power alliance. Eden capped off both Jebb's and Cadogan's minutes by stating that there was 'much force in this'. Eden minute, 23 January 1945 and Cadogan minute, 22 January 1945, FO 371/50672/U520

foremost, they needed to continue their pursuit of a world organisation, which was seen as the best way of bringing the United States into European commitments. Second, the Foreign Office recommended that the United Kingdom adopt the Vandenberg proposal for a five-power alliance, not so much as a replacement for the world organisation, but rather as a structural support.[794] Though the latter suggestion would not be taken up by the Cabinet in the end, the Foreign Office, now settled firmly on the need to create an international organisation and to have their compromise—now known as the 'Roosevelt compromise'—adopted by the Soviets. The only remaining hurdle was again the Prime Minister, who seemed to suggest that he still might side with the Soviet Union on this issue.[795] Churchill's views were met with increasing alarm in the Foreign Office, where Jebb wrote that, 'If the Prime Minister takes the view that he will side with the Russians if the Russians stick out on their thesis it will quite likely mean that the Americans will not be able to come into the World Organisation.' He pointed out that at the recent APW Committee meeting, it was agreed that the President's proposal—which Jebb noted was actually the British compromise offered at Dumbarton Oaks—was one which the British should support 'irrespective of the Russian attitude'. In this way, they might 'bring pressure to bear on the Russians to accept it'.[796]

Foreign Office pressure finally convinced the Prime Minister, who wrote that now was not the time to 'fight a stiff battle' with the Americans. Similar to Jebb and Cadogan, his focus remained on continuing great power cooperation into the post-war period. 'The only hope for the world', he wrote, 'is the agreement of the three Great Powers. If they quarrel, our children are undone'.[797] Despite Churchill's note, a concerned Eden wrote to Cadogan, 'I fear P[rime] M[inister] still does not understand [these] issues and is under influence of Cripps

[794] Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 25 January 1945, APW (45) 12, FO 371/50673/U654
[795] Churchill to Eden, M. 90/5, 19 January 1945, FO 371/50673/U626
[796] Jebb minute, 21 January 1945, ibid
[797] Churchill to Eden, 25 January 1945, FO 371/50673/U626

memorandum. I did my best last night.'[798] Eden's lack of confidence in Churchill on these matters was not apparent at the time but certainly weighed on the Foreign Secretary. Weeks before, Eden had confided to his diary his concerns over what he saw as an ambiguous Anglo-American position going into the upcoming three power talks.

> I am much worried that the whole business will be chaotic and nothing worthwhile settled, Stalin being the only one of the three who has a clear view of what he wants and is a tough negotiator. P.M. is all emotion in these matters, F.D.R. vague and jealous of others.[799]

This chapter has examined the period between the start of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference in August 1944 and the beginning of the Yalta Conference in February 1945. It has put forward a view that the United Kingdom, far from being a passive observer during the Dumbarton Oaks Conference and in the months that followed, played the most important role in defining the role of the great powers within the organisation. The first major contribution, from a deliberative standpoint, was the initial stand made by Cadogan and Webster against the American and Soviet positions on the veto rights of the great powers. The British delegation's ability to bring their American counterparts over to their position—one which favoured parties to a dispute *not* being able to vote in that dispute—helped to align the Anglo-American position on this question, and set the stage for a contentious debate between the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union which would last until the Yalta Conference. Second, a suggestion made by Jebb in a meeting of the Steering Committee at Dumbarton Oaks—specifically, one intended to resolve the impasse on the veto question—ended up forming the contents of what would become known as 'the Roosevelt compromise'. This is a British contribution which has been consistently overlooked in the history of the United Nations but one which salvaged the very creation of the organisation itself.

[798] Eden minute on M.110/5 (PM/45/49), 25 January 1945, ibid
[799] Eden diary, 4 January 1945, Avon Papers, 20/1; also quoted in Dilks (ed.), pp. 692-93

In the months after the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, the sense of achievement in having reached agreement between the three powers had given way to critical debates within the Foreign Office and Cabinet over the question of great power voting rights. For officials such as Webster, this was nothing short of a battle over the nature of the organisation. Others, such as Jebb and Cadogan, however, wavered somewhat in their views. They both, to varying degrees, expressed support for a kind of great power alliance, even if this came at the expense of the organisation. Indeed, it is somewhat striking that there was, at a critical juncture, such a fundamental reconsideration. This was an example not only of the priority that officials continued to place on great power cooperation, but also of the way in which concern for the national interest, at times, overtook the objective of creating a wider international structure. While their ultimate recommendation was to move forward with the creation of a world organisation, the debate in these months revealed important aspects of their approach to statecraft, which this thesis argues can best be described by the phrase 'realist-internationalism'.

Integral to understanding this approach is highlighting the extent to which these Foreign Office officials relied on alliances as ordering mechanisms in themselves. Whether it was a Western Security Group or a five-power alliance, officials viewed such arrangements, to paraphrase Cadogan, as tried and tested means of ordering an international system. On the one hand, they might buttress a world organisation; or in other scenarios, they might insure against that organisation's breakdown. Finally, officials continued to return to an earlier realisation—namely, the importance of bringing the United States into European commitments through an international organisation. It was the acceptance of this point which played the most important role in steadying the wavering approaches of the Foreign Office and Cabinet by the time of the Yalta Conference.

Chapter Seven

The Final Push: Yalta and San Francisco Conferences, February – June 1945

This chapter focuses on the period between the start of the Yalta Conference and the end of the San Francisco Conference, a time which proved to be the most pivotal for the Foreign Office thus far. Specifically, this section sets out to examine Foreign Office approaches to the conference in the context of emerging discord between the great powers. Previous historical scholarship has focused on this period, especially as it relates to the Yalta Conference, the origins of the Cold War and the San Francisco Conference itself.[800] But less attention has been given to the Foreign Office preparation for the San Francisco Conference, in particular, and the ways in which officials balanced their increasing suspicions of the Soviet Union—and to a lesser extent the United States—against the necessity of delivering on the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. Sean Greenwood's *Titan at the Foreign Office*, though it discusses some of Jebb's work before and during the Yalta Conference, does not examine Foreign Office preparation between February and April.[801] Similarly, P.A. Reynolds and E.J. Hughes' *Historian as*

[800] A number of historians have focused on the conference from the perspective of the United States. See Hoopes and Brinkley, *FDR and the Creation of the U.N.*, pp. 184-204; Schlesinger, pp. 111-279; Campbell, *Masquerade Peace*, pp. 159-193; Divine, *Second Chance*, pp. 279-298; Dan Plesch, *America, Hitler and the UN*, pp. 171-184; Ruth Russell, *A History of the United Nations Charter*, pp. 625-932; Harley Notter, *Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939-1945*, pp. 440-450. Other have focused on the Canadian and Australian contributions. See Chapnick, *The Middle Power Project*, pp. 126-138; Harper and Sissons, *Australia and the United Nations*, pp. 47-80; Alan Watt, *The Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy, 1938-1965*, pp. 78-93. On the Yalta Conference, see Serhii Plokhy, *Yalta: The Price of Peace* (New York: Penguin Books, 2011); Diana Preston, *Eight Days at Yalta*: *How Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin Shaped the Post-War World* (London: Picador, 2019); David Reynolds, *Summits: Six Meetings That Shaped the Twentieth Century* (New York: Basic Books, 2007), pp. 103-161; Kimball, *Forged in War,* pp. 308-318; Gilbert, *Road to Victory*, pp. 1171-1218; Barker, *Churchill and Eden at War*, pp. 259-260; Folly, *Churchill, Whitehall and the Soviet Union*, pp. 133-143, 163-166; Kitchen, *British Policy Towards the Soviet Union*, pp. 247-250; Herbert Feis*, Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin*, pp. 489-558; David Reynolds's annotations covering this period in *Kremlin Letters* is also useful. See pp. 528-583; Mastny, *Russia's Road to the Cold War*, pp. 239-266

[801] Greenwood has argued that 'Gladwyn's energetic buttonholing before and during Yalta likely played a part in winning [the Soviets] round.' Greenwood, *Titan at the Foreign Office*, p. 186

Diplomat, focuses more on the work of Charles Webster in these months, as opposed to a wider examination of Foreign Office preparation for San Francisco.[802]

The opening section begins with a discussion of the Yalta Conference, where the outstanding questions of great power voting rights and the admission of the 16 Soviet republics were finally resolved. The writing here does not add, in any concrete way, to the extensive scholarship on this conference, but it does highlight the split which existed between the Prime Minister and the Foreign Office, as well as the work of Cadogan during the three-power discussions over the future world organisation. Overall, this section of the chapter helps to set the stage for its analysis of the work carried out by the Foreign Office in the months that followed the conference.

Though the Yalta Conference marked a great achievement for these governments when it came to the post-war organisation, the optimism which characterised the end of the meetings soon soured, as Anglo-Soviet relations descended into mutual suspicion.[803] Soviet moves in Romania and Poland, coupled with ostensibly minor disputes about invitations to the San Francisco Conference, led to Molotov's initial refusal to attend the meeting. This move, coupled with a wrinkle in Anglo-American relations over the subject of colonial trusteeship, led the Foreign Office to consider a postponement of the conference in March.[804] At one point, Cadogan warned that if the conference were held as current politics stood, it would lead to 'disaster'.[805] Though a postponement was decided against, the San Francisco Conference saw

[802] Reynolds and Hughes, *Historian as Diplomat*, pp. 55-73

[803] Anglo-Soviet relations in this period have been covered in a number of works. See Ross, 'Foreign Office Attitudes Towards the Soviet Union', pp. 532-538; Adamthwaite, 'Britain and the World, 1945-9: The View from the Foreign Office', pp. 225-227; 231-232; Rothwell, *Britain and the Cold War*, pp. 136-144; Kitchen, *British Policy Towards the Soviet Union*, pp. 250-267; Folly, *Churchill, Whitehall and the Soviet Union*, pp. 142-166; Baylis, *Diplomacy of Pragmatism*, pp. 34-36; Barker, *Churchill and Eden at War*, pp. 292-295

[804] The subject of trusteeship, though one of the most important subjects in the history of the creation of the organisation, will not be discussed in detail here. The topic will be mentioned only in relation to some of the negative effects it had on Anglo-American relations in these months, and it will rely chiefly on the scholarship of William Roger Louis. See Louis, *Imperialism at Bay*, pp. 448-474. A.W. Brian Simpson has also addressed the issues of human rights, domestic jurisdiction, regional organisations and colonial trusteeship both before and during the San Francisco Conference. Simpson, *Human Rights and the End of Empire*, pp. 254-274

[805] Cadogan minute, 2 April 1945, FO 371/50696/U2594

a renewed battle over the veto question, which again threatened to derail the establishment of the organisation. Throughout the period, officials in the Foreign Office were as perturbed as they were pessimistic about future relations, though their focus remained fixed on securing Russian participation in the organisation.

Through a close reading of the Foreign Office files from this period, this chapter brings out certain essential aspects of the Foreign Office approach towards the post-war organisation between February and June 1945. The first notable finding is the way in which officials dealt with the fundamental question of regional versus international machinery. Though a future international organisation remained a central objective for the Foreign Office, it did not constitute the entirety of British strategy towards the post-war world. The question of a Western Security Group continued to be a central objective for some officials, especially given the increased Soviet influence—diplomatically and militarily—in Eastern Europe. Crucially, officials began to re-purpose the prospect of such a western grouping, now thinking that the formation of such a bloc might prevent France from exerting its control over the region.[806] Thus, the idea for a Western Security Group now took on the triple purpose of protecting against Germany, insuring against Russia and dampening French influence in Western Europe.

Though the Foreign Office would eventually put the issue on hold in favour of concluding the world organisation discussions, the question of regional versus international machinery did not disappear. Indeed, during the San Francisco Conference, one of the most heated debates came over the question of whether regional blocs or alliances between states would be subordinate to the world organisation. The Foreign Office never objected to states being allowed to join such alliances, but officials did oppose these groupings undermining the

[806] Some studies which have examined the push for a Western Security Group into the spring of 1945 have often underplayed the Foreign Office views of the grouping potentially serving as a check on France. Baylis, *Diplomacy of Pragmatism*, pp. 30-36 and 'British Wartime Thinking about a Post-war European Security Group', p. 279. Sean Greenwood, however, has covered this subject in detail. Sean Greenwood, *The Alternative Alliance: Anglo-French Relations Before the Coming of NATO, 1944-48* (London: Minerva, 1996)

authority of the Security Council. This concern became increasingly important given the recent Franco-Soviet Treaty and the prospects this held for the future European order. A position articulated by Jebb in the run up to the San Francisco Conference ended up laying the foundation for the British approach once negotiations began. There, the British delegation provided a robust defence of the position that regional alliances should not usurp the authority of the Security Council, leading to what Webster described as 'a victory for the global as against the regional point of view'.[807]

Finally, the Foreign Office in these months concentrated on ensuring that the key structures and functions of the organisation as laid out in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals were not drastically altered or limited by the counterproposals of smaller powers. This was most evident in the debates over the veto question, which saw formidable opposition from a number of quarters. The official correspondence sent between San Francisco and London reveals that Cadogan and Webster played important roles in these debates throughout the conference, helping to smooth differences between the great powers and then ensuring that these delegations stood strong in the face of widespread opposition.[808] The result was an acceptance by the smaller powers of the Yalta voting formula and with it, the realisation of a fundamental aim of the Foreign Office since the summer of 1942, namely that the great powers, operating at the centre of a worldwide organisation, would be primarily responsible for the maintenance of peace and security.

The first great hurdle: The discussions on the world organisation at the Yalta Conference

The decisions reached at Yalta concerning a world organisation came as a great relief to the Foreign Office, and in particular Jebb and Cadogan who were in attendance. Both men had left

[807] Webster diary, 20 May 1945, Reynolds and Hughes, *Historian as Diplomat*, p. 62
[808] Some of Webster's contribution during the conference has been highlighted by Reynolds and Hughes. See ibid, pp. 55-73

London in a rather 'defeatist' mood.[809] The difficulty in reaching a Cabinet decision on the voting issue had taken its toll and it seemed that the Prime Minister, despite him agreeing to the Foreign Office position, still did not grasp the issue. This was most apparent during preliminary meetings between the Americans and British in Malta. Edward Stettinius, now the American Secretary of State, noted that the Prime Minister 'did not seem to understand the international organisation or the voting procedure in the council'.[810] In another meeting, a pessimistic Eden told Harry Hopkins that they 'were going into a decisive conference and had so far neither agreed what we would discuss nor how to handle matters with a Bear who would certainly know his mind'.[811] Moreover, as Serhii Plokhy has highlighted in his history of the Yalta Conference, the Americans and British travelled to the conference 'in a poor bargaining position' given that the Red Army was now 70 miles east of Berlin just as the Western Allies, having recently incurred a German counterattack at the Battle of the Bulge, were regrouping.[812]

At the Yalta Conference, Stalin first addressed the subject of the world organisation during the opening dinner, noting that the great powers must reserve their predominant position, and that the small powers—many of whom he thought had played minor roles in the outcome of the war—should not be able to wield undue influence.[813] The Americans and British agreed in principle, but still emphasised that the great powers must not run roughshod over the interests of smaller states. After the meal, Churchill, in conversation with Stettinius and Eden, explained that he was still attracted to the Russian thesis, primarily because it would ensure great power unity after the war. Here the Foreign Secretary disagreed once again with the Prime Minister, but this time in front of the American Secretary of State, who subsequently

[809] Webster diary, 1 February 1945, ibid, p. 55
[810] Stettinius diary, 1 February 1945, Campbell and Herring (ed.), *The Diaries of Edward Stettinius Jr, 1943-46*, pp. 231-233. See also Stettinius, *Roosevelt and the Russians*, pp. 61-62
[811] Eden diary, 2 February 1945, Avon Papers, 20/1; also quoted in Eden, *The Reckoning*, p. 512
[812] Plokhy, *Yalta: The Price of Peace*, pp. 392-393. Similarly, Kimball has noted that the Americans and British, on the eve of Yalta, 'had very little military leverage'. Kimball, *Forged in War*, p. 310
[813] Plokhy has examined the question of great power voting rights as it was discussed at the conference. See Plokhy, *Yalta: The Price of Peace*, pp. 117-127. In his account of the conference, the importance of a world organisation appears to be entirely an American concern. See Polkhy, pp. 393, 398

explained his position on the matter.[814] Stettinius felt that he had made some headway in convincing Churchill, and Eden would later follow up that Stettinius's appeal was the decisive moment in bringing the Prime Minister around on the voting question.[815]

While the Dumbarton Oaks proposals were a central topic of the negotiations from the start, it was not until the third day of the conference that progress was made. Here, Stalin admitted his own ignorance of the subject, but made clear that erecting an organisation which might outlast those who had lived through the horrors of war was essential.[816] By the next day, 7 February, Churchill, who had only recently been steered away from the Russian thesis became the champion of the so-called 'Roosevelt compromise'. In a rambling speech, which Cadogan described as 'off the rails', he warned that if the three powers were to move in the direction of the Russian position, the world organisation might be in jeopardy.[817] Despite the Prime Minister's 'harangue' and Stalin's admitted ignorance of the details of the voting question, the American and British delegations were able to slowly allay the fears of the Russians on this issue. On the British side, Cadogan was one of the indispensable figures of the conference, guiding Churchill into line where possible and reassuring the Americans of the British position when necessary.[818] His influence was such that Jebb, upon returning to London, told Webster that Cadogan had effectively traded spots with Eden and become Churchill's primary advisor on the voting question.[819] By the close of meetings on 7 February, Stalin and Molotov had been persuaded by Roosevelt's compromise, as well as the Dumbarton Oaks proposals more broadly.[820]

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[814] Stettinius diary, 4 February 1945, Campbell and Herring (ed.), pp. 240-42; Hughes, 'Winston Churchill and the Formation of the United Nations Organization', p. 192
[815] Stettinius diary, 4 February 1945, Campbell and Herring (ed.), pp. 240-42
[816] Extract of minutes from Argonaut, 2nd Plenary Meeting, 6 February 1945, FO 371/50674/U934
[817] See letters from Cadogan to his wife, Theo Cadogan, 7 and 8 February 1945, Dilks (ed.), pp. 705-07. For the views of Roosevelt and Hopkins on this speech, see Preston, *Eight Days at Yalta*, pp. 179-180
[818] Cadogan diary, 8 February 1945, Dilks (ed.), pp. 705-07
[819] Webster diary, 14 February 1945, Reynolds and Hughes, *Historian as Diplomat*, p. 56
[820] Message from Eden to Foreign Office, Argonaut to AMSSO, JASON 187, 7 February 1945, FO 371/50674/U934

The following day the Russians brought up the issue of the admission of the Soviet republics into the organisation.[821] In what came as a pleasant surprise to the Americans and British, the Russians backed off of their original request that the 16 republics of the Soviet Union be admitted as founding members of the organisation. They instead asked that two-to-three be admitted—namely the Ukraine, White Russia, and Lithuania—based on their contribution to the war effort.[822] The British were quick to see the benefits of this proposal. For one, the admission of two or three Russian 'puppets' would ease the case against Britain and their supposed 'bloc' of Dominions. Churchill thought it could be a 'friendly gesture' to the Russians; and perhaps more importantly, it would mean that Britain was not the 'only multiple-voter in the field'.[823]

The question of colonial trusteeship was also taken up at the conference, where Jebb admitted that there was a 'wide gulf' opening between the Americans and British on this matter.[824] The Foreign Office had supported a proposal by the Colonial Office which advocated the dissolution of the mandate system in favour of a new international system, but these were strongly opposed by Churchill who wrote that, '"Hands off the British Empire" is our maxim and it must not be weakened or smirched to please sob-stuff merchants at home or foreigners of any hue.'[825] During discussions at Yalta, Eden was adamant that the question not be brought up at the forthcoming conference on world organisation, a suggestion which had been made by the Americans. The Foreign Secretary spoke with Harry Hopkins, who explained that the President was not exactly of the same mind as some officials in the State Department, and he would most likely not force a completely unfavourable system on the British.[826] Elsewhere,

[821] This subject has been discussed in detail by Plokhy, *Yalta: The Price of Peace*, pp. 183-195
[822] Extract of minutes from Argonaut, 3rd Plenary Meeting, 7 February 1945, FO 371/50674/U983. Minute by Jebb, 8 February 1945, FO 371/50674/U983
[823] Churchill to Attlee, JASON 220, 8 February 1945, FO 371/50674/U983
[824] Jebb minute, 4 February 1945, FO 371/50807/U1047. For a detailed account of this issue at Yalta, see Louis, *Imperialism at Bay*, 448-460
[825] Churchill to Eden, 31 December 1944, M. 1257/4, FO 371/50807/U235
[826] Cadogan minute, 5 February 1945, FO 371/50807/U1047

Stettinius sought to reassure Churchill, and it was finally agreed that territorial trusteeship would only apply to three categories: existing mandates of the League of Nations; territory reclaimed from the enemy; and any other territory which might be voluntarily placed under trusteeship.[827] For the time being, British officials were comforted in knowing that the international organisation would not, in theory, threaten the Empire.

With nearly all issues concerning the world organisation resolved, the three delegations began exploring possible dates for a United Nations Conference as well as the countries which would be invited. It was suggested that the conference begin on the 25th of April and that all countries who had joined the United Nations by 1 March 1945 would be invited.[828] Now, roughly four months after the conclusion of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference in October, the three powers had formally agreed to the basic framework of the world organisation. More importantly, the Foreign Office had achieved their aims more easily than expected. The compromise on the voting formula was their own—though they were resigned to let the Americans take credit for it, as a matter of tactics—and they had not had to concede too much on the question of the 16 Soviet republics. As Cadogan wrote to his wife at the end of the conference, 'I hope the world will be impressed!'[829]

Great power friction and the question of postponement

For all of the optimism which came out of Yalta, just weeks after the conference, Soviet diplomatic manoeuvres in Eastern Europe caused great suspicion amongst officials in London. These developments led, in part, to the first crisis within the Foreign Office in these months. On 1 March, the Romanian Prime Minister, Nicolae Rădescu, was forced from office and replaced less than a week later by Petru Groza, the first communist Prime Minister of the

[827] Extract of minutes from Argonaut, 5th Plenary Meeting, 9 February 1945, FO 371/50807/U1215
[828] Record of 4th Plenary Conference, 8 February 1945, FO 371/50674/U985; Telegram from Eden to Foreign Office, JASON 256, 9 February 1945, FO 371/50674/U985
[829] Cadogan to Theo Cadogan, 11 February 1945, Dilks (ed.), pp. 708-09

country. The British government were outraged, calling it a direct violation of the Declaration on Liberated Europe which had been agreed at Yalta.[830] Looking east, Churchill was dour about the prospects of Anglo-Soviet cooperation, warning that Britain could not afford to be 'cheated' in the same way over Poland, even if it meant going to war with the Soviet Union.[831] There, the Soviets had announced on state radio that the government under the Lublin Poles would represent the country at the San Francisco Conference, a move which ran directly against the wishes of the Americans and British. Churchill soon wrote to Roosevelt expressing a grim outlook. If there could not be a satisfactory agreement over Poland prior to the start of the conference, he said, 'We are likely to give the world the impression that we shall be basing the new World Organisation on a foundation of sand.'[832] To add to the animosity, Stalin and Molotov requested that the Ukraine and White Russia be invited to the San Francisco Conference.[833] Though the Americans and British had agreed at Yalta to eventually allow the Ukraine and White Russia into the future organisation, they had not agreed to their attending the meetings in San Francisco. Both the British and Americans decided to 'stick to their guns' and not give way to the Soviet request that the two republics attend the conference.[834] As a result, Molotov backed out of the San Francisco Conference on 22 March, giving as his reason a budget meeting of the Supreme Soviet.[835]

Britain's relationship with the United States in these months was on a much better footing, though the issue of colonial trusteeship remained unresolved, and officials were growing increasingly frustrated on this point. In an attempt to gain insight on American intentions, senior officials agreed that Jebb should visit the United States on a 'scouting

[830] This provided that the great powers would work together to ensure that European countries were able to 'solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems'.
[831] Dilks (ed.), p. 718. See also Churchill's remarks at a Cabinet meeting on 3 April. War Cabinet conclusions WM (45) 39, 3 April 1945, CAB 65/52; Baylis, *Diplomacy of Pragmatism*, p. 35
[832] Quoted in Memorandum by Jebb, 'Can San Francisco be postponed?', 31 March 1945, FO 371/50696/U2594
[833] Molotov to Eden, 13 March 1945, FO 371/50690/U2210
[834] Telegram from Washington Embassy to the Foreign Office, No. 1870, 22 March 1945, FO 371/50690/U2212; Telegram from Washington Embassy to the Foreign Office, No. 1989, 26 March 1945, FO 371/50690/U2213
[835] Molotov to Clark Kerr, 22 March 1945, FO 371/50699/U2786

expedition'. Cadogan felt that it would be helpful if Jebb could understand—and possibly influence— the lines on which State Department officials were thinking, especially in regards to the organisation and procedure of the conference.[836] When he travelled to Washington in March, Jebb reached an agreement to set up an 'informal organising group' of representatives of the great powers which would meet in the weeks leading up to the conference. Next, they agreed that economic and social organs of the future organisation, while essential to the functioning of the institution, should be addressed in detail after the conference, so that the discussions in San Francisco might proceed more efficiently. Finally, they addressed the question of colonial trusteeship, with Pasvolsky telling Jebb that the British will be 'agreeably surprised' by the 'modest' nature of the American paper on colonial issues.[837]

Foreign Office calculations in regards to colonial questions had changed in the aftermath of the Crimea Conference, leading Jebb to write that the earlier proposals put forward by the Colonial Secretary were 'still-born'.[838] As the Foreign Office worked towards formulating a new policy, some officials speculated that a more 'thorough-going form of international trusteeship' would be pressed by the Americans, and might include 'direct international administration'. Added to this was what officials believed to be the American intention to create a 'moral umbrella' under which they might set up military bases on captured Japanese islands.[839] Though they had yet to receive a formal proposal from the Americans, officials' worst fears were stoked when, in late March, the Foreign office received word that the United States was planning to introduce a 'fully matured plan' which would include 'international inspection' of mandated territories as well as increased 'international

[836] Cadogan minute, 6 March 1945, FO 371/50683/U1804; Record of meeting in Jebb's room on 27 February 1945, FO 371/50683/U1786; Minutes from a meeting in Cadogan's room, 5 March 1945, FO 371/50683/U1804
[837] Telegram from Washington Embassy to the Foreign Office, No. 1814, 20 March 1945, FO 371/ 50807/U1982
[838] Jebb minute, 24 February 1945, FO 371/50807/U1460. Also quoted in Louis, *Imperialism at Bay*, p. 472. For the debates concerning trusteeship which took place within Whitehall after the Yalta Conference, see Louis, *Imperialism at Bay*, pp. 463-474
[839] Foreign Office minute on International Colonial Policy, 8 March 1945, FO 371/50807/U1623

supervision' of colonies.[840] The announcement stirred both Eden and Churchill, with the Prime Minister writing that, 'I do not like it. It goes far beyond what I was assured at Yalta.'[841] The Foreign Office tried to downplay the report, but at the same time, officials were frustrated by the uncertainty of the issue. As Cadogan wrote, 'They've been hanging this over our head since last May, without doing us the compliment of explaining, in the least degree, what they mean.'[842] Others complained of what they saw as an American tendency to issue 'strong (though vague) idealistic sentiments'. As Ronald Campbell wrote,

> Statements of general principles are so much in the blood of the Americans and so much part of their traditional methods of thought that they are not only a temptation they find hard to resist but almost an end in themselves which it is incumbent on an American government to secure.[843]

Between the uncertainty of the American position on colonial trusteeship and the lingering tension with Moscow, there was a serious consideration in early April whether the Foreign Office should recommend a postponement of the conference. Jebb weighed the consequences of such a decision, noting that 'we are between the devil and the deep sea.' In the end, he suggested that they not go in this direction. The State Department and Roosevelt administration had done a great deal of leg work in bringing around public opinion in their country, and to delay the conference at this stage, he believed, would have 'dreadful psychological effects'.[844] It proved to be a wise decision, as the colonial trusteeship issue was not nearly as big of a problem as officials had feared. In reality, the State Department was at odds with American military officials on the subject of trusteeship. While the former wanted to erect a Trusteeship Council and help certain dependent territories gain independence, the latter was conscious that such proposals might hinder their ability to maintain control of territories captured from the Japanese—ones which they hoped would help establish an

[840] Telegram from Washington Embassy to the Foreign Office, No. 162, 23 March 1945, FO 371/50807/U2207
[841] Eden to Churchill, 29 March 1945 and Churchill to Eden, 29 March 1945, FO 371/50807/U2207
[842] Cadogan minute, 2 April 1945, FO 371/50807/U2207
[843] Campbell minute, 31 March 1945, FO 371/50807/U2207
[844] Memorandum by Jebb, 'Can San Francisco be postponed?', 31 March 1945, FO 371/50696/U2594

American military presence in the Pacific.[845] These differences, combined with the death of Roosevelt on 12 April, meant that the United States would not provide the Foreign Office with their views until the San Francisco Conference.

An adaptive grand strategy: Jebb's 'Political Forecast' and the Western Security Group

While the creation of the world organisation remained the focus for the Economic and Reconstruction Department throughout the spring of 1945, officials continued to weigh other options which might help to secure British interests. Regional 'machinery' in the form of an alliance of Western European democracies continued to be floated. But important to these strategic considerations were the assumptions of post-war Europe on which the Foreign Office was basing its outlook.

The period after the war, Jebb wrote in a paper for the Post Hostilities Planning Staff, was sure to be 'troublous and difficult in the extreme'. Disorder would be the norm throughout Europe, with domestic populations struggling between left-wing governments and right-wing dictators promising recovery and reform. Contrary to some of the thinking around the Chiefs of Staff, he did not think that the Soviets would expand westward, although he admitted that Soviet influence 'will almost undoubtedly be paramount in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Roumania [sic], Hungary, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia'. This did not mean absolute Soviet control over these countries, but their populations would likely look east, to Moscow, rather than west when it came to questions surrounding armaments and foreign policy. It was essential that Anglo-Soviet relations remain on a cooperative footing, though the situation in the Middle East and Far East could present problems. On the future of Anglo-American relations, Jebb was clear that 'our interests in general are completely interlocked', and in his view, both countries were

[845] Campbell, *Masquerade Peace*, p. 190. For a detailed discussion of the debates over trusteeship within the Roosevelt administration, see Louis, *Imperialism at Bay*, pp. 475-496

dependent on one another. Britain would need the 'whole-hearted moral and physical support' of the United States in any future conflict, while Washington would depend on London as a 'bridgehead' to Europe.[846]

A vital pillar of the Foreign Office approach both to the European and international orders remained the creation of a Western Security Group which might protect against future German hostility. On the one hand, it would prove to Moscow that Britain was serious about resisting Germany. As Archibald Clark Kerr had reported, the Soviets viewed British policy towards Germany as 'the touchstone of our faith as a good ally'.[847] On the other hand, if Britain could assume a leadership role within Western Europe, this might also increase its power vis-à-vis the United States and Soviet Union. Moreover, the grouping of Western European countries might serve as an insurance policy against either the United States or the Soviet Union leaving the world organisation in the future. The idea of regional machinery feeding into an international order—or serving as a backup should the international order break down—had remained a fundamental organising principle for Jebb since the earliest iteration of his Four Power Plan.

The question of a Western Security Group had lingered into February, with little attention paid to it during the Crimea Conference.[848] The Foreign Office had yet to respond to Churchill's message of 31 December, though the Prime Minister had followed up in February with another message to Eden, writing that the idea of British security being dependent on it taking responsibility for 'a cluster of feeble states' was ridiculous. 'We ought to think of

[846] Draft of the 'World Strategic Survey', 5 February 1945, FO 371/50774/U1080. Jebb wrote this section of the PHPS report, despite his view of the PHP Staff as 'wretched' and his belief that their work was coloured by an unreasonable fear of the 'Russian bogey'. Jebb minute, 18 December 1944, FO 371/40741B/U8523; Baylis, *Diplomacy of Pragmatism*, p. 28; see also Lewis, *Changing Direction*, pp. 163-165

[847] Memorandum by Clark Kerr, 'Memorandum respecting the observations on the attitude of the Soviet Government towards possible formation of a group of Western European democracies', No. 772, 19 November 1944, FO 371/40725/U8736

[848] With the exception of Churchill's message of 8 February. Churchill to Eden, M. (Arg) 7/5, 8 February 1945, FO 371/50826/U1900

something better', he said.[849] Even if they were to entertain the idea of a Western Bloc, he felt that there would first need to be an Anglo-French treaty, and he was insistent that the French be the first to recommend such a bilateral alliance. A meeting with the French Foreign Minister, Georges Bidault, in February further stalled the initiative, however, with the Quai d'Orsay hinting that such an Anglo-French treaty was dependent on Paris and London coming to terms on the future treatment of Germany as well as the crisis in the Levant.[850]

The Foreign Office, however, continued to consider the issue, due in part to reports from their ambassadors in Brussels and Paris. Significantly, these diplomats began to see the value of the treaty as not only a protection against Germany and possibly Russia, but also as a check on France. As the Ambassador to Belgium, Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen, warned Eden on 20 February, 'Belgium looks for British support as an offset to the French pressure which she fears.'[851] A month later, he followed up with a similar message, noting that France was showing 'definite signs' of a policy which might be directly at odds with British interests. Belgium and Holland, he added, were relationships which Britain could not afford to overlook. 'The link between ourselves and the Low Countries is so ancient and so vital that it is really a law of nature in the politico-strategic sphere.'[852] On 11 March, a telegram from Duff Cooper, then British Ambassador in Paris, echoed Knatchbull-Hugessen's suspicions and called for a decisive line from London. His recommendation was for Britain to take up the initiative and attempt to create a political and military alliance with France. Should London refuse, the French would likely lead a Western Bloc of nations, which could, should the world organisation not come to have the influence originally envisioned, possibly lead to France—together with its ally Russia—exercising a dangerous influence in Europe. This outcome, he warned, would

[849] This minute from Churchill came in response to Clark Kerr's memorandum of 19 November 1944 which was not read by the Churchill until Yalta. Churchill to Eden, 8 February 1945, M(Arg) 7/5, FO 371/50826/U1900
[850] Ward minute, 19 March 1945, FO 371/50826/U1768
[851] Telegram from Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Eden, No. 51, 20 February 1945, FO 371/50826/U1264
[852] Knatchbull-Hugessen to Oliver Harvey, 24 March 1945, FO 371/50826/U2270

'leave us in a position of dangerous isolation'.[853]

The view in the Foreign Office was one of concern. Officials were somewhat suspicious of French intentions in Western Europe, and they feared that if they did not take the lead in the region, then France would not hesitate to assume the mantle. In the internal discussions which took place, Jebb admitted that, should France occupy the Rhine area as far north as Cologne, Belgian independence would be in jeopardy. Because they could not yet guarantee French friendship in the future, Jebb said, 'this might be a very dangerous situation for us.'[854] Likewise, John Troutbeck of the new German Department, wrote that the Belgians are 'fully justified in their fear of French ambitions'.[855] Jebb and others in the Foreign Office pushed for the government to continue to pursue an Anglo-French treaty which might make up the basis of a wider regional defence organisation including Belgium, Holland, and eventually Norway and Denmark. Such an arrangement would accomplish several objectives, including checking the power of Germany, preserving the independence of small states, and preventing France itself from dominating the region. Added to this was the idea that the all-important international order would be more firmly supported. As Knatchbull-Hugessen put it, the 'triangle-frame' of the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union would suffer 'unless the smaller regional pieces fall into their place in the general structure'.[856]

Though there was serious consideration in these months about the Foreign Office moving ahead with the construction of an alliance with Belgium and Holland—and later France, Norway and Denmark—this was eventually decided against. Eden, not to mention Churchill, believed that carrying France was the prerequisite; and even into April, Cadogan remained optimistic of the French seeking an Anglo-French pact. It was ultimately decided

[853] Telegram from Duff Cooper to Eden, No. 290, 11 March 1945, FO 371/371/50826/U1768
[854] Jebb minute, 26 February 1945, FO 371/50826/U1265
[855] Troutbeck minute, 6 March 1945, FO 371/50826/U1265. John M. Troutbeck: First Head of the German Department, 1945-46
[856] H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Oliver Harvey, 24 March 1945, FO 371/50826/U2270; see also, Troutbeck minute, 6 March 1945 and Jebb minute, 26 February 1945, FO 371/50826/U1265

within the Foreign Office that they would wait to take up such an alliance until after the conference on world organisation. As Harvey explained, 'Whilst the need for the [Western European] Group as our long-term policy is very clear, it is less certain whether the moment is a good one, on the eve of the San Francisco.'[857]

'World Organisation or Alliances?': A Foreign Office reassessment

Although the Foreign Office would put the Western Security Group on hold, their intention to one day create such a pact meant that they would continue to be the foremost proponents of the world organisation making sufficient room for regional organisations. Importantly, however, officials understood the need to strike a balance. While the world organisation would need to allow for such alliances and pacts, these could not usurp the authority of the Security Council. To do so would not only weaken the organisation, but it would also drive the United States away and potentially allow the Franco-Soviet Treaty to become the most important ordering mechanism on the European continent.

In the run up to the San Francisco Conference, the French posed the biggest challenge to this Foreign Office approach. Concerned over how quickly the world organisation could respond to future aggression, French officials had proposed an amendment to the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals which would allow alliances to operate outside the control of the Security Council. The parties undertaking action would simply need to inform the Security Council of their actions. The recent Franco-Soviet Alliance, as Nevile Butler pointed out, was at present the only guarantee the French had against a hostile Germany in the future, and they wanted to ensure that it could be as effective as possible.[858] It was a proposal which some in the Foreign Office thought could wreck the entire organisation. Worse, the Northern Department estimated

[857] Harvey minute, 5 April 1945, FO 371/50826/U2799
[858] Butler minute, 4 April 1945, FO 371/50703/U2950

that Russia, given their recent treaty with France, would likely support such a measure.[859] The situation left British officials scrambling for a response. On the recommendation of the Foreign Office, the APW Committee warned against accepting the French idea, making it clear that any enforcement action in the future should be taken as a result of Security Council decisions and not individual treaty obligations.[860]

The question was one of grave importance, for it struck at the heart of how the organisation would undertake its primary purpose: the maintenance of peace and security. In searching for a way to reassure the French, Butler suggested Senator Vandenberg's idea for a five-power treaty which would be designed to protect against Germany and Japan. Such a proposal, he felt, would provide for some measure of 'unity' prior to the conference and 'would be justified by the weakening of confidence since Yalta'.[861] Cadogan noted that the entire question raised a 'difficult and delicate matter', but the central divergence revolved around the possibility that the great powers might take action in opposition to the wishes of their counterparts in the Security Council. This was a fundamental problem, as it would, in practice, violate the principle of unanimity among the great powers. When the matter arrived on Eden's desk, the Foreign Secretary largely agreed with Cadogan, but he felt that the idea of a five-power alliance was worth examining in detail.[862]

In a paper titled 'World Organisation or Alliances?', Jebb assessed whether British interests could, going forward, be secured by a world organisation or an 'interlocking series of alliances'. The latter represented an 'alternative' international order, he felt, as opposed to arrangements which might reinforce a world organisation. While both had their merits, 'The great danger', he warned, 'is that we may resolutely pursue neither one policy nor the other and consequently find ourselves in the worst position, namely without a World Organisation

[859] Cited in ibid
[860] APW (45) 9th Meeting, 29 March 1945, copy in FO 371/50692/U2335
[861] Butler minute, 4 April 1945, FO 371/50703/U2950
[862] Cadogan minute, 11 April and Eden minute, 12 April 1945, ibid

and without adequate alliances.' As a starting point, he reiterated that the 'principal objective' for the United Kingdom was to bind the United States into concrete commitments in Europe. One way to do this was to establish a treaty with the United States, though he doubted whether there was an American appetite for such an alliance. For one, many Americans were likely to associate treaty obligations with 'power politics'. Instead, the fact remained that in order to secure commitments from the United States, a wider world organisation was a necessity.

The French thesis, however, presented a serious obstacle. If adopted, Jebb was clear that it would 'prejudice the whole future of the World Organisation'. Such an arrangement—whereby great powers, operating through an alliance, might be able to take action regardless of the view of the Security Council—would, in effect, lessen the influence of the Security Council to something like that of the Council of the League of Nations. Far from negating the formation of alliances, however, Jebb saw the benefits that such arrangements could bring, provided they were in line with the purpose and principles of the organisation and they remained subordinate to the Security Council. Importantly, they would also serve as an important insurance policy against the possibility of the United States or the Soviet Union opting out of the world organisation in the future. His recommendation was that the Foreign Office should make a concerted effort to convince their French and Soviet counterparts of the inherent difficulties contained in the French proposal. 'No suggestions that [the Security Council] would be 'too slow in action' should be allowed to militate against its being ultimately entrusted with full responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security all over the world.' Jebb's paper went on to make up the basis of the British position on the matter, and copies of the document were handed to every member of the British delegation travelling to San Francisco.[863]

[863] Memorandum by Jebb, 'World Organisation or Alliances?', 15 April 1945, copy in Webster 14/2, LSE

No 'theoretical security organisation': The Foreign Office prepares for San Francisco

Although the most detailed planning had been completed and the most contentious differences between the great powers had been resolved, the possibility remained that the majority of the countries within the United Nations could still reject the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals and in turn, prevent the creation of an international organisation. Thus, the great powers would need to 'sell' the merits of the organisation while not sacrificing the essential structure and function of the machinery outlined at Dumbarton Oaks.[864] For the United States, this meant a domestic public relations campaign and an effort to bring their Latin American neighbours on board.[865] While the Foreign Office did not represent a traditionally isolationist public as in the United States, they did work to bring around key stakeholders, especially the Dominion governments, whose support at the conference was considered vital for British influence.

On 13 March, leading figures within the League of Nations Union, including Lord Lytton, Professor Gilbert Murray and Lord Robert Cecil—the latter having been the key architect of the League of Nations on the British side—met with Eden, Jebb and Webster at the Foreign Office. The meeting was a snapshot of some of the continuities and change in British internationalism in the first half of the twentieth century. Cecil at first stressed the importance of bringing public opinion along, but his chief concern was the voting system in the Security Council, an arrangement which he felt 'in effect made an alliance of the five powers'. He did not think that Eden could get the world 'to accept a proposition so unjust'. Lord Lytton echoed this concern, noting that it would mark a 'retreat from the position of the Covenant'. In reply, a defensive Eden made clear that it was not to be solely 'a theoretical security organisation for the maintenance of peace'.[866] The relationship and collaboration of the great powers, Eden stressed, was the lens through which the Foreign Office viewed the potential of the world

[864] Record of meeting in Jebb's office, 27 February 1945, FO 371/50683/U1786
[865] Campbell, *Masquerade Peace*, p. 61-66; 111-129; Divine, *Second Chance*, pp. 283-287
[866] Webster diary, 13 March 1945, Webster 29/12, LSE

organisation, and it was essential to get these powers 'round the table' from the start. [867]

The approach of the Foreign Office was not entirely one of defence, however. In the months leading up to the conference, the Economic and Reconstruction Department, in particular, worked to offer amendments to the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals which, if accepted, would further increase the power of the Security Council. The first related to the Council's ability to make recommendations in disputes which did not affect the maintenance of peace and security. Whereas the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals had given the Council the power to investigate these kinds of disputes, it did not give them the authority to recommend potential solutions or settlements.[868] The next proposed amendment concerned domestic jurisdiction, and it suggested that the Council have the right to intervene in the affairs of other states if they deemed a situation to be a threat to international peace and security. On the minds of such officials as Jebb, Webster and Cadogan was the Nazi policies towards the Jewish populations of Germany; but essential in their consideration was the fact that the Security Council not be allowed to interfere in matters which was not deemed a 'threat to the peace'.[869]

In addition to their own suggested amendments, the Foreign Office worked to incorporate the views of the Dominion governments where possible and also to oppose their suggestions when needed. Some examples included Canada's longtime desire for certain states—namely those who had contributed to the war effort in significant ways—to receive weighted consideration when it came to the election of non-permanent members of the Security Council. Due to a compromise offered by Cadogan, the United Kingdom adopted the line that, in selecting non-permanent members to the Security Council, 'due regard' should be given to

[867] Record of meeting between the Secretary of State and a Committee of the League of Nations Union, 13 March 1945, FO 371/50685/U1913

[868] 'Dumbarton Oaks Proposals for a General International Organization', Chapter VIII, Section A. For this British amendment, see FO 371/50709/U3583

[869] For Foreign Office discussion in November 1944, see FO 371/40722/U8079. For a more detailed account of the way in which the Foreign Office dealt with the subjects of human rights and domestic jurisdiction in the months prior to the conference, see Simpson, *Human Rights and the End of Empire*, pp. 254-259

their contribution to the maintenance of peace and security.[870] Another Canadian suggestion—that non-members of the council not be bound by decisions taken in that body, except in agreement with them or through a two-thirds vote of the Assembly—was resisted by the Foreign Office who felt that such a proposal would 'deprive the organisation of teeth and of the power of rapid action'.[871] While there was a serious interest in trying to incorporate Dominion suggestions into the structure and functioning of the organisation, there was the recognition that first, the British had already gone some way to ensure these recommendations were included in the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals and second, that as much as they sought to help the Dominion governments, the British—especially after Yalta—had certain 'moral obligations' to stay true to the essential pillars of the three power cooperation.[872]

By the beginning of April, the majority of Foreign Office amendments had been approved—first by the APW Committee and then by the War Cabinet—and they now faced their final pre-conference obstacle: gaining the support of the Dominions.[873] On 4 April, the leaders of the Dominion governments gathered in London for the annual Commonwealth Conference, which ended up dealing almost entirely with the forthcoming discussions on world organisation. There was agreement on certain key points which would go directly into the future United Nations Charter. One of the more notable was a draft of the preamble submitted by Field Marshall Smuts, Prime Minister of South Africa.[874] When it was tabled, Lord Cranborne noted that the Foreign Office, and in particular Webster, had produced such a draft months earlier. In the penultimate meeting of the conference, a revised draft incorporating

[870] Minutes of British Commonwealth Meeting [hereafter BCM], BCM (45) 9th meeting, 11 April 1945, Webster 13/8, LSE. For this British amendment, see FO 371/50709/U3583
[871] Draft memorandum by Minister of State, 'World Organisation: Views of Dominion Governments', 23 February 1945, FO 371/50677/U1303
[872] Jebb to Eden, 19 February 1945, FO 371/50676/U1146
[873] War Cabinet conclusions, WM (45) 38, 3 April 1945, CAB 65/50
[874] BCM (45) 5th Meeting, 6 April 1945, Webster 13/8, LSE. Mazower has written that the preamble was 'Smuts's chief contribution to the United Nations', though he does not mention the work of Webster. Mazower, *No Enchanted Palace*, pp. 60-64

Webster's and Smuts's original versions was submitted and approved.[875] The revised version would make up the basis of the future preamble of the United Nations Charter, though Webster was to downplay his contribution on this issue.[876]

The Commonwealth Conference also offered the Foreign Office a sample of more difficulties to come over the voting question. The New Zealand representatives, in particular, found it 'wrong in principle' that a permanent member of the Security Council might be able to veto enforcement action against itself. Others, such as Hume Wrong, then the Canadian Associate Under-Secretary for External Affairs, understood that great powers would need to reserve the right to veto action against itself, but he objected to the idea that a great power might have the ability to veto what constituted a threat to international security. Eden addressed some of these concerns during the meeting, noting that while the principle of unanimity was a key characteristic of the League of Nations, the intention of the great powers was to limit that principle to a smaller group of states going forward, thereby ensuring that the organisation's ability to maintain peace would be more effective.[877] The Commonwealth Conference ended without agreement between the United Kingdom and the Dominions on this point, a schism which was to become somewhat of an embarrassment to the Foreign Office in the forthcoming negotiations. Weeks later, as the San Francisco Conference was in full swing, the British delegation found that some of their toughest opponents on this question were their own Commonwealth partners.

[875] BCM (45) 11th meeting, 12 April 1945, copy in Webster 13/8, LSE. For Webster's earlier drafts, see FO 371/40725/U8785. Christof Heyns, 'The Preamble of the United Nations Charter: The Contribution of Jan Smuts', *African Journal of International and Comparative Law* 7:2 (1995), p. 335
[876] Webster diary, 26 June 1945, Reynolds and Hughes, *Historian as Diplomat*, pp. 69-73
[877] BCM (45) 6th Meeting, 9 April 1945, Webster 13/8, LSE

'How can we work with these animals?' Anglo-Soviet tension at the San Francisco Conference

Hours before the San Francisco Conference opened on the afternoon of 25 April, the forces of the Western Allies had established contact with the Red Army near the German town of Strehla. This long-awaited military triumph, however, did not seem to lighten the mood between the Russian delegation and their American and British counterparts.[878] Early Soviet objections to the American chairmanship of the conference, combined with differences over whether the Ukraine, White Russia, the Lublin Polish government and Argentina should be invited to the conference, left many in doubt as to whether the great powers could come together for this final stretch. The tension was such that Eden wrote to the Foreign Office that the Americans were 'becoming increasingly apprehensive of Molotov's technique of obstruction and seem to be inclining in favour of a showdown'.[879]

For the sake of the conference and the future international organisation, the British were determined to work with the Russians; but in these months, few in the Foreign Office were sanguine about the threat Moscow posed to western influence across Europe. Poland continued to be the source of suspicion, with the British growing increasingly certain that Moscow did not intend to honour the terms agreed at Yalta, namely those which stipulated that the three powers were to be involved in any discussions on the future of the Polish government. British fears were confirmed to some extent when, on 3 May, they received word that 15 Polish representatives affiliated with the exiled Polish government in London were captured. It had been a blatant contradiction of Molotov's earlier promise to not interfere.[880] Cadogan considered the chances of such cooperation to be 'hopeless'. 'How can one work with these

[878] Anne O'Hare McCormick, 'Grim War Mood Pervades Opening of Conference that Seeks Peace', *The New York Times*, 26 April 1945
[879] Telegram from UK Delegation to Foreign Office, No. 26, 27 April 1945, FO 371/50705/U3178
[880] Divine, *Second Chance*, p. 293

animals?', Cadogan wrote, 'And if one can't, what can one hope for in Europe?'[881] The military situation in Europe also shaped these crucial diplomatic considerations. While many were in a celebratory mood at the imminent defeat of Nazi Germany, others warned that the position of Russia could not be ignored. Early into the conference, Eden and Cadogan handed a message to Edward Stettinius which urged American forces to continue their advance into Czechoslovakia, and in particular Prague, in order to create some Anglo-American leverage when it came to orchestrating the post-war settlement in that country.[882]

Though the State Department would decline this suggestion, Anglo-American cooperation appeared formidable in the early days of the conference. The collaborative approach between the two powers—throughout the war and more recently during discussions in Washington prior to the conference—continued at San Francisco, where the Atlantic allies remained in close contact, often meeting behind the scenes on both the ministerial and official level. Later in the conference, Cadogan remarked that the Americans and British had fared well in shooting down amendments which sought to significantly alter the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals. Senator Connally of the American delegation, in particular, had 'the gift of the gab' and his oratory, coupled with Cadogan's knowledge of the complex questions, led the Permanent Under-Secretary to remark that 'he's our heavy artillery and I am the sniper.'[883] The British delegation was far from the American sidekick that some previous histories of the San Francisco Conference have portrayed.[884] Nevile Butler reported that Stettinius leaned 'a good deal' on Eden, while some reporters suggested that, 'it seems to be the American policy at San Francisco to play along with Britain vis-a-vis the Russians.'[885] Still, for Foreign Office officials, it was agreed that the Americans could take all the credit they desired if it meant their

[881] Cadogan diary, 5 May 1945, Dilks (ed.), p. 739
[882] Campbell, *Masquerade Peace*, p. 192
[883] Cadogan diary, 15 May 1945, Dilks (ed.), pp. 742-3
[884] Schlesinger, *Act of Creation*, pp. xvi-xviii; Divine, *Second Chance*, 279-298; Hoopes and Brinkley, *FDR and the Creation of the U.N.*, pp. 184-204
[885] Edwin L. James, 'Mr Hopkins has gone on important mission', *The New York Times*, 27 May 1945

country committing to the organisation. As Butler noted, 'We want people to love us, and not make odious comparisons.'[886]

Crises of the conference: The regional organisation and veto questions

The debates over the power of regional alliances relative to the international organisation and the veto question were the two most significant of the conference.[887] Both raised fundamental questions about the nature of the organisation, and in each case, the Foreign Office defended views which they had held over the preceding years. At its root, the regional question dealt with a simple concept: whether, from a security perspective, the future international order would be determined by the machinery of regional alliances or the world organisation. Although the Foreign Office had earlier given their support for a French amendment which would allow a regional alliance freedom of action should the Security Council not reach a decision on that particular dispute, another amendment introduced by the Soviet Union on this question forced a larger debate.[888] Soviet representatives had suggested an amendment which would have made all of their existing treaties exempt from approval by the Security Council, a proposal which caused Latin American states to demand that a similar provision be made for the recently signed Act of Chapultepec, a non-binding agreement in which Latin American republics—as well as the United States—promised to defend one another in case of attack. Importantly, the United States supported them in this effort, hoping to add to the Charter a provision which would allow for states to undertake regional action in 'collective self-defence'.[889] The Foreign Office felt that such a suggestion gave too much freedom of action to

[886] Nevile Butler to Michael Wright, 2 May 1945, FO 371/50709/U3604
[887] The importance of the regional question at the conference has, at times, been overlooked. Simpson has written that, 'One issue dear to the heart of the Foreign Office had not proved controversial at Dumbarton Oaks, and this was true too at San Francisco.' Simpson, *Human Rights and the End of Empire*, p. 260
[888] Record of UK Delegation Meeting, 12 May 1945, copy in Webster 14/1, LSE
[889] Campbell, *Masquerade Peace*, pp. 164-173

regional groupings, and Eden warned Stettinius that it would lead to 'regionalism of the worst kind'.[890]

There remained a strong desire among Foreign Office officials to limit the ability of regional groupings to operate entirely outside of the Security Council's authority. Members of the British delegation felt that the Latin American states—and even the American delegation, to a certain extent, were risking the authority of the Council. 'The single tree of Chapultepec…seems to loom infinitely larger in their horizon than the entire forest of Dumbarton Oaks', one official wrote.[891] Back in London, members of the Economic and Reconstruction Department who had remained in London expressed their concern with the recent proposals of other delegations, warning that, 'There will not be much left of the Security Council's authority by the time the conference ends.'[892] In the minds of some British officials was Article 21 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, which stated that the organisation would not override international agreements or understandings such as the Monroe Doctrine. Such a situation, Eden believed, would leave the Security Council on a 'very thin covering'. He made it clear to Stettinius that he could not sign a charter which contained such amendments. On this point, however, the Americans remained firm, and Eden eventually agreed to their proposal for 'collective self-defence', so long as there was no reference to the Act of Chapultepec.[893] While other histories have sought to portray a serious divergence of views between the Americans and British on this point, in reality, the views of each delegation did not diverge on the essential point of maintaining the Security Council's authority over regional pacts.[894] Webster himself considered it a great achievement, noting that with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, the British delegation had secured a 'victory for the global

[890] Quoted in Campbell, *Masquerade Peace*, p. 172 and Hoopes and Brinkley, *FDR and the Creation of the U.N.*, p. 197
[891] Telegram from UK Delegation to Foreign Office, No. 284, 12 May 1945, FO 371/50709/U3645
[892] Telegram from UK Delegation to Foreign Office, No. 291, 12 May 1945, FO 371/50709/U3646
[893] Ibid
[894] Schlesinger, *Act of Creation*, pp. 184-85; Campbell, *Masquerade Peace*, pp. 162-173

as against the regional point of view', in that they were able to keep the 'dominance of the central organisation'.[895]

While the regional organisation debate forced uncomfortable discussions—especially between the British and the Americans—the question of great power voting rights once again threatened to destroy the organisation. At a committee meeting on 17 May, Peter Fraser, the New Zealand Prime Minister, asked that the great powers explain the 'scope, extent and effect of the voting and veto proposals' so that they might have a better idea of what was at stake.[896] It fell to Cadogan, as the British representative on the council that day, to describe what had been decided at Yalta just three months prior. While the Covenant of the League of Nations, he explained, had allowed for all members to exercise veto power, in the new organisation, the secondary powers would be deprived of the veto. It was an arrangement, he told the delegations gathered, that might seem 'unequal' but it was not 'unreasonable'. The five powers, he pointed out, had and would continue to have the responsibility for maintaining peace and security, not to mention that, taken together, they represented more than half the population of the world. In international politics, he said, 'you have got to accept the inequalities you find.' At the same time, Cadogan assured those gathered, the five great powers would not be able to simply dictate terms to the rest of the world. Seven votes of the members of the Security Council—including all the permanent members—would be required in order for that body to enforce action, while no member could prevent a matter from being discussed by the council.[897] 'Although there may be theoretical criticisms of these proposals, they do represent something that we can do within the limits of reality, and that they will constitute a contribution to the maintenance of peace.'[898]

[895] Webster diary, 20 May and 15 May 1945, Reynolds and Hughes, *Historian as Diplomat*, pp. 61-62
[896] *Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organisation* [hereafter UNCIO], Vol XI, pp. 317-319
[897] Telegram from UK Delegation to Foreign Office, No. 376, 19 May 1945, FO 371/50712/U3814
[898] UNCIO, Vol XI, pp. 320-322

At the end of Cadogan's speech, Fraser, clearly impressed by the performance, asked that Cadogan's speech be printed and circulated to all delegations.

Despite Cadogan's explanation, many of the smaller powers were not convinced. Though they accepted that the great powers—given the military capabilities of the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union, in particular—should have the right to veto any enforcement action within the Security Council, their objection to the veto came in the realm of the peaceful settlement of disputes. In other words, when a dispute did not involve a threat to the maintenance of peace and security. In these cases, they did not think that the great powers should be able to prevent the discussion of disputes or the recommendation of settlements. The British delegation relayed to the Foreign Office that the basic idea of a great power veto clearly revealed 'the uneasiness' of the smaller powers, and privately, Cadogan told the British delegation that the small powers might make the veto issue 'the occasion of a demonstration against the Great Powers'.[899] Worse, the British delegation considered Australia and New Zealand to be the 'protagonists' of the smaller powers working against such interests of the Security Council. Though their opposition had earlier been voiced at the Commonwealth Conference in April, it was their intention at San Francisco, stated H.V. Evatt, the head of the Australian delegation, 'to remove from the charter a dangerous blot'.[900]

The smaller powers decided to issue a 23-point questionnaire to the great powers about the interpretation of veto, to which the great powers decided that their responses should be made collectively, to ensure solidarity against the challenges from the smaller powers. It was during this process, however, that the Soviet delegation began to protest a technicality—namely, whether or not a procedural issue within the Security Council was itself subject to a

[899] Record of UK Delegation Meeting, 19 May 1945, copy in Webster 14/1, LSE
[900] 'US Foreign Policy Set by Stettinius for Secure Peace', *The New York Times*, 29 May 1945. Drew Pearson of the *Washington Post* wrote that 'To all the stuff-shirt Tories of the British Foreign Office these two [H.V. Evatt and Peter Fraser] are considered the terrors of the Empire.' Quoted in Louis, p. 519

veto.[901] Taken to its logical end, this would lead to a set up whereby a permanent member could effectively veto the discussion of a dispute, based ostensibly on procedural grounds. This scenario was what the smaller powers referred to as the 'hidden veto' and the debate it stoked led Webster to consider it the 'crisis of the conference'.[902] 'It hardly seems possible', he lamented, 'that [the conference] can survive and bring the Charter into existence'.[903]

As the conference threatened to collapse, Cadogan took the lead on the issue within the British delegation. Though some British and American officials—Jebb and Leo Pasvolsky included—were sympathetic to the Soviet line, others, such as Webster, were alarmed at what this would mean for the functioning of the Security Council. Webster cautioned Cadogan on this point, and the Permanent Under-Secretary, in turn, agreed with the professor. At a cocktail party on the evening of the 26th—hosted by Halifax to celebrate the anniversary of the Anglo-Soviet Alliance—Cadogan spent nearly the entirety of the night in discussion with Soviet delegate Andrei Gromyko, who he thought was 'too frightened of Moscow to depart by a single hair's breadth from his instructions'.[904] More importantly, despite their earlier agreement that the permanent members could not veto discussion or consideration of a dispute, the Soviets now showed signs of 'wobbling' on this point.[905] As the British delegation waited for Gromyko to receive direction on the issue, Cadogan wrote to the Foreign Office asking for approval of his recommended line. Here he suggested that the British delegation 'stand fast on this crucial point provided we carry the Americans and Chinese or at least the former with us'. He continued,

> It should in other words be established beyond a shadow of doubt, and so provided in the Charter, that the discussion and consideration in the Security Council of any question brought before it by any state by the assembly or by the Secretary General

[901] This came in response to a question posed by the Australian delegation which read: 'In case a decision has to be taken as whether a certain point is a procedural matter, is that preliminary question to be considered in itself as a procedural matter or is the veto applicable to such preliminary question?' UNCIO, Vol. XI, p. 707
[902] Telegram from UK Delegation to Foreign Office, No. 578, 4 June 1945, FO 371/50717/U4325
[903] Webster diary, 1 and 2 June 1945, Reynolds and Hughes, *Historian as Diplomat*, pp. 65-66
[904] Cadogan diary, 27 May 1945, Dilks (ed.), p. 747
[905] Telegram from UK Delegation to Foreign Office, No. 493, 29 May 1945, FO 371/50714/U4124

shall…not be blocked by any one permanent member.[906]

When the question was put to the Economic and Reconstruction Department, Paul Falla and J.G. Ward were divided in their views, with the former open to accepting the Russian proposal if need be, and the latter seeing the ability of a great power to decide what was procedural to be a retrograde step. It was pointed out that Churchill, in discussions with Stalin, had said that it was important that the three great powers not assume 'the position of rulers over the rest of the world without even allowing other nations to state their case'.[907] Eden settled the matter by agreeing that Cadogan's approach should be followed.[908]

This negotiating line was to take on increasing importance, when, on 1 June, Gromyko returned to his counterparts with the decision from Moscow. In effect, the Russians had returned to the basic question of whether the permanent members could veto discussion of disputes, regardless of whether it was a procedural matter or not. To do otherwise, he said, would be a 'retreat from Yalta'.[909] In a message to the Foreign Office, Cadogan wrote that, 'There is no disguising the fact that a head-on clash with the Russian has now developed.'[910] In a message to his wife, however, he was more adamant that the Russian position was not simply about the functional dynamics of the Security Council.

> It's simply arguing about words, on the surface, but it is of course a symptom of something much deeper—Russian suspicions and unwillingness to cooperate. How to cure those I really don't know. And I don't know whether it's better to have a good rough show-down with the Russians, or to attempt to go on coaxing them. I am inclined to think the former.[911]

At this point, Cadogan and others were considering what was to come of the conference. To prevent an entire dissolution, some recommended that they adjourn the conference and return at a later date; while others suggested continuing to draft the charter but to leave out this

[906] Telegrams from UK Delegation to Foreign Office, No. 493 and No. 495, 29 May 1945, FO 371/50714/U4124
[907] Cited in P.S. Falla minute, 30 May 1945, FO 371/50714/U4124
[908] Eden minute, undated, on Telegram No. 495, FO 371/50714/U4124
[909] Quoted in Campbell, *Masquerade Peace*, p. 180
[910] Telegram from UK Delegation to Foreign Office, No. 559, 2 June 1945, FO 371/50717/U4292
[911] Cadogan to Theo Cadogan, 2 June 1945, Dilks (ed.), pp.748-9

particular question surrounding the veto until a later date.[912] Frustration was directed at the Russians, but at the same time, others pointed to the disruptive role played by the smaller powers. Webster felt that some, especially Evatt, had succeeded in 'driving a wedge' between the Soviet Union and the other great powers. Thinking that the behaviour of the smaller powers might very well wreck the international organisation at this late stage, he wrote angrily that, 'The prospect of a completely lawless world must make them pause—or must it?—as so many of them seem to have no sense of responsibility at all.'[913]

Meetings between the great powers continued, however, with the British holding fast to the line recommended by Cadogan. They succeeded in bringing onside the Americans, Chinese, and French, all of whom were clear that, given past agreement on this very point about the veto powers of the permanent members, they could not now renege. The British and American delegations stayed close on this point and continued to hold private meetings in Stettinius's private penthouse. The goal, first and foremost, was to keep the Russians in the organisation. On this point, the British delegation and the Foreign Office notified Churchill, who they thought might, in conjunction with US President Harry Truman, send an appeal to Stalin to resolve the outstanding issue.[914] On receiving this recommendation, Churchill pointed out that he had repeatedly reassured the Russians that the great powers, under the Yalta formula, were safe from sanctions being applied against them. 'All [the Russians] would have to suffer would be to be forced to hear any case of complaint from a small power and defend themselves or not, as they chose.'[915] The Prime Minister sided with the Foreign Office and counselled that, 'To give way on this point would destroy the whole purpose and prestige of the Organisation.'[916]

[912] Telegram from UK Delegation to Foreign Office, No. 559, 2 June 1945, FO 371/50717/U4292
[913] Webster diary, 3 June 1945, Reynolds and Hughes, *Historian as Diplomat*, pp. 66-67
[914] Foreign Office to Churchill, 4 June 1945, PM/45/226, FO 371/50717/U4292
[915] Churchill to Foreign Office, M. 567/6, 4 June 1945, FO 371/50717/U4348
[916] Telegram from Foreign Office to UK Delegation, No. 1121, 6 June 1945, FO 371/50717/U4348

Despite the scramble by Foreign Office officials and the Prime Minister to give detailed instructions to the delegation in San Francisco, a telegram eventually arrived from Moscow in which Stalin said that what had been the subject of such intense debate amounted to an 'insignificant matter' and that the Soviet Union supported the position of the British and the Americans.[917] Much of this was down to Harry Hopkins, who, operating as a special envoy of the US President, had spoken with Stalin in Moscow and gone some way to explain the outstanding issues.[918] Now that the great powers had resolved their dispute over the 'hidden veto' question, they returned the questionnaire to the smaller powers and sought to extinguish, once and for all, their protests against the veto.

Even as the great powers resolved their differences on this crucial point, there remained some steady resistance to the veto question, however, with Australia and New Zealand providing some of the strongest criticism.[919] On 9 June, the Australian delegation, supported by the New Zealand delegation, voiced opposition to the idea that a great power could prevent recommendations for the pacific settlement of disputes. In a rebuttal to a speech by Evatt, Webster delivered an impassioned defence of the great power position. He noted that the rule of unanimity had been present in the League of Nations for the last 25 years, and that the smaller powers had never questioned it. To think that the world organisation could, through established mechanisms, take action against one of the great powers would prove to be catastrophic, as it would mean another world war. He added that the great powers retained a special position due, in part, to the 'blood, sweat and tears' they had sacrificed during the war.[920] When Evatt repeated his opposition days later, the great powers again united in their

[917] Campbell, *Masquerade Peace*, p. 185; and Schlesinger, *Act of Creation*, p. 217
[918] Record of 6th meeting between Hopkins and Stalin, 6 June 1945, copied in Sherwood (ed.), *White House Papers of Harry Hopkins*, Vol. II, pp. 900-902; Schlesinger, *Act of Creation*, pp. 213-218
[919] The Australian and New Zealand delegations were described as having a 'militant attitude'. Telegram from UK Delegation to Foreign Office, No. 693, 13 June 1945, FO 371/50720/U4666
[920] Webster diary, 9 June 1945, Reynolds and Hughes, *Historian as Diplomat*, p. 68; Telegram from UK Delegation to Foreign Office, No. 650, 10 June 1945, FO 371/50719/U4532

defence of the basic structure of the organisation. To drive the point home, Senator Tom Connally of the American delegation tore up a sheet of paper in front of Evatt—an indication, he said, of what would happen to the charter should the voting formula be rejected.[921] In a more measured speech, Lord Halifax stressed the traditional role of the United Kingdom as the great power who had long defended the rights of small states in the organisation, but he also made clear that great power cooperation was the essential nucleus of world peace. Without it, there would be rival power blocs and a return to war.[922] In what was a victory for the permanent members of the Security Council, the Yalta voting formula eventually passed by a vote of 30 to 2 on 13 June.[923] The majority of smaller nations, while they did not agree with the voting formula in theory, accepted that it was necessary to have a 'defective' organisation rather than no organisation at all.[924]

Though the voting issue was the most important of the conference, there were a number of other questions which were settled and enshrined in the United Nations Charter. Unfortunately for Cadogan, Jebb and Webster, their efforts to give the Security Council increased authority to intervene in domestic affairs were defeated, a decision they thought withdrew from the organisation 'the power to intervene against outbreaks of intolerance of the kind which led to the present war'.[925] Elsewhere, both the World Court and the Military Staff Committee were brought into the Charter, the latter having been a key enforcement mechanism in Jebb and Webster's earlier plans. On the issue of trusteeship, the American and British delegations at the conference worked together to produce a draft which made up the basis of

[921] Schlesinger, *Act of Creation*, p. 223
[922] Telegram from UK Delegation to Foreign Office, No. 693, 13 June 1945, FO 371/50720/U4666
[923] There were 15 abstentions and 3 absentees. Telegram from UK Delegation to Foreign Office, No. 708, 14 June 1945, FO 371/50720/U4667. See Russell, *A History of the United Nations Charter*, p. 738; Schlesinger, *Act of Creation*, p. 223
[924] Telegram from UK Delegation to Foreign Office, No. 673, 12 June 1945, FO 371/50719/U4609
[925] Record of UK Delegation Meeting, 13 June 1945, copy in Webster 14/1, LSE; Webster diary, 13 June 1945, Reynolds and Hughes, *Historian as Diplomat*, p. 68; see 'Charter of the United Nations', Chapter I, Article II; Harper and Sissons, *Australia and the United Nations*, pp. 61-64

discussions.[926] In the end, it was decided to create a Trusteeship Council which would oversee a wider trusteeship system, the latter of which was intended 'to promote the political, economic, social and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories and their progressive development towards self-government or independence'. Important for British officials, however, was that the United States stuck with what had been agreed to between Churchill and Stettinius at Yalta. Though the United Kingdom would not have to hand over its overseas possessions, in reality, the Charter's new provisions related to trusteeship were to play an essential role in building momentum for later de-colonisation.[927]

If 'solemn deliberation' had marked the opening of the conference on 25 April, a mood which can only be described as exuberance marked its conclusion. On 26 June, the delegations gathered in the Herbst Theatre, just across from the War Memorial Opera House where the majority of negotiations had taken place. Lord Halifax, who had been the Foreign Secretary when questions of post-war aims were first raised within the Cabinet, signed for the United Kingdom. For Jebb and Webster, it marked a moment of triumph, and both men took to celebrating with the British delegation in San Francisco. Elsewhere, Cadogan, who had returned to London weeks before, turned his attention to Anglo-French relations in the Levant.

The signing of the United Nations Charter marked the end of the most pivotal period in the entirety of Foreign Office planning for a post-war organisation. Ironically, it was in the final stages of negotiating the United Nations Organization—namely at Yalta and San Francisco—that its creation seemed to be most in doubt. The changing relationship with the Soviet Union—sparked, in part, by the Kremlin's actions in Romania and Poland—played a role, as did the protestations of the smaller powers. As this chapter has shown, the Foreign Office, even in the months leading up to the conference, still questioned whether, and to what

[926] Record of UK Delegation Meeting, 6 June 1945, copy in Webster 14/1, LSE
[927] See 'Charter of the United Nations', Chapters XII and XIII. For a detailed discussion of the trusteeship issue at San Francisco, see Louis, *Imperialism at Bay,* pp. 512-573; Simpson, *Human Rights and the End of Empire*, pp. 268-272 and Russell, *A History of the United Nations Charter*, pp. 808-842

extent, the creation of a world organisation would deliver on their post-war foreign policy objectives. These British officials remained a steadying force in these months, however, first in preparing for the conference and then helping to deliver the Charter in a form that did not alter or detract in any serious way from the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals. Jebb served an important role in articulating how regional alliances might relate to the organisation, a position which led the British delegation at San Francisco to ensure—even in the face of American, Soviet and French opposition—that the Security Council retained its authority. At the conference itself, both Webster and Cadogan were crucial figures in the defence of the Yalta voting formula, whether in opposition to renewed Soviet objections or in response to formidable protests by the smaller powers. The result was a diplomatic achievement of the first order—namely, the creation of a new world organisation which was seen to work in the interests of the United Kingdom.

Conclusion

The establishment of the United Nations Organization was undoubtedly a great achievement for the Foreign Office and in particular, for Cadogan, Jebb and Webster. But as the three men took in the proceedings at the first United Nations General Assembly in January 1946, described in the opening to this thesis, a pessimism was already growing. Cadogan, who privately referred to the Soviets as 'animals' during the San Francisco Conference, began to view relations between the great powers as irreparable. After a frustrating day at the Preparatory Commission in November 1945, he wrote that the new organisation was becoming 'a parody of the League, with all the failings and no advantages, that I can see'.[928] When he became Britain's first Permanent Representative to the United Nations in February 1946, Cadogan would witness first-hand the breakdown of great power cooperation which Foreign Office planners had originally viewed as the central foundation of the international system. It was no better for Jebb, who succeeded Cadogan to that post in 1950 and wrote two years later that, 'Let us frankly recognize the comparative weakness of the United Nations as an instrument for providing the physical force to resist aggression.'[929]

From the late 1940s through the fall of the Berlin Wall, the rules-based international order which the organisation embodied had been overshadowed by a larger competition between the Soviet Union and the Western allies. This did not mark an end to the United Nations nor to the international system is sought to orchestrate, however. By the time the Soviet Union collapsed in 1989, American and British statesmen would speak of a 'Liberal International Order'—which had as one of its pillars the organisation created in 1945—as having triumphed.

In the present day, the debate over the future of this rules-based order has led some to

[928] Cadogan diary, 24 November 1945, quoted in Dilks (ed.), p, 786
[929] Gladwyn Jebb, 'The Role of the United Nations', *International Organization* 6:4 (1952): 509-520, here p. 520

examine its foundations once again.[930] Too often in this pursuit, however, there is less attention paid to the motivations, the ideas, the individuals and the circumstances that ushered it into existence. The aim of this thesis has been to explore one aspect of this history—namely, the role of Foreign Office officials in helping to create the United Nations Organization—and in turn, shed light on what was a unique approach to constructing an international order.

From its inception, the Economic and Reconstruction Department proved itself willing and capable of addressing the fundamental questions of a future order. It replaced what had been a reactive and largely futile effort by Cabinet members to develop war aims with what became an operating ethos, laid down by Gladwyn Jebb, to be the 'master and not the victim of events'.[931] The emphasis on charting a 'grand strategy of peace', in Richard Law's words, is what allowed the department to become the engine room of post-war political planning, not only within the Foreign Office, but across government ministries.[932] By the time of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, its focus on big-picture, long-term strategy had lived up to Stafford Cripps's desire to see a planning body which would allow the United Kingdom to meet the Americans and Soviets 'on equal terms'.[933]

Perceptions of American planning, in particular, helped drive and even shape that of Britain, but did not determine it. An early calculation made within the Foreign Office was that British interests in the post-war period would be dependent on whether they could bring the United States into the defence of the European order. This understanding—best represented by

[930] Examples include: Robert Kagan, 'The twilight of the liberal world order', in Michael O'Hanlon (ed.), *Brookings Big Ideas for America* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 2017); Patrick Porter, 'A World Imagined: Nostalgia and Liberal Order', *CATO Institute Policy Analysis* 843 (2018): 1-21 and *The False Promise of Liberal Order: Nostalgia, Delusion and the Rise of Trump* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2020); Andrew Bacevich, 'The Global Order Myth', *The American Conservative*, 15 June 2017; Graham Allison, 'The Myth of the Liberal Order: From Historical Accident to Conventional Wisdom', *Foreign Affairs* 97:4 (2018): 124-133; Rebecca Friedman Lissner and Mira Rapp-Hooper, 'The Liberal Order is More Than a Myth', *Foreign Affairs*, 31 July 2018; Michael Mazarr, 'The Real History of the Liberal Order: Neither Myth or Accident', *Foreign Affairs*, 7 August 2018
[931] Memorandum by Jebb, 'Relief Machinery: The Political Background', August 1942 FCO 73/264/Pwp/42/8
[932] Richard Law, 'Speech to Cambridge Society for International Affairs, 18 March 1942', *Time and Tide*, 21 March 1942, copy in FO 371/35363/U830
[933] Memorandum by Cripps, 'A Note on the Planning of International Reconstruction', 18 May 1942, FO 371/31538/U1903

the comment of one Foreign Office official that the Americans 'are going to make our world or mar it'—meant that it would be necessary to go some way towards accepting the plans of the Roosevelt administration. But crucially, the Foreign Office did not have very far to go. For one, the idea of an international order—and an international organisation at the heart of that order—was as present in British minds as it was within those of the Roosevelt administration, a point which became clear in the drafting of the Atlantic Charter. Second, British officials, like their counterparts in Washington, understood from their experience of the League of Nations that a less cumbersome and more effective system needed to be developed whereby the organisation would be able to mobilise adequate military power to resist aggression. Thus, when it became clear that Roosevelt was envisioning a four power nucleus at the centre of a wider organisation, the Foreign Office was attracted to the proposal, seeing it as a way to prevent the rise of Germany and Japan in the future and at the same time, allowing the United Kingdom to maintain its position as a world power.

Importantly, however, Jebb hoped to craft British ideas onto this basic conception, most notably in the form of regional structures, economic and social organisations and a possible international organisation. The regional approach, in particular, was one that British planners originally hoped might possibly give rise to an international organisation. Not only were British concerns on stabilising the European continent, but the Manchurian crisis in the early 1930s had laid bare the fact that countries would not be willing to commit men and material to prevent aggression unless they felt their interests directly threatened. Though the regionalist approach would eventually fade by the end of 1943— due, in part, to American opposition—the decision to begin planning for an international organisation meant that the Economic and Reconstruction Department, by the spring of 1944, was able to deliver on ideas which had been progressing in parallel over the previous year.

The department was not the only grouping within Britain thinking about the structure

of a post-war international order—or more particularly, a world organisation—but they quickly distinguished themselves as the individuals who could balance big ideas for international order with a furtherance of national and imperial interests. Early on, Jebb criticised intellectuals such as HG Wells and Clarence Streit who he considered 'starry-eyed idealists', as well as others, such as Arnold Toynbee and his World Order Study Group, who he thought were 'long-haired theoreticians' promoting grand schemes for world government. His criticism of the latter grouping was, at times, shockingly arrogant, as was his view that the League of Nations had been the 'Professors' Peace'. The one intellectual who he did value, however, was Charles Webster, who he considered to be a 'great power man' with an 'encyclopaedic knowledge' of past international organisations, and therefore, more in touch with the realities of international politics. While this characterisation was true to a certain extent, Webster could also display a somewhat radical version of internationalism, as evidenced by his articles supporting the 'gradual evolution' towards a world state, which appeared in *The Times* in the late 1930s.

In their wartime planning, however, Jebb, Webster and other officials including Cadogan, developed plans for the post-war world which combined both realist and internationalist notions. At the beginning of the planning process, there was far more emphasis on power and national interest. Cadogan, in the early years of the war, had spoken of the experience of Munich as one which had returned 'force securely to its throne'.[934] On the other hand, Jebb's earliest drafts—Relief Machinery: The Political Background and the Four Power Plan—were remarkable, both for their scope as well as their realist calculations. As one official wrote, it was not 'some misty dream for the distant future', but rather, 'the stuff of current politics'.[935] While the basic conception of a nucleus of great powers operating at the centre of a wider international order would last through to the creation of the United Nations

[934] Cadogan diary, 6 January 1940, in Dilks (ed.), p. 243
[935] Law minute, 30 September 1942, FO 371/31525/U742

Organization, it would be masked to a great degree by more internationalist aspects.

Much of this was due to the gradual incorporation of Charles Webster into the Economic and Reconstruction Department. From the moment he was asked to comment on Jebb's plans in May 1943, he began to recommend traditional tenets of internationalism, most notably that the medium and small powers should be made to feel more influential within the international order, whether through their involvement (on a non-permanent basis) in a World Council or their making up a World Assembly.[936] Elsewhere, his emphasis on the need for both economic and social organisations as well as mechanisms to be developed to facilitate the peaceful resolution of disputes were products of his belief that international affairs, since the early nineteenth century, had been moving in a progressively internationalist direction. Even Cadogan and Jebb, who tended to be more realist in their thinking, did not overlook the benefits of an international system ordered along political, legal and economic lines. They insisted, however, that should an international organisation come into existence, it would need to be 'less rigid' than that of the League of Nations. The powers most capable and willing to use force would need to be free from the cumbersome procedure and restriction which had hindered the previous organisation during the interwar years.

This approach, described in this thesis as 'realist-internationalism', was most evident in two areas of British planning as it developed between 1944 and 1945. First, even as the Foreign Office was progressing closer to the formation of a world organisation, officials continued to search for additional security guarantees as well as ways to increase their power relative to the Soviet Union and the United States. The formation of an alliance between the western democracies came to be seen as a way to achieve these objectives. Not only would it serve as a 'hard and fast' protection on the European continent (whether against Germany,

[936] Jebb later noted that, 'The gradual modification of the various Foreign Office papers…so as to get them more in harmony with the idea of world organisation…was to a large extent [Webster's] work.' Jebb, 'Review of Reynolds and Hughes' *Historian as Diplomat*', p. 480

Russia, and even France), but it would also help Britain to balance the power of the United States and the Soviet Union. This remained the case even a month after the United Nations Charter was signed, when Jebb wrote that the United Kingdom 'is obviously less important than its two great Allies until and unless it can either develop a workable Commonwealth system…or establish some entity in Western Europe, or both'.[937] Importantly, such an alliance was also seen by officials as a way to buttress rather than undermine a world organisation.

Second, the great power concert dimension of the international organisation was ever present in the minds of British planners. It was this notion which defined Jebb and the Foreign Office's earliest plans, and it remained the principle objective throughout. Nowhere was this more apparent than in January 1945, when, just as the three allies were preparing to meet in Yalta, Jebb and Cadogan briefly considered the formation of a five-power alliance in place of a world organisation. While this shocked Webster at the time, he, too, understood the necessity of the great powers working together to underpin a wider order. His belief that 'power must be commensurate with responsibility' effectively became an axiom within the Economic and Reconstruction Department in these years. At the San Francisco Conference, during an onslaught of challenges by smaller states against the proposed authority of the Security Council, Webster wrote to Halifax that 'the heart of the organisation is still that concert of the Great Powers…inside an ordered system comprising states great and small.'[938]

The idea of a 'concert of great powers' was one of the most notable differences in the way in which British and American planners conceptualised the nucleus of a future international order. Both Jebb and Webster were fond of the Concert system which had grown up in Europe after the Napoleonic Wars, but each man drew different insights from the history. For Jebb, the system was a model of great power cooperation, as evident, in his early plans,

[937] Memorandum by Jebb, 'Reflections on San Francisco', 25 July 1945, FO 371/50732/U5998
[938] Webster to Halifax, 18 May 1945, Webster 14/5, LSE

that the four powers might operate as a kind of 'Concert of the World'. For Webster—an historian of the Congress of Vienna and the Concert system—it was the beginning of a modern internationalist order, in which the great powers brought in the smaller nations. Importantly, Webster felt it was Lord Castlereagh's deftness in balancing the interests of the great and small powers which created a distinct tradition in British foreign policy.[939] It was one which guided his thinking—and coloured his memoranda—throughout the period.

In preparing a 'grand strategy for peace', Foreign Office officials also looked to another, more recent precedent in which an international order had been erected on the ruins of a world war. In a new way that has not been fully understood, despite its failure, the League of Nations became increasingly important as the planning for a future international organisation progressed. On this subject, the British made the most of their expertise. Indeed, after it had been decided at the Moscow Conference that an international organisation would be created, the Foreign Office planning was as influential, if not more, than that of the Americans or Soviets. Much of this was down to the work of Charles Webster, as well as other officials such as Cadogan, who had an intimate understanding of the League, including its weaknesses and strengths. Here, the focus on the mechanics of the organisation—how they would settle disputes, how they might allow for peaceful change, how they might enforce decisions with military power—were essential considerations. It was this more mechanical and technical usage of historical knowledge which helped strengthen their negotiating position at the Dumbarton Oaks discussions. Added to this was a deeper understanding of previous precedents, such as the Concert system. Seen this way, the work of Jebb and Webster proves to be one of the great twentieth-century examples of what scholars today refer to as 'Applied

[939] Webster wrote in July 1945 that Castlereagh 'did more than any other man of his period to try and work out a feasible scheme for the co-operation of the Great Powers. He was also the greatest defender of the small powers, seeing quite clearly that the two objects were not incompatible but complementary.' Memorandum by Webster, 'Castlereagh or Canning', Webster 15/2, LSE

History'.[940]

In examining the work of the Economic and Reconstruction Department, the thesis also sheds light on important realities in diplomatic planning—namely, the way in which strategies evolve through a deliberative process, as opposed to ready-made blueprints. Foreign Office plans were not only the product of internal discussions among officials with different regional foci and responsibilities, but also the outcome of debates across government ministries. At times, there was an incorporation of plans, such as those of Cripps; and at other times, there was a steady resistance, as in the case of Jebb and Webster's opposition to Churchill. Their repeated criticisms of the Prime Minister, however, were sometimes misplaced, especially given that, as it turned out in the spring of 1943, Churchill's basic ideas on a future organisation did not differ from their own as fundamentally as they had earlier claimed.

It is important to note that officials in the Foreign Office and especially those in the Economic and Reconstruction Department erred in their assumptions concerning the Dominions. In particular, officials were all too confident that the Dominion governments—to say nothing of the smaller powers making up the United Nations—would simply follow their lead in the creation of a post-war organisation. This lazy estimation faced an uncomfortable reckoning in the spring of 1945, most notably at the San Francisco Conference, where the New Zealand and Australian delegations, among others, showed themselves willing to stall proceedings at a crucial moment.

More consequentially, Foreign Office planning throughout the war came up against the national interests of the United States and the Soviet Union, both of whom had their own extensive planning operations. Jebb's meetings with American officials in the spring and

[940] Robert Crowcroft, 'A Tiger in the Grass: The Case for Applied History', *History Today* 68, 9 September 2018; Francis Gavin, 'Thinking Historically: A Guide for Strategy and Statecraft', *War on the Rocks*, 19 November 2019; Margaret MacMillan, *The Uses and Abuses of History* (Canada: Penguin, 2009); Hal Brands and Jeremi Suri (eds), *The Power of the Past: History and Statecraft* (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2016)

summer of 1943—and especially the way in which he sought to create a 'middle way' between earlier versions of the Foreign Office plans and those of the State Department—are indicative of the way in which the Economic and Reconstruction Department adapted strategies to changing circumstances. Most importantly, Cadogan's contribution during the negotiations at the Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco conferences represented the way in which British diplomats conceded, resisted and compromised, all while keeping their main foreign policy objectives in sight.

As important as the way in which British officials adapted to political stimuli is the way in which developments in the military sphere influenced considerations within the diplomatic sphere. Until the summer of 1943, planning within the Foreign Office had been along Anglo-American lines, with little attention paid to the views of the Soviet Union. After significant gains by the Red Army—coupled with a series of terse messages from Moscow—British officials addressed Anglo-Soviet relations with increasing urgency, most notably in their push for a three-power agreement at the Moscow Conference. For the remainder of the war, Soviet military advances across Europe and the Kremlin's expanding political influence in Eastern Europe caused added concern within the Foreign Office. These developments, coupled with a quiet acceptance that the United Kingdom's influence was declining, led officials to begin considering other ordering mechanisms on the European continent.

Closely related to how diplomats adapt strategies to changing political and military dynamics is another important insight into the statecraft of officials in this period—namely the way in which they sought to develop the mechanics of international order from abstract concepts. The comparison between the American and British cases is important here. Firstly, the Foreign Office and State Department had different conceptions of the way in which an international organisation would develop. For British planners, it was, in Jebb's words, an 'evolutionary approach to international organisation' whereby the great powers might

cooperate within regional structures and then work to develop a wider organisation. In Washington, there was more a preference for creating worldwide structures and then addressing regional issues in turn. Secondly, both the Americans and British differed in their views of alliances and their ability to order an international system. Throughout the war, members of the Roosevelt administration often spoke of an international organisation replacing 'alliances' and 'balances of power' and 'power politics', whereas for the Economic and Reconstruction Department, these were the very structures which might underpin such an organisation. The British appreciation for alliances as ordering mechanisms was a factor which would have increasingly significant influence on the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation at the end of the decade.

In their attempts to order an international system, Foreign Office officials were presented with trade-offs which shaped their tactical approach. The most important of these was an acceptance that the American preference for creating a worldwide organisation would need to come before the British preference of first developing regional structures. British officials accepted by the end of 1943, that if they continued to press their point on this matter, the Americans might opt out of a global role—a possibility which the Foreign Office had long sought to avoid. Indeed, in their earliest assessments of British interests in the post-war world, there was an understanding that the United States entering into commitments to preserve a world order was a necessity. The question was how officials might take the Roosevelt administration's desire for a global role and shape it on the 'anvil of [British] experience'.[941] Jebb's Four Power Plan and the department's subsequent United Nations plans all sought to craft regional designs onto a great power nucleus; but after Jebb's meetings in the United States in March and August of 1943, there was a gradual acceptance that the American preference would need to be adopted. Eden came to embody this new approach, writing that 'I don't want

[941] Extract from letter by Ronald Campbell, 26 July 1942, FCO 73/264/Pwp/42/17

to discourage the Americans in any of this enterprise.'[942] It was this understanding which ultimately led the Foreign Office to focus on the immediate creation of an international organisation.

Ultimately, the British role in the creation of the United Nations Organization was hugely significant and British officials could be forgiven for seeing it as an achievement of their statecraft. The ideas and expertise that Foreign Office officials brought to bear on the negotiations at the Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco conferences were such that Jebb, in July 1945, suggested that the United Kingdom 'played…a preponderating part' in the creation of the organisation.[943] Where the British role was perhaps most significant, however, was on the question of voting in the Security Council. The United Kingdom held from the start that great powers should not vote in disputes to which they were a party. Though this would change in the final charter, the British delegation's original stand on this point—in opposition to the United States and the Soviet Union—prevented the organisation from becoming, in Cadogan's words, a 'four power dictatorship' which the smaller powers would likely never have accepted. More important was that the British planners developed the compromise—later known as the 'Roosevelt compromise'—which posited that great powers might have the ability to veto decisions but not discussions within the Security Council. It was this solution which saved the organisation at a crucial moment when talks looked like they might collapse.

Reflecting on the process years later, Webster commented that, 'The responsibility of world-wide peacemaking is the most serious that any statesman can undertake except that of world-wide war.'[944] During the Second World War, Jebb and Cadogan would doubtless have agreed. Their appreciation of the need to develop a 'grand strategy for peace' helped make the Economic and Reconstruction Department the engine of British post-war political planning

[942] Eden minute, 26 September 1943, FO 371/35440/U4349
[943] Memorandum by Jebb, 'Reflections on San Francisco', 25 July 1945, FO 371/50732/U5998
[944] Charles Webster, 'Patterns of Peacemaking', *Foreign Affairs* 25:4 (1947): 596-611, here p. 602

early on; while the addition of Webster brought in invaluable expertise which moved their proposals for the post-war international organisation in a more internationalist direction. Importantly, the combination of their worldviews—all of them deeply rooted in historical knowledge and experience—helped define a distinct realist-internationalist approach to statecraft which had the most important implications for the rules-based international order inaugurated in 1945.

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